JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. The second appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of possession with arrears of rent of a plot of land held on Karayma right under the document Ext. A1 dated 17th May 1941. Both the lower courts have decreed the suit and hence the second appeal by the 1st defendant. 2. The lower courts have held that the transaction covered by Ext. A1 does not come within the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act so as to confer fixity of tenure on the 1st defendant. I do not propose to investigate the correctness of that decision, though it is also objected to, and I take for the purpose of this case that the Malabar Tenancy Act does not apply. But I make it clear that if it becomes necessary for the parties to agitate this question, they are free to do so and I leave that question open. 3. The lower courts have further held that the notice issued by the landlord's lawyer was not a proper notice to quit. Nevertheless, they have held that no notice was necessary in the case and therefore the suit was properly laid. On the basis of that finding they have granted the decree for eviction. 4. There was also a claim for value of improvements by the appellant and the lower courts have allowed over Rs. 3,000/- on this ground. In second appeal the quantum of the value is also disputed. 5. The main contest between the parties is whether the finding of the lower courts that no notice to quit is essential in this case is correct. Both the lower courts refer to a passage at page 617 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act based on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Monindra Nath Chowdhnry v. Radha Prasanna Gon (47 IC 19) to the effect that the provision as to notice to quit applies to case where the parties are not regulated by their own contract; and a provision in a lease enabling the landlord to resume possession on payment of the cost of the building erected by the tenant dispensed with the necessity for a notice to quit. The lower courts have further held that S.4 of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants improvements Act corresponding to S.5 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act entitles a tenant to remain in possession till he is paid compensation for his improvements; and in such a case there is no need for a notice to quit. These are the lines of reasoning of the lower courts, which I have to consider in this case. 6. The first question therefore is whether the wording of Ext. A1 discloses a contract to the contrary as contemplated by S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant recital in the document is that in case the transferor evicts the transferee after the period of six years, the transferor agrees to pay the value of the chamayams already existing at the time of the document and the value of the shop thereafter to be constructed by the transferee according to the local custom and also the amount of Rs. 10/- already received, and the transferee agrees then to surrender possession to the transferor. It is this provision that has been construed by the lower courts as a contract to the contrary, which dispenses with the necessity of a notice to quit, and it is in this connection they have relied on the Calcutta decision in Monindra Nath's case. 7. What S.106, Transfer of Property Act, mentions is the absence of a contract dispensing with the necessity for a notice to quit. The mere absence of any provision regarding notice to quit is not to be construed as a contract dispensing with such notice. The absence of such a provision is not a contract to the contrary which dispenses with the necessity of a notice to quit. In the Calcutta case their Lordships have held that when there is a contract under which the lessee agrees to surrender on payment of the value of his building, such contract is a contract dispensing with a notice to quit. With due respect to the learned Judges, I may observe that such a proposition as a general proposition of law is certainly too wide for acceptance. With due respect to the learned Judges, I may observe that such a proposition as a general proposition of law is certainly too wide for acceptance. In that particular case a piece of land within the limits of the Municipality of Burdwan was let on an annual rent of 12 annas with a provision in the document that the landlord might at any moment retake possession on the payment of full compensation for the building. It was that provision that was construed by their Lordships as a contract to the contrary dispensing with a notice to quit. 8. It is too much to say that a provision like the one before me, where there is not even an undertaking that the transferee will surrender possession without any objection when the value of the building is paid, is a contract dispensing with the notice to quit. The utmost that can be said in this case is that there is no contract between the parties regarding notice to quit; and in such a case, because a contract dispensing with notice to quit is absent, S.106 must apply. In this connection, the observation of Ramesam J. in Kannan kutty v. Elaya Veetil Velu (AIR 1924 M. 771) that a provision that the transferor must give the value of kuzhikoors and chamayams when the transferee is evicted at any time after the expiry of 12 years did not dispense with the necessity of a notice to quit may be usefully noted. Therefore, in my opinion, the relevant provision in Ext. A 1 is not a contract to the contrary dispensing with the necessity of a notice to quit; and since, on the finding of the lower courts, the notice to quit was not proper, the suit should have been dismissed for that reason. 9. There is yet another aspect to this part of the case. Ext. A1 was of the year 1941 with a term of six years which expired in 1947. Thereafter till the filing of the suit in 1949, the tenant was holding over; and to such a tenancy S.116 of the Transfer of Property Act must apply. 9. There is yet another aspect to this part of the case. Ext. A1 was of the year 1941 with a term of six years which expired in 1947. Thereafter till the filing of the suit in 1949, the tenant was holding over; and to such a tenancy S.116 of the Transfer of Property Act must apply. The question then naturally arises as to what are the terms of the tenancy by holding over whether the time or term as to notice to quit contained in an expired lease should be held to be a term of the tenancy arising by holding over. In Kodali Bahayya v. Yadavalli Venkataratnam (1952 (II) MLJ 227) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has held, after reviewing the relevant decisions on the subject, that the terms as to notice to quit contained in an expired lease should not be held to be terms of the lease arising by holding over under S.116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore. even if the relevant provision of Ext. A1 considered hereinbefore is a contract to the contrary dispensing with the necessity of a notice to quit, that provision should not be considered to be a term of the lease by holding over after the expiry of the term mentioned in the document. If so, the tenancy should have been terminated with a proper notice to quit before the suit was instituted. 10. There is yet another reasoning of the lower courts, which is reiterated before me at the bar, to be met. The reasoning is that S.4 of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act (S.5 of the earlier Malabar Act) gives the tenant a right to continue in possession until the value of his improvements is paid and this provision of law creates a statutory tenancy in his favour and such statutory tenancy dispenses with the necessity of a notice to quit. In the Tenants Improvements Act the term 'tenant' is not defined. But S.2(d) provides that the term 'tenant' includes a person, who, as lessee, sublessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be lessee, sublessee, etc. is in possession and some other persons as well. This is not a definition of the term, but includes within its ambit several categories of persons. But S.2(d) provides that the term 'tenant' includes a person, who, as lessee, sublessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be lessee, sublessee, etc. is in possession and some other persons as well. This is not a definition of the term, but includes within its ambit several categories of persons. S.4(1) then enacts that every tenant shall on eviction be entitled to compensation for improvements and every tenant to whom such compensation is due shall, notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy or the payment or tender of the mortgage money or premium, be entitled to remain in possession until eviction in execution of a decree or order of court. Sub-s.(2) proceeds to lay down that a tenant so continuing in possession shall hold as a tenant subject to the terms of his lease or mortgage. I had occasion to consider this provision recently in another connection in Ummeyi Umma v. Pazhayavalappil Kunhikali (S. A. No. 318 of 1960) and I held that this provision had not the effect of abrogating Art. 148 of the Limitation Act. S.4(1) gives the tenant a right to continue in possession after and notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy until the value of his improvements is paid. That right, I had pointed out in the earlier case, arose only after the determination of the tenancy and notwithstanding such determination. If a particular condition or procedure is essential for the determination of the tenancy, that condition cannot be dispensed with or abrogated by a provision of law, which gives the tenant a statutory right to continue in possession after and notwithstanding such determination. Therefore, if a proper notice to quit is necessary for the determination of the tenancy, that requirement is not dispensed with or abrogated by S.4 of the Tenants Improvements Act, which only gives the tenant a right to continue in possession after such valid determination of the tenancy. The question whether the tenant is entitled to continue in possession till the value of his improvements is paid does not arise until the tenancy is validly terminated. In this case the question is not whether the tenant is entitled to continue after the determination of the tenancy until he is paid his value of improvement. It is, on the other hand, whether the tenancy has been validly terminated by a proper notice to quit. In this case the question is not whether the tenant is entitled to continue after the determination of the tenancy until he is paid his value of improvement. It is, on the other hand, whether the tenancy has been validly terminated by a proper notice to quit. That question cannot be construed with reference to, or be mixed up with, a right of the tenant, which comes into being only after the termination of the tenancy. In that sense the right of the tenant to continue in possession is not a revival or continuation of the earlier tenancy; but the right is one conferred by virtue of S.4(2) of the Improvements Act, which again will avail only until the value of improvements is paid. 11. In this connection it is worthwhile to note a distinction between a tenancy legislation giving fixity of tenure to the tenant and a provision like S.4 of the Improvements Act. In the former case no question of determination of tenancy arises, because by the statute the determination of the tenancy is itself prohibited excepting on the grounds mentioned in the statute. In such a case the grounds for bringing a suit for eviction will only be those mentioned in the statute; and the absence of a proper notice to quit may not be a valid defence to a suit for eviction, unless such a defence is justified by the terms of the statute. The decisions referred to by the Full Bench in Thanu Ittiachen v. Mundi ( 1961 (2) KLR 354 ) in paragraph 4 of that judgment may be usefully referred to in support of this. I may also refer to the decision of the Madras High Court in K. Narayanan Nair v. A. Kunhan Mannadiar (61 LW 216) apparently indicating a contra view. As indicated by me, the question has to be decided with reference to the particular provisions of the tenancy legislation and its scheme. At any rate, it is not necessary for me to decide in this case the question whether a notice to quit is necessary in a case where the tenant is granted fixity of tenure by a statute. I do not express any final opinion on that question and merely indicate the problem. 12. As indicated hereinbefore, the terms of Ext. At any rate, it is not necessary for me to decide in this case the question whether a notice to quit is necessary in a case where the tenant is granted fixity of tenure by a statute. I do not express any final opinion on that question and merely indicate the problem. 12. As indicated hereinbefore, the terms of Ext. A1 do not disclose a contract to the contrary dispensing with a notice to quit; and even if the recitals amount to such a contract to the contrary, such terms are not to be applied to the tenancy by holding over after the term fixed therein is over. Similarly, the provisions of the Tenants Improvements Act do not also dispense with or abrogate the necessity for a proper notice to quit. Therefore, in view of the concurrent finding of the lower Courts that the notice issued by the landlord in this case is not a proper notice, the decree for eviction granted by the lower Courts has to be set aside. The second appeal is allowed, the decision of the lower courts is set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct both parties to bear their respective costs throughout. 13. In the view I have taken, there is no need for considering the other question regarding the sufficiency or otherwise of the quantum of the value of improvements granted by the lower courts.