JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by the landlord of a shop room situated in Berhampur town, against the concurrent decisions of the House Rent Controller and the appellate authority (Additional District Magistrate) dismissing his application u/s 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the eviction of his tenant (opposite party No. 1) from the said shop room. 2. Opposite party No. 1 has been continuing as a tenant of the said shop room for a long time. On the 3rd January, 1957 (when the Act was not in force in the State) the Petitioner issued a notice to the opposite party terminating the tenancy and calling upon him to pay arrear rent due to him and also to deliver possession of the shop room by 31st January, 1957. The Petitioner further stated that if the premises were not vacated by that date steps would be taken to evict the opposite party and damages would be claimed from him at Rs. 30/- per month. There was also a statement in the notice to the effect that the Petitioner wanted the shop room for his own use. To that notice opposite party No. 1 sent a reply, on 30-1-1957, through his advocate, saying that he was paying rent regularly at Rs. 18/- per month, but that the previous month's rent, though tendered, was refused by the Petitioner. He further stated that he was taking steps to secure some other shop room for himself and he hoped that within 6 months he would be able to vacate the premises. Thereafter nothing further happened. The opposite party tendered rent which was again refused by the Petitioner. Thereupon the latter opened a Current Account in his name with the Urban Co-operative Bank, Berhampur and regularly deposited the monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 19/-. Even after the expiry of the period of six months, the Petitioner took 110 steps to serve a fresh notice to quit on the opposite party nor did he take any steps for his eviction, nor did he care to accept the rent tendered. In the meantime, the (Orissa House Rent Control) Act came into force with effect from the 2nd January, 1959, in the town of Berhampur. 3. In the meantime, the (Orissa House Rent Control) Act came into force with effect from the 2nd January, 1959, in the town of Berhampur. 3. The Petitioner then applied to the House e Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act, on 19th May, 1959 for eviction of the opposite party. The grounds for his eviction were stated to be: (i) non-payment of rent from 30th November, 1956 till the date of application; (ii) the Petitioner's need of the shop room for his own use for business purpose; (iii) damages caused to the shop room by the opposite party. The parties went for trial on all these matters. The Petitioner examined himself and one more witness on his behalf. The opposite party remained content with examining himself only. 4. The two lower Courts concurrently held against the Petitioner on all the aforesaid three grounds. The allegation of damage to the house was rightly not pressed before us. Mr. Ramdas's main contention on behalf of the Petitioner is that in respect of the other two grounds the two lower Courts have committed an error of law which was apparent on the face of the record. 5. As regards non-payment of rent, the findings of the two Courts are that the Petitioner by his own conduct in refusing to accept the rent when tendered, for the period subsequent to February, 1957 (see exts. B and C) compelled the opposite party to open a separate account in his own name in the Urban Cooperative Bank and deposit the same. The pass book relating to that account was produced in the case, and it shows that a sum of Rs. 18/- was being regularly deposited every month, upto 4th July 1961. As there was no law dealing with the rent control at that time, (i.e. during 1957 and 1958), the opposite party could do nothing else. Mr. Ramdas, however, contended that when the Act was brought into force in Berhampur town with effect from 2nd January, 1959 the opposite party as the tenant should have again tendered rent to the landlord and that his omission to do so in consequence of which rent from January 1959 up to April 1959 was admittedly not paid, would amount to 'wilful default' within the meaning of the proviso to Section 7(1) of the Act. There was admittedly non-payment of rent for the months of January, February, March and April, 1959. According to Mr. Ramdas, failure to pay rent even for one month from the date on which it fell due was sufficient to entitle the landlord to take steps for the eviction of the tenant u/s 7(1)(i) of the Act; and the burden would then shift on the tenant to claim the benefit of the aforesaid proviso to that Sub-section, by showing affirmatively that the default was not 'wilful'. The question of burden of proof is somewhat academic in this case in view of the conduct of the parties. Rent was tendered, but it was refused by the Petitioner in February and March, 1957. Thereafter he neither took steps for the eviction of the opposite party nor gave him any intimation about his willingness to accept the rent tendered-even after the coming into force of the Act. In the absence of any indication of the willingness on his part to accept the rent tendered the tenant was undoubtedly entitled to assume that even after the coming into force of the Act, any offer of rent made by the tenant may be refused by the landlord; and hence he continued to deposit the rent in the account opened with the Urban Co-operative Bank, Berhampur and awaited further action by the landlord. The moment the latter applied to the Rent Controller for eviction he show d the pass book relating to that account and offered to pay the entire arrear rent up-to-date. Under such circumstances the two lower Courts were justified in holding that there was no wilful default on the part of the opposite party to pay the rent due. No question of error of law arises. 