Apambi Kabuini v. Chief Commissions of Manipur — 1963 DIGILAW 70 (GAU)

ORDER : This is an application by one Apambi Kabuni, for a writ of certiorari to quash the order, Annexure-A, of the first respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Manipur dated 17-10-1962, by which he reviewed and set aside his prior orders - Annexure-B and Annexure-C dated 30-9-1961 and 22-5-1962, passed respectively in C.C. Revenue Misc. Case No. 16 of 1961 and C.C. Revenue Appeal Case No. 10 of 1962 and directed a full and detailed enquiry as to whether the land in question was a place of worship to be made by the Settlement Officer personally. 2. The facts relating to this Writ Application as seen from the Annexure-s and the file produced before me are as follows : The petitioner Apambi Kabuni filed C.C. Revn. Misc. Case No. 16 of 1961 before the first respondent on 25-7-1961. In the said petition, she stated that she was in possession for about 11 years of a certain piece of land measuring 25 x 30 and shown in the sketch enclosed therewith and had put up 2 sheds and was carrying en a small hotel business, that she filed numerous petitions in 1958, 1959, 1960 and 1961 for settlement of the said land, that certain villagers of Kakhulong basti headed by the 3rd respondent, the Khullakpa demolished the huts in January, 1959, that they were bound down under Section 107 Cr. P.C. by the Additional District Magistrate and that she was willing to pay the necessary premium and revenue and she requested that the land may be allotted to her. On this application, the papers were all called for and the Chief Commissioner wanted the comments of the Settlement Officer and accordingly the Settlement Officer submitted a report on 30-8-1961 from which we find that the Khullakpa of the village filed written objections before the Settlement Officer claiming the land to be a place for religious festivities of the Kakhulong village and also pointing out that the petitioner was an outsider and further stating that the villagers had constructed a shed on the site. The Settlement Officer in his report did not express any opinion as to whether the land should be settled on the petitioner or whether it should be allowed as a place of religious festivities of the people of Kakhulong. The Settlement Officer in his report did not express any opinion as to whether the land should be settled on the petitioner or whether it should be allowed as a place of religious festivities of the people of Kakhulong. After receiving the said report, the Chief Commissioner heard arguments on 1-9-1951 and passed the order Annexure-B on 30-9-1961, stating that there was no doubt that the petitioner had occupied the land for well over 10 years until criminal trespass was committed, that nobody objected to her possession till 1958 and that the contention that the land was used for religious purpose was untenable and so he directed that the land should be settled with the petitioner on the usual terms and he sent a copy of the order to the Settlement Officer for necessary action. 3. On receipt of the order from the Chief Commissioner, the Settlement Officer passed orders settling the land on the petitioner on 7-2-1962. The order of settlement referred to Annexure-B, the order of the Chief Commissioner in Revenue Misc. Case No. 16 of 1981 and stated that the Settlement Officer was directed to convey the sanction of the Chief Commissioner to the settlement of the land on the petitioner on a premium of Rs. 562.50 nP. to be paid within 30 days from the date of the order, that it was for business purpose and that construction should be put up within one year from the date on which possession of the land was handed over failing which the land should revert to the Administration. The petitioner states that on receipt of the order, she paid the premium on 8-2-1962 and the land revenue on 20-3-1962, that she applied for delivery of possession after removal of the shed erected by respondents 3 to 7 thereon and that the Settlement Officer started Eviction Case No. 17 of 1961 and after hearing the parties, ordered eviction of respondents 3 to 7 on 8-11-1961. Those statements of the petitioner are admitted by respondents 1 and 2. 4. Those statements of the petitioner are admitted by respondents 1 and 2. 4. The order of the Settlement Officer dated 3-11-1961 for eviction showed that a civil suit had been filed by respondents 3 to 7 as T.S. No. 67/51 of 1961 in the Sub Judges Court for declaration of title aver the disputed plot, but that as there was no order of injunction by the Civil Court and as the area had already settled with the petitioner in C.C. Misc. Case No. 16 of 1961, the Settlement Officer felt that he had to issue a formal order putting the petitioner in vacant possession of the land and therefore he directed the removal of the unauthorised occupation. Against that order of eviction, respondent 3, the Khullakpa filed Misc. Appeal No. 58 of 1961 to the Director of Settlement and Land Records, but the said appeal was dismissed. He stated while dismissing the appeal that in the suit neither the Administration nor the petitioner had been impleaded as parties and therefore any order in the suit will not affect the Administration or the petitioner