Judgment :- 1. In a suit filed after the commencement of Act XXXI of 1958 a decree was passed under S.10 [2] thereof for payment of the decree debt in 17 instalments applying the other provisions of the Act regarding interest, etc. Thereafter, amending Act II of 1961 effected some changes to some of the provisions of the parent Act. The amending Act also provided that the amendments should be deemed to have come into force on 14th July 1958, i. e., the date of commencement of the parent Act. Subsequently the decree-holder, who is a banking company, filed an application under S.7 of the Act for amending the decree in accordance with the provisions of the amending ;Act, The lower court dismissed that application and hence the Civil Revision Petition by the banking company. 2. Mr. Rama Shenoi, the learned advocate of the petitioner, draws my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. K. Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR. 1958 SC. 875). In that case the Income-tax Officer made an order of assessment for the year 1952 53 on 9th October 1952. Thereafter, S.18A [5] of the Income-tax Act was amended and by the amending Act the amendment was to be deemed to have been included in the parent Act as from 1st April 1952. After the said amendment the Income-tax Officer started proceedings under S.35 of the Act purporting to rectify the mistake apparent from the record. The matter was taken up before the High Court of Bombay and the High Court held that the mistake mentioned by S.35 had to be apparent on the face of the order and it could only be judged in the light of the law as it stood on the date when the order was passed. On appeal the Supreme Court held, following the observation of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952 AC. 109 at p. 132], that the effect of the retrospective operation of the amending Act was that the proviso inserted by the amending Act would, for all legal purposes, have to be deemed to have been included in the parent Act as from 1st April 1952. It was argued before the Supreme Court that in applying an amendment retrospectively, the finality of the order passed by the Income-tax Officer should not be impaired. It was argued before the Supreme Court that in applying an amendment retrospectively, the finality of the order passed by the Income-tax Officer should not be impaired. On this contention their Lordships held that the order of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer was not final and it remained always to be modified under S.35 of the Act. Their Lordships also observed that the action taken by the Income-tax Officer under S.35 was not in revision of his own order in the light of the retrospective amendment. In that view, their Lordships held that that principle could not be applied to the case. 3. It is apparent from this judgment that their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved of the principle that the finality of an order could not be impaired by the retrospective application of an amendment. Their Lordships referred to two decisions of the Privy Council, namely: The Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving ( (1905) AC. 369) and Delhi Cloth & General Mitts Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner [AIR. 1927 PC. 242]. In the earlier case the Privy Council held that while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure might properly have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touched a right in existence at the passing of the statute would not be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. In the next case the Privy Council again held that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of the existing finality of orders, which, when that statute came into force, were final, were provisions which touched existing rights. The effect of these Privy Council decisions, which were approved by the Supreme Court, is that the existing finality of orders will not be affected by the retrospective application of an amendment in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. 4. In the case before me the decree was passed after the commencement of Act XXXI of 1958 and the decree was in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act as it then stood. The question is whether in such a case,. where the provisions of the Act have already been applied once and a decree passed in accordance with those provisions, an application under S.7 can be filed for the amendment of the decree to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the amending Act. 5. Mr. The question is whether in such a case,. where the provisions of the Act have already been applied once and a decree passed in accordance with those provisions, an application under S.7 can be filed for the amendment of the decree to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the amending Act. 5. Mr. Rama Shenoi invites my attention again to a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Kuruvila v. Joseph (1960 KLT. 1207), to which I was a party. In that case the Division Bench held, relying on the ruling of the Supreme Court in SPL Narayanan Chettiar v. M. Ar. Annamalai Chettiar (AIR. 1959 SC. 275), that the agriculturist debtor, even if he failed to claim benefits of the Act when the decree was passed after the commencement of the Act, could claim relief under S.7 [2] by getting an amendment of the decree. It was laid down therein, following again the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, that the failure to claim relief at an earlier stage would not preclude the debtor from claiming relief at a later stage, because the debtor had two opportunities to claim the benefits. I may straightway observe that the decision, though it considered only applications by debtors, will apply to applications by creditors as well. The further question for consideration is whether that decision can be pressed into service in the present case. In this case relief was claimed [might be by the debtor] at the time when the decree was passed and the decree itself was passed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Having applied the provisions of the Act once, can a party again under S.7 [2] pray for an amendment of the decree under the amended provision? According to me, the answer to this question is in the negative, because the decree already passed is final under the Act and there is no express enactment or necessary intendment in the amending Act that such decrees also should be reopened. In fact, a similar question came up for consideration before me in another case where the petitioner was the debtor, and I held therein that the debtor had two opportunities or occasions for claiming one relief and if he used one of these opportunities and obtained relief as well, he could not claim relief a second time. In fact, a similar question came up for consideration before me in another case where the petitioner was the debtor, and I held therein that the debtor had two opportunities or occasions for claiming one relief and if he used one of these opportunities and obtained relief as well, he could not claim relief a second time. The case is Sangameswara Iyer v. Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. [1963 KLT.11]. I think the same principle must apply in this case as well. 6. The result is the decision of the lower court is correct and the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Dismissed.