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1963 DIGILAW 8 (BOM)

State v. Mohanlal Devichand Shah

1963-02-04

VASANTI A.NAIK

body1963
JUDGMENT - 1. These two appeals preferred by the State Government from the aiders of acquittal raise common questions of law and fact and can, therefore," be disposed qf by the same judgment. The accused was working a stone quarry at Lonavala. For carrying on that work, he had employed a few workers. On 214-61 the Inspector appointed by the Central Government, inspected the quarry and found the following failures: (1) Notices required by rule 22 of the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950, were not displayed. (2) A register of wages as required by Rule 26(1) of the said Rules was not maintained at the workspot. (3) A register of overtime as required by rule 25 (2) of the said Rules was not maintained. (4) A register of fine or deduction for damage was not maintained at the workspot as required by Rule 21(4} of the said Rules. (5) Wage slips to the workers were not issued as required by rule 26(2) of the said Rules. (6) A muster Roll was not maintained at the workspot as required by rule 26(5) of the said Rules. Consequently, the Inspector lodged two complaints, the first in respect of the first three failures (case No. 764 of 1961) and the second in respect of failures Nos. 4 to 6 (case No. 763 of 1961), under Section 22-A read with Section 18 of the Minimum Wages Act 1948. 2. The accused contended that it was not necessary to keep the Registers on the workspot, nor was it practicable to do so as the spot was an open space. He fur-ther contended that the Inspector appointed by the Central Government had no authority to lodge the complaints and the Court cannot take cognizance of the complaints filed by him, under Section 22-B (b) of the Minimum of Wages Act. The trying Magistrate treated the secona point as a preliminary objection and on consideration ot the provisions of the Minimum Wagse Act and some other relevant provisions, came to the conclusion that the Inspector appointed by the Central Government was not competent to lodge the complaints. Consequently, he discharged the accused on all the counts. It is from these decisions that the State has prerred these two appeals. 3. Now, It is necessary to refer to some of tne provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, for appreciating the rival contentions raised in these appeals. Consequently, he discharged the accused on all the counts. It is from these decisions that the State has prerred these two appeals. 3. Now, It is necessary to refer to some of tne provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, for appreciating the rival contentions raised in these appeals. The Act hss been passed with a view to provjde for minimum rates of wages in certain employments and the enforcement of the provisions of the Act is entrusted to either the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. Section 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act [Hereinafter called as the Act) defines "appropriate Government" as: "(i) in relation to any scheduled employment carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or a Railway administration or in relation to a mine, oilfield or major port, or any corporation established fay a Central Act, the Central Government; and (ii) in relation to any other scheduled employment, the State Government". The expression "scheduled employment" has been defined in Section 2(g) of the Act to mean "an employment speciiied in the Schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment". Section 3 of the Act authorises the appropriate Government to fix minimum rates of wages in regard to the employment specified in Parts I and II of the Schedule respectively and prescrio-ed the procedure in that behalf. Section 5 lays down the procedure for the fixing and revising of minimum wages. Section 5(2) provides that after following the procedure prescribed by the said section, the Appropriate Government shall by notification in the official gazette fix, or as the case may be, revise the minimum rates or wages in respect of each scheduled employment, and unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date ot its issue. Section 19 provides that the appropriate Government may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Inspectors for the purposes of this Act and define the local limits within which they shall exercise their functions. Sub-section (2) of the said Section defines the the power of the Inspector so appointed. Section 22-B relates to the cognizance of offences. Section 19 provides that the appropriate Government may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Inspectors for the purposes of this Act and define the local limits within which they shall exercise their functions. Sub-section (2) of the said Section defines the the power of the Inspector so appointed. Section 22-B relates to the cognizance of offences. Sub-section (1Kb) is relevant for our purposes, and it runs thus: "No Court shall take cognizance of a complaint against any person for an offence under clause (b) of Section 22 or under Section 