Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the plaintiff company -- Rohtas Industries Ltd. -- from the judgment and decree dated the 17th November, 1958, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in First Appeal 541 of 1951, whereby the plaintiff-appellants suit against the defendant-respondent has been dismissed on reversal of the judgment of the trial Court. 2. The only point of controversy between the parties before the learned single Judge as also in this Letters Patent Appeal has been as to whether the plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the suit was not governed by Article 51 of the Limitation Act, as contended on behalf of the defendant, but by Article 115 and hence it is not barred by limitation. Before the learned single Judge of this Court, it was conceded on behalf of the plaintiff and so was it before us that Article 115 would not apply to this case. In support of the decision of the trial Court, however, it was argued before the learned single Judge that the case was governed by Article 85. This argument was rejected and it has been held that the proper Article to apply is Article 51, under which the suit is barred by limitation. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha appearing in support of this appeal, in the first instance, endeavoured to bring the plaintiffs case under Article 85 of the Limitation Act, but in the alternative, canvassed that even under Article 51 the suit is not barred by limitation. 3. The facts as found by the Court below and which were not challenged by the defendant before the learned single Judge have been summarised by him in his judgment under appeal. Briefly stated, they are these. The plaintiff company carries, inter alia, business of manufacturing paper at Dalmianagar. Its practice has been that it purchases bamboos from various contractors for the purpose of manufacture of pulp and makes advances to them against supplies to be made by them on the condition that the price of bamboos supplied according to the mill weight after deduction for moisture will be set off from time to time against the advances until the advances were satisfied. The defendant was one such contractor. The defendant was one such contractor. In October, 1943, he entered into a contract with the plaintiff for supply of bamboos on the conditions mentioned in the deed of contract dated the 25th of November, 1943 (Ext. 7). The written agreement was only for one year but after its expiry the dealings were carried on between the parties on the same terms and conditions, year after year, of course, rates of bamboos varying from time to time. The accounting year of the plaintiff company is from 1st of November, to 31st of October. During the accounting years of 1943-44, 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47, advances made by the plaintiff to the defendant amounted to Rs. 23100/-. As against that, the defendant supplied bamboos in those years of the total value of Rs. 18786/4/5. Thus, a balance of Rs. 4313/11/6 remained due in the plaintiff from the defendant at the end of the accounting year 1946-47. According to the plaintiffs case, the defendant went on supplying bamboos against the advances made upto May, 1947 but stopped supply after May and did not make any further supply in spite of repeated demands. The plaintiff ultimately served a pleaders notice dated 25th of May, 1949 (Ext. A) on the defendant and the latter in his reply dated the 13th of June, 1949 (which reply is not in the records of the case) refused either to make any supply or return the balance of money advanced in payment of goods to be delivered. The learned Subordinate Judge, on the strength of Ext. A, came to hold that the contract was finally broken by the defendant in May, 1949, and hence the suit was not barred under Article 115 of the Limitation Act. As I have said above, the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge has not been supported with reference to the said Article. But, in order to decide whether Article 85 or 51, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, is the proper Article to apply; and, if the latter, whether the suit is barred [as it has been rightly conceded on behalf of the defendant that, if the former Article applies, the suit is obviously not barred), if is necessary to refer to the pleadings of the parties and to state a few more facts with reference to the oral and documentary evidence in the case. 4. 4. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the plaint it has been stated :- - "2) That the plaintiff purchases bamboos from various contractors for the purpose of manufacturing pulp and makes advances to them from time to time against supplies to be made by them: on condition that the price of bamboos supplied according to mill weight after deduction for moisture content will be set off from time to time against the advances till the advances made to the particular contractor are satisfied and that on his failure the contractor will be liable to refund the unredeemed advance with interest at the rate of Rs. 1/- per cent per month. 3) That the defendant used to deal in bamboos and agreed to supply bamboos to the plaintiff and wanted advances from the plaintiff on the above conditions, in October, 1943. x x x x x x x x x x x 5) That after May, 1947 the Defendant stopped supplying bamboos and when he was asked to make supplies of bamboos he pleaded that he could not get wagons from the railway administration and promised to make supplies as soon as he could arrange for wagons. When the Defendant could not however, resume making supplies by May, 1949 a notice of demand through pleader was given to him to which he made a reply through his pleader Babu Dayawant Sahai Verma of Daltonganj on 13-6-1949, and requested that the accounts should be explained to him". The reply to these allegations in the plaint is to be found in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the defendants written statement which runs thus: "(5) That this defendant denies the allegations contained in paras 2 and 3 of the plaint about, conditions attached to the plaintiffs dealings with this defendant or other contractors supplying bamboos to them. This defendant admits so far that the plaintiffs used to purchase bamboos from this defendant and to make payments to him from time to time on account of the price, of course without any such condition as alleged by the plaintiffs. This defendant admits so far that the plaintiffs used to purchase bamboos from this defendant and to make payments to him from time to time on account of the price, of course without any such condition as alleged by the plaintiffs. This defendant emphatically denies the plaintiffs allegation that the unsatisfied portions of the payments made by them were to be refunded with any interest and submits respectfully that there was absolutely no such agreement between the parties." "(8) That the reason for the end of the dealings between the parties as mentioned in para 5 of the plaint is quite false. The wagons used to be arranged by the plaintiffs themselves as a part of their own obligation and therefore there could be no occasion for the defendant to put forth any such difficulty. The true facts are that when the defendant thought that the supplies made by him had much exceeded the payments received by him he asked the plaintiffs through their employees for an account of all the transactions that passed between the parties but the former began to evade on filmsy grounds and when pressed hard they offered a mere inspection at their own office at Daimianagar. The defendant insisted upon being supplied with a true copy, inasmuch as a thorough and minute examination of so many dealings was not possible by a mere look at through the pages of their books in a few minutes or hours and that also in their own office, but the plaintiffs would never agree to furnish any copy. The defendant however, reluctantly agreed to an inspection at the residence of the plaintiffs lawyer Babu Byomkesh Dutt at Daltonganj. On such inspection the defendant discovered that the accounts contained fictitious entries of several items shown as advances after 23-12-46, that the supplies made by the defendant as per four wagons noted in para 7 of this written statement did not find mention at all, that the weight and price of the supplies that were noted were under-rated and incorrectly recorded. The totalling was also found to be incorrect. The amount on account of supplies as noted therein came to Rs. 18821/9/6 in place of Rs. 18786/4/6 as shown in the accounts. The totalling was also found to be incorrect. The amount on account of supplies as noted therein came to Rs. 18821/9/6 in place of Rs. 18786/4/6 as shown in the accounts. The plaintiffs accounts are under the circumstances highly unreliable and those upon which the plaintiffs rely in support of their false claim in this suit are certainly fabricated by some of their employees with whom the defendant could not pull on well." Ext. 1/h is a letter dated 12-2-45 from the defendant addressed to the Purchase Officer of the plaintiff company. By this letter, the defendant asked the Purchase Officer to make arrangements for 4 wagons within the month of February, 1945. In the alternative, he asked him to direct his Daltonganj office to pay him another sum of Rs. 800.00 at the rate of Rs. 200.00 per wagon. He further stated that the advance of Rs. 1000.00 made to him was to be deducted from the month of April, 1945, as approved by the Purchase Officer. Ext 1/f is another letter dated 16-3-45 from the defendant to the Purchase Officer requesting him to indent and allot wagons at Barwadih for loading bamboos in April, 1945. By letter dated 9-445 (Ext 1/c) the defendant requested the Purchase Officer for more wagons. 