Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Alleppey in O. S. No. 210 of 1956. The plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representative is the appellant before us. 2. The suit was for the amounts due under two promissory notes executed by the first and second defendants, Exts. A and F dated the 20th September 1950. Ext. A covers a sum of Rs. 13500/ -and Ext. F. a sum of Rs. 2,900/-. 3. Along with the two promissory notes the first and second defendants also executed a karar, Ext. G and handed over Ext. H, a title deed of the properties specified in Ext. G. The lower court gave a decree on the strength of Exts. A and F; but rejected the appellant's contention that the execution of Ext. G and the handing over of Ext. H evidenced a mortgage by deposit of title deeds, and denied the charge claimed in the plaint. The contention before us is that the denial of the charge was wrong; and that in any case the lower court should have held that the appellant was entitled at least to an equitable lien as a result of Ext. G on the properties specified therein. 4. It is not possible to say that Ext. G evidences a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. The essential requisites for creating a mortgage by deposit of title deeds or an equitable mortgage as it is called in English Law are evident from S.58 (1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. They are: a debt; a deposit of title deeds; and an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt. 5. There is nothing in Ext. G or in the evidence before us to indicate that the handing over of Ext. H was with, a view to make that deed a security for the amounts advanced under Exts. A and F. The only statement regarding Ext. H in Ext. G reads as follows: Ext. G also shows, quite clearly, that the promise of the first and second defendants was only to execute a mortgage in the future in case defaults occurred and they were called upon to do so: 6. A and F. The only statement regarding Ext. H in Ext. G reads as follows: Ext. G also shows, quite clearly, that the promise of the first and second defendants was only to execute a mortgage in the future in case defaults occurred and they were called upon to do so: 6. In the view we have taken that there has been no mortgage by deposit of title deeds it is unnecessary to consider whether a mortgage by deposit of title deeds could be created in Travancore prior to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, coming into force in Travancore on the 1st May 1952.6 TLR. 119 and 12 TLR 177 seem to support the respondent's contention that such mortgages were not possible prior to the extension of that Act. A different view may be possible but it is unnecessary for us to decide that question in this case and it is naturally left open for future determination. 7. Ext. G does not, as already stated, evidence or create a mortgage. And as it does not create a mortgage the question as to whether it should have been registered, if it did, also does not arise for consideration. 8. The only question apart from the question whether a mortgage by deposit of title deeds has been created and which we have answered against the appellant is whether Ext. G creates a lien in favour of the appellant on the properties specified therein on the basis of the well known maxim that equity regards as done that which ought to be done. 17 TLR. 105 gives some support to this contention. The Judges said: "We see no adequate reason for refusing to hold that an agreement for value to give a mortgage of immovable property creates an equitable lien on such property." 9. The observation is based on Martin v. Reid [31 L. J. C. P. 126]. The only question decided in that case can be gathered from the following passage from the judgment of Williams J. : "The only question before us is, whether all the property comprised in the agreement passed by way of pawn. The rule of law that there must be a delivery in order that the property may pass is not disputed; but the question is, whether there was a sufficient delivery in this case, and I quite agree that there was." 10. In AIR. The rule of law that there must be a delivery in order that the property may pass is not disputed; but the question is, whether there was a sufficient delivery in this case, and I quite agree that there was." 10. In AIR. 1930 P. C. 76 an agreement by which the executant pro-missed to give a regular mortgage of his immovable property for the money advanced to him came up for consideration. The Board said: "Their Lordships are of opinion that the terms of the said agreement of 14th February 1920, which relate to the immovable property of the company, do not constitute a mortgage or charge upon such property within the meaning of S.58 and 100, T. P. Act, 1882. So far as the immovable property was concerned, the said agreement merely created a right in the plaintiffs to obtain another document, viz., a regular deed of mortgage of the said immovable property which was to be executed by the company." 11. In AIR, 1938 Madras 889 a bank advanced money without any immediate security but on the basis of an undertaking to provide security when called upon to do so and subsequently the security promised was called for by the bank. In dealing with that case Leach C. J., said, quite categorically: "In this country an agreement to mortgage creates no charge." 12. The main equitable liens are two: the vendor's lien for his purchase money and the purchaser's lien for his deposit. A third is that of trustees and personal representatives on the trust property for the expenses, incurred by them. As stated by Halsbury a simple covenant or agreement to charge land does not create a lien upon the covenantor's real estate where the agreement was only for a personal security with power to call for a real security; and a covenant or promise in writing to give a security by mortgage does not create a lien in favour of the covenantee or promisee (3rd Edition, Vol. XXIV, page 165). 13. In the light of what is stated above we hold that there was no mortgage by deposit of title deeds; that Ext. XXIV, page 165). 13. In the light of what is stated above we hold that there was no mortgage by deposit of title deeds; that Ext. G by promising a mortgage in the future did not create a lien either immediately or when the conditions precedent for the performance of the promise came into being; and that the only decree that the appellant is entitled to get is the one awarded to him by the court below. 14. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. Dismissed.