JUDGMENT This is an appeal filed by the State against the order passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate of Peermade dismissing a complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. The respondents were prosecuted by the Forest Range Officer of Erumely for offences under section 27 (d) (e) and (f) of the Travancore-Cochin Forest Act, 1951 - Act III of 1952. The case was that on 10th June, 1958, they trespassed into the reserve forest and cut down a sandalwood tree. The learned Magistrate took up the case on file as C.C. No. 124 of 1962 and issued summons for the appearance of the accused to 15th June, 1962 . On that day accused were not served. The Magistrate passed the following order: “I find that the Act under which the case has been preferred is repealed and that the Act in force at present is the Act IV of 1962. Hence there is no ground for proceeding with the case. Accordingly the complaint is dismissed under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code.” The order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, is patently wrong and unsustainable in law. That section gives power to the Magistrate to dismiss a complaint without issuing process, if in his opinion no sufficient ground is made out for proceeding with the enquiry. But there can be no dismissal of complaint under section 203 after the case is taken on file and process is issued. This is a summons case and the summons case procedure has to be followed and order has to be passed either convicting or acquitting the accused. Now coming to the ground mentioned by the Learned Magistrate it is equally wrong and contrary to law. It is not disputed that if the prosecution is able to prove the allegations in the complaint, the act complained of would amount to an offence under section 27 of the Forest Act, 1952. But the 1952 Act has been repealed and Was substituted by the Kerala Forest Act — Act IV of 1962 — which came into force on 18th January, 1962. Even though the offence was committed in 1958 the complaint was laid only in June, 1962. But the 1952 Act has been repealed and Was substituted by the Kerala Forest Act — Act IV of 1962 — which came into force on 18th January, 1962. Even though the offence was committed in 1958 the complaint was laid only in June, 1962. The learned Magisrate in deciding the case proceeded on the ground that Act III of 1952 was not in existence on the date when the accused was charged and therefore the accuse I could not be convicted of an offence under the law which was not in force at the time of the trial. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that Act IV of 1962 in repealing Act III of 1952 did not save penalties in respect of offences committed under that Act and therefore no prosecution is maintainable in respect of an offence committed under the repealed Act. This view is not correct. section 4 of the Travancore-Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 reads as follows: “Where any Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not — (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed ; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed ; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed.” So there is a specific saving of penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of offences committed against any enactment so repealed. It is contended that this provision could be attracted only when an Act or Regulation is repealed ‘simpliciter’, but not when as in the present case, the repeal is followed by reenactment. It is contended that this provision could be attracted only when an Act or Regulation is repealed ‘simpliciter’, but not when as in the present case, the repeal is followed by reenactment. The Repealing Act, it is pointed out nowhere provides that offences committed, when Act III of 1952 was in force could be punished after its repeal and that section 85 of the New Act which contains its saving provisions does not indicate that a criminal liability incurred when the Repealed Act was in force would continue after it came to an end. A similar question arose in the case in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, Pratap Singh1, where the position as regards section 6 of the General Glauses Act in the case of repeal and re-enactment was considered. It is stated at page 88: “Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights md liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Glauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Glauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not materia.” A scrutiny of the various sections would show that the New Act nowhere evinces an intention which is inconsistent with the continuance of the rights and liabilities accrued or incurred under the Repealed Act and in my opinion section 4 of the General Glauses Act would apply and the accused could be prosecuted under section 27 of the Repealed Act. The order of acquittal is, therefore; wrong. The next question is whether a re-trial should be ordered. It is submitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the third accused that the allegations in the report on which the complaint is made is that accused 1 and 2 cut the tree, that there is no evidence to fasten liability on the third accused, that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to proceed against him and in such cases of complete paucity of evidence this Court could interfere and quash the proceedings. There is considerable force in the submission made. Learned counsel appearing for accused 1 and 2 states that the offence having taken place in 1958, interests of justice do not require that there should be a re-trial after the lapse of such a long time. It is not known why for an offence detected in 1958 the Range Officer did not file a complaint till June, 1962. Considering all the circumstances. I think that interests of justice do not require that there should be a re-trial after the lapse of five years. So while pointing out that the learned Magistrate had gone wrong in acquitting the accused, I dismiss the appeal. M.C.M.-----Appeal dismissed.