6. The word 'wilful' must be given full significance. The meaning of the word as given in the "Oxford Dictionary" is two-fold (1) - "asserting or possessed to assert one's own will against persuasion, instruction or command; governed by will without regard to reason; determined to take one's own way; obstinately, self-willed or perverse". (2) -"done on purpose or wittingly; purposed; deliberate, intentional; not accidental or casual; chiefly, now as always, in a bad sense, of an action either evil in itself or blameworthy in a particular case; often (with colour of sense) implying perverse or obstinate". (2) -"done on purpose or wittingly; purposed; deliberate, intentional; not accidental or casual; chiefly, now as always, in a bad sense, of an action either evil in itself or blameworthy in a particular case; often (with colour of sense) implying perverse or obstinate". Here nothing perverse or obstinate can be attributed to the conduct of the opposite party (tenant). The mere non-payment of rent in the circumstances of this case would not justify such an inference. There is no evidence that after 1957 there was any attempt either by persuasion or instruction or command, or the part of the Petitioner, to enforce payment of the rent due, after which the opposite party persisted in not tendering the rent due. Mr. Ramdas could not cite any authority in support of his extreme contention that as soon as the Act came into force in Berhampur town it was the duty of the tenant to tender the rent to the landlord whenever it became due what ever might have been the past conduct of the parties and that when he failed to do so he committed 'wilful' default. 7. Turning to the second ground in support of eviction, the evidence which has been accepted by the two Courts is to the following effect. The Petitioner (landlord) is a fairly prosperous businessman of Berhampur town, where, according to his own statement, he deals in iron and hardware, paints, furniture and also manufactures iron, steel and wire products. His iron shop is located in the main bazar. The shop room of the opposite party is adjacent to the same. The iron dealers of Berhampur town all have their shops in that locality. The landlord's residential house is also close-by, and consists of several rooms. In addition, he has other buildings in Berhampur town at different places such as Premnagar, Rampa Sahi etc. some of which have been let out on rent to other persons. In some other places he has godowns for keeping his stocks. In addition he has taken some other houses on rent and using the same for business purposes. According to Mr. some of which have been let out on rent to other persons. In some other places he has godowns for keeping his stocks. In addition he has taken some other houses on rent and using the same for business purposes. According to Mr. Ramdas, the landlord was thus compelled to take some other rooms on rent for his business purposes mainly because the opposite party would not vacate the shop house which was situated in the main bazar of Berhampur town and that if that shop room was vacated, the landlord would be able to bring it into immediate use by extending his shop adjacent to that room and may be able to give up his rented buildings. Hence it was urged that on the evidence of the Petitioner (which was accepted by the two lower Courts) it must be held, in (sic), that the landlord required the shop room bona fide for his own business needs. Mr. Ramdas also relied on Rustomji Dinshaw Billimoria Vs. Dosibai Rustomji Master, and Basant Lal Saha Vs. P.C. Chakarvarty, and urged that it was unreasonable to expect the landlord to carry on his business in another rented building while his own building which is well situated in the main bazar area and adjacent to another shop of his, is occupied by the opposite party. 8. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act entitles a landlord to obtain possession of the house by the eviction of a tenant if he can satisfy the House Rent Controller that he requires the house, in good faith, for his occupation or use by himself. The expression 'good faith' has been inserted obviously with a view to prevent the landlord from using the machinery of the Act as a device for turning out a tenant under the cloak of 'requiring it for his own use', though in reality for letting it out to another person on a more profitable basis. Again the words "requires the house" have been construed in the aforesaid Calcutta decision following an earlier decision of that Court in AIR 1934 Cal 223 -to mean something more than mere wish and involve the element of need to some extent at least. Again the words "requires the house" have been construed in the aforesaid Calcutta decision following an earlier decision of that Court in AIR 1934 Cal 223 -to mean something more than mere wish and involve the element of need to some extent at least. To quote the words of the learned Judge: Mere wish or convenience or whim or fancy of the landlord will not, in my view, be enough to show that the landlord "requires" the premises. The landlord must show certain circumstances or facts to prove the need or necessity for the landlord. At the same time the statement does not say that it must be an absolute need or an absolute requirement in the sense that the landlord will not have any accommodation of any description and that he must actually be in the streets, before he can demand his own house for his occupation. With these observations I respectfully agree. The need must obviously be the need at the time of the application for eviction and it cannot refer to any possible use to which the building might be put at a future date. The landlord must, therefore, show that at the time of his applying for relief u/s 7 of the Act (May, 1959) his business as an iron dealer had expanded so much that his existing shop in