JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.- This Second Appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment filed by respondents 1 and 2, the owners of the land containing certain coconut topes, which form the subject-matter of the litigation. The appellant resisted the suit claiming that he was in occupation of the land as a lessee since August 1955, under an yearly lease, the same having been renewed every year, the last of such renewals being for a year from 13th August, 1958, and that he being a cultivating tenant was entitled to protection against eviction by reason of the provisions of Madras Act XXV of 1955. The agreement governing the rights of the parties is in writing. Exhibit A-4 is typical of the preceding agreements. That says in effect that the appellant had taken on lease for a year coconut trees standing on the five topes specified in the schedule to the document and that in respect of three of the topes the appellant should preserve the land and make fit for cultivation at his own expenses. The appellant further agreed that he would not cultivate any kind of crop on the land in the tope. The schedule to the document expressly stated that the lease was in respect of the trees standing on the properties namely coconuts, mangoes, jack fruit, etc. The document is in Tamil and the word used is “Guthagai” which is generally indicative of rent. But the term is also used sometimes to indicate fee payable under a license. The question for consideration is whether the appellant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the protection under Act XXV of 1955. The term “cultivating tenant” in relation to any land is defined under the Act as meaning a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied. “Cultivation” under the Act means use of land for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture. “Land” is defined as land used for purposes of agriculture or horticulture. section 3 of the Act declares that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding during the continuance of the Act except in accordance with the provisions contained therein. “Cultivation” under the Act means use of land for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture. “Land” is defined as land used for purposes of agriculture or horticulture. section 3 of the Act declares that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding during the continuance of the Act except in accordance with the provisions contained therein. It will be plain from the definition to which we have made reference that before the appellant can claim the protection of the Act, he should satisfy the Court that there has been a transfer of property in his favour under a tenancy agreement for agricultural purposes. Both the Courts below have held that the appellant could not be held to be a cultivating tenant and upheld the claim of respondents 1 and 2 for eviction. The substantial question that arises for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether there has been a lease of the land in favour of the appellant by respondents 1 and 2, and secondly whether such a lease is for agricultural purposes. The document makes it clear that the right created under the document is only in respect of the trees. The preamble as well as the schedule indicate that the agreement entitled the appellant only to collect the produce from the trees. There is no doubt a clause in the agreement which says that the appellant would be entitled to repair the land so as to render it useful for obtaining the produce. However that would seem to imply that no interest in land was created for if such a right or interest was intended to be created under the document, there was no necessity for this clause at all. Further, it is significant that the privilege to till the soil is confined only to three of the five topes mentioned in the document. More significant than that is an undertaking on the part of the lessee not to cultivate any other crop on the land. These as well as the express terms in the lease stating that the trees alone were granted would appear to show that what was granted was the usufruct of the trees impliedly coupled with a license to use the land. These as well as the express terms in the lease stating that the trees alone were granted would appear to show that what was granted was the usufruct of the trees impliedly coupled with a license to use the land. In Natesa Gramani v. Thangavelu Gramani1, a document stated that the lessee had: “taken for lease for two years palmyra trees” in a certain garden… .“that he would not cut the leaves of any of the trees except those whose leaves had to be cut out.” It was held that it was not a lease of immovable property and that the document containing the lease did not require registration. The decision no doubt, turned on the definition of movable property in the Registration Act which included juice in trees: but it is useful as a guide to the principle to be adopted in the construction of the document now in question. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Yagappa Nadar2, a question arose as to whether income derived from toddy, was agricultural income when it was received by the actual cultivator. On a construction of the document in that case it was held that no interest in the land had been transferred and what the petitioner obtained was a mere license to tap the trees and draw the juice. The learned Judges also held that the income derived from toddy would be agricultural income when it was received by the actual cultivator, whether owner or lessee of the land on which the trees grew. But if the income was received by a person who had not produced the trees from which toddy is tapped or had not done any agricultural operations whereby these trees had been raised, it would not be agricultural income. We will have to refer to this aspect of the matter when we consider the second point. In Venugopala Pillai v. Thirunavakkarasu3there was a lease of coconut trees for the purpose of drawing toddy. The document which was executed between the parties showed that the lessee obtained the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees and a right to enter upon the land for the said purpose. But it was equally clear from it that the lessee did not obtain any right in and to the land. The document which was executed between the parties showed that the lessee obtained the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees and a right to enter upon the land for the said purpose. But it was equally clear from it that the lessee did not obtain any right in and to the land. It was held that so far as the land was concerned, the lessee was a mere licensee, and his right to enter the land was only so long as he had the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees. But there was a further question in the case: viz., that with which we are not now concerned, whether such right as was granted to the lessee, the right of drawing toddy, would be “ immovable property” within the definition of that term in the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judges cited with approval the following passage in Marshall v. Green,1: “The principle of these decisions appears to be this, that wherever at the time of the contract it is contemplated that the purchaser should derive a benefit from the further growth of the thing sold from further vegetation and from the nutriment to be afforded by the land, the contract is to be considered as for an interest in land ; but where the process of vegetation is over, or the parties agree that the thing sold shall be immediately withdrawn from the land, the land is to. be considered as a mere warehouse of