1 would do better to quote in fall the letter dated 19-4-45 (Ext. 1/b) from the defendant to the Head Supervisor of the plaintiff company. The letter runs thus: "To The Head Supervisor, R. I. Ltd. Daltonganj. Dear Sir, I am to inform you that I have received a letter from Head Office, that sufficient number of. wagons will be allotted to me to clear my Bamboo stock at Barwadih in May 1945. In the meantime, I am in need of money to pay my coolies and I have already got a stock of about 15 wagons at Barwadih, so to facilitate the further progress of my work in order to complete the full terms of the agreement between you and myself a further sum of Rupees five hundred may be given to me to-day and you are at a liberty to verify my stock immediately. Delay In payment of advance and writing for supplies of wagons will put me to a great loss and I am afraid I wont be able to complete your orders in time. Yours Faithfully, Sd. S. Maitra, Contractor Barwadih 19-4-45. Delay In payment of advance and writing for supplies of wagons will put me to a great loss and I am afraid I wont be able to complete your orders in time. Yours Faithfully, Sd. S. Maitra, Contractor Barwadih 19-4-45. X X X X X X X" These letters would show that advances were not being made against specified or appropriated stocks of bamboos, the delivery of which was also not being made by the defendant against particular advances. The entire course of transaction was being treated as an integral one, that is to say, a running and open account was maintained in respect of the; entire transactions. The advances were being debited in the plaintiffs books of account in the name of the. defendant, as found by the Court below in regular course of business and the prices of the bamboos supplied were being credited to his account as and when the supplies were: made. It would appear from Exts. 4 series -- entries in the ledger register of the plaintiff company -- that the balance due from the defendant, which was always a debit balance, was struck at the end of each accounting year and carried forward to the next one. Letters dated 23-4-1945 (Ext. 1/a), dated 25-3-46 (Ext. 1/m), wherein it has been stated: "further there is outstanding advances against me of your firm, which I will have to adjust by supplying you the bamboos", dated 9-11-46 [Ext. 1/n) and dated 6-12-46 (Ext. 1/1) all point to the same conclusion. The last letter in the records is dated 11-3-47 (Ext. 1/k) whereby the defendant requested the Purchase Officer to supply him at least 8 wagons within a week from the receipt of the letter. To counteract the irresistible effect of the conclusion from the letters aforesaid, reliance was placed on behalf of the defendant on Exts. 3 series, the receipts granted by, him from time to time for the amounts advanced. To counteract the irresistible effect of the conclusion from the letters aforesaid, reliance was placed on behalf of the defendant on Exts. 3 series, the receipts granted by, him from time to time for the amounts advanced. It is no doubt true that the receipts do show that money was being advanced by the plaintiff company to the defendant from time to time against particular stocks of bamboos at particular places or against railway receipts; although some of them are not so specified, but from the nature of dealings between the parties as evidenced by the letters of the defendant referred to above and the entries in the ledger book of the plaintiff company in the name of the defendant, I have no doubt in my mind that the entire series of transactions were treated as an integral whole and particular supply of bamboos was not being adjusted against the corresponding particular advance of money. The amounts of money advanced; as I have said above, were being debited to the account of the defendant from time to time and the pieces of bamboos supplied were similarly being credited to his account. Both the credit and debit amounts were being lumped up together and the balance due from the defendant was struck at the close of the accounting year. I may note here, as I have said above also, that in no year a credit balance, was struck in favour of the defendant. This fact as also the statement in paragraph 2 of the plaint to the effect that the price of bamboos supplied ..... will be set off from time to time against the advances made to the particular contractor are satisfied do clearly indicate that, although the account, as I have said above, was a running and open one, it was not mutual to attract the provisions of Articles 85 of the Limitation Act. The supply of bamboos by the defendant was invariably made to discharge his liability under the advances and never by way of creating an independent obligation on the plaintiff company. The supply of bamboos by the defendant was invariably made to discharge his liability under the advances and never by way of creating an independent obligation on the plaintiff company. In my opinion, although the mere fact of there being no favourable balance due to the defendant from the plaintiff company at any point of time during the course of the dealings is by itself not sufficient to rule out the account being mutual between the parties, I do not find anything in this case to show that it was mutual. There is no case of a running, open and mutual account made out in the plaint nor is there anything to show that the defendant at any point of time made independent supplies to the plaintiff company, independent of the advances made by it. 5. Great reliance was placed on behalf of the plaintiff on the case of Tea Financing Syndicate Ltd. V/s. Chandra Kamal, AIR 1931 Cal 359, for the application of Article 85 of the Limitation Act to the facts of this case. In that