and that the proceedings under S. 15 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, must proceed. Thereupon the 3rd respondent filed C.C. Rev. Appeal Case No. 10 of 1961 on 24-2-1962. It has to be mentioned that these proceedings were not against the order of settlement passed by the Settlement Officer, but related to the eviction proceedings consequent on the order of settlement. In the said second appeal, the Chief Commissioner passed the order Annexure-C on 22-5-1962 after bearing both the parties to the effect that the settlement was actually made by the Settlement Officer and secondly that there was no illegality, and that the Chief Commissioner only gave a further sanction as the land was within 5 miles of the Deputy Commissioners house and. that the Director of Settlement and Land Records was right in dismissing the appeal. He accordingly dismissed the second appeal. 5. I may refer to another petition filed by some villagers - Yonteng Kabuini, Thaigoirung Kabuini and others, who are not parties in this writ on 5-6-1962 for cancellation of the settlement given to the petitioner herein stating that the land in question known as Village Lamthohpam was used from time immemorial for the purpose of the annual and periodically customary practices of the villagers for more than 60 years. It was mentioned that an attempt was being made to evict the villagers without notice to all of them and it was requested that the settlement may be cancelled after hearing the villagers. On this petition, the Chief Commissioner passed the order Annexure-D on 6-6-1962 stating that he had finally decided the case in favour of the petitioner Apambi Kabuini and that if the applicants felt that they had title, they can file a Civil Suit and obtain stay order and hence the said petition was rejected. 6. It was after this that the present respondents 3 to 7 filed C.C. Rev. Case No. 8 of 1961 before the Chief Commissioner on 18-6-1952 again stating that the land in question was set apart as the Lamthokpam (place of worship) for the villagers of Kakhulong according to the tribal custom, that it used to be an open space, that recently a house was constructed on it for use in religious functions, that all the tribal people of the village have got rights to use the said land, that the villagers were aggrieved when the land was offered in settlement to Apambi Kabuini, a resident of Saombung, 7 miles off from Imphal, that she never had any prior possession, and that the said objections have not been considered by the Chief Commissioner and they were directed to approach the Civil Court, but that it was not easy for them to do so and for the said reasons they prayed for a review of the former orders passed by the Chief Commissioner and for being allowed to continue in use and occupy the land as their Lamthokpam as before until the hearing of the Review Petition or a decision of the Civil Court. On this petition, arguments were, heard by the Chief Commissioner and the order Annexure-A was passed on 17-10-1962. In the said order, the Chief Commissioner stated that the main point urged in the review petition was that the land settled was a place of worship, that it was true that sufficient and proper opportunity was not afforded to the petitioners for leading evidence on this point and that he therefore felt it necessary that a full and detailed enquiry should be made on this point. He accordingly set aside his earlier orders Annexure-B and C and directed the file to be sent to the Settlement Officer so that parties may be given full opportunity to prove and disprove whether the land settled was used for religious purpose and further directed an enquiry to be conducted by the Settlement Officer personally and to give his findings within 3 months. It is against this order Annexure-A that the present writ application has been filed. 7. Now, the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner are - firstly, that the Chief Commissioner had no jurisdiction to review on 17-10-1962 his own previous orders Annexures-B and C as there was no statutory provision in the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for such review; secondly, that he exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the application for review of his previous order dated 30-9-1961 made by respondents 3 to 7 beyond the statutory period of 90 days from the date of the order, thirdly, that even if he had the power of review under S. 96 of the Act, he did not have the necessary ,facts or grounds to give him jurisdiction under Sub-Sec. (3) of the S. 96 of the Act and fourthly, that the power of review even if it was vested in him was not one to be used to come to a different conclusion only on the ground that he has changed his mind but that it has to be done on new evidence and new material which may have been found after the original order was passed and lastly that there was a patent error of law on the face of the record which has resulted in manifest injustice. 8. For respondents 1 and 2, it was contended that the Chief Commissioner as the Administrator under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, was the highest Revenue Officer of the Union Territory of Manipur and therefore was quite competent to review his own order and that there was no want of jurisdiction. Next, it was said that he entertained the application for review by condoning the delay and that it did not affect his jurisdiction or render it void. Next, it was argued that the question whether the disputed land was a place of worship was not fully investigated into and therefore there was sufficient ground for review within the meaning of sub-sec. Next, it was argued that the question whether the disputed land was a place of worship was not fully investigated into and therefore there was sufficient ground for review within the meaning of sub-sec. (3) of S. 96 of the Act. Lastly, it was argued that the matter has not been finally decided, but that the Settlement Officer has only been directed to enquire into the matter and to take evidence, that there was no error of law apparent on the face of record and that there has been no injustice. 9. Before I proceed to deal with the above arguments, we have to clarify under what provisions of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, the various orders Annexures-A, B and C were passed by the Chief Commissioner. As I shall have to refer often to the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act in this order, I shall be calling it as the Act. The Act makes reference to the Administrator; but as all the orders Annexure-s A-D have been passed as Chief Commissioner and as 1st respondent is named as Chief Commissioner I shall also be using the same term in referring to the Administrator. I shall deal first with Annexure-B dated 30-9-1951. The Act came into force on 1-6-1961. Prior to that the settlement of Government lands was being done by Officers in accordance with the provisions of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder. The said Regulation was repealed by S. 170(1) of the Act, which provided that the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation as extended to Manipur or so much thereof as relates to the matters covered by the provisions so brought into force shall stand repealed. The settlement of Government land is dealt with under S. 14 of the Act and hence the provisions relating to such settlement under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation must be treated as repealed. Under S. 14(1) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner may allot land belonging to the Government for agricultural purposes or for construction of dwelling houses, in accordance with such rules as may be in that behalf. Rules for such assignment had been made under the Land and Revenue Regulation as will be seen from Notification No. R/109/58 dated 9-5-1959 and in particular Rules Nos. 1 to 25 of the said Rules. Rules for such assignment had been made under the Land and Revenue Regulation as will be seen from Notification No. R/109/58 dated 9-5-1959 and in particular Rules Nos. 1 to 25 of the said Rules. When Rules were framed under the present Act, Rules Nos. 5 to 17 of the old Rules have been retained as will be seen from the Notification No. 14D/12/60-M (v) issued by the Chief Commissioner on 31-5-1961. Section 14(2) of the Act, gives the power to the Administrator to allot any such land for the purpose of an industry or for any purpose of public utility on such conditions as may be prescribed. Now, when we come to our present case, it will be seen that the application of the petitioner was not for agricultural purpose or for construction of a dwelling house. She said in the application made to the Chief Commissioner on 25-7-1961 that she was running a small hotel for the tribal people in the said land and living therein with her children and maintaining herself. It is on that application that the order Annexure-B was passed directing that the land may be settled with her. The order of settlement passed by the Settlement Officer-cum-Additional Deputy Commissioner on 7-2-1962 also shows that the land was settled on her not for construction of a dwelling house or for agricultural purposes but for business purposes. Thus, we have to take it that the allotment of the land was for the purpose of public utility, namely, to run a hotel for the tribal people and hence the order of allotment was passed by the Chief Commissioner under S. 14(2) of the Act. As I already stated, the Chief Commissioner called for the comments of the Settlement Officer on the application of the petitioner and before settlement, respondent 3, who is the Khullakpa or the Head of the Village raised objection that it was a land used for religious purposes by the villagers. But the Chief Commissioner took into account tire fact that the petitioner was occupying the land for over 10 years until 1958 without any objection from any person until criminal trespass took piece at the instance of respondent 3 in January, 1959. He, therefore, rejected the contention of respondent 3 that the land was used for any religious purposes. But the Chief Commissioner took into account tire fact that the petitioner was occupying the land for over 10 years until 1958 without any objection from any person until criminal trespass took piece at the instance of respondent 3 in January, 1959. He, therefore, rejected the contention of respondent 3 that the land was used for any religious purposes. Thus, the objection of respondent 3 as the Head of the Village and on behalf of the villagers was gone into even before the settlement was grafted to the petitioner on 30-9-1961 and it was rejected. No doubt the actual settlement based on the order Annexure-B was given on 7-2-1962 by the Settlement Officer. But it is clear from the Settlement Officers order that he was only carrying out the direction contained in Annexure-B and that it was not a case of the Settlement Officer allotting the land to the petitioner under S. 14(1), as has been stated in the order of the Chief Commissioner, Annexure-C dated 22-5-1962. 