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1963 DIGILAW 92 (ORI)

KRISHNA NAIK v. S. BHASKAR RAO

1963-07-17

R.L.NARASIMHAM

body1963
JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against a final order u/s 131(3), Code of Criminal Procedure passed by Shri P.N. Negi Magistrate, First Class, Rayaghada directing the Petitioners to remove an obstruction said to have been placed by them in the bed of water channel known as 'Kushak Nullah' which is a public stream. 2. On 10-12-1960, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Rayaghada, drew up a proceeding u/s 133, Code of Criminal Procedure and caned upon the Petitioners to show cause as to why an alleged obstruction put by them across the aforesaid public channel known as Kushak Nullah should rot be removed. In the notice the Sub-divisional Magistrate did not expressly mention the particular Magistrate before whom cause should be shown though the last paragraph of Sub-section (1) of Section 133, Code of Criminal Procedure confers powers on him to direct the party concerned to shown cause either before himself or some other Magistrate of the first or second class. The Petitioners showed cause before the same Sub-divisional Magistrate and after some adjournments, he transferred the case on 1-8-1961 to the file of Shri P.R. Negi, Magistrate, First Class for disposal according to law. The case dragged on in his Court till 26-9-1962 but the Petitioners on no occasion objected to his hearing the case on the ground that the transfer of the case was made against the provisions of the Code and that he had no jurisdiction to try the same. 3. Mr. Murty for the Petitioners contended that the Sub-divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to transfer the case to the file of Shri Nagi after the Petitioner had shown cause. According to him if the Sub-divisional Magistrate wanted the case to be heard by some other Magistrate he should have specified in the preliminary notice u/s 133, Code of Criminal Procedure itself the name of the Magistrate before whom cause was to be shown. He further urged that the power of the Sub-divisional Magistrate to transfer any case to a subordinate Magistrate conferred by Section 192, Code of Criminal Procedure has no application to a proceeding u/s 133, Criminal Procedure Code. 4. There is undoubtedly a sharp conflict of judicial decisