JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.- These appeals which are filed by the State Government under section 7 of Madras Act XXX of 1956 raise the question whether the villages of Sembankulam, Chittanatham and Komagudi in Tiruchirapalli District are Inam Estates within the meaning of the Madras Estates Abolition Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948). The three villages form part of the properties endowed for religious and charitable purposes, the supervision and control thereof being with the Prince of Arcot. The management is now regulated by the provisions of the Prince of Arcot Endowments Act , 1922 (Madras Act II of 1922). It is admitted that the right of the charity over the villages is only to receive melwaram from the ryots who have permanent occupancy rights with respect to their holdings. Again, it is not a matter of dispute that the entire income thus received have been exclusively utilised since the 18th century when the two mosques were built at Tiruchirapalli, for their upkeep. The mosques were originally in the nature of private chapels for the use of their founder, the Nawab of Carnatic: but later they were thrown open to the public. There is however no evidence of actual dedication of the villages to the mosques. But there is evidence of the uniform conduct of the successors of the founder of treating the properties as belonging to the mosques and utilising the entire income therefor. We can at least infer therefore that the income from the villages was given to the charity. It is an accepted principle in law that where there is no indication to the contrary, a gift of income from a property will be equivalent to a gift of the corpus itself. If, therefore, it were to be held that there was an appropriation of the entirety of the income from the aforesaid villages exclusively for the benefit of the mosques, we can reasonably infer that the villages in question had been granted to the two mosques. If so much can be inferred, there is no further impediment in treating these villages as estates coming within the scope of section 3 (2) (a) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as there is ample material on record to show that the British Government had recognised such a grant. This precise question came up for consideration in C.R.P. Nos. If so much can be inferred, there is no further impediment in treating these villages as estates coming within the scope of section 3 (2) (a) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as there is ample material on record to show that the British Government had recognised such a grant. This precise question came up for consideration in C.R.P. Nos. 177 to 193 of 1950 with respect to one of the villages now concerned-Komagudi. Ramaswami, J., after an elaborate consideration of the relevant documents and authorities came to the conclusion that the village was an estate. Indeed, the position was conceded by the Prince of Arcot in his capacity as the Administrator of the endowments in regard to the Sembankulam village in an earlier case before this Court in S.A. Nos. 254 to 262 of 1947. After the passing of the Madras Act (XXVI of 1948) the Settlement Officer took action suo motu, and pursuant to an enquiry, found that the villages of Chittanatham and Komagudi were Inam Estates ; but that the village of Sembankulam was not. On appeal, however, the Tribunal held that none of the villages could be regarded as an Inam Estate as in its opinion there was not such a grant of the villages by the Nawab to the two mosques as to constitute a wakf under the Muslim Law. We now have to consider the correctness of that view. That the villages originally constituted the properties over which the Nawab of Carnatic had absolute power of disposal (that is, over the melwaram) admits of no doubt. Sometime during the 18th century the Nawab of Carnatic, Mahommed Ali Walajah, constructed two mosques at Tiruchirapalli and set apart the income from these villages for the upkeep of the mosques. No muttawali was however appointed. But that circumstance cannot make the dedication, if there was one, incomplete or ineffective. For, in such a case, the founder viz., the Nawab, should be regarded as the muttawali. Under the Muslim Law a wakf means dedication . by a person embracing the Muslim faith of any property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as religious, pious or charitable. The dedication must be permanent and by the owner of the property who by reason of such dedication of the property should divest himself of such property and hand over the possession thereof to the muttawali. by a person embracing the Muslim faith of any property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as religious, pious or charitable. The dedication must be permanent and by the owner of the property who by reason of such dedication of the property should divest himself of such property and hand over the possession thereof to the muttawali. Dealing with the subject of completion of a wakf, Mulla in his work on Mahomedan Law, states at page 170, Article 186: “A founder of a wakf may constitute himself the first muttawali (superintendent). The founder and the muttawali being the same person, no transfer of physical possession is necessary whichever of the two views is upheld. Nor is it necessary that the property should be transferred from his name as owner into his name as muttawali. Such a transfer is not necessary even in Allahabad where the view of Mahommed prevails.” (The two views referred to are of Abu Yusuf and Mahomed The former took the view that for a valid wakf a mere declaration by the owner would be sufficient while the latter stated that besides the declaration a muttawali should be appointed and possession of the property should be handed over to him.) Again, at page 173, Article 188, it is stated: “If land has been used from time immemorial for a religious purpose, e.g., for a mosque or a burial ground or for the maintenance of a mosque, then the land is by user wakf although there is no evidence of an express dedication.” The Tribunal has lost sight of the principle stated above. The treatment of the income from the villages since the 18th century should itself have been taken by the Tribunal as amounting to such user as would constitute a wakf. But it is not necessary to decide the case on any such ground as we are of opinion that the uniform course of conduct on the part of the founder's family and of the British Government shows that there must have been a grant or dedication of the villages. It is idle to expect after two centuries any evidence of dedication particularly when no writing is required under the Muslim Law to constitute a valid wakf. The long user in the case must itself point to a lawful origin and there could be no lawful origin unless there had been created a wakf. It is idle to expect after two centuries any evidence of dedication particularly when no writing is required under the Muslim Law to constitute a valid wakf. The long user in the case must itself point to a lawful origin and there could be no lawful origin unless there had been created a wakf. We shall now refer to the treatment of the properties all these years. Their history has, if we may say so with respect, been admirably summarised in the judgment of Ramaswami, J., in C.R.P. Nos. 177 to 193 of 1950. In the year 1787 there was a treaty entered into between Mahommed Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, and the East India Company. Clause 9 of the treaty stated: “That in the like event, His Highness the Nawab of Carnatic after deducting from the whole amount of revenues 2,13,421 pagodas annually for jagirs to the family of His Highness and 21,366, pagodas annually for charities shall and will pay into the treasury of the United Company 4/5ths of the Miscellaneous revenue to the general expenses of such war.” This treaty under which the Nawab of Carnatic agreed to pay 4/5ths of the revenues from the villages under his control specifically treated the private properties of the Nawab as distinct from charity properties. That would not have been so, unless the Nawab had divested himself of the properties, and dedicated the same to the charities. There was a later treaty in the year 1792 entered into between the Company and the Nawab. That would not have been so, unless the Nawab had divested himself of the properties, and dedicated the same to the charities. There was a later treaty in the year 1792 entered into between the Company and the Nawab. Clause 3 of the treaty stated: “The said company shall possess full authority over the Carnatic (except the jagirs belonging to the family of the said Nawab amounting to star pagadas 2,13,911 which, on condition of the good behaviour of the jagirdars of the said jagirs and of their fidelity to the Nawab and to the said company shall be continued to them subject to the pleasure of the said Nawab only, and except also certain charities amounting to star pagodas 21,366 subject to the same conditions as are mentioned with respect to jagirs) and shall collect the revenue thereof.” In the year 1801 the Company took over the management of the entire Carnatic and paid to the then Nawab 1/5th of the income from the Jagirs ; but the villages which formed part of the endowments were not taken over ; nor was there any provision thereunder for deducting likewise any part of the income from the charity properties. That shows that the villages were not treated in the same way as the private properties of the Nawab who by that time had taken the title of Prince of Arcot. The Inam Commission which investigated into the titles of the various Inams in the Madras Presidency in the second half of the 19th century enquired about the villages. Referring to Sembankulam which we shall take as typical, the Inam Fair Register states: “This was one of the villages reserved by the Nawab and given as mosque endowments referred to in paragraph 9 of the Tiruchy proceedings to which the Government Order, dated 13th September, 1859, applies.” The Inam Commissioner confirmed the grant. Even earlier than the enquiry there was recognition of the three villages as having been wholly dedicated to the mosque. In a letter, dated 8th July, 1859 from the Collector of Tiruchirapalli to the Board of Revenue, there is reference to a grant by Carnatic Sircar of these villages and it further stated that the affairs of the institution were being managed by the Nawab's agent. Enclosed to the letter was a list of properties granted for the support of mosques. Enclosed to the letter was a list of properties granted for the support of mosques. Therein the villages of Komagudi, Sembagudi and Chittanatham were referred to as having been entered in the Traver's Register and as “supported by no documents but granted for the support of the mosque.” The Government duly forwarded this statement to the Inam Commission who treated them as Inams. Soon after the Inam Commission completed its enquiry, there was a protest from the Nawab that the endowed properties could not be treated as Inams ; the reason was that the property being held under a treaty could not be classed with Inams properly so-called in which there was a power of resumption. It was only as a result of the Inam proceedings that such right of resumption was given up on the Inamdars paying a certain sum of money by way of quit rent and title deeds were thereafter granted to them. The outcome of the protest can be seen in Exhibit D-2 where we find the following observation of the Governor-in-Council: “The Rt. Hon’ble Governor-in-Council observes that the action of the Collector of Trichinopoly is clearly wrong in treating the endowments of the mosques and tombs of the Carnatic family an the same manner as ordinary inams especially when made aware that the Inam Commission had received special instructions not to deal with these tenures.” In Exhibit D-3 which deals with the villages, it is stated: “The marginally noted entire inam villages were first settled as religious inams in favour of certain mosques at Tiruchirapalli but the entries were subsequently struck off the English Inam Register under the orders of the Government, as the villages are not to be dealt with by the Inam Settlement Department. The villages named in the margin and minor inams in certain other villages formed the endowment granted by the Carnatic Circar for the support of certain mosques in the district of Tiruchirapalli. They were brought to inam settlement in 1870 under instructions contained in G.O. -No. 637 (Political) dated 13th September, 1859. The villages named in the margin and minor inams in certain other villages formed the endowment granted by the Carnatic Circar for the support of certain mosques in the district of Tiruchirapalli. They were brought to inam settlement in 1870 under instructions contained in G.O. -No. 637 (Political) dated 13th September, 1859. The Receiver of the Carnatic property appointed under Act XXX of 1858 having objected on the ground that the villages formed the private property of the Nawb although they were obstensibly held for the benefit of certain mosques and charitable endowments and that the Receiver had power to dispose of them, Government permitted him to act on his own judgment and responsibility in regard to the course to be taken by him in respect of the villages in question. As there was neither permanent settlement nor inam settlement in the case of these villages, it would be difficult to determine under section 17 of the Act whether the village service inams existing in the village are State grants or grants made by the Proprietor. It is probably also unlikely that the Government having relinquished their reversionary rights to these villages will now care to lay any claim to the village service inams in them.” The villages were consequently struck off from the Inam Fair Register as the Government had relinquished their reversionary rights in respect of them. The Receiver is stated to have claimed the endowed properties as the private properties of the Nawab, but that statement must be regarded as inaccurate in the light of the earlier records to which we have made reference. Presumably, he said so in the view that the mosque was a private one. Although the villages had been removed from the Inam Register, the enquiry conducted by the Commission will be of considerable probative value. The circumstance that the villages should not be regarded as an inam in the sense that there was a right of resumption therein in the British Government, cannot mean that there was no grant by the Carnatic Ruler, to the mosque. The removal of the villages from the Register of Inams was not because that they were not granted but for the reason that the Inam Commissioner could not treat them like any other Inam in which the Government had reversionary interest. The removal of the villages from the Register of Inams was not because that they were not granted but for the reason that the Inam Commissioner could not treat them like any other Inam in which the Government had reversionary interest. “Then again, the nature of the villages has been placed beyond all dispute by the passing of Act II of 1923 (The Prince of Arcot Endowments Act, 1923). That Act was necessitated as members of the public began to file suits to call the Prince of Arcot to account for the administration of the trust. That was regarded as not quite in keeping with the prestige and dignity due to the Prince. Mr. C.P. Ramaswamy Iyer who piloted the Bill which later came to be the law, elaborately dealt with the history of the endowments before the Legislative Council and pointed out that although the British Government took over the supreme suzerainty and undertook to pay one-fifth of the revenues of the Carnatic to the titular Nawab, they did not resume the management of the mosques and the endowments and the passing of the Religious Endowments Act did not alter the position as the Nawab continued to manage the same. The Law Member then stated: “I am mentioning this for the purpose of showing that practically by virtue of a political treaty the Prince of Arcot became vested: with special powers in respect of these endowments thus differentiating these endowments from the ordinary mosques or wakf properties. The Law Member then stated: “I am mentioning this for the purpose of showing that practically by virtue of a political treaty the Prince of Arcot became vested: with special powers in respect of these endowments thus differentiating these endowments from the ordinary mosques or wakf properties. As I said, this was a political arrangement and as such, no stipulations were made for any outside control-----subsequently owing to various reasons into which it is unnecessary to go just at present, a suit was filed in the Trichinopoly Court against the Prince on the footing that the Trichinopoly mosque and the properties appurtenant to that mosque were subject to ordinary Mahommedan Law, that the Prince was liable as an ordinary trustee and was accountable as an ordinary trustee.” Referring then to the dedication with respect to the Triplicane Mosque established by the Nawab, the Member referred to a judgment of this Court where it was held that the Nawab was not in the position of an ordinary trustee, that muttawallis could be appointed at his pleasure and that he was subject only to a kind of inherent supervision by the Government and that there was no power vested in any one in respect of this particular mosque to question the Prince of Arcot. There was also a suit with respect to the Trichinopoly mosque and during the pendency of that suit the Prince of Arcot is stated to have made a proposal for compromise practically waiving the supreme powers which vested in him as a representative of the former suzerain. It will be seen therefore that there was no contest at any time that there was no valid grant of the properties to the mosque by the Nawab: the only controversy was whether he who was in the position of a muttawalli should be dragged to the Court at the instance of any member of the public — a thing which was presumably regarded by some as an affront to his dignity. The Act put the matter beyond controversy. It provides for the better management of the endowments and prevents the Prince of Arcot being dragged to Courts by filing suits against the trust. Section 2 of the Act refers to the villages as religious endowments and correlates them to the institutions referred to under the Act. Schedule A gives a list of the properties constituting the religious and charitable endowments. Section 2 of the Act refers to the villages as religious endowments and correlates them to the institutions referred to under the Act. Schedule A gives a list of the properties constituting the religious and charitable endowments. The enactment itself therefore proceeds on the footing that there had been a valid setting apart of the villages for the charity ; but by virtue of the dignity due to him as the descendant of a former suzerain, he was not held accountable like any other mutawalli or trustee. In other words, the enactment is consistent with there having been a dedication of the properties mentioned therein: it was passed only for the limited purpose of precluding the public from interfering with his management by reason of his peculiar status and position. The Prince of Acrot at no stage repudiated that there was no endowment of the villages for the benefit of the mosque. Earlier we have referred to the fact that in the litigation that came before this Court (S.A. Nos. 254 to 262 of 1947) it was the common case for the Prince of Arcot as well as for the ryot that the village in question was an estate. The Tribunal has summarily rejected that decision on the ground that it would not constitute res judicata. But the point to be considered is not whether it would be binding as res judicata : but. what value the judgment has with respect to the statement contained in it that the Prince of Arcot conceded that the village in question was an estate. The Tribunal considered that considerable significance should attach to the treaty of 1792 which while it enabled the Company to retain 4/5th and pay only 1/5th income from the Jagirs to the Nawab, it allowed him to take the entire income in respect of what was called charity properties. This according to the Tribunal would show that the latter properties were private. In our opinion, the circumstance would support only a contrarty inference. Management of the charity was a matter of prestige to the Prince: he was allowed to have it. As the properties were not treated as. private properties, the Government did not take possession of them or even of 4/5th income therefrom as in the case of private properties. In our opinion, the circumstance would support only a contrarty inference. Management of the charity was a matter of prestige to the Prince: he was allowed to have it. As the properties were not treated as. private properties, the Government did not take possession of them or even of 4/5th income therefrom as in the case of private properties. Again, the stipulation in the treaty for resumption of both kinds of properties was to provide a sanction against disloyalty. That the private property and charity property were treated alike in this respect is of no significance. We have already pointed out that the failure to appoint a mutawalli cannot make a dedication incomplete. Nor do we see anything in there being an appointment of a mutawalli to the Triplicane mosque, while there was no such appointment for the Tiruchirapalli one. As the Nawab was in Tiruchirapalli, he evidently thought there was no need for it, particularly when he conceived it as his private worshipping place. The Prince of Arcot did not appear in these appeals to support the view taken by the Tribunal. Mr. N. Vanchinathan who appeared amicus curiae for there respondent contended that as there was no proof of the grant of the village and entries in the Inam. Register had been subsequently removed, it must be held that there was no dedication by the Nawab at any time of the properties in favour of the mosque. From what we have stated above, it would be plain that there was never a dispute that the melwaram interest in the properties had not been set apart for the benefit of the mosque. That there was a grant to the charity can admit of no doubt, having regard to the various documents referred to by us. Nor can there be any doubt that the British Government had recognised the same on more than one occasion. We cannot therefore accept the view taken by the Tribunal. Before concluding we must express our deep obligation to Mr. Vanchinathan for the able way in which he put forward the case on behalf of the respondent. The villages in question will, therefore, come within the scope of section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and would also constitute Inam Estates. The appeals, therefore, succeed and are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. V.S.-----Appeals allowed.