22-A, except on a complaint made by, or with the sanction of, an inspector". Section 27 relates to the power of State Government to add to Schedule and it runs thus: "The appropriate Government, after giving by notification in the Official Gazette not less than three months notice of Its intention so to do, may by like notification1 add to either part of the Schedule any employment in respect of which it is of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be fixed under this Act, and thereupon the Schedule shall in its application to the State be deemed to be amended accordingly". The Schedule to the said Act is in two Parts. Part I contains 17 items. Items No. 8 is relevant for the present discussion and It reads as follows: "Employment in stone breaking or stone crushing". The Maharashtra Government has added a few entries to the schedule, which need not be considered here. 4. The main contention raised by the defence Is that the employment In the present case is an employment in respect of which the State Government is the appropriate Government and, therefore, the Inspector, who is authorised to lodge a complaint under Section 22-B (1) (b) of the Act, is the Inspector appointed by the State Government, and since the complaints in the present case havs not been lodged by the Inspector appointed by the State Government, but have been lodged by the Inspector appointed by the Central Government, the complaints are incompetent and no cognizance can be taken on the basis of these unauthorised complaints. Now, the wording of Section 22-B (1) (b) of the Act is somewhat general. Now, the wording of Section 22-B (1) (b) of the Act is somewhat general. All that the section says is that no Court can take cognizance of a complaint except on a complaint made by, or with the sanction of, an Inspector, inspectors are appointed both by the State Government as also by, the Central Government In respect of the Scheduled employment that fall within their respective Durview. Section 19 of the Act, empowers the appropriate Government to make appointment of Inspectors and define the local limits within which they are to exercise their functions. All that the wording of Section 22-B (1) (b) of the Act, suggests is that the status of the person lodging a complaint or sanctioning the lodgment of a complaint should not be inferior to that of an Inspector. Even so, the question as to whether in a particular case, it is the inspector appointed by the State Government or by the Central Government who is competent to lodge a complaint has to be decided with reference to the employment falling within the purview of the Central or the Stale Governments, which is determinative of the question as to which Government is the appropriate Government. The definition of the expression "appropriate Government" again has relation to the scheduled employments carried on by the respective Governments. The Central Government is the appropriate Government in relation to the scheduled em-ployment carried on, (1) by or under the authority of the Central Government or a Railway administration, (2) or in relation to a mine, oilfield or major port, and (3) or any corporation, established by a Central Act. The State Gov-ernment will be the appropriate Government in relation to any other scheduled employment. 5. The main argument that was advanced by Mr, Kotwal, on behalf of the State, was that the stone quarry, which is being worked by the accused, is a mine, ana therefore the scheduled employment under item Ho. 8 of the Schedule is an employment in relation to a mine and the appropriate Government will be the Central Government. The definition of "Scheduled employment" as defined In Section 2(g) of the Act, is simple and means an employment specified in the Schedule. The Schedule does not reter to operations in a mine either in part I or part II. The definition of "Scheduled employment" as defined In Section 2(g) of the Act, is simple and means an employment specified in the Schedule. The Schedule does not reter to operations in a mine either in part I or part II. The employment referred to in item No. 8 of the Schedule is not necessarily connected with mining operations, because the activities of stone breaking and stone crusnmg can-be independent of a mine or even a quarry. If the scheduled employment mentioned at item No. 8 of the Scne-dule is not connected with a mine, then evidently, the-appropriate Government in respect of this scheduled employment would be the State Government. Mr. Kotwal, however, contended that a quarry Is a mine and the activities of stone breaking and stone crushing, in so far as they are connected with a quarry, have a necessary relationship with a mine. Consequently, he argued that in respect of item No. 8 of the Schedule, the appropriate Government will be the Central Government as soon as it is found that the operations of stone breaking and stone crushing are connected with a stone quarry, which, according to him, is necessarily a mine. In elaboration of this argument, he has taken me through the provisions of the Mines Act (No. 35 of 1952) and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Ad (67 of 1957), 6. The Mines