10. In Annexure-C, the Chief Commissioner has said that the settlement was actually made by the Settlement Officer and that the Chief Commissioner only gave sanction as the land was within 5 miles of the Deputy Commissioners house. There is nothing in the order Annexure-B which would show that the Chief Commissioner was only giving sanction for the allotment of the land. The question whether the land is one which should be allotted or not has not been considered in Annexure-B. There was no application to him either by the petitioner or by the Settlement Officer for sanction for allotment. There is also no provision under the Act which required such sanction. What was directed by Annexure-B was to settle the land on the petitioner. Hence, the statement in Annexure-C to that effect was far from correct. Annexure-B was clearly an order passed by the Chief Commissioner under S. 14(2) of the Act allotting the land to the petitioner for purpose of public utility. 11. Now I come to Annexure-C. We are not strictly speaking concerned with the order Annexure-C in this writ application. Annexure-C was an order passed in proceedings relating to the eviction of respondents 3 to 7 from the land under S. 15 of the Act. Section 15 authorises the eviction from Government land of a person who occupies it without lawful authority. Annexure-C was an order passed in proceedings relating to the eviction of respondents 3 to 7 from the land under S. 15 of the Act. Section 15 authorises the eviction from Government land of a person who occupies it without lawful authority. Admittedly, respondents 3 to 7 did not have any lawful authority to occupy the land if it was Government land. We also know from the records that in January 1959 they criminally trespassed on the land which was in the occupation of the petitioner for 11 years continuously that Sec. 107 proceedings were taken against them and orders passed directing them to keep the peace and that in spite of it they had erected a shed on the land. Thus, the Settlement Officer has every right to evict them from the land under S. 15. In this particular case, the order for delivery of possession in favour of the petitioner was passed on the application of the petitioner for being put into possession. The procedure for such eviction proceedings is prescribed under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1961 - Chapter VIII Rules 126 to 133. Thus, the order of eviction against respondents 3 to 7 must be treated as having been passed under the said Rules and the order in appeal of the Director of Settlement and Land Records and the further order in second appeal, namely, Annexure-C must be treated as order passed under Sec. 93 of the Act. These orders have nothing to do with the actual settlement in favour of the petitioner, though no doubt the eviction was ordered in view of the settlement in favour of the petitioner. Even without such a settlement, action can tie initiated by competent authority under Sec. 15 of the Act and it is permissible still to evict a person from the land even if the order has been set aside b the Chief Commissioner himself. But the order in this case was to deliver possession to the petitioner after evicting Respondents 3-7. That order would remain cancelled when the settlement in favour of the petitioner itself is set aside. Thus, there was really no purpose in reviewing and setting aside the order Annexure-C at all, because when once the order Annexure-B is set aside on review, the delivery of possession to the petitioner also automatically goes. That order would remain cancelled when the settlement in favour of the petitioner itself is set aside. Thus, there was really no purpose in reviewing and setting aside the order Annexure-C at all, because when once the order Annexure-B is set aside on review, the delivery of possession to the petitioner also automatically goes. On the other hand, if the order Annexure-B is to remain in force, then the order Annexure-C must also remain as delivery of possession has to be given to the petitioner on such settlement. Thus, we are in this writ petition mainly concerned with the setting aside of order Annexure-B and only subsidiarily with the order Annexure-C. 12. Now, I shall deal with the arguments in this case. The first question is whether the Chief Commissioner has the power to review his orders. My attention was drawn, for the petitioner to Sec. 96 of the Act which gave the right of review to a Revenue Officer of any order passed by himself or by any of his predecessors-in-Office. What was argued was that the Chief Commissioner was not a Revenue Officer under the Act and hence Sec. 96 did not give him the power. My attention was particularly drawn to the proviso to Sec. 96(1), in which it was provided that a Revenue Officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner had to obtain the permission of the Deputy Commissioner before reviewing any order and the Deputy Commissioner himself had to obtain the permission of the Administrator before reviewing an order passed by any of his predecessors-in-Office. It was pointed out from the proviso that the Revenue Officers given the right of review under Sec. 96 were only the Deputy Commissioner and the other Revenue Officers subordinate to him and that it was not intended that the Administrator should have the power of review. 