the thing sold, and the contract is for goods.” We are not however concerned in this case with any such provision of the Transfer of Property Act or whether a lease of usufruct from trees will be immovable property ; what we have to see is whether there has been a lease of the land. There can be no doubt that the appellant's right was to enjoy only the coconut yield from the trees which derived their nutriment from the land. It may be that such a benefit amounts to an interest in immovable property. But that is not the same thing as saying that there has been a transfer of the land itself. In the case cited above the distinction that there could be a transfer of interest in immovable property without there being a transfer of the land has been recognised. But that is not the same thing as saying that there has been a transfer of the land itself. In the case cited above the distinction that there could be a transfer of interest in immovable property without there being a transfer of the land has been recognised. In the unreported judgment in C.R.P. No. 696 of 1958 Rajagopalan, J. has held that where a lease was merely of the usufruct of coconut trees on land, the lessee who had the right to collect the usufruct of the trees already standing on the land without any right to carry on operations, horticultural or agricultural, would not be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of Act XXV of 1955. A slightly different view has however been expressed by Anantanarayanan, J. in Muthuraja v. Rajarathinam,2 where a lease was granted for the enjoyment of the usufruct of cashewnut plantation standing on the land. The learned Judge following the judgment of Ramaswami, J. in Chacko, In re3, held that the lessee would be a cultivating tenant. It is not very clear from the judgment of the learned Judge in the former case as to what exactly were the terms of the lease in that case whether there had been a transfer of the land by way of lease, express or implied, for agricultural purposes, In Chacko, In re3 Ramaswami, J., was concerned with the meaning of the term “agriculture” . The learned Judge after a full analysis of the judicial decisions held that the word agriculture denoted the raising of valuable or useful products deriving nutriment and sustenance from the soil with the aid of human labour or skill. We shall presently refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court which have given a somewhat narrower interpretation of the term. The question to be considered in the present case as we said earlier is whether there had been a lease of the tope as such or of the trees alone. That question would depend mainly on the terms of the agreement. It is evident from the contents of the document which we have set out above that it cannot be said that exclusive possession of the land was given to the appellant. On the other hand, he is prohibited from doing anything on the land. That question would depend mainly on the terms of the agreement. It is evident from the contents of the document which we have set out above that it cannot be said that exclusive possession of the land was given to the appellant. On the other hand, he is prohibited from doing anything on the land. In the case of three of the topes he was specifically given a power to render the soil fit, to facilitate presumably the irrigation of the trees, etc. We are, therefore, of opinion that there has been no lease of the land. It is argued for the respondents that even if that question were to be answered in the affirmative, the lease should not be regarded as one for agricultural purposes. Support for the argument is sought from the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy4. The question in that case concerned whether the profits realised from sale of forest trees would constitute agricultural income within the meaning of the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the term “agriculture” would comprise within it (1) basic operations like tilling of the land, sowing seeds, planting, etc., such basic operations requiring expenditure of human skill and labour on the land itself and (2) other operations which have to be resorted to by the agriculturist and which are absolutely necessary for the purposes of effectively raising the produce from the land, referred to as subsequent operations like protecting the crops, pruning, cutting, harvesting, etc. It was held that where there had been no sowing or planting but only subsequent tending and protection of the produce as in the case of a forest, it would not be agriculture. This view was reiterated in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Sri Ramakrishna Deo1. What is therefore essential to constitute an agricultural operation is the tilling of the land sowing seeds, planting and similar operations on the land. The mere presence of subsequent operations without there being the basic operations referred to above, as in the case of forest produce and spontaneous growth, could not be agricultural operations. In other words, if there are no basic operations as referred above, there cannot be an agricultural operation. Mr. The mere presence of subsequent operations without there being the basic operations referred to above, as in the case of forest produce and spontaneous growth, could not be agricultural operations. In other words, if there are no basic operations as referred above, there cannot be an agricultural operation. Mr. Ramamurthy Ayyar appearing for the respondents contends that as the coconut trees had already been in existence when the lease was made to the appellant, what he did or was expected to do in relation to them during the period of the lease could only constitute subsequent operations and the lease granted in favour of the appellant could not therefore be an agricultural one. We are, however, unable to agree with the contention. It is not necessary for the purpose of an agricultural lease that the lessee should do both the basic as well as subsequent operations. It would be sufficient if the basic operations had been done by somebody else even years earlier. Let us illustrate what we say. For example, suppose a piece of paddy land has been leased out to X who, after tilling and sowing the seeds, abandons the land, and the landlord is thereupon obliged to lease it out to Y for conducting the further agricultural operations, it cannot be said that the lease in favour of Y is not agricultural lease. The decisions referred to above were concerned with forest produce and there was no question of tilling the soil or planting by anybody at any time. It was held that as there could be an agricultural operation only if two things co-existed, namely, basic and subsequent operations the mere existence of the latter alone would not make the operation an agricultural one. That does not mean that both sets of operations should be done by the same individual or within a specified period of time. There can be an agricultural lease in regard to coconut trees planted already and existing on the land at the time the lessee takes the property on lease. Therefore if there had been a transfer of the land in favour of the appellant by way of lease, he would be entitled to protection as cultivating tenant as the lease should be regarded as one for agricultural purposes. Therefore if there had been a transfer of the land in favour of the appellant by way of lease, he would be entitled to protection as cultivating tenant as the lease should be regarded as one for agricultural purposes. But as we have held earlier that there was no demise of the land, the view taken by the Courts below is correct. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.S.-----Appeal dismissed.