case, having found that "plaintiffs liability to account to the defendant for the proceeds of the tea sold by them was an independent obligation and the circumstance that they were expected and intended to apply such sums as would be necessary in liquidation of their advances does not mean that this was an account in which the obligations were all on one side as distinct from an account in which there are cross claims or reciprocal demands", Chief Justice Rankin said: "I think that Article 85 must be applied to the facts of this case." The learned Chief Justice in the earlier portion of the judgment laid down - ". ...... the requirement of reciprocal demands involves, as all the Indian cases have decided following Holloway, Ag. C, J. transactions on each side creating independent obligations on the other and not merely transactions which create obligations on one side, those on the other being merely complete or partial discharges of such obligations. ...... the requirement of reciprocal demands involves, as all the Indian cases have decided following Holloway, Ag. C, J. transactions on each side creating independent obligations on the other and not merely transactions which create obligations on one side, those on the other being merely complete or partial discharges of such obligations. It is further clear that goods as well as money may be sent by way of payment." Applying the said principle of law, it is abundantly clear in the instant case that, according to the case of the plaintiff company in the plaint as also on the materials on the records of this case, goods were supplied by the defendant by way of repayment of advances made and at no point of time by way of an independent obligation. In my judgment, therefore, the present case is governed by the principle of law laid down in Velu Pillai V/s. Ghose Mahamed, ILR 17 Mad 293, Shivi Gowda V/s. Fernandez, ILR 34 Mad 513, Gopal Rai V/s. Harchand Ram Anant Ram, AIR 1922 Pat 364 and Basant Kumar Mitra V/s. Chota Nagpur Banking Association, Ltd., AIR 1948 Pat 18; Article 85 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied. 6. Then the question arises as to whether the suit is barred by limitation under Article 51 of the Limitation Act as held by the learned single Judge of this Court, Article 51 reads thus - "Description of suitPeriod of limitation.Time from which period begins to run. 31. For the balance of money advanced in payment of goods to be delivered.three years.When the goods ought to be delivered." This is, undoubtedly, a suit for the recovery of the balance of money advanced in payment of goods to be delivered, and the point which falls for decision is as to whether the plaintiff has succeeded in showing that the goods against such balance of money remaining due ought to have been delivered within 3 years of the institution of the suit and were not so delivered. The learned single Judge has taken the view that, there being no evidence on the side of the plaintiff to show as to when the goods ought to have been delivered according to the practice or usage obtaining in the plaintiff company, it must be taken "that the goods should have been supplied at the most before the. next advance was made". next advance was made". If the said view of the starting point of limitation under Article 51 be correct, obviously the suit is barred. But, with great respect, I am unable to agree with it. In the paragraphs of the plaint quoted above, the plaintiffs definite case was that the price of the bamboos supplied was to be set off from time to time against the advances till the advances were satisfied and that the defendant stopped supplying bamboos after May, 1947, and, when he was asked to make supplies, he pleaded that he could not get wagons from the Railway Administration and promised to make supply as soon as he could arrange for them. In reply, the defendant did not categorically dispute in the written statement, as would appear from the portions extracted above, that he had stepped supplies after May, 1947. In the 8th paragraph, he only gave a different reason for his stopping the supply but did not dispute the time of the stoppage of supply after May, 1947. On the pleadings, therefore, even assuming that the time for the supply of the balance of bamboos was not further extended, as there is no evidence to indicate that it was so done beyond May, 1947, it is abundantly clear that the goods could be supplied and, therefore, ought to have been supplied within a reasonable lime after May, 1947. There is nothing to indicate that the goods should have been supplied at the most before the next advance was made -- rather, from the, course of conduct of dealings between the parties as evidenced by the letters referred to above, it is manifest that, by mutual arrangement and consent, the amounts of advances made were being lumped up together and the prices of bamboos supplied were being gradually adjusted as and when the supplies, were made. No particular supply was adjusted against a particular advance. As I have said above, although the receipts, Exts. 3 series, do indicate that advances were being made in most cases against specified stocks or railway receipts, the