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1963 DIGILAW 9 (GAU)

Sudhir Chandra Guha and another v. Jogesh Chandra Das, Plaintiff

1963-02-18

M.C.PATHAK, S.K.DUTTA

body1963
PATHAK, J.:- The facts leading to the above two first appeals are as follows: Plaintiff Jogesh Chandra Das filed Rent Suit No. 3/59 on 26th June 1959 against 1st defendant Sudhir Chandra Guha, 2nd defendant Messrs. Osten Engineering Private Ltd., for recovery of Rs. 6.200/-on account of arrear of house rent. The plaintiff's case was that late Padmabati Das was the widow of his father's brother. She died childless and had life interest in the properties described in the schedule to the plaint. In December 1950, 1st defendant came into occupation of the suit premises and on 7-4-1951 he managed to obtain from Padmabati Das a document purporting to be a lease for 12 years fixing house rent at Rs. 200/- p. m. according to English calendar month on false represen­tation and practising fraud. That the said document was inoperative and invalid in law. The premises were in occupation of the 2nd defendant as sub-tenant under the 1st defendant. The defendants had not paid any house rent from 1954 either to Padmabati or to the plaintiff. The house rent up to end of May 1956 became time-barred. The plaintiff, therefore filed the suit claiming arrear rent from 1st June 1956 to 25th February 1959 amounting to Rs. 6200/-, after giving up the claim of Rs. 378-9-0. 2. The defendants contested the suit and filed a joint written statement. Their case was that Padmabati Das was the ab­solute owner of the suit premises and she leased out the same to the 1st defendant at a rental of Rs. 200/- p. m. for 12 years under a registered deed dated 7th April 1951. At the time of execution of the said deed, Padmabati Das took Rs. 7200/-from the 1st defendant towards advance rent. Thereafter till the end of 1958, late . Padmabati Das received a further sum of Rs. 16.900/- towards rent either herself or through her authorised agent Shri N. Das, Gopalpara. Besides the said amount, the 1st defendant paid Rs. 3014.38 towards municipal tax of the suit premises and Rs. 409 towards land reyenue of the patta land on which the suit premises stood. Further, on the authority and request of late Padmabati Das and her agent Shri N. Das, the 1st defendant repaired the suit premises by incurring a sum of Rs. 2700/-during the years of his occupation. 3014.38 towards municipal tax of the suit premises and Rs. 409 towards land reyenue of the patta land on which the suit premises stood. Further, on the authority and request of late Padmabati Das and her agent Shri N. Das, the 1st defendant repaired the suit premises by incurring a sum of Rs. 2700/-during the years of his occupation. It was settled that the said amounts paid towards municipal tax and land revenue and spent for repairs of the premises would be treat­ed as payment of advance rent. In this way. late Padmabati Das received Rupees 30,223.88 in all from the defendants and the actual dues by way of rent of the suit premises up to 31-8-1959 came to Rupees 20.600/- at the rate of Rs. 200/- p. m. Thus there was an excess payment of Rs. 9,623.88 towards advance rent to late Padmabati Das and if that amount was adjusted against future rent, no arrear rent was due by the defendants in respect of the suit premises. The defendants fur­ther alleged that the plaintiff had no cause of action, that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiff had no right to sue. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: 1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action? 2. Whether the plaintiff has right to sue alone and the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of par­ties? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Was the lease dated 7th April 1951 granted by Mrs. Padmabati Das in favour of the defendant No. 1 ob­tained by fraud and misrepresenta­tion? 5. Whether the defendant are entitled to claim any deduction for expenses of repairs as alleged in their writ­ten statement? If so, how much? 6. What are the amounts the defendants paid on account of land re­venue and municipal taxes? 7. What amount of house-rent, if any, was paid by the defendants? 8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for house-rent? If so, how much? ' 9. Is the story of payment towards rent as alleged in para 16 of the written statement true? 10. Whether the defendants are entitled to any compensation under S. 35-A, Civil P. C.? If so, how much? 11. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled? 4. If so, how much? ' 9. Is the story of payment towards rent as alleged in para 16 of the written statement true? 10. Whether the defendants are entitled to any compensation under S. 35-A, Civil P. C.? If so, how much? 11. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled? 4. Title Suit No. 18 of 1959 was filed on 14-8-1959 by the same plaintiff Jogesh Chandra Das against the same defendant No. 1 Sudhir Chandra Guha and 2nd defendant Messrs. Osten Engineering Private Ltd., for ejectment from and re­covery of khas possession of the suit pre­mises and a decree for Rs. 600/- on ac­count of house rent. 5. The plaintiff's case in T. S. 18/59 was that Padmabati Das was the widow of his father's brother. She used to live at Goalpara, Assam, during the latter part of her life She had life interest in the pro­perty described in the schedule to the plaint and she having died childless on 25-2-1958, her life interest devolved on the plaintiff as absolute owner. The 1st defen­dant came into occupation of the suit pre­mises in December 1950 and he obtained a document dated 7-4-1951 purporting to be a lease for 12 years commencing from 1-4-1951 at a monthly rent of Rs. 200/-according to the English Calendar month. But the deed was obtained fraudulently and by false representation and therefore, it did not bind the plaintiff. The 1st defendant taking advantage of the absence of Padmabati Das from the premises, cut some valuable trees in 1951 which were grown on the suit premises without any authority and permission. Thereafter the 1st defendant constructed two houses on the vacant land within the compound with­out any authority. The plaintiff filed T. S. 12/51 against 1st defendant and Padmabati Das in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, U. A. D., Dibrugarh for restrain­ing the 1st defendant from committing further acts of waste and making per­manent constructions and that suit was decreed in part on 28th September 1956. During the pendency of the said suit and appeal from the decree therein, the 1st defendant had constructed 4 or 5 per­manent structures by cutting several other trees. In Dag No. 3961 measuring an area of four kathas of land, there was tank for fish-culture which was in occupation of the 1st defendant. During the pendency of the said suit and appeal from the decree therein, the 1st defendant had constructed 4 or 5 per­manent structures by cutting several other trees. In Dag No. 3961 measuring an area of four kathas of land, there was tank for fish-culture which was in occupation of the 1st defendant. But due to careless­ness and negligence of the 1st defendant,, the banks of the tank had been worn out and water-hyacinth was allowed to grow and thereby the water of the tank was polluted. The 1st defendant also from time to time made additions and altera­tions in the original houses without any authority. Further he was carrying on his business in the new construction as a result of which there was increase of land revenue which had created permanent en­cumbrance on the property for which the 1st defendant was liable for compensation. That the 1st defendant had from time-to time let out parts of the premises to dif­ferent parties and had been earning illegal profits thereby. Since April 1954 the 1st defendant failed to pay house rent to Padmabati Das and even after her death he had failed to pay any rent to the plaintiff. On 6-7-1959 the plaintiff issued a notice to the 1st defendant asking him to attorn to the plaintiff and to make fresh arrangement for future occupation or in the alternative to vacate the suit premises after 1st August 1959 and to deliver possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. A copy of the said notice was sent to the 2nd defendant. But the defendants did not comply with the notice and therefore, the plaintiff brought the suit for ejectment and for recovery of khas possession and also for recovery of Rs. 600/- being the house rent from May 1959 to July 1959 at the rate of Us. 2GO/-P. m. 6. The defendants contested the suit and filed a joint written statement. Their case was that late Dhairya Narayan Das was the absolute owner of the suit land and premises. On the strength of a will executed by late Dhairya Narayan Das which was duly probated, his widow Padmabati Das became the absolute owner of the suit land and premises and as such she voluntarily leased out the said pre­mises to the 1st defendant at rental of Rs. On the strength of a will executed by late Dhairya Narayan Das which was duly probated, his widow Padmabati Das became the absolute owner of the suit land and premises and as such she voluntarily leased out the said pre­mises to the 1st defendant at rental of Rs. 200/- p. m. with effect from 1-4-1951 for a period of 12 years under a register­ed lease dated 7-4-1951. That in terms of the said agreement, the 1st defendant was entitled to erect necessary structures on the suit premises for carrying on his busi­ness and in pursuance of that agreement and on the authority of late Padmabati Das, 1st defendant constructed one struc­ture and while he was constructing ano­ther, the plaintiff designedly instituted T. S. 12/51 against the 1st defendant In the Court of the. Subordinate Judge, U. A. D., Dibrugarh, for restraining him from completing the constructions. In that case Padmabati Das who was the 2nd defendant filed a written statement con­firming the action of the 1st defendant in making those constructions. The 1st defendant had paid in all Rs. 30,223.88 towards rent of the suit premises to late Padmabati Das and as such there had been an excess payment of Rs. 9623.88 (as detailed hereinabove in stating the facts of R. S. No. 3/59) and till the said amount stood adjusted towards future rent, the 1st defendant could not be deemed to be defaulter. 7. It was further stated that the 2nd defendant was a private Limited Company sponsored and promoted by the 1st defen­dant for expansion and stability of busi­ness and the 1st defendant was conducting business of the 2nd defendant. The defen­dants also contended that the plaintiff had no cause of action, that the. suit was bad for 'non-joinder of necessary parties and that the plaintiff had no right to sue. The defendants filed an additional written statement wherein they averred that they were entitled to protection under the pro­visions of the Assam Act 12 of 1955 and that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, that is, the legal heirs of late Padmabati Das. 8. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed in Title Suit No. 18/59: 1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action? 2. Has the plaintiff any right to sue? 3. Is the suit bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? 4. 8. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed in Title Suit No. 18/59: 1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action? 2. Has the plaintiff any right to sue? 3. Is the suit bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the relief claimed in the suit without obtaining a declaration of his right and title in the suit premises? 5. Is the suit maintainable in law and in its present form? 6. Has the suit been properly valued? 7. Did the plaintiff become the owner of the suit premises on the death of Mrs. Padmabati Das? 8. Is the lease dated 7th April 1951 granted by late Mrs. Padmabati Das. In favour of the defendant No. I invalid and obtained by fraud or false misrepresentation? IB. Has the plaintiff let out parts of the premises in suit as alleged by the plaintiff? 10. Whether the defendants committed any waste to the properties in suit? Whether the defendants made some unauthorised constructions on dif­ferent parts of the properties? 11. Whether the acts of defendants con­stitute permanent encumbrances to the properties in suit? 112, Was any legally valid notice served upon the defendants? 13. Are the defendants defaulters under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Con­trol Act? 14. Is the plaintiff entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit? 15. Whether the defendants are entitled to any compensation under S. 35-A, Civil P. C.? If so, how much? 16. To what relief are the parties entitled? Additional issue: 17. Whether the defendants are protected from eviction under the provi­sions of Assam Act 12 of 1955? 9. The learned trial Judge, who tried both the suits analogously and disposed of the same by a common judgment, decreed R. S. No. 3/59 for Rs. 6200/- with costs and decreed T. S. No. 18 of 1959 partly with proportionate costs. In T. S. 18/59 the plaintiff's claim for arrear rent of Rs. 600/- was decreed but his claim for recovery of khas possession of the suit premises was rejected. Against the decree in R. S. No. 3/59 the defendants therein have filed F. A. N. 25/63. In T. S. 18/59 the plaintiff's claim for arrear rent of Rs. 600/- was decreed but his claim for recovery of khas possession of the suit premises was rejected. Against the decree in R. S. No. 3/59 the defendants therein have filed F. A. N. 25/63. Against the decree in T. S. No. 18/59 the plaintiff therein filed Title Appeal' No. 3/63 in the Court of the District Judge, U. A. D. at Jorhat, which was transferred to the High Court and has been numbered as F. A. 44/66 along with the cross-objection. 10. Let us first take up the First Ap­peal No. 25/63: On the submissions made by the learned counsel of both parties, the following points arise for decision: 1. Whether the plaintiff has a right to bring the suit for realisation of rent due to late Padmabati Das? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of the other legal heirs of late Padmabati Das? 3. Whether the defendants have been able to substantiate their plea of payment of rents? The suit properties belonged to late Dhairya Narayan Das. He left a will dated 21-2-1920 in favour of his wife late Padmabati Das. Dhairya Narayan Das died In October 1921. The probate of the will was granted on 8-5-1922. A certified copy of the probate has been filed in the case which is Ext. 32. By virtue of the will, late Padmabati Das became the absolute owner of the suit properties left by her husband. The plaintiff, who was the son of the brother of Dharya Narayan Das, in the ordinary course, would have been the Teversioner and would.have got the pro­perties of late Dhairyanarayan Das after the death of his widow as a reversioner but due to the intervention of the will that position changed and Padmabati Das became the absolute owner of the suit properties. The above facts are found proved by the evidence on record. 11. The above facts are found proved by the evidence on record. 11. In 1949 the plaintiff brought a suit against Padmabati Das for a declaration that the properties described in schedule to the plaint of that suit was undivided Soint property of the joint family of which the plaintiff was the sole surviving male member and as such he was entitled to half share of it as heir and to the other half as reversioner and also for declara­tion that the will left by the defendant's husband late Dhairya Narayan Das was void and inoperative. The suit was numbered as T. S. 3/49. A compromise decree was passed in T. S. No. 3/49 and the compromise petition No. 925 dated 29-12-1950 was made part of that decree. Ext. 13 is a certified copy of the decree in T. S. No. 3/49 dated 31-1-1951. Clauses (b) and (c) of the compromise petition are as follows: "(b) That the plaintiff hereby agrees that during the life-time of the defendant, she will be in actual possession of the land in suit with buildings, structures and other appurtenance thereon and enjoy all the rents and profits thereof without any in­terruption, claim, demand or disturbance by the plaintiff or any person claiming through or under him. (c) That the defendant agrees not to alter, sell, mortgage, commit any waste or encumber in any way or make any dis­position of by will or otherwise the pro­perties in suit arid that on her death the same, that is, the property in suit shall devolve and be vested upon the plaintiff absolutely and, in case the plaintiff pre­deceases the defendant, upon the plain­tiff's rightful heirs and legal representa­tives." The suit properties In T. S. No. 18/59 are Included in the suit properties in T. S. No. 3/49. This decree in T. S. 3/49 has aot been set aside by any superior Court and as such It stands and It remains bind­ing on the parties thereto or their, succes-sors-in-interest. 12. In terms of the decree In T. S. 3/49, $he plaintiff Jogesh Chandra Das became the absolute owner of" the properties in the present suit on the death of late Padmabati Das who died on 25-2-59. R. S. 3/59 was filed for realisation of the rent due to late Padmabati Das for the period from 1st June 1956 to 25th February 1959. R. S. 3/59 was filed for realisation of the rent due to late Padmabati Das for the period from 1st June 1956 to 25th February 1959. After the death of Padmabati Das, the plaintiff obtained the succession certifi­cate on 2-5-59 which is Ext. 28 in the case. This succession certificate was ob­tained among other things for realisation of Us. 6454 from Sudhir Chandra Guha, Khaliamari Ward, Dibrugarh Town as house rent from 1st April 1956 to 25th February 1959 for holding No. 882 of Khalihamari Ward, Dibrugarh town. The defendants admitted and relied on the lease deed dated 7-4-51, Ext. G, executed by Padmabati Das and the 1st defendant. The deed was duly registered and re­mained effective and operative. Though the plaintiff in his plaint alleged that the lease deed was collusive and fraudulent, yet the lease deed stands valid and opera­tive inasmuch as it has not been declar­ed illegal and inoperative by any Court. The admitted position being that the 1st defendant took lease of the suit premises from Padmabati Das at a monthly rent of Rs. 200, he is liable to pay rent to Padmabati Das till her death. If any arrear rent Was due by the 1st defendant to late Padmabati Das, apart from other questions as to title of the plaintiff in the suit premises, by virtue of the succession certificate the plaintiff is entitled to re­cover the arrear rent. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiff has a right to bring Rent Suit No. 3/59 for the realisation of the rent due to late Padmabati Das. The plaintiff's right to sue so far as this case is concerned is based on the succession certificate and if there are other legal heirs of late Padmabati Das they may have a claim against the plaintiff in res­pect of the amount realised under the decree, but the present Rent Suit as such cannot be said to be bad for non-joinder of the other legal heirs of late Padmabati Das, if 13. We have next to consider the plea of payment taken by the defendants in the instant case. The defendants' definite case is that at the time of taking the lease on 7-4-1951, a sum of Rs. 7200/- was paid to Padmabati Das towards advance rent. Regarding the payment of this sum of Rs. We have next to consider the plea of payment taken by the defendants in the instant case. The defendants' definite case is that at the time of taking the lease on 7-4-1951, a sum of Rs. 7200/- was paid to Padmabati Das towards advance rent. Regarding the payment of this sum of Rs. 7200/-, some discrepancies in the deposition of the 1st defendant himself have been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. But this amount is mentioned in the registered lease deed, the genuineness of which was never questioned during the Padmabati Das. The lease was executed on 7-4-1951 and Padmabati died on 25-2-1959. In the circumstances we are inclin­ed to accept that the sum of Rs. 7200 was paid to Padmabati Das as advance rent at the time of execution of the lease deed. 14. The defendants adduced evidence to show that a further sum of Rs. 16,900/-towards rent was either paid to Padmabati Das herself or paid to her through her authorised agent Nikhilend Das who was examined on commission as a defence witness. From the evidence it appears that Padmabati Das knew Assamese and Bengali and she could write in those two languages. Exts. 1, 2, 4, 10, 22, 23, 25 (before the Commissioner) are receipts wherein signatures or thumb impressions taken in presence of a lawyer are found. Ext. 1 is a receipt written in Bengali which Padmabati could read and write and the other exhibits mentioned above show that the amounts were sent either by money order or by insured post. In the circumstances there is no difficulty in accepting that these payments were made by the 1st defendant to Padmabati Das. The total amount covered by these receipts appears to be Rs. 2350/-. 15. Exts. 3, 5 to 9, 11 to 21, 24 and 27 are receipts written in English and signed by Nikhil Das, Nikhilendu Das or N. Das. Of these, Exts. 11, 13, 15, 18 and 19 are money order receipts addressed to Mrs. Padmabati Das by the remitter. On these receipts, however, there is no'signature or thumb impression of the addressee Padma­bati Das. Rules 118 and 119 of the Indian Post Office Rules framed under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, read as follows:- "118. Of these, Exts. 11, 13, 15, 18 and 19 are money order receipts addressed to Mrs. Padmabati Das by the remitter. On these receipts, however, there is no'signature or thumb impression of the addressee Padma­bati Das. Rules 118 and 119 of the Indian Post Office Rules framed under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, read as follows:- "118. The payment of a money order shall ordinarily be made at the address of the payee:- (1) to the payee himself, where it has been so indicated by the remitter on the money order form; (2) in any other case, to the payee or to any person authorised in writing by the payee in this behalf. 119. The money order and acknowledg­ment shall be signed by the payee named by the remitter, or by some person autho­rised in writing by the payee in this behalf. The signature shall be written in ink in the space provided for the pur­pose." There is no signature or thumb impression of the payee on any of the said receipts as required under the Indian Post Office Rules (Supra). No letter of authority by the payee Padmabati Das in this respect has been produced or proved in the case. D. W. Nikhilendu Das in his evidence ad­mitted that Padmabati Das did not give ^im any authority in writing or anything ;in writing to realise, rent of the suit pre-Imises from the 1st defendant or to do any 'act regarding the said premises, but he acted on her request and verbal instructions. He clearly admitted in his evi­dence that he had no* written authority from Padmabati Das to receive money orders on her behalf. In the circum­stances the money order receipts which were signed by Nikhilendu Das cannot be legally accepted as payments to the ad­dressee Padmabati Das. 16; The lease of the suit premises was granted on 7-4-1951 with effect from 1-4-1951. By Ext. 1 (Com) Padmabati Das acknowledged receipt of Rs. 200/- on 4-12-1951 as advance rent. This receipt was written by Nikhilendu Das. The date has been written in English also under the date written in Bengali and Nikhilendu Das cou'ntersigned the receipt. Ext. 1 (Com) bears revenue stamp, but Exts. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 26 and 27 (before the Commissioner) do not bear revenue stamps. Ext. This receipt was written by Nikhilendu Das. The date has been written in English also under the date written in Bengali and Nikhilendu Das cou'ntersigned the receipt. Ext. 1 (Com) bears revenue stamp, but Exts. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 26 and 27 (before the Commissioner) do not bear revenue stamps. Ext. 29 (Com) is a letter dated 22-9-1952 written by Padmabati Das In Bengali to the 1st defendant From this letter it appears that a sum of Rs. 50/-was paid by the 1st defendant which was asked to be treated as payment in Bhadra; Rs. 50/- for the month of Aswin was directed to be sent to her Goalpara ad­dress; a sum of.Rs. 50/- paid previously by Ema (wife of the 1st defendant) was taken as payment for the month of Sravan. In the said letter the 1st defendant was re­quested to send either by himself or by, his wife a sum of Rs. 50/- p. m. to Padmabati Das to her address wherever she resided. She further acknowledged receipt of the sum of Rs. 700/- up to date in three instalments at the rate of Rupees 200/- and in two instalments at the rate of Rs. 50/-. She further stated in Ext. 29 (Com) that she would keep an account of these receipts and she requested the 1st defendant also to keep accounts of the payments to her. She further requested the 1st defendant to send Rs. 50/- for the month of Aswin on receipt of the said letter. Ext. 36 (Com) is another letter written by Padmabati herself in Bengali It is dated 8-3-1958. In Ext. 36 (Com) Padmabati Das wrote that Nikhil Babu told her that after a long corres­pondence and after a long time about 5 to 7 days ago 1st defendant sent Rs. 300/- in his name. She further requested the 1st defendant to send a sum of Rs. 700/- very early which was needed for her treatment. She further requested him to send the said Rs. 700/- by money order in her name as Nikhil Babu was not available at all times and that on receipt of the said Rs. 700/- at least for 6 or 7 months she would not trouble the 1st defendant. We have already seen that under Ext. 22 (Com) a sum of Rs. 700/- was received by Padmabati on 28-3-1958. 700/- by money order in her name as Nikhil Babu was not available at all times and that on receipt of the said Rs. 700/- at least for 6 or 7 months she would not trouble the 1st defendant. We have already seen that under Ext. 22 (Com) a sum of Rs. 700/- was received by Padmabati on 28-3-1958. No receipt has been produced for the sum of Rs. 300/-which was said to have been received by Nikhil Babu five to seven days prior to 8-3-1958. A receipt for Rs. 300/- is found to have been given by Nikhilendu Das on 18-3-1958 under Ext. 21 (Com). If the sum of Rs. 300/- was sent 5 to 7 days prior to 8-3-1958, it is not understood why a receipt for Rs. 300/- was given on 18-3-1958. From Ext. 36 (Com) it appears that the sum ol Rs. 300/- was sent by the 1st defendant to Nikhil Babu. The 1st defen­dant resides at Dibrugarh and Nikhil Das resides at Goalpara and there is no expla­nation from, the defendants' side how this money was sent to NikhiLDas. There is no explanation why Ext. 21 (Com) should be dated 18-3-1958 if the same was receiv­ed as stated in Ext. 36 (Com) five to seven days prior to 8-3-1958. These circum­stances arouse reasonable doubts as to the genuineness of Ext. 21. We have already observed that D. W. Nikhilendu Das ad­mitted that Padmabati did not give him any authority in writing or anything in writing to realise rent of the suit premises from the 1st defendant or to do any act regarding the said premises. 17. Regarding the authority for Nikhi­lendu Das to realise rent on behalf of Padmabati, the 1st defendant relied on Ext. 38 written in English at Goalpara and dated 30-11-1954. The signature of Padmabati Das is there in Assamese. Ext. 38 appears to /be very important document In the instant case. By this letter Padma­bati admitted the receipt of Rs. 3500/-, she permitted 1st defendant to make payment of rent of her house to Nikhilendu Das of Goalpara, to construct or alter the build­ings which would be found necessary for; the 1st defendant's residential and busi­ness purposes, to fit electric pump and new electric fittings etc. and also to repair the houses whenever necessary. We have al­ready observed that Padmabati Das new both Bengali and Assamese. and also to repair the houses whenever necessary. We have al­ready observed that Padmabati Das new both Bengali and Assamese. She used to write long letters in Bengali as is evidence-ed by Ext. 28 dated 21-5-1952, Ext. 29 dated 22-9-1952, Ext. 36 dated 3-8-1958. Naturally one would wonder why Ext. 38 dated 30-11-1954 was written in English and only the signature was put in Assamese. Nikhilendu Das in his ex­amination in chief stated that Ext. 38 was a typed letter in English drafted by him at the request of Mrs. P. Das and the con­tents of the letter were explained to her. He further stated that Ext. 38 was written in reply to a letter by the 1st defendant to Mrs. P. Das. We do not know what was contained in the 1st defendant's letter dated 2-11-1954 mentioned in Ext. 38. Moreover, in Ext. 38 a receipt for Rupees 3500/- was said to have been sent along with it. -This receipt is Ext. 26 (Com) dated 15-11-1954. There is no revenue stamp on it. The contents of the receipt are typed and the signature of Padmabati Das exists in Assamese. This receipt dated 15-11-1954 is alleged to have been sent with letter dated 30-11-1954 which was in reply to a letter dated 2-11-1954 from the 1st defendant to Padmabati Das. More­over, 1st defendant (D. W. 5) stated that in his ledgers the rent account of Padma­bati would be found; some ol the remit­tances on account of rent and expenditure incurred in connection with suit property would be found in the ledgers and some would not be found and that the remit­tances and expenditures which were not in the ledgers could be found only by re­ceipts. He produced the cash books only. Ext. V-2 is the copy of the entry in cash book for 1952-53 of the Eastern Engineer­ing Company of Dibrugarh for payment of house rent to Mrs. Padmabati Das. wherein there is a reference to payment of Rs. 450/- to Mrs. Padmabati Das of Goalpara on 2-1-1953 through Nikhilendu Das. Ext. V-3 is the copy of the entry in cash book for the year 1954-55 of the Eastern Engineering Company for pay­ment of house rent to Mrs. Padmabati Das wherein it is found that a sum of Rs. 500/-was remitted to Padmabati Das on 15-1-1955 towards house- rent of Khaliamari house. Padmabati Das of Goalpara on 2-1-1953 through Nikhilendu Das. Ext. V-3 is the copy of the entry in cash book for the year 1954-55 of the Eastern Engineering Company for pay­ment of house rent to Mrs. Padmabati Das wherein it is found that a sum of Rs. 500/-was remitted to Padmabati Das on 15-1-1955 towards house- rent of Khaliamari house. It is strange however to find that cash book for the year 1953-54 has not been produced. That apart, the receipt Ext 26 (Com) is dated 15-11-1954 and if the sum of Rs. 3500/- was paid in between 1st April, 1954 and 31st March, 1955, this amount would have been sure­ly entered in the cash book for 1954-55, but in 1954-55 only a sum of Rs. 500/-was shown1 as paid on account of house rent of Khaliamari house to Padmabati Das. Hence Ext. 26 (Com), the receipt for Rs. 3500/- for rent of Dibrugarh house at Khaliamari granted in November 1954 does not appear to be genuine. In Title Suit No. 12/51, Padmabati Das was exa­mined on commission by the MunsifE, Goalpara on 11-12-55 and 26-2-56. The evidence is to be found in Ext. 18 in this case. She stated therein that it was not proper on the part of Sudhir Babu to construct any house without her permis­sion and she had got objection to such construction. She further added that Sudhir Babu had constructed houses forcibly against the terms of the lease. If the contents of Ext 38 which is dated 30-11-54 were known to Padmabati Das, she would have certainly stated that she gave permission for such constructions. From these statements made by Padma­bati Das on oath in Title Suit No. 12/51, it appears that the contents of Ext. 38 were not known to her. It is also not proved by any evidence that this letter Ext. 38 was in fact sent from Goalpara on that day to Dibrugarh inasmuch as the postal envelope is not produced. Hence, no reliance can be placed on the contents of Ext. 38. The 1st defendant himself admitted that the amount of Rs. 3500/- under Ext. 26 (Com) as well as the amount of Ks. 1500/- under Ext. 24 (Com! were not entered in his cash books and he did not remember how these amounts were paid to Padmabati. Hence, no reliance can be placed on the contents of Ext. 38. The 1st defendant himself admitted that the amount of Rs. 3500/- under Ext. 26 (Com) as well as the amount of Ks. 1500/- under Ext. 24 (Com! were not entered in his cash books and he did not remember how these amounts were paid to Padmabati. The 1st defendant also stated that sometimes he paid rent to Nirmalendu, the brother of Nikhilendu who was an Electrical En­gineer at Dibrugarh but the receipts were granted to him by Nikhilendu. Unless there is definite proof that the sums for which receipts were given by Nikhilendu were in fact paid to Padmabati, such pay­ments cannot be accepted as payments to Padmabati only on the statement of Nikhilendu whose evidence appears to be interested. In view of the facts and cir­cumstances of the case, it would be diffi­cult for any court of law to accept the receipts executed by Nikhilendu Das to prove payment of rent by the 1st defen­dant to Padmabati Das. On a careful consideration of the evidence on record, we hold that the defendants have been able to prove payment of Rs. 7200/- plus Es. 2350/- in total Rs. 9550/- towards rent. Thus rent had been paid up to the end of March, 1955 at the most. 18. The 1st defendant stated that he paid Rs. 3014.38 nP. towards municipal taxes and Rs. 364/- towards land revenue for the suit premises. In his evidence, the 1st defendant (D. W. 5) stated that the municipal tax was payable by Padma­bati, but according to her and Nikhil-endu's instructions, he paid municipal tax of about Rs. 3000/- and land revenue of about Rs. 400/-, which should the adjusted towards rent. To prove the payment of 'municipal tax he examined D. W. 1. Ext. 1 is a document prepared by D. W. 1 on the application of the 1st defendant on the basis of the entries of demand bill register from 1951 to 1959. But neither the demand bill registers nor any certi­fied copies thereof have been produced in Court Admittedly under the terms of the lease, municipal tax as well as land revenue were payable by Padmabati, the landlord. But neither the demand bill registers nor any certi­fied copies thereof have been produced in Court Admittedly under the terms of the lease, municipal tax as well as land revenue were payable by Padmabati, the landlord. The 1st defendant (D. W. 5) stated in cross-examination that he had got the municipal tax payment receipts and the land revenue receipts with him, and then he added that he did not know whether these receipts were with him or the receipts were sent to Padmabati To prove the payment of land revenue, he examined the Mouzadar, D.W. 3. But this witness has not produced any receipt but he has proved the certificate, Ext. U. It is not understood under what provi­sion this certificate was issued. He should have produced the counterfoil receipts to prove these payments. On a considera­tion of the evidence regarding the pay­ment of municipal tax and land revenue, It is found that the 1st defendant did not produce the receipts though he stated that the receipts were with him and these receipts alone could have proved the pay­ment. If the 1st defendant really paid the municipal tax and land revenue.there was no reason why he sent these receipts to Padmabati without keeping any receipts from her for those payments. In the circumstances, we hold that the learned Subordinate Judge rightly held that the payment of the municipal tax 'and the land revenue by the 1st defen­dant could not be legally proved. 19. The 1st defendant also claimed that a siim of Rs. 2700/- was expended by him in repairing the suit premises. There is no express authority permitting him to incur the expenditure. We have already discussed Ext. 38 and found that no reliance can be placed on it. The evidence given by Padmabati Das who was examined on behalf of the 1st defen­dant in Title Suit No. 12/51 has already been referred to. In cross-examination, the 1st defendant (D.W. 5) stated that in Title Suit No, 12/51 Padmabati was exa­mined on Commission as his witness and he had read her deposition and he did not remember if he protested against her statement. Though the 1st defendant in his evidence stated that he spent Rs. 2700/- in repairing the premises, there is nothing on record to show that any bills for the expenditure incurred for the repairs of the premises were at all sub­mitted to Padmabati Das. Though the 1st defendant in his evidence stated that he spent Rs. 2700/- in repairing the premises, there is nothing on record to show that any bills for the expenditure incurred for the repairs of the premises were at all sub­mitted to Padmabati Das. Moreover, the 1st defendant did not produce his account books to substantiate his statement that he actually spent Rs. 2700/-. In the cir­cumstances, we are unable to accept his statement that he spent the sum oi Rs. 2700/- towards repairs of the premises on instruction from Padmabati Das. 20. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, we are clearly of opinion that the 1st defendant did not pay any rent to Padmabati Das from 1st June 1956 to 25th February 1959 as claim­ed by the plaintiff in the suit and the 1st defendant is liable to pay the said amount. We, therefore, hold that the learned Subordinate Judge correctly de­creed the suit for Rs. 6200/- against the defendants in rent suit No, 3 of 1959, 21. Let us now take up F. A. 44/66 which arises out of T. S. 18/59. Some of the issues in T.S. 18/59 had been decided against the plaintiff who has challenged those findings of the learned trial Court in his appeal. Some of the issues had been decided by the learned trial Court against the defendants who had challeng­ed those findings in their cross-objection. Issues 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 had been decided .by the learned trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. He held that Padmabati Das was the absolute owner of the suit properties and after her death, the plain­tiff had become the absolute owner of the same on the strength of the decree 'in T.S. 3/49. The other heirs of Padma­bati Das if there were any had no right and title to the suit properties and that the suit was maintainable in law In Its present form. Against these findings the learned counsel appearing for the respon­dents submitted that the present suit was an ejectment suit simpliciter. The defen­dants disputed the title of the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to- get a decree in the instant suit without first getting a declaration of his title in a proper title suit. Against these findings the learned counsel appearing for the respon­dents submitted that the present suit was an ejectment suit simpliciter. The defen­dants disputed the title of the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to- get a decree in the instant suit without first getting a declaration of his title in a proper title suit. -He submitted that there was no mention of Title Suit No. 3/ 49 in the plaint, nothing was stated whe­ther the plaintiff became the owner by virtue of the decree in T.S. 3/49. That apart, the compromise decree in T.S. No. 3/49 could not confer any title inasmuch as it was not registered. It was further submitted that admittedly late Padmabati Das had other heirs than the plaintiff and without making the other heirs of late Padmabati parlies to the suit, no declaration in respect of the title to the suit properties could be made and in \hat view also the suit was bad for non-join­der of necessary parties. 22. The learned counsel for the appel­lant on the other hand submitted that the 1st defendant who claimed through Padmabati could not challenge the plain­tiff's title which was derived from her by virtue of the decree in T. S. No. 3/49 which stood unchallenged. By virtue of the decree in T. S. No. 3/49 the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit properties on the death of Padmabati Das and as such the other heirs of Padmabati Das if there were any were not necessary parties and the suit was maintainable in the present form and the plaintiff need not bring another title suit for declara­tion of his title to the suit properties, 23. On the submissions of the learned counsel of both the parties, the point that falls for determination is whether the plaintiff could get a decree in the instant case without filing a suit for declaration of his right to the suit properties. On a careful consideration of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced by them, it is found that the plaintiff brought the instant suit for ejectment on the basis of his title derived from Padmabati Das on her death by virtue of the decree in T.S. No. 3/49. The properties in T. S. No. 3/49 were the absolute properties of Dhairya Narayan Das. The properties in T. S. No. 3/49 were the absolute properties of Dhairya Narayan Das. During his life­time he made a will In respect of the entire properties in favour of his wife Padmabati Das, who after the death of her husband, got the will probated as evidenced by-Ext. 32, certified copy of the probate dated 8-5-1922. Though the plaintiff in his plaint in the instant suit stated in a roundabout way that he got the suit properties as a reversioner after the death of Padmabati Das, he cannot be allowed to take that plea at all on the face of the probated will and the decree in T. S. No. 3/49. The will was not set aside. On the other hand, on an exami­nation of the compromise decree, it is found that absolute right, title and Inte­rest of Padmabati Das in the suit proper­ties by virtue of the will was admitted and on that basis the compromise was entered into. The compromise decree in T. S. No. 3/49 laid down that on the death of Padmabati Das (defendant), the properties in that suit would devolve and be vested upon the plaintiff absolutely and in case the plaintiff predeceased the defendant (Padmabati Das), the properties would devolve on his rightful heirs'and legal representatives. The compromise decree in. T. S. No. 3/49 did not include properties other than the subject-matter of that suit. The" properties in respect of which the compromise was entered in­to in that decree were the subject-matter of the suit itself. Under S. 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, a consent decree is ex­empt from registration if it does not com­prise immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit. The compromise decree in question therefore was not required to be register­ed for conferring title in respect of pro­perties in the decree according to its terms. In the circumstances by virtue of T. S. No. 3/49 the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit properties on the death of Padmabati Das and the other heirs of Padmabati Das, if there be any are not found to be necessary parties In the present suit. 24. The defendants in their written statement took the stand that the plain­tiff could not succeed in the suit without impleading Sreemati Monica Borah and Sreemati Nalini Bala Choudhuri who were also the legal heirs of late Padma­bati Das. 24. The defendants in their written statement took the stand that the plain­tiff could not succeed in the suit without impleading Sreemati Monica Borah and Sreemati Nalini Bala Choudhuri who were also the legal heirs of late Padma­bati Das. Their case in the written state­ment was that the plaintiff along with some others were the legal heirs of Padmabati Das xand therefore the suit was not maintainable. Since Padmabati Das became the absolute owner of the suit properties by virtue of the will left by her husband and the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the same by virtue of the decree in T. S. No. 3/49,"the other heirs cannot be said to have any interest In the suit properties. 25. The 1st defendant obtained the lease of the suit properties from Padma­bati Das by Ext. 16. Under Ext. 16, the lease was to continue for 12 years; the lease would have expired in 1963 only. It was therefore argued that the suit which was filed in 1959 was in any view of the niatter premature. The 1st defendant claimed his leasehold right under Ext 16 which was executed by Padmabati Das and therefore the 1st defendant cannot chal­lenge the title of Padmabati Das in res­pect of the suit properties and he is estop­ped by Section 116, Indian Evidence Act. A tenant may however question deriva-tive title of successor of the landlord ordinarily but when the title in the de­mised property devolves on a person by virtue of a lawful decree against the land­lord, such derivative title cannot be questioned by the lessee so long as that decree stands as a valid decree. The plaintiff stepped into the shoes of Padmabati on 25-2-59 by virtue of the decree in Title Suit No. 3/49. Both the plaintiff and the 1st defendant claimed their right in the suit properties through Padmabati Das, and therefore the 1st defendant can­not challenge the title of the plaintiff who derived his title from the 1st defen­dant's landlady Padmabati Das by virtue of a lawful decree. The title of the plaintiff in the suit properties stand deter­mined by the decree in T. S. No. 3/49. In that view, we hold that the plaintiff need not bring any separate title suit to get a decree in this suit for eviction, if he was otherwise- entitled to get the ejectment decree. No doubt, Ext. The title of the plaintiff in the suit properties stand deter­mined by the decree in T. S. No. 3/49. In that view, we hold that the plaintiff need not bring any separate title suit to get a decree in this suit for eviction, if he was otherwise- entitled to get the ejectment decree. No doubt, Ext. 16 was for a period of 12 years and ordinarily the 1st defendant's leasehold right would have continued up to 1963, but by virtue of the decree in T. S. No. 3/49 the interest of Padmabati in the suit properties termi­nated on her death on 25-2-59 and it vest­ed on the plaintiff. Hence, under the provisions of Section 111(c) of the Trans­fer of Property Act, the lease of the suit properties granted by Padmabati Das in favour of the 1st defendant terminated on 25-2-1959. The continuance of stay of the 1st defendant on the suit property after 25-2-1959 would be without autho­rity unless he attorned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that he requested the 1st 'defendant to attorn to him in writing, but the 1st defendant refused to do so. Therefore the present suit for ejectment could not be said to be prema­ture. On a consideration of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the case, we are clearly of opinion that the present suit for ejectment is maintainable and the plaintiff has a right to sue and we affirm the findings of the learned trial ' Court in respect of Issues 2, 3, 4, 5 and -7. 26. The learned trial Court after considering the evidence on record found that a legally valid notice was served on the defendants and he decided issue No. 12 in favour of the plaintiff. We have considered the oral and documentary evidence regarding this issue and we are satisfied that the learned trial Court cor­rectly held that a legally valid ejectment notice was served on the defendants. 27. This is an ejectment suit and the same has been valued on the annual rental together with arrear rent claimed. We therefore find that issue No. 6 has been correctly decided by the learned trial Court. 28. The instant suit is not for declara­tion of the lease deed, Ext. 16 as invalid on the ground of fraud and misrepresen­tation. That apart, there is no definite allegation and proof of fraud etc. We therefore find that issue No. 6 has been correctly decided by the learned trial Court. 28. The instant suit is not for declara­tion of the lease deed, Ext. 16 as invalid on the ground of fraud and misrepresen­tation. That apart, there is no definite allegation and proof of fraud etc. In the circumstances, we agree with the finding of the learned trial Court regarding issue No. 8. 29. Issue No. 9 was decided against the plaintiff by the learned trial Court which held that there was no subletting as alleged in the plaint. The lease was taken by the 1st defendant. He deposed that the 2nd defendant is a registered private limited company and he was Managing Director of the 2nd defendant. It is therefore clear that defendants 1 and 2 are different persons in the eye of law. However, there is no proof from the plaintiff's side that the 2nd defendant paid any rent to the 1st defendant. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiff failed to prove any subletting by the 1st defen­dant. We, affirm the finding of the learn­ed trial Court regarding this issue. 30. We have considered the evidence regarding Issues Nos. 10 and 11 and we hold that the learned trial Court decided those issues correctly. 31. Issue No. 13 is whether the 1st de­fendant is a defaulter under the -Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. The plaintiff's case is that the 1st defendant defaulted payment of rent since March 1954. In the instant suit, the plaintiff claimed arrear rent for three months from Mav to July 1959 after the death of Padmabati Das. In Rent Suit No. 3/59 we have discussed the evidence regarding the plea of payment of rent taken by the 1st defendant and we have found that the 1st defendant paid up rent up to March 1955. In any view of the matter the defendants did not attorn to the plain­tiff after he became the absolute owner of the suit properties on the death of Padmabati Das on 25-2-1959, on which date the lease in favour of the 1st defen? dant determined. There was valid eject­ment notice on the defendants. There was no payment of rent since April 1955. In the circumstances, the defendants are liable to be evicted. 32. The last question to be consider­ed is whether the defendants are protect­ed under the provisions of Assam Act XII of 1955. dant determined. There was valid eject­ment notice on the defendants. There was no payment of rent since April 1955. In the circumstances, the defendants are liable to be evicted. 32. The last question to be consider­ed is whether the defendants are protect­ed under the provisions of Assam Act XII of 1955. Ext. 16 is the lease of the dwell­ing house and the premises of the land­lady at Khaliamari, Dibrugarh within the municipal area of Dibrugarh. It is not a lease of- land to which Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act Is applicable, which is clear from Sec­tion 2(1) (c) of the said Act. From Ext. 18 also, it is found that Padmabati rented her house at Dibrugarh to the 1st defen­dant by a deed of agreement. Thus it is clear that the said Act is not at all appli­cable to the instant case and the question of protection under Section 5 of the said Act does not arise. The learned trial Court misconceived the whole matter in discussing and deciding Issue No. 17. In the circumstances, we set aside the find­ing of the learned trial Court that the defendants are protected from eviction under Section 5 of the Assam Act XII of 1955. 33. In the circumstances, the plain­tiff's suit stands decreed both for eject­ment and compensation of Rs. 600/- for use and occupation. The appeal is allow­ed with costs and the cross-objection is dismissed. 34. In the result, F. A. 25/63 is dis­missed with costs and F. A. 44/66 is allow­ed with costs and the cross-objection is dismissed, 35. S. K. DUTTA, C. J.:- I agree. Order accordingly.