13. The Act does not define a Revenue Officer. But Sec. 4 of the. Act gives the power of appointment of the classes of Revenue Officers mentioned in (a) to (k) therein to the Government meaning the Central Government or to such Officers as may be authorised by the Government in that behalf. From this, it was argued that the Administrator was not included in the term "Revenue Officer". But from Sec. 4 itself, we see that it is not an exhaustive section and it does not mention all classes of Revenue Officers. From this, it was argued that the Administrator was not included in the term "Revenue Officer". But from Sec. 4 itself, we see that it is not an exhaustive section and it does not mention all classes of Revenue Officers. It refers to certain classes of Revenue Officers in (a) to (k) therein. Under the Act, the Administrator is the highest Revenue Authority. The Administrator has various functions under the Act. One of such functions is that of the Chief Revenue Authority. An peals and Second Appeals are provided in Sec. 93 of the Act from the orders of Revenue Officers to the Administrator. It is not as if the Administrator has got only appellate powers under the Act. As I have already pointed out, he has the power tinder Sec. 14(2) to allot land for the purpose of an industry or for any purpose of public utility. He has also the power to entrust the management of any Government land or any rights therein to, the Gram Panchayat of the village. These are net appellate powers but original powers. I need not deal with all the various sections of the Act, which give him such original power. In acting under Sec. 14, there can be no doubt that tie is acting as a Revenue Officer. There is no provision in the Act for an appeal against the Administrators orders to the Central Government or to any higher authority. His orders are in his capacity as the highest Revenue Authority under the Act. I may here refer to Chapter VIII of the Act, dealing with the procedure of Revenue Officers. In that Chapter, Sec. 84(1) gives him the power to transfer any case or class of cases arising under the Act or any other law for the time being in force from any Revenue Officer to any other Revenue Officer competent to deal with it. Then, we have Secs. 86 to 89 dealing with compelling attendance of witnesses, hearing of cases, adjournment of hearing of oases, and power to order payment of costs etc. by Revenue Officers. There can be no doubt that in revenue matters before the Administrator, Secs. 88 to 89 would apply to him also. Again, there is Sec. 92, regarding correction of error or omission in any order passed by a Revenue Officer. Certainly, this would also apply to the Administrator. by Revenue Officers. There can be no doubt that in revenue matters before the Administrator, Secs. 88 to 89 would apply to him also. Again, there is Sec. 92, regarding correction of error or omission in any order passed by a Revenue Officer. Certainly, this would also apply to the Administrator. Thus, there can be co doubt that the Administrator is himself a Revenue Officer, Thus, Sec. 96 of the Act, which gives the power of review to a Revenue Officer is certainly intended to apply to the Administrator also. 14. The power of review is intended to be used only in exceptional cases as mentioned in Sub-Sec. 3 of Sec. 96. In the case of subordinate Revenue Officers, like the Deputy Commissioner and other Revenue Officers, Sec. 93 provides for an appeal from every original order passed by them tinder the Act. Thus, even if there way no power of review given to these subordinate Revenue Officers, parties would not be affected very much, as they could take the matter in appeal to the higher authorities. But in the case of the Administrator, his orders whether original or appellate are final and the parties have no right of appeal from the said orders. The only relief which they can at all avail of has to be by an application for review to him. It is quite possible that new and important matters of evidence may be discovered or some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found after the orders of the Administrator. There roust be some way by which relief can be obtained by the parties in such cases. For this reason also I am of opinion on construction of the various sections of the Act that the Administrator will also be included within the term a Revenue Officer in Sec. 96 of the Act. No doubt, the proviso does not make any provision for the Administrator to obtain any prior permission before exercising the power because he happens to be the highest revenue authority. That by itself will not show that the Administrator is not a Revenue Officer. Hence, I hold that the Chief Commissioner or the Administrator as he is called in the Act has the right of review under Sec. 55 of the Act. That by itself will not show that the Administrator is not a Revenue Officer. Hence, I hold that the Chief Commissioner or the Administrator as he is called in the Act has the right of review under Sec. 55 of the Act. In the light of this conclusion, if is unnecessary for me to deal with the further arguments raised by the learned Government Advocate that the power of review is inherent in every tribunal and further that ever since the time of the Maharajah the right of review has existed in the highest revenue tribunal in this Territory. Nor is it necessary for me to deal with R. 135 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1961, which was cited in support of the contention that the provisions of the C.P.C. including Or. 47 have been made applicable to the proceedings taken by any Revenue Court under the Act. 15. I shall now proceed to consider the question of limitation raised by the petitioner. Section 96(2) provides that no order affecting any question of right between private persons shall be reviewed except on the application of a party to the proceedings or except after notice to the other party, and that no application for the review if such order shall be entertained unless it is made within ninety days from the date of the order. In our present case, there was dispute between the petitioner on one hand and respondent 3 on the other as to who was entitled to the settlement. The petitioner was claiming that she was in possession for 11 years until 1959 January and that respondent 3 and other villagers trespassed on the land in January, 1959 and put a shed on it. Hence, she came forward with an application for settlement. The respondent 3 on the other hard claimed the land on behalf of the villagers and said that the land was used for religious festivities of the village from time immemorial. This had to be decided before the matter was disposed of under Sec. 14(2) of the Act. Hence, she came forward with an application for settlement. The respondent 3 on the other hard claimed the land on behalf of the villagers and said that the land was used for religious festivities of the village from time immemorial. This had to be decided before the matter was disposed of under Sec. 14(2) of the Act. Actually, the matter was sent by the Chief Commissioner to the Settlement Officer for his comments and in his comments the Settlement Officer pointed out the claims of both parties End in his order Annexure-B, the Chief Commissioner dealt with the objection raised by respondent 3 and over-ruled it and accepted the case of the petitioner that she was in possession continuously for a period of 11 years until 1959 and so he ordered the settlement in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the question to be decided was the claim as between the two parties and the order Annexure-B affected the right claimed by the two private parties. Thus, this is an order which comes exactly under Section 96(2) of the Act. This is also admitted in the counter statement filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. It was for that reason that respondents 3 to 7 filed the application for review on 18-6-1962, because without an application for review the Chief Commissioner cannot review his order Annexure-B. Under Sec. 96(2), the application for the review of such an order cannot be entertained unless it is made within 90 days from the date of the order. The order Annexure-B is dated 30-9-1961. The application for review was filed only on 18-6-1962, which is more than 8 months from the date of the order. Thus, it is obviously barred by limitation and it cannot be entertained. 16. What was contended for respondents 1 and 2 was mat in entertaining the application, the Chief Commissioner condoned the delay. I have the entire papers before me, and I do not find that there was any application fir condoning the delay and no order was also passed by the Chief Commissioner condoning the inordinate delay in filing the review application. What I find is that on receiving the review petition, the Chief Commissioner issued notice to the parties and stayed the proceedings. The fact of the delay does not appear to have been brought to his notice. What I find is that on receiving the review petition, the Chief Commissioner issued notice to the parties and stayed the proceedings. The fact of the delay does not appear to have been brought to his notice. Nor does he appear to have applied his mind to the question of limitation at all. This is an error apparent on the face of the record which would go to the very root of the matter. When Sec. 96(2) clearly states that no application for the review of such an order shall be entertained unless it is made within 90 days from the date of the Order, the Chief Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain an application long after the period of limitation. Thus he has clearly exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the