Judgment A.B.N.Sinha, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant arises out of a money suit, which was instituted by the plaintiff-respondent, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2107/03 nP. as compensation for damages caused to a consignment of bins. The case of the plaintiff was that it had booked 25 baskets of bins at Manoharpur a Railway Station on the South Eastern Railways for being carried by a passenger train and for being delivered to it at Birsa, another railway station on the aforesaid Railway. The consignment, comprised of the aforesaid baskets of bins reached Birsa, according to the plaintiffs case, in a rain damaged condition on account of the servants of the Railway Administration concerned not having given adequate protection to the consignment against the ravages of the monsoon during the time when it was in their control. It is admitted that the consignment was booked on the 15th June, 1958, and it arrived at Birsa Railway Station on the 18th June, 1958, and that an open delivery was given to the plaintiff on the 18th July, 1958. The damages assessed by the Traffic Inspector under the damages and deficiency certificate were at 6% in respect of 768 bundles of biris and 50% on 513 bundles of biris. The plaintiff claimed the price of the biris at the rate of Rs. 6/-per thousand, and on calculation he instituted the suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount of" Rs. 2107.03 nP. The defence inter alia was that the suit was barred by limitation and that the claim of the plaintiff was exaggerated, the price of biris given in the schedule of the plaint being not correct. The trial Court found on all the points in favour of the plaintiff except on the point of the price of biris. It held that the suit was not barred by limitation and fixed the price of biris at the rate of Rs. 4/- per thousand and not at the rate of Rs. 6/- per thousand as claimed by the plaintiff. Accordingly it decreed the suit of the plaintiff in part with proportionate cost. On appeal by the defendant, the judgment and decree of the trial Court have been affirmed. Hence this second appeal in this Court. 2. 4/- per thousand and not at the rate of Rs. 6/- per thousand as claimed by the plaintiff. Accordingly it decreed the suit of the plaintiff in part with proportionate cost. On appeal by the defendant, the judgment and decree of the trial Court have been affirmed. Hence this second appeal in this Court. 2. Two points have been urged before me namely, (1) that the Courts below have erred in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, and (2) that the decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 1912.06 nP. as granted by the trial Court was not in accordance with the judgment. On a correct calculation the decree should have been for Rs. 1432.20 nP. only. 3. The main question for determination is about limitation. There is no dispute that Article 30 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the facts of this case. Under the said Article, the limitation against a carrier for compensation for losing OF injuring goods is one year from, the date when the "loss or injury occurs. Under Sec.15 (2) of the Limitation Act read with Section 80 of the Code, of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff will be entitled to a deduction or extension of two months. Thus, damages can only be awarded in respec of loss or injury, which has occurred within fourteen months of the suit. The Court of appeal below has held on the basis of the decision in Union of India V/s. Gujarat Tobacco Co., AIR 1955 Cal 448 that Limitation, would begin to run in this case from the date on which the open delivery in respect of the consignment was given to the plaintiff that is, from 18th July, 1958, and the, suit, having been filed on the 17th September, 1959, was, accordingly, within the time. The following may be usefully quoted from the decision in the aforesaid Calcutta case : - "Such loss or injury obviously, occurs while the goods are in the custody of the carrier and, prima facie therefore, the date thereof will be within its special or peculiar knowledge in any event, the carrier will certainly be in a much better position than either the consignor or the consignee to prove that date and accordingly, it has been held over and over again that, under Article 30 Limitation Act, the onus to prove the date of "loss or injury" mentioned in the Third Column of that Article, is, where the goods are carried by rail and the loss or injury occurs in the course of such transit, on the Railway concerned, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence on its part on this point, that is, in the event of its failure to discharge the onus, the date of delivery to the party should be taken as the relevant date of "loss or injury" or in other words, as the starting point of limitation under Article 30." In the present case, on evidence whatsoever has been adduced on behalf of the defendants to prove the date of loss or injury, Learned Counsel appearing for the defendant-appellants, has however, placed reliance on a particular passage in Ext. 3 dated the 22nd August, 1958, which is the office copy of the notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act sent by the plaintiff. The portion of Ext. 3, ought to be relied on, reads as under :- "After the booking when the parcel was in the Railway custody the same was stacked or the open platform without having them covered with tarpolin, as a result of which 12 baskets out of 25 found badly drenched by rain water." It has been argued on the strength of the above passage that the plaintiff must be taken to have admitted that the loss or injury occurred on the 15th June, 1958, namely, the very date on which the consignment was booked, and, there-fore, the suit filed on the 17th September, 1959, was clearly beyond months and was thus barred by limitation. I am however, of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention, and it must be rejected. I am however, of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention, and it must be rejected. The question as to the date when the loss or injury occurred is clearly a question of fact and in reaching a conclusion on that question, the Courts below had no evidence adduced by the defendant to go upon and were invited to base their conclusion on such evidence including Ext. 3 which the plaintiff had adduced, and I am of the opinion that the construction which they have concurred in putting on Ext. 3 is by way of appreciation of evidence which cannot be assailed in Second Appeal. In any event, I do not find anything wrong with the construction which the Court of appeal below has put on Ext. 3 or on such portion thereof which was sought to be relied on. Ext. 3 taken as a whole, at the highest, amounts to an admission on the part of the plaintiff to the effect that he knew that a portion of the consignment had got drenched on the very day on which, the consignment was booked. But to say that it got drenched, even if the nature of the consignment in the present case is taken into account, does not necessarily connote loss or injury, in the sence ordinarily understood. Each successive day from the 15th June, 1958, may have counted, and it is quite, likely that every succeeding moment made matters worse resulting ultimately in actual loss and injury, it is quite conceivable that the continued negligence of the railway authorities, for instance, neglect to cover the goods, neglect to remove them under cover, neglect to minimise the effect of rain once it had fallen and possible other causes may have all combined to cause the injury complained of in the suit. The defendant having: adduced no evidence on this question and the material on which it sought to rely being of no avail, it must be held to have failed to discharge the onus which lay on it, and the finding as to the date when the loss or injury occurred stands and should be taken to be the date for limitation to start, and counting from that date the suit is, admittedly, in time. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. P. K. Bose, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, has sought to rely on various decisions, some reported and some unreported. I am afraid none of the cases referred to by him have any application to the facts of the present case. In Behar Journals Ltd. V/s. Indian Union, Second Appeal No. 339 of 1953 (Pat) disposed of on 26-8-1957, as well as in Zahoor Hussain V/s. Union of India, Second Appeal No. 790 of 1955 (Pat) disposed of on 5-11-1958, the question which fell for determination was whether the period during which a correspondence was going on between the plaintiff and the defendant Railway would serve to extend the period of limitation as given in Article 30 of the Limitation Act. In both these cases, there was no controversy in regard to the date of which the goods were damaged or injured. In Dudhi Co-operative and Development Federation Ltd. V/s. Union of India, First Appeal No. 180 of 1955 (Pat) disposed of on 23-11-1960, it will appear from the concluding portion of the judgment that the evidence adduced by the Railway Administration as to the date on which the injury had occurred had been accepted as being the 1st of July, 1951, and the suit in that case having been filed on the 2ist October, 1952 was held to be barred. That decision, therefore, based on the facts of that case is of no use to the present appellant in this case. Likewise, the decisions in Central India Chemicals Private Ltd., Sehore V/s. Union of India, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 301 is a decision on the facts of that case, where the crucial dates for the application of Article 30 of the Limitation Act were apparent on the plaint itself. The case reported in The East Indian Rly., Co. V/s. Ram Autar, 20 Cal WN 696 : (AIR 1917 Cal 103) dealt with the question of the applicability of Article 30 of the Limitation Act to a case where-loss had been pleaded in the plaint." In the present case, there is no controversy as to the ap-plicability of Article 30. The decision reported in Secy, of State V/s. Neaz Ali Hamid Ali, AIR 1935 All 407 is also a decision on the facts . The decision reported in Secy, of State V/s. Neaz Ali Hamid Ali, AIR 1935 All 407 is also a decision on the facts . of that case, where on the construction of a letter written by the plaintiff dated the 5th August, 1931, the Courts had come to a finding that the ]oss had occurred prior to the 5th August, 1931, and the suit which had been instituted in that case on the 1sth October, 1932, was held to be time-barred. The fact that, in the aforesaid Allahabad decision, the letter of the plaintiff in question had been construed to come to a finding as to the date on which the loss or injury had occurred is no authority for holding that in the present case also on Ext. 3, it must be held that the loss or injury had occurred on the 15th June, 1958. None of the cases therefore, arc of any assistance to the appellant in the present case. I find, therefore, that there is no merit in the contention that the suit is barred by limitation. Mr. P. K. Bose, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, drew my attention to paragraph 5 of the written statement filed in this case and urged that the plaintiff was itself at fault in not turning up to take delivery of the consignment for about a month after its arrival, and in those circumstances the railway cannot be held to be liable for compensation. I find, however, that neither any issue was joined on this question nor was any evidence laid by either party. Moreover, no ground in this behalf was taken in the lower appellate Court, nor has been taken in this Court. In the circumstances the defendant must be taken to have abandoned this plea, and I do not think that any case for remand to the trial Court for a fresh trial on this issue has been made out. 5. The second contention to the effect that the decree in regard to the quantum of damage, as passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court, was not in accordance with the judgment has to be accepted. The decree in favour of the plaintiff, as granted by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court is for Rs. 1912,06 nP. This however, should be reduced to Rs. 1432.20 nP. only. The decree in favour of the plaintiff, as granted by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court is for Rs. 1912,06 nP. This however, should be reduced to Rs. 1432.20 nP. only. The trial Court, while accepting the extent of damage as evidenced by the damage certificate granted by the Traffic Inspector at 60 percent in regard to 708 bundles of biris and at 50 percent in regard to 513 bundles, had reduced the price of biris from Rs. 6/- per thousand as claimed by the plaintiff to Rs. 4/- per thousand only. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has urged that, 3,83,000 biris comprised in 768 bundles at Rs. 4/- per thousand will be worth Rs. 1532/- only, and 60 per cent thereof will be Rs. 919.20 nP. likewise, 5,56,500 biris contained in 513 bundles, at Rs. 47-per thousand will be priced at Rs. 1026/- and 50 per cent of the said amount will come to Rs. 513/-. On adding Rs. 919.20 nP. to Rs. 513/- the net amount of damages which should have been allowed to the plaintiff was Rs. 1432.20 nP. and not Rs. 1912.06 nP. No mistake in the above accounting was pointed out to mo on behalf of the plaintiff, and I, therefore, hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs. 1432.20 nP. only. In the result, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are affirmed with this modification only that in place of the present decree for Rs. 1912.06 nP. as passed by the Courts below a decree for Rs. 1432.20 nP, only will be substituted. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, as mentioned above. The plaintiff-respondent will be entitled to its proportionate cost.