supplies actually made and the adjustments thereupon were, as a matter of fact, not being done in the said mode. The receipts as well as one of the letters referred to above (Ext. 1/h) show that roughly an advance of Rs. 200.00 was made against one wagon of bamboos. The receipts as well as one of the letters referred to above (Ext. 1/h) show that roughly an advance of Rs. 200.00 was made against one wagon of bamboos. It would appear from the receipts of the year 1946-47, namely, Exts. 3 (an) dated 20-4-46, 3(ao) dated 214-46, 3 (ap) dated 12-6-46, 3 (aq) dated 17-10-46, 3(ar) dated 23-10-46, 3 (as) dated 23-1246, 3 (at) dated 14-147, 3 (au) dated 22-1-47, 3 (aw) dated 7-2-1947 and 3 [ax) dated 14-2-1947 that all these advances during the period aforesaid were made against particular railway receipts. The advance of Rs. 200.00 on 27-2-47 (vide Ext. 3(az)) was against bamboo stock at Barwadih Railway station and the advance of Rs. 500.00 on 5-3-47 as evidenced by Ext. 3 (ay) was "against eight wagons of bamboos at Barwadih station stock". In the letter, Ext. 1/k, dated 11-347 referred to above, a request was made by the defendant to supply him at least 8 wagons. After this letter, the two advances of Rs. 200.00 and Rs. 150.00 made respectively on 22-3-47 and 14-4-47 (Exts. 3 (aaa) and 3 (aab) ) were again against particular railway receipts and these were the last advances. The amount of Rs. 5007- advanced on 5-347, It is obvious, could not be an advance to cover the entire price of 8 wagons of bamboos at Barwadih station. In that background, the letter, Ext. 1/k, dated 11-347 clearly shows that the said 8 wagons were to be supplied not only against advances of Rs. 200.00 and Rs. 5007- made on 27-247 and 5-347 respectively, but also against the amounts advanced prior to 20-446. This, in my opinion, undoubtedly establishes that the course of dealings between the parties was that no time for delivery was fixed and no delivery was made or was to the made against a particular amount of advance before the. advance of the next amount. On the other hand, it clearly shows that the supplies were made and accepted by mutual consent till the transactions continued between the parties. P.W. 1 has said in his evidence: "Up to May, 1947 the defendant supplied bamboos. When the defendant stopped supplies, we made demands for the unsatisfied advances, but the defendant did not take any care. On the other hand, it clearly shows that the supplies were made and accepted by mutual consent till the transactions continued between the parties. P.W. 1 has said in his evidence: "Up to May, 1947 the defendant supplied bamboos. When the defendant stopped supplies, we made demands for the unsatisfied advances, but the defendant did not take any care. In May 1949 we gave notice to the defendant through pleader." The statement of this witness that up to May, 1947 the defendant supplied bamboos has neither been challenged in cross-examination nor has it been controverted by the defendant in his evidence. The entry in the ledger of the year 1946-47 (Ext. 4/c) shows that Rs. 1023/15/- was credited to the account of the defendant on account of bamboo supply on May 9, 1947, Rs. 857/13/6 on May 15, 1947 and Rs. 258A on June 13, 1947. I have, therefore, no difficulty in holding, on the basis of the various facts referred to above, that the supplies were actually made by the defendant to the plaintiff company up to May, 1947, could have been completed and so ought to have been completed within June, 1947, if not later. That being so, in my opinion, the starting point of limitation in this case under column 3 of Article 51 of the Limitation Act is not earlier than June, 1947. Hence the suit filed on the 18th of May, 1950 is within time and is not barred by limitation under the said Article. 7. A number of decisions of various High Courts in India including this court, while interpreting a similar expression in Article 31 of the Limitation Act as one in column 3 of Article 51, had taken the view that the time by which the goods ought to be delivered could be ascertained with reference to the correspondence between the carrier and the person entitled to the delivery of the goods when the suit was for compensation for non-delivery of the goods. Such view was that the time under Article 31 would begin to run from, the final refusal of the railway company to deliver the goods, as evidenced by the correspondence. Such view was that the time under Article 31 would begin to run from, the final refusal of the railway company to deliver the goods, as evidenced by the correspondence. I may refer to only one such decision of this Court in Union of India V/s. Bansidhar Modi, 1954 BLJR 496 : ( AIR 1954 Pat 548 ) wherein, on the basis of an earlier decision of this Court in N. and N. W. Rly. Co. Ltd. V/s. Kameshwar Singh, ILR 12 Pat 67 : (AIR 1933 Pat 45J, it was held that "the expression when the goods ought to have been delivered in the third column of the Article must be construed as meaning when the defendant company finally said that the goods would not be delivered; time would then begin to run from after a definite refusal or a declaration of inability to deliver goods by the railway company." Although the view expressed in such cases with reference to the expression occurring in column 3 of Article 31 has been overruled by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Boota Mal V/s. Union of India, AIR 1962 S C 1716, I have no difficulty in applying the principles of those cases in interpreting the similar expression in column 3 of Article 51. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court, that, under Article 31 the same starting point has got to be taken whether the suit is for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering, goods. It has to be rioted further that the goods are entrusted to a carrier for delivery at the destination, and generally and ordinarily there is no difficulty in ascertaining as to when the goods ought to be delivered, But in a case where money is advanced in payment of goods to be delivered, the time for delivery of the goods due to one reason or the other can be extended by mutual consent of the parties either expressly or impliedly. The course of the conduct of dealings between the parties as evidenced by the correspondence and other facts and circumstances can be looked into to find out as to when, in a given set of facts, the goods ought to have been delivered. The course of the conduct of dealings between the parties as evidenced by the correspondence and other facts and circumstances can be looked into to find out as to when, in a given set of facts, the goods ought to have been delivered. If it can be gathered from the course, of such dealings that the person who had advanced the money was ready to accept the delivery of goods within a reasonable time after the last delivery until which time surely the person who had received the advance was making delivery, then it can be reasonably inferred trial the goods ought to have been delivered within the last extended time or within a reasonable time of the last delivery. That being so, in the instant case there is no difficulty in taking the view that the goods ought to have been delivered in June, 1947, if not later, and surely the defendant had refused to deliver the goods after may, 1947 and prior to 25th of May, 1949 when the pleaders notice (Ext. A) was given on behalf of the plaintiff. In the Supreme Court case referred to above, even dealing with the provisions of Article 31, it has been pointed out- "Now if the correspondence is only about tracing the goods that would not be material in considering the question as to when the goods ought to have been delivered. On the other hand, if the correspondence discloses material which might throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination, then it may be open to the court to take into account the correspondence. Further if there is anything in the correspondence which has a bearing on the question of reasonable time and the railway wants to go back on that, to that extent the railway may be estopped from denying that. But the correspondence can only be taken into account to determine what would he the reasonable time and not to show that because of the subsequent conduct of the railway the reasonable time got extended by the time taken by the railway in tracing the goods. Where however the correspondence provides material from which reasonable time in a particular case may be found out the correspondence would be relevant to that extent," 8. Where however the correspondence provides material from which reasonable time in a particular case may be found out the correspondence would be relevant to that extent," 8. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs suit for realisation of Rs. 4313/11/6 was rightly decreed by the learned Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff, however, is not entitled to any interest on the said amount prior to the date of the suit as no contract to pay interest on the balance of the money advanced remaining due has been proved in this case. The learned Subordinate Judge has awarded interest at 1 per cent per month from 25-5-49 upto the date of the trial Court decree under Sec. 61 (2)(b) of the Sale of Goods Act. But this is not a suit by the plaintiff for the refund of price on account of any breach of contract on the part of the seller and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to any interest prior, to the date of institution of the suit under the said provision of law. It was so conceded also on its behalf, of course, It is entitled to interest pendente lite and future at, the usual rate of 6 "per cent per annum. 9. In the result, I allow the appeal in part, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned single judge of this Court, modify those of the trial court and decree the plaintiffs suit against the defendant for the sum of Rs. 4313/11/6 with interest pendente lite and future from the date of the institution of the suit till realisation at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, specially in view of the different stands taken on behalf of the plaintiff at different stages of the litigation, on the question of limitation, I would direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. V.Ramaswami, J. 10 I agree.