application. Section 96(2) does not even give the power to the Chief Commissioner or to any Revenue Officer to condone the delay. But Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, may be applied for an application for a review of judgment if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the fixed period. No reason was mentioned in the application of respondents 3 to 7 for the delay in filing the application. Nor has the Chief-Commissioner, as I said, condoned any such delay for sufficient reason. The mere fact that he entertained the application does not amount to an order under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. It is clear therefore that the Chief Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain this application against the cider Annexure-B dated 30-9-1961 when it was beyond time by a period of more than 5 months. 17. The learned Government Advocate argued that the order Annexure-B is an administrative order as it was only one giving permission to settle the land and that it was not a judicial or quasi-judicial order and hence no question of interfering with it in this writ proceeding will arise. But I cannot agree with him. 17. The learned Government Advocate argued that the order Annexure-B is an administrative order as it was only one giving permission to settle the land and that it was not a judicial or quasi-judicial order and hence no question of interfering with it in this writ proceeding will arise. But I cannot agree with him. On the application of the petitioner, the matter was sent for comments of the Settlement Officer and it was found that respondent 3 and other villagers had erected a hut in the land and objections were heard and on receiving the comments of the Settlement Officer, the Chief Commissioner heard arguments as seen from the order sheet and then alone he passed the order giving the settlement to the petitioner, I cannot say that it was a mere administrative order. It is an exercise of statutory power given to him under Sec. 14(2) of the Act. It is not a power to be exercised arbitrarily, but only after hearing the objections of other persons including respondents 3 to 7 for the settlement. Such objections were actually heard and the objections were rejected and then the order of settlement was passed. In the case of similar orders passed by subordinate Revenue Officers, there is provision for appeal and second appeal to the Chief Commissioner. Hence, I cannot say that the order Annexure-B is a mere administrative order. The Chief Commissioner hap first to decide whether the land should be allotted for industry or for purpose of public utility and he has heard objections of persons to such settlement and he alone passed the order. There can be no doubt therefore that it is a quasi-judicial order by him. If it is found that such a quasi-judicial order has been passed by him on an application which he had no right to entertain after the period of limitation, certainly this Court can interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. Next I come to the order Annexure-C, which has also been set aside in the review application. As I already said, this order was passed in eviction proceedings on the ground that the land has been settled on the petitioner. 18. Next I come to the order Annexure-C, which has also been set aside in the review application. As I already said, this order was passed in eviction proceedings on the ground that the land has been settled on the petitioner. If the order setting aside the settlement, namely, Annexure-B has itself to be quashed, then it follows that the order Annexure-C passed in eviction proceedings also has to be set aside as the petitioner would be entitled on the settlement of the land on her to get delivery of possession. On the other hand, if it is not quashed, there is no point in quashing the order setting aside Annexure-C. Thus Annexure-C depends on the order Annexure-B. The review petition against the setting aside of the order Annexure-C dated 22-5-62 has no doubt been filed within time. Respondent 3, who was acting on behalf of the villagers himself filed the second appeal before the Chief Commissioner and the order was gassed after hearing him. He had to file the application for review within 90 days from the date of the order and he has actually filed it within 90 days, that is, 18-6-1962. But it follows that if the Chief Commissioner had no power to set aside the order of settlement 1o the petitioner he cannot set aside the order Annexure-C in view as that was an order passed consequent on the order of settlement. I shall presently deal with the question whether there was enough ground for setting aside the orders Annexures-B and C. 19. Now we shall proceed to deal with the order Annexure-A, which is complained against in this writ proceedings, I have already referred to Sec. 96(3) of the Act, which is as follows : "96(3). No order shall be reviewed except on the following grounds, namely :- (i) discovery of new and important -matter of evidence; or (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason". The grounds mentioned are discovery of new and important matters of evidence or some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason. Respondents 1 and 2 tried to bring it under "any other sufficient reason". It is not stated that there was discovery of any new or important matter of evidence. The grounds mentioned are discovery of new and important matters of evidence or some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason. Respondents 1 and 2 tried to bring it under "any other sufficient reason". It is not stated that there was discovery of any new or important matter of evidence. Nor was any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record shown. The claim of respondents 3 to 7 in the review petition was that they and other villagers of the locality have been occupying the disputed land since the time of their fore-fathers. The same claim was raised by them before the Settlement Officer and the said claim was already rejected by the Chief Commissioner and he even found that for a period of 11 years up to 1959, the petitioner herself was occupying the land without any objection from anybody and hence the claim of respondents 3 to 7 that they were in occupation of the land was not tenable. It may also be mentioned that security proceedings were taken against respondent 3 and other villagers when they trespassed in the land in 1959 and they were directed to keep the peace. In actual fact, the claim of respondents 3 to 7 appears to be that they have right over the land as against the Government by immemorial occupation for more than 60 years. Thus, they were disputing that the land was Government land and could be settled on the petitioner in the face of their claim. They had also filed a suit as T.S. No. 67/51 of 1961 before the Subordinate Judge to establish their claim and the suit is pending. In the order Annexure-D dated 6-6-1962, which was passed by the Chief Commissioner a few days before he entertained the review application, he himself stated that if the applicants felt that they had title to the disputed land they could file a civil suit and obtain a stay order. A civil suit to establish title is the proper thing for Respondents 3-7. Now the investigation ordered by the Chief Commissioner is to give an opportunity to respondents 3 to 7 to establish this very right which they could claim in a civil suit. That cannot be treated as sufficient reason to interfere in a review application and to set aside the order. Now the investigation ordered by the Chief Commissioner is to give an opportunity to respondents 3 to 7 to establish this very right which they could claim in a civil suit. That cannot be treated as sufficient reason to interfere in a review application and to set aside the order. Thus even applying Sec. 96(3) of Act, it is clear that there were not sufficient grounds for reviewing the orders Annexure-s B and C. It would appear to be, a clear change of opinion on the part of the Chief Commissioner as mentioned by the petitioner in the writ application. 20. I must also refer to one other matter, which has not been raised in the writ application. The land in dispute was treated by the Chief Commissioner as Government land available for allotment. The petitioner applied for such allotment and the Chief Commissioner, directed the allotment on 30-9-1961. Accordingly, the Settlement Officer settled the land on the petitioner by his order dated 7-2-1962 and called upon the petitioner to pay the premium and the revenue within a fixed period. The said premium of Rs. 562.50 nP. was paid by the petitioner on 8-2-1962, the very next day after the order and the land revenue of Rs. 22.50 nP. was also paid on 20-3-1962 as stated by her in paragraph 5 of the writ application. Thus, a contract has been entered into by the Government with the petitioner and the petitioner has performed her part of the contract by payment of the premium and the land revenue which were accepted by respondents 1 and 2. By such a, contract, the petitioner got right to the Government property so long as she observed the conditions as provided in the order of settlement. Respondents 3 to 7, if they were affected by the said order of settlement passed by the Settlement Officer could have filed an appeal to the Chief Commissioner under Sec. 93 of the Act. But they did not do so. What the Chief Commissioner has now done by setting aside his own order for settlement is to take away the valuable contractual right, which was vested in the petitioner by the settlement on her and by her performance of her part of the contract. But they did not do so. What the Chief Commissioner has now done by setting aside his own order for settlement is to take away the valuable contractual right, which was vested in the petitioner by the settlement on her and by her performance of her part of the contract. It seems to me that the power of review granted under Sec. 96 of the Act is not intended to take away such a valuable right from the petitioner. For this reason also the order in review cannot be allowed to stand. 21. A writ of certiorari will therefore issue quashing the order of the, first respondent dated 17-10-1962, setting aside the orders Annexure-s B and C dated 30-9-1961 and 22-5-1962 as prayed for by the petitioner. The respondents 1 and 2 will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocates fee, Rs. 100/-. Order accordingly.