Act had defined the terms "mine" and "minerals" in clauses (i) and (ii) respectively of Section 3 of the Act. Under clause (j), mine means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searcnmg tor or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on. That takes us to the definition of "minerals" contained in clause (ii), which means all substances which can be obtained from the earth by mining, digging, drilling, by-draulicking, quarrying or by any other operation and Includes mineral oils, which in turn includes natural gas and petroleum. Mr. Kotwal, therefore contended that stone, which is taken out by the process of drilling or quarrying or by any other operation, is a mineral and a stone quarry is a mine as stone has been obtained therefrom by the process of excavation. For reinforcing this argument, he referred to the definition of "minerals" and "minor minerals" as contained m ciausesia) ana (e) or Section 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. For reinforcing this argument, he referred to the definition of "minerals" and "minor minerals" as contained m ciausesia) ana (e) or Section 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act. Clause (a) does not give the definition of minerals. It merely says that all minerals except mineral oils are included in the definition of "minerals". This definition is an inclusive definition. Clause (e) defines "minor minerals" to mean "building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral". Mr. Kotwal emphasized the expression- "building stones" contained in the above definition and pointed out that for the purposes of the Act, building stones are minor minerals. Mr. Kotwal Wen referred to item No. 54 in List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India under which "Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest", is a Union subject. The Mines Act of 1952 and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act of 1957 are the Acts passed by the Parliament tor the regulation of mines and mineral development. He also referred to item No. 23 in the IInd List (State List) of the seventh schedule of the Constitution, under which the right of regulation of mines and mineral development by the State Government is made subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. The regulation of mines and mineral development, therefore, is primarily a Union subject and the operation oi the State would be restricted to the field, which is not covered by an enactment passed by the Parliament for the regulation of mines and mineral development. The regulation of mines and mineral development, therefore, is primarily a Union subject and the operation oi the State would be restricted to the field, which is not covered by an enactment passed by the Parliament for the regulation of mines and mineral development. In view Ot the provisions of item No. 54 in List 1 and Item No. 23 In List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the provisions of the Mines Act of 1952 and the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act of 1957, It does appear that the word "mine" has been given the widest connotation and on a strict Interpretation of these provisions, even a stone quarry can fall within the, definition of the word "mine" and can come under the regulation and control of the Central Government. 7-10. Mr. Kavlekar, on behalf of the accused, contended that Inclusion of a quarry in the definition of "mine" is revolting to commonsense and is also opposed to the established meaning of the word mine. In this connection ha referred me to the meaning of the word mine as given in the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VI, p. 463. The meaning given is as follows: "An excavation made in the earth for the purpose oi digging out metals or metallic ores, or certain other minerals, as coal, salt, precious stones", Mr. Kavlekar contended that the wider meaning of the word "mine" to include building stones is now outdated and the meaning that has been attached to that word In recent times is based on the deposit or minerals sucn as, metals or metallic ores, coal, salt, precious stones etc. He also referred to the meaning of the word "mineral" In the same Dictionary at p. 466, which Is as toltows: "Any substance which is obtained by mining; a product of the bowels of the earth, in early and in modern technical use, the ore (of a metal)", Mr. Kavlexar also referred me to Stroucrs Judicial Dictionary, vol. 3, p. 1792, wherein the meaning ot we words "Mines" and "Minerals" is given as follows: "the primary meaning of the word mine standing alone, is an underground excavation made for the purpose ol getting minerals.....". Kavlexar also referred me to Stroucrs Judicial Dictionary, vol. 3, p. 1792, wherein the meaning ot we words "Mines" and "Minerals" is given as follows: "the primary meaning of the word mine standing alone, is an underground excavation made for the purpose ol getting minerals.....". Minerals means : "Primarily all substances -- other than (and underneath) tne agricultural surtacs of We ground wnicti may be got tor marttitacturing or mercantile purposes, wneiner from a mine, as tne word would seem to sigmty, or sucn as stone or clay, which are got by open working. . . . The particular signification of each of these words may be varied largely by the context ....." I am unable to understand how the meaning of tne woros "mines" and "minerals" in Strouds Dictionary supports Mr. Kavlekars contention. At page 1794 of the same Dictionary, reference has been made to the deemed cases wherein stone got by quarrying has been including in minerals, in my view, the entire discussion as to wnetner a stona quarry falls within the definition of mine is ot academic interest. In its broaaest sense, a stone quarry cart tall within the category of a mine as defined in the Mines Act of 1952 or the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act of 1957. In view of the language of the items at Nos. 54 in List 1 and 23 in List ll or the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the main point to be considered Is, whether the Parliament has passed any law for regulating the stone quarries. The power oi tne Parliament to pass a legislation in respect of a stone quarry can hardly be disputed. If the Parliament passes an enactment regulating the stona quarries, tnen evidently, the Central Government would be the appropriate Government. It would be competent to tne Parliament to mention an employment in respect of tne operation ot a stone quarry as a scneduied employment, by including it in the Schedule attached to tne Minimum Wages Act The Schedule, however, does not mention either a mine or a stone quarry and item No. 8 viz., Employment in stone breaking and stone crusmng, cannot, therefore, be said to be an employment In respect ot mine wnetner in its broadest sense so as to mciuue a stone quarry or in the narrow sense as gwen in the Oxford English Dictionary. It is significant to note that under Section 27 of the Act of 194B, the Central Government has no power of adding items to the scneauie or the Act. On the other band, it is open to the State Government under that section to add to tne scneauie any employment In which, according to the State Government, it is necessary to fix minimum rates of wages. 11. Mr. Kotwal contended that item NO. 8 in the Schedule of the Act, as it stands today, is applicable to the operations of stone breaking and stone crusmng carried on in a stone quarry and since a stone quarry is a mine, the appropriate Government is the Central Government. He had to concede that item no, 8 OT tne Schedule, as it stands today, might not nave relation to a mine other than a stone quarry and any employment in such a mine may not fall under me purview of item no. 8 of the Schedule. He went on to make a distinction between the process of stone breaking and stone crusn-Ing, which is an integral part of the main operation ot mining and an incidental part of such an operation, Mr. Kotwal agreed tnat when the process of stone DreaKing and stone crushing is ancillary to the principal mining operation, the employment in respect of the process of storw breaking and stone crushing, would not be coverea by item No. 8 of the Schedule. According to mm, we position ot the employment of stone breaking and stone crushing when It goes on In respect of a stone quarry stands on a different footing, because the essence or quarrying operations consists in the breaking and crusn-ing of stone. In advancing these arguments, Mr. Kotwal has kept before his mind the decision of the supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Mineral industry Association Nagpur v. Regional labour Commissioner (Central) ,Jaoaipur, (1961 (1) SCI 112. Trie lacts 01 that case were as follows: By a notification by the President of India unoer Article 258 ot tne Constitution, the central government delegated to Governments of certain States including the Madhya Pradesh with their consent, its functions relating to fixation OT minimum rates otwages in respect of employees employed in stone-breaking and stone-crush ing operations carried on in mines within their respective States. Pursuant to the said delegation, the maonya rra-desh Government issued the impugned notification purporting to act under section 5(2) of the Minimum wages Act, 1948, prescribing minimum rates ot wages tor employment in stone-Breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in mines. On a writ application Dy tne appeiiant company to quash that notification as ultra vires, contending that the notification cannot fasten upon me manganese mining industry the character of employment in stone-breaking or stone-crusning. It was held (reversing tne decision of the High court: "(i) That the impugned notltioation under section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, had not the effect of adding an entry in the Schedule to the Act, for which appropriate notification has to be under section 27 or the Act. (ii) That, in the context, the terms stone-breaking or stone-crushing referred to item 8 of the Schedule to the Act are confined to operations in quarries and as not cover stone-breaking or stone-crusning operations which are carried on in mines and that therefore tna impugned notification is ultra vires, and (iii) That the impugned notification of the Maanya pradesh State Government Wing ultra vires, the State cannot fall back upon Hie Presidents notification for support". Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar, who delivered the judgment at tne court, posed tne following question: (p. 117 of swj: (at p. 1072 Of AIR) "When tne Schedule reters to the employment ot stone-breaking or stone-crustiing, does it refer to the Incidental stone-creaking or stone-crusning in connection witn manganese mine operations?" His Lordship then proceeds to answer the question in the following terms: "In a chemical or a geological sense, stones may include manganese and that Is one of the meanings given to the word In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, on the other nano, tne word stone as popularly understood in ordinary parlance particularly when It is coupled witn the word breaking or crushing would exclude manganese, employment in stone-creaking or stone-crushing in this sense would refer to quarry operations. Thus whether or not the word stone should be understood In the wrder sense or in a limited sense must depend upon the con text In which the word is used. Tne intention wnich is reasonably deducible from the context, would decide whe ther it is the expanded meaning or the limi ted meaning of the word that can be accept ed. Tne intention wnich is reasonably deducible from the context, would decide whe ther it is the expanded meaning or the limi ted meaning of the word that can be accept ed. The same consideration could apply to the denotation of the word employment. We have carefully considered all the items in the Schedule and nave taken into account the general beneficent policy of the Act but we are una- we to hold that when item 8 refers to stone-breaking or stone-crustiing, it Is intended to cover the breaking or the crushing of stones incidental to the manganese mining operations, me context seems to exclude the application or the wider meaning of the word stone used in Item 8. mere- fore, our conclusion Is that the stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations which are carried on in mines are not included in Item 8 in the Schedule; and if that be the true position, the Impugned notification issuea ty the State Government under Section 5(2) is ultra vires." A little later, the learned Judge has observed in tne same judgment. "As it stands the entry is, in our opinion, confined to stone-breaking and stone-crusnmg employment in quarries and not in mines". I am unable to understand how these observations, in any way help Mr. Kotwal in the argument that he is advancing. On the other hand, these observations cut tne grouna under the toot of his argument, it may be that in the widest sense, a stone quarry tails in the category of a mine, me supreme court has emphasized that the operation of stone breaking and stone crushing is only ancillary to the mining operations carried on in a manganese mine. The wording of item No. 8 in the Schedule indicates tnat tne operation of stone-breaking or stone crushing snoutn be independent and should stand by itself. Thus the operation is integralty connected with a stone quarry and the entire process of extracting stones is carried on by continuous breaking and crushing of stones in tne quarry. The operation of stone breaking and stone crusn-Ing may as well be entirely moepenaent even of a stone quarry. For instance, stones may be woken and crusneo tor the purpose of pounding tnem to small pieces, or even to sand so as to serve as a mixture With cement and tor any other purpose. The operation of stone breaking and stone crusn-Ing may as well be entirely moepenaent even of a stone quarry. For instance, stones may be woken and crusneo tor the purpose of pounding tnem to small pieces, or even to sand so as to serve as a mixture With cement and tor any other purpose. tHIS work may be carried on and is usually done so, outside the quarry, and beyona the site of tne quarry. Whatever that may be, the essence lies in the operation of stone breaking and stone crusmng being sui generis and not being dependent upon or ancillary to other operations, unless, therefore, the parliament amends item No. 8 ot the Schedule so as to inciuae me operation of stone-breaking and stone-crusning in a stone quarry or in fill mines including a stone quarry, it is not possible to hold that the appropriate Government would be the Central Government, merely on the oasis mat, in its widest connotation the words stone quarry" may fall witnin the ambit of the word mine. 12. If the appropriate Government, so far as tne scheduled employment at item No. 8 of the schedule is concerned, is the state Government, then it follows that the Inspector, who is competent to file a complaint in respect of the breaches ot the various provisions of me Act, is the inspector appointed by we state Government under Section 19 of the Act. Since the complaints, in tnis case, have been lodged by an Inspector appointed by the Central Government, the Court cannot take cognisance of tnose complaints under Section 22-B (1) (b) of the Act. 13. The result Is that, tne appeals tail and are, therefore, dismissed. 14. Appeals dismissed.