the main bazar was inadequate for that purpose and that the other buildings which he had taken on hire were also used for the same business, and that if the opposite party could be evicted from the shop room in question there would be no necessity for the landlord to keep those rented premises. Evidence on these points is totally lacking in this case. It is true that in his application u/s 7 of the Act the Petitioner stated in vague manner that "the Petitioner also wants the house for the purpose of his business use". But as admittedly he has multiple business in various parts of Berhampur town such a vague statement will not suffice. While giving evidence in Court also he did not state, even in examination-in-chief, that the houses which he had taken on hire were being used for the purpose of his iron business. Such a specific assertion is necessary because he has other business dealings such as in paints, furniture, manufacture of wire products etc. While giving evidence in Court also he did not state, even in examination-in-chief, that the houses which he had taken on hire were being used for the purpose of his iron business. Such a specific assertion is necessary because he has other business dealings such as in paints, furniture, manufacture of wire products etc. which could not possibly have taken place in the premises in the main bazar. The trial Court rightly pointed out that if really there was need for the shop room occupied by the opposite party the landlord would have taken steps for his speedy eviction even in 1957 or 1958, long before the coming into force of the Act. 9. In this connection, I may refer to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 S.O. 499. There the question for consideration was w bet her a landlord could evict a tenant if he could show that the building was required bona fide for re-erection or for its replacement by another building. Their Lordships pointed out that the Controller must be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim of the landlord and for that purpose, it would not suffice, if the landlord comes forward and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strong it might be. To quote their Lordships, "It is therefore impossible to hold that the investigation by the Controller should he confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord to reconstruct; this intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances". Here also a mere statement by the landlord that he wanted the shop room in question for the purpose of expanding his business as an iron dealer win not suffice. It must be further shown that, on the date of his application, his business as an iron dealer had expanded so much that his existing shop in the main bazar was inadequate for that purpose and that he had been compelled to take on rent other premises for the same business. As already pointed out, this caution is specially required because of the various other business which the Petitioner carries on in other parts of the town 10. Mr. Ramdas relied on some observations in (1963) I Andhra Weekly Reporter p. 91. As already pointed out, this caution is specially required because of the various other business which the Petitioner carries on in other parts of the town 10. Mr. Ramdas relied on some observations in (1963) I Andhra Weekly Reporter p. 91. In that case Section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949 and the corresponding Section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Control and Eviction) Act, 1960 came up for consideration. Under the former Act, the landlord was entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant in respect of a non-residential building "for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on". The learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, following the earlier decisions to the High Court held that these words were susceptible to the meaning that a landlord who has made all preparations to commence a business and taken all necessary steps in bona fide manner towards the starting of that business would be entitled to apply for eviction of a tenant. In the subsequent Andhra Pradesh Act of 1960 this matter was clarified by the insertion of two sub-clauses as follows: 7(3)(a)(iii) In case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, (a) for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on the date of the application; (b) for the purposes of a business which the landlord bona fide proposes to commence. The learned Judge held that the amendment made in 1960 was only by way of clarification and it did not make any material alterations to the old Act. In the Orissa Act, however, the language, as already pointed out, is "if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation or use of himself". It is true that if there is some evidence on record to show that on or about the date of his application to the Controller (May, 1959) the landlord had made some preparations to take some steps to expand his ironware business in the main bazar, or else to show that it was that business which was being conducted in the buildings rented to him in another part of Berhampur town, there may be some justification for the view that the disputed shop room was required by the landlord in good faith for his use. But evidence on this essential point is totally lacking in this case. 11. In the circumstances of this case, therefore, the mere fact that the Petitioner has taken on rent some other premises for his business in Berhampur will not suffice to show that the Courts below committed an error of law in saying that the benefit of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act was not available to him. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50/- (Rupees fifty) only, to be paid to opposite party No. 1. Misra, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed