Judgment :- 1. In this Writ Petition, Mr. A. K. Ramaseshadrinathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the orders of the three subordinate authorities holding that an application filed by the contesting respondent, namely, the tenant, under S.11 (2) (b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959, is maintainable and in consequence giving appropriate relief to the tenant by vacating the order of eviction already passed. 2. The petitioner landlord filed an application for eviction of the respondent on the ground of default in the payment of rent and eviction was ordered on 22121959 by the Rent Control Court. There was an appeal taken against this order by the tenant to the appellate authority, namely, C. M. A. No. 460, and there is no controversy that the appellate authority, by its order dated 5 31960 dismissed the tenant's appeal and confirmed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. 3. The tenant does not appear to have challenged the matter any further and on 9 31960 filed two applications, (a) M. P. 829 of 1960 under S.11 (2) (b) of the statute for vacating the order of eviction that has been passed on 22121959 and (b) M. P. No. 830 of 1960 for excusing the delay in filing the application for vacating the order already passed. 4. These two applications were quite naturally opposed by the petitioner landlord. The main ground of objection that was taken by the landlord was that S.11 (2) (b) does not apply to circumstances like this and that there is no jurisdiction in the Rent Control Court either to entertain such an application or to vacate the order of eviction that has been already passed. 5. All the authorities have concurrently declined to entertain the objection raised by the landlord and the result was that" M. P. 830 of 1960, namely, the application to excuse the delay was allowed and the main application, M. P. No. 829 of 1960 purporting to be under S.11 (2)(b) of the Act was allowed, thereby vacating the order of eviction that has been already passed on 22121959 and that order, as I have mentioned earlier, was also confirmed by the appellate authority on 5 31960. 6. The approach that has been made by the three authorities in coming to the same conclusion was different. 6. The approach that has been made by the three authorities in coming to the same conclusion was different. But I am not impressed with the approach made by any of the authorities nor with the conclusion arrived at by all these authorities. As I will indicate presently, the approach made by them is absolutely erroneous. 7. Mr. A. K. Ramaseshadrinathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that S.11(2)(b) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959, has got a very limited operation and in this case inasmuch as no relief was sought for by the tenant in question before the Rent Control Court and within the time mentioned therein and inasmuch as the tenant had chosen to take up the matter in appeal the tenant can no longer avail himself of the relief provided under S.11 (2) (b) of the Statute. 8. No doubt, this position taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is controverted by Mr. T. Chandrasekhara Menon, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent. But I do not think it necessary to go into this matter in any great detail because I had occasion to consider a similar position in a recent judgment rendered by me in O. P. No. 835 etc., of 1961 and that judgment was rendered by me on 721963. 9. In that decision I had exhaustively considered the scheme of the statute which is under consideration before me now and with particular reference to the scheme of the provisions contained in S.11 (2) (b) of the Act and after a consideration of the various provisions and also the intention of the legislature as well as the scheme of the statute itself I had held that the appellate authority can in no sense be stated to be the Rent Control Court & it is probably at one stage, namely, when the matter was in controversy in the Rent Control Court that the Legislature wanted.to show an indulgence to the tenant to have the order set aside under S.11 (2) (b) by satisfying the requirements provided for therein and I have also stated that even after the adjudication has been made and the Rent Control Court had decided that the landlord was entitled to get an order of eviction, the legislature intended that the tenant must be given a chance to vacate the order of eviction. 10. 10. I had also indicated that the appellate authority functioning under S.12 or under S.18 of the statute can in no sense be stated to be a Rent Control Court. I have also referred to the definition of the expression "Rent Control Court" as well as the provisions constituting the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority. I have also indicated that the reliefs that could be claimed under S.11 (2) (b) will not be available to a tenant after he has chosen the remedy by way of appeal or revision and taken a chance of getting the order of eviction itself cancelled at the hands of the appellate authority or the revisional authority as the case may be. But the point to be noted is that I have also held that after a tenant had availed himself of the right of appeal and revision and ultimately failed, it is no longer open to him to fall back upon the limited right given to him of having the order of eviction set aside by the Rent Control Court under S.11 (2) (b). 11. It is also seen that my learned brother Raman Nayar, J., had also taken a similar view in the decision reported Mohamed Khani Rowther v. Thaivana Ammal (1963 KLT. 205), though this decision of the learned judge was not brought to my notice at the time when I had independently to consider a more or less similar question as the one that now arises before me. The only aspect dealt with by the learned judge and which requires to be noticed is that the learned judge, if I may say so with respect, takes the same view that I have taken in my decision, namely, the order of eviction was unsuccessfully taken in appeal and revision is absolutely irrelevant since S.11 (2) (b) expressly provides that the deposit is to be made within one month of the date of the order of the Rent Control Court and it gives no scope for the argument that the date of the dismissal of the revision petition is the material date. The learned judge has also stated that if a tenant pursues an appeal or a revision without seeking relief under S.11 (2) (b), he takes the risk of the appeal or revision being decided against him and cannot thereafter seek relief under S.11 (2) (b) after the time for that has elapsed. 12. Mr. T. Chandrasekhara Menon, learned counsel for the respondent, has fairly stated before me that the decision of Mr. Justice Raman Nayar was the subject of appeal in writ appeal No. 115 of 1962 & my lord the Chief Justice & Mr. Justice Govindan Nair have earlier in the day dismissed the appeal taken as against the judgment of the learned judge. That means, the position in law laid down both by myself and by my learned brother Raman Nayar, J. and indicated above is good law and therefore, it follows that the view of all the subordinate authorities in this case that it is open to the tenant in the circumstances of this case to invoke the provisions of S.11 (2) (b) must be considered to be absolutely erroneous. 13. Before parting with this case I must also refer to another decision of my learned brother, Velu Pillai, J., reported in Parvathy Ammal v. Chakkunny (1962 KLT. 655), wherein the learned judge has taken the view that it is open to a tenent to file an application under S.11 (2) (b) within one month as provided therein even before an appellate authority. So far as that question is concerned, with respect I expressly reserve my opinion to consider the said question as and when an occasion arises. Even that decision may not help the tenant in this case because admittedly application purporting to be under S.11 (2) (b) was filed not before the appellate authority but before the Rent Control Court. The fact that I am adverting to this aspect should not be understood to mean that I am in agreement with the view expressed by my learned brother, Velu Pillai, J., referred to above. 14. Subject to these observations, the Writ Petition is allowed and all the orders under attack are set aside. Parties will bear their own costs.