Judgment K.Sahai, J. 1. One Ganga Bishun had mukarrari interest in village Belkhara tauzi No. 13244, under Arwal Police Station of Jehanabad Sub-division. It appears that, on the vesting of the zamindari interest, a sum of Rs. 545.13 was fixed as the compensation for Ganga Bishuns mukarrari1 interest. He died on the 29th November 1956. 2. Krishna Gopal (respondent No. 2), who is a son of Musammat Jageshwari (respondent No. 1), applied, under Sec.372 of the Indian Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for grant of a succession certificate for the amount mentioned above on the allegation that he was the nearest heir of Ganga Bishun. Nepur Kuer (appellant No. 4) is the mother of the first three appellants. They filed applications, under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for being added as objectors to the succession certificate case. Their prayer was allowed by an order dated the 10th November, 1959. On the 13th May, 1961, Jageshwari Kuer (respondent No. 1) filed a petition to be added as a petitioner. That petition was allowed on that very date, and she was added as a petitioner. The appellants case in the Court below was that Jageshwari Kuer was not the daughter of Ganga Bishun, and that the petitioners respondents were not entitled to the grant of a succession certificate in respect of Ganga Bishuns properties. On the other hand, the case of the respondents was that Nepur Kuer was a mistress and not a wife of Ganga Bishun, and that the other three appellants were his illegitimate sons. 3. The Court below held that Nepur Kuer was not married to Ganga Bishun, and that the other three appellants were his illegitimate sons. It further held that Jageshwari Kuer was the daughter, and Krishna Gopal was the daughters son, of Ganga Bishun. It also held that Jageshwari Kuer was the nearest heir of Ganga Bishun, and, accordingly, it ordered grant of a succession certificate to Jageshwari. 4. Appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Shambhu Nath has raised several points. I propose to consider them one by one. The first point which he has urged is that the compensation money payable under the Land Reforms Act is not a debt, and hence it cannot form the subject-matter of a succession certificate. 4. Appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Shambhu Nath has raised several points. I propose to consider them one by one. The first point which he has urged is that the compensation money payable under the Land Reforms Act is not a debt, and hence it cannot form the subject-matter of a succession certificate. He has pointed out that, under Sec.372 (1) (f) of the Act, a certificate can be issued in respect of debts or securities. He has also pointed out that Sec.214 (2) of the Act reads: "(2) The word debt in Sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes." 5. Learned counsel has first argued that compensation is the form which an immovable property of Ganga Bishun has taken, and hence it is not a debt. This argument must be rejected. It is true that Ganga Bishun previously held immovable property; but that property does not exist any longer. Compensation is the amount fixed as payable to him in lieu of the immovable property which he held. This is an ascertained sum, and it cannot be denied that it is payable to Ganga Bishun or his heir or legal representative. The word "debt" has been defined in Whartons Law Lexicon as follows: "a sum of money due from one person to another. An action of debt lay where a person claimed the recovery of a liquidated or certain sum of money affirmed to be due to him;" It seems to me to be clear that the compensation money has all the attributes of a debt as mentioned in the definition of "debt" in the Lexicon. 6 Mr. Shambhu Nath has drawn my attention, in support of his argument, to three decisions. The first is the case of Mohammad Afzal V/s. Salahuddin Ahmad, AIR 1937 Pat 617. All that was held was that the claim made in that case was in the nature of rent, and hence it was not a debt Rent has been, excluded from the definition of debt in Sub-section (2) of Sec.214 of the Act itself. Hence, that decision is not at all relevant for the purposes of this case. 7. The second decision is the case of Ramu Singh V/s. Aghori Singh, 19 Pat LT 558 : (AIR 1938 Pat 68). Hence, that decision is not at all relevant for the purposes of this case. 7. The second decision is the case of Ramu Singh V/s. Aghori Singh, 19 Pat LT 558 : (AIR 1938 Pat 68). There, it was held that a mortgage is not a debt within the meaning of Sec.381 of the Act. This cannot possibly be denied because, as defined in Sec. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgage is the transfer of an interest in immovable property. It is not an ascertained sum payable by one person to another, so that it could be held to be a debt. Hence, that case also is not applicable. 8. The third case, to which reference has been made, is Subhadrammal V/s. Kannammal, AIR 1940 Mad 590 . That was a case in respect of provident fund, and it was held that a person claiming to be the heir of a depositor is not liable to take out a succession certificate after the depositors death because the amount vests in the successor. It is unnecessary to discuss that case because the present case does not relate to provident fund. 9. On the other hand, I may refer to the case of Secretary of State V/s. Smt Parijat Debi, 37 Cal WN 769 : (AIR 1933 Cal 841). It has been held in that case that the word debt as used in Sec.214 of the Act means a sum of money which is now payable, or will become payable in future, by resson of a present obligation. I may also refer to an unreported decision of a Bench of this Court in Ramsaran (Das) Kashyap V/s. Kaviraj Basudevanand, Misc. Appeal No. 56 of 1959, disposed of on the 2nd May, 1953 (Pat). The question which arose for decision in that case was whether ad interim compensation payable under the Land Reforms Act could be attached as a debt in execution of a decree. Their Lordships have held that ad interim compensation, when it becomes payable to the outgoing intermediary at the end of a period of six months or a shorter period determined by the Collector, amounts to a debt which can be attached in execution of a "decree. Their Lordships have held that ad interim compensation, when it becomes payable to the outgoing intermediary at the end of a period of six months or a shorter period determined by the Collector, amounts to a debt which can be attached in execution of a "decree. This decision also supports the view which I have expressed above that the compensation money payable to Ganga Bishun is a debt in respect of which Ganga Bishuns heir was entitled to a grant of succession certificate. 10. Learned counsel has also urged that the compensation money in question in this case amounts really to profits payable in respect of land within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Sec.214. There is no substance at all in this argument, because the compensation is not in lieu of profits arising from land but it is the amount payable for the vesting of the zamindari interest itself. 11. The next point which Mr. Shambhu Nath has taken is that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to a proceeding for grant of a succession certificate, and that Order 1, Rule 10 was, therefore, not applicable in this case. On this ground, he has urged that the Court below has acted illegally in permitting jageshwari Kuer to be added as a petitioner under Order 1, Rule 10. In my opinion, this argument must also fail. If it was illegal for Jageshwari to be added as a petitioner under Order 1, Rule 10, it was equally illegal for the appellants to be added as objectors in the proceeding under the same provisions. I may refar to Sec.384 of the Act in this connection. Subsection (3) of that section lays down: "(3) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1) and to the provisions as to reference to and revision by the High Court and as to review of judgment of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applied by Sec.141 of that Code, an order of a District Judge under this Part shall be final." The part relates to proceedings for grant of a succession certificate. Section 141 is as under: "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction." 12. Section 141 is as under: "The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction." 12. Sec.384 (3) of the Act appears to show that the provisions relating to reference to and revision by the High Court as well as to review of judgment as given in the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to a proceeding for grant of a succession certificate before the District Judge, and that they would apply because of the provisions of Sec.141 of the Civil Procedure Code. The inference, therefore, is clear that other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the procedure in suits will apply also to a proceeding for grant of succession certificate under the Act because it is a proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction. 13. The third point which learned counsel has put forward is that the compensation money has already been paid to the appellants and that that constitutes an impediment within the meaning of Clause (e) of Sec.372 (2) of the Act to the grant of a succession certificate to Jageshwari Kuer. The Court below has, however, pointed out that the order-sheet (Exhibit C) shows that the order for payment of the compensation money was made during the pendency of the proceeding for grant of the succession certificate, and that it was not quite clear that the-payment had actually been made. I have seen Exhibit C. It shows that an order was passed in respect of a sum of Rs. 645.03 and not in respect of the sum of Rs. 545.13 which forms the subject-matter of the present proceedings. In any case, the mere fact that the appellants have taken out some money which they were not entitled to receive will not disentitle Jageshwari Kuer from being granted a succession certificate in respect of that money. 14. Learned counsel has also challenged the finding of fact that Jageshwari Kuer is the daughter of Ganga Bishun. He has argued that there is no document to prove this relationship. It is true that there is no document; but no less than seven witnesses have deposed to the fact that Jageshwari Kuer is the daughter of Ganga Bishun. 14. Learned counsel has also challenged the finding of fact that Jageshwari Kuer is the daughter of Ganga Bishun. He has argued that there is no document to prove this relationship. It is true that there is no document; but no less than seven witnesses have deposed to the fact that Jageshwari Kuer is the daughter of Ganga Bishun. The Court below has considered the evidence of all these witnesses very carefully, and no reason, has been advanced before me why their evidence should not have been accepted. 1 have considered their evidence, and I do not see any ground for arriving at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the Court below. 15. Lastly, Mr. Shambhir Nath has urged that the learned Additional District Judge, who has passed the impugned order, ought not to have held that Nepur Kuer (appellant No. 4) was not the legally married wife of Ganga Bishun. This finding is based not only upon the evidence of the applicants witnesses but also upon the clear statement of opposite partys witness No. 1, i.e. the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants themselves. He has said in clear terms that Nepur Kuer is not the legally married wife of Ganga Bishun. It is clear therefore, that the finding in respect of this fact cannot possibly be held to be wrong. 16. No other point has been raised. Having fully considered the matter, I am of opinion that the succession certificate has been rightly granted to Musammat Jageshwari Kuer. The result is that this appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs : hearing-fee Rs. 32.00.