Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. In exercise of the powers conferred upon the Governor by Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, being satisfied that, with a view to preventing Shri Sobran Lal from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, and civil defence and the efficient conduct of military operations, it is necessary to detain him, by his order No. 32 D dated 2nd March, 1963, the Governor directed that he be arrested by the police wherever found and detained in the Bhagalpur Special Central Jail until further orders. Pursuant to this order, Sobran Lal was arrested on 4-3 1963. On 39-3-1963, he brought this application under Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, substantially on the grounds that the grounds for his detention were not communicated to him, that the order of detention is not a bona fide order, as it has been made for an ulterior motive and for a collateral purpose, that the order is mala fide as there is malice, in law, which can be inferred from the very fact that the order is made contrary to the objects and purposes of the Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder that the detaining authority has permitted himself to be influenced by extraneous considerations, that the order is not based on materials of a rationally probative value and lacks good faith, that prior to the issuance of this order a proceeding had been instituted against the petitioner under Section no of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same object would be achieved in that proceeding, and, therefore, in detaining him for an indefinite period of time, the authority has acted mala fide and that the order is illegal and improper and he should be set at liberty forthwith. 2. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State denying the allegations of mala fides and asserting that the order passed by the Governor of Bihar was based on sufficient other materials against the petitioner and those materials could not be disclosed in the interest of the defence of India and national security. 3. I think that none of the grounds of challenge is available to the petitioner. 3. I think that none of the grounds of challenge is available to the petitioner. The Government is not bound to disclose the materials on which the order of the Governor is rested, and Court is incompetent to require disclosure of the materials, nor is it competent for the Court to consider the authority of the order on merits. Sec. 45 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, lays down that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court. In view of authoritative judicial pronouncements, I do not propose to embark upon a detailed examination of the grounds urged before us. It will suffice to refer succinctly to those authorities. Before 1 do so, it is necessary to point out that the provisions of Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1963, are in pari materia with Rule 20 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. Now, in In re, Manubhai Bhikabhai, AIR 1943 Bom 194 Beaumont C.J., delivering the judgment of the Bench, observed as follows: "I entertain no doubt that this Court has jurisdiction under Sec. 491, Criminal P. C., to require a person detained under the Defence o£ India Rules to be brought before it with a view to satisfying itself that the detention is legal. But there is also no doubt that it is not open to this Court, or any other Court, to go behind the reasons given by Government for the detention. The law on the subject has recently been discussed by the House of Lords in England in (1942) AC 206, Liversidge V/s. Sir John Anderson, and there is no doubt that under a rule, framed as is Rule 26, Defence of India Rules, it is not open to the Court to inquire into the reasons which induced Government to think that the arrested person is likely to act in the manner specified in the rule. Therefore normally if a man is detained under Rule 26, it is useless for the Court to make an order under Sec. 491, Criminal P. C., for his production in Court. Therefore normally if a man is detained under Rule 26, it is useless for the Court to make an order under Sec. 491, Criminal P. C., for his production in Court. It is, however, open to a person detained under that rule to challenge the bona fides of Government, and to show that Government were not really of the opinion stated in their order, but were induced by Some different reason to detain the detenus. But normally the Court will require definite evidence that a charge of lack of bona fides can be preferred against Government in the matter." 4. In Emperor V/s. Vimlabai Deshpande, AIR 1946 PC 123 Sir John Beaumont has observed that under Rule 26 the Government may make an order of detention if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from indulging in the subversive activities specified, it is necessary to do so. He has pointed out that the Government must be satisfied; mere suspicion is not enough, but there is no qualifying adverb such as reasonably or honestly attached to the word satisfied. It is not the requirement of Rule 26 that the Government must he reasonably or honestly satisfied. The inevitable consequence of the omission of such qualifying adverbs is that it is not open to the Court to require disclosure of the grounds and to determine whether the grounds were sufficient to justify the detention. In an earlier decision, Emperor V/s. Sibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have laid down that Rule 26 does not go beyond the rule-making power and is not invalid. In Kamla Kant Azad V/s. Emperor, AIR 1914 Pat 354 a Bench of this Court has laid down that it is not open to a Court of law, on an application made by a person detained under Rule 26(1) (b) for a writ o£ habeas corpus to enquire info and pronounce on the validity of the reasons, which led to the making of the order of detention and that the Courts are debarred from considering the propriety of the order and setting it aside, merely on the ground that in their opinion, if was not an order which should have been made. Their Lordships have further laid down that the High Court may examine the correctness of the recital contained in any such order, and if it comes to the conclusion that the recital is incorrect, may declare the order to be invalid and the detention of the individual concerned illegal. They have also laid down that the Governor is not required to give the person detained under Rule 26(1)(b) any indication of the reasons which had led to the making of the order of detention, still less to set them out in the order itself. The observation of their Lordships that the word satisfied in Rule 26(1) (b) must be construed as meaning reasonably satisfied cannot be accepted as correct, in view of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee to the contrary, as stated above. Another Bench of this Court in Kali Prasad Upadhya V/s. Emperor, AIR 1945 Pat 59 has laid down that it is not necessary for the Crown to show that the Governor had actually materials on which he was satisfied that an order under Rule 26 was necessary. No contrary decision has been cited on behalf of the petitioner. In view of these authorities, the grounds taken by him are not at all tenable, except, of course, the ground of mala fides. 5. Coming to the question of mala fides, the case of the petitioner is that he and his sons deal in iron ferrous and non-ferrous scrap materials at Jamalpur. B.P. Burnwal, Sub-inspector of Police, Jamalpur, approached him for a loan of Rs. 400 which he declined to give without a hand-note. This enraged the Sub-inspector, and on the night of 15/16th September, 1955, he came to the petitioners house and abused him in filthy language. Thereupon, the petitioner instituted against him a suit for damages, and, having lost it he has preferred an appeal, being Money Appeal No. 1 of 1960. Again, B.P. Burnwal managed to have a proceeding under Section no of the Code of Criminal Procedure instituted against him through the instrumentality of Shri D.N. Pandey, the officer in charge of the Jamalpur Police Station, and the petitioner was arrested on 28-3-1961 and was produced before the Sub-divisional Officer on the same day. The Magistrate allowed the petitioner to be enlarged on bail on furnishing security of Rs. 2000 with two sureties of the like amount. The Magistrate allowed the petitioner to be enlarged on bail on furnishing security of Rs. 2000 with two sureties of the like amount. The petitioner furnished sureties but was not released on bail. His repeated attempts having failed to obtain his enlargement on bail, he moved the High Court which ordered his release on bail at once on personal security. It is said that the High Court expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Magistrate, so much so that a proceeding for contempt of Court was drawn up against both the Sub-inspector and Shri J.P. Agarwala, the Magistrate. The contention of the petitioner is that in order to feed fat the grudge the police authorities have manoeuvred to get him detained under the Defence of India Rules. This contention cannot he accepted for the following main reasons. First, the proceeding under Section no of the Code is still pending, and unless a decision is given on merits it is difficult to make a categorical pronouncement that it is a malicious proceeding engineered by the police authorities. Second, the pendency of the proceeding tinder Section no does not necessarily exclude the application of Sec.30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, because the object of both is entirely different and both the proceedings may be had simultaneously. Therefore, in the absence of convincing evidence, which lacks in this case, it will be wholly wrong to assume that the police and the State Government are in collusion and as a result of the conspiracy between the officers of the different Departments, the detention of the petitioned has been brought about. The onus undoubtedly lay upon the petitioner, and this onus has remained undischarged. No relation between the proceeding under Section no of the Code and the proceeding under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules has been established. Lastly, the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State shows that there were other materials before the Governor to justify the detention of the petitioner under the Defence of India Rules to prevent subversive activities. When the Governor had other materials before him--a fact, the correctness of which is not open to question--it is idle to contend that the so-called strained relations between the petitioner and the police authorities culminating in the initiation of the proceeding under Section no of the Code provided motive for his detention under the Defence of India Rules. When the Governor had other materials before him--a fact, the correctness of which is not open to question--it is idle to contend that the so-called strained relations between the petitioner and the police authorities culminating in the initiation of the proceeding under Section no of the Code provided motive for his detention under the Defence of India Rules. In fact, there is no evidence worth the name to establish. any connection between these two proceedings. It is manifest, therefore, that the petitioner has utterly failed to establish that his detention has been actuated by malice on the part of the Government and is not bona fide. The plea of mala fides, being groundless, must be rejected outright. 6. It follows that there is no merit in this application which must be dismissed. Ramratna Singh, J. 7 I agree.