V. B. RAJU, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the State against the acquittal of the respondent who was prosecuted under secs. 16 (1) (a) and 7 (v) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The respondent runs a restaurant in Nadiad called Manmohan Restaurant. He sold 1 1/2 seers of adultered Dahi (curd) to the complainant the Food Inspector of Nadiad Borough Municipality in the presence of Panchas and on analysis it was found to contain 502 fat deficiency. It was proved by the prosecution and admitted by the accused that the complainant Food Inspector had come with the Panchas to his restaurant and that he had asked for a sample of Dahi. He also admitted that the Food Inspector had given Ex. 15 to him and that after giving Ex. 15 the complainant had purchased 1 1/2 seers of Dahi from him and divided it into three parts. The respondent also admitted that the Food Inspector gave one of the parts of the sample of Dahi to him. The accused further admitted that he was given the price of Dahi and the receipt is Ex. 16. In the face of these admissions the learned Magistrate acquitted the respondent on the ground that the respondent had not stored Dahi for sale but for preparing Lachhi. The learned Magistrate relied on Narandas v. The State A. I. R. 1962 Allahabad 82and referred to the observations of that High Court that if the storage is not for sale a mother who keeps milk diluted with water for feeding her infant child or giving it to an ailing child would commit an offence of storing adulterated food. For these reasons the learned Magistrate acquitted the respondent. Hence this appeal by the State. ( 2 ) THE word adulterated is defined in sec. 2 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act. Section 10 of the Act gives powers to the Food Inspector to take samples of any article of food from any person selling such articles or from any person who is in the course of conveying delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser or consignee or from a consignee after delivery of any such article to him. Section 10 of the Act gives powers to the Food Inspector to take samples of any article of food from any person selling such articles or from any person who is in the course of conveying delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser or consignee or from a consignee after delivery of any such article to him. The Food Inspector has no power of taking samples of any article of food unless it discovered by these three clauses to the respondent was not selling Dahi but was merely selling Lachhi the Food Inspector had no power to take the sample of Dahi which according to the respondent was stored by him for the purpose of converting it into Lachhi. If really the Dahi of which 1 1/2 seers was sold by the respondent to the Food Inspector was not intended for sale the Food Inspector had no power of taking a sample of that article and the respondent should have refused to give him the sample. In fact the respondent says that he had sold 1 1/2 seers of Dahi after receiving the notice Ex. 15from the Food Inspector. By Ex. 15 the Food Inspector clearly told the respondent that he was taking a sample of Dahi for the purpose of analysing under the Act. After having received Ex. 15 the respondent sold 1 1/2 seers of Dahi to the Food Inspector. ( 3 ) SECTION 7 of the Act reads as follows:-- "no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale. Or store sell or distribute- (i) any adulterated food; (ii) any misbranded food; (iii) any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed except in accordance with the conditions of the licence (iv) any article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority with a view to preventing the outbreak or spread of infectious diseases; or (iv) any article of food in contravention of any other provision of this Act or of any rule made threreunder. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent had stored Dahi for conversion to Lachhi and not for sale and it is contended that storage (in sec. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent had stored Dahi for conversion to Lachhi and not for sale and it is contended that storage (in sec. 7 of the Act) must mean only storage of articles intended for sale and he has relied upon The Public Prosecutor v. Kandasamy A I. R. 1959 Madras 333 and A. I. R. 1962 Allahabad82 (supra ). But sec. 7 of the Act uses the words manufacture for sale or store sell or distribute. The word storeis not qualified by the words store for sale. Although the words for sale are used after word manufacture they are not used after the word store in the same clause. The Legislature did not use the expression manufacture or store for sale sell or distribute. In the Allahabad case the following observations are made:-- "mixtures commonly made of different articles of food for domestic use would come within the definition of the term adulterated. Milk diluted with water for purposes of feeding infants and patients would also come within the definition of adulterated. The verb store is a word of general import. It means to keep or lay up for future use. If a mother keeps milk diluted with water for feeding her infant child or to administer it to an ailing child it will amount to storing of adulterated milk. To treat such an act on the part of the mother as an offence will certainly lead to an absurdity It is a well recognised rule of interpretation that endeavour should be made to avoid any absurdity in the interpretation of a section. Under section 7 manufacture of adulterated food is not prohibited. What is prohibited is its manufacture for sale. There appears no reason why manufacture of adulterated food should be treated differently from its storage. The expression or store is preceded by the words manufacture for sale and is followed by sell. Therefore the context in which stores is used indicates that it means storing for sale. It must be read as taking colour from the expression manufacture for sale and sell with which it is associated in the section. ( 4 ) AS the words for sale do not follow the word store in sec. 7it is unnecessary to interpret the word ` store as meaning storage for sale. It must be read as taking colour from the expression manufacture for sale and sell with which it is associated in the section. ( 4 ) AS the words for sale do not follow the word store in sec. 7it is unnecessary to interpret the word ` store as meaning storage for sale. When a mother stores some article to be given to her infant child she does not store it as milk but as milk and water which itself can be called as an article of food. It may be called milk to which water is added or water to which milk has been added. The article which a mother keeps may be in popular parlance called milk but it is not milk. That would be an article of food as defined in sec. 2 (v) of the Act. If a personkeeps milk and water and stores it as milk and water he commits no offence. But if he stores milk and water as milk that would be a different thing altogether. A mother does not store milk and water which she intends to give to her infant child as milk as understood in the trade or milk business. She stores it as milk and water to be given to her infant child or she stores it as water to which milk has been added. A mother is careful to see that what she gives to her infant conforms strictly to the standards of infants milk. She gives to her infant pure unadulterated infants milk. Infants milk is itself an article of food. ( 5 ) MILK infants milk ` diluted milk and milk and water are four different articles of food. A person who stores an article as milk and water commits no offence. But he does commit an offence if he stores milk and water as milk in the strict sense. A trustee of a trust for the free distribution of pure milk to hundred children everyday may store adulterated milk for such free distribution. It is therefore not necessary to interpret the word store as meaning store for sale. But he does commit an offence if he stores milk and water as milk in the strict sense. A trustee of a trust for the free distribution of pure milk to hundred children everyday may store adulterated milk for such free distribution. It is therefore not necessary to interpret the word store as meaning store for sale. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent also relies on A. I. R. 1959 Madras 333 (supra) where it is observed that the first essential requisite to be established is that the milk from which the Inspector gets a small quantity from the vendor as sample is intended for sale. But it is difficult to say how this can be an essential ingredient for the prosecution under sec. 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act has already been quoted above and even one act of sale or distribution would come within that section. A sale to the Food Inspector would be a sale as recognised by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court themselves. In the Madras case it is observed that what is given by the accused to the Inspector is undoubtedly a sale. If an article of adulterated food is sold even to the Inspector that would be an offence under sec. 7 of the Act and it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the sample was taken out of a larger quantity which was also intended for sale. ( 7 ) AS already observed no sample should be given to an Inspector by a person who is not selling an article of food or who comes otherwise within the scope of sec. 10 of the Act. 8 In the instant case 1 1 seers of Dahi was sold after ex. 15 was given to the respondent that is after the respondent knew that action under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was proposed to be taken against him. 1 therefore hold that when a sample of food is sold to the Food Inspector it is not necessary to prove that the sample was taken out of a larger quantity which was also intended for sale. 9 In the instant case the sale to the Inspector is proved by the prosecution and admitted by the accused. The accused is therefore clearly guilty under sec. 7 of the Act. IQ. 9 In the instant case the sale to the Inspector is proved by the prosecution and admitted by the accused. The accused is therefore clearly guilty under sec. 7 of the Act. IQ. The appeal is allowed the acquittal of the respondent is set aside and he is convicted under sec. 7 of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 251/ ( twenty five ) in default one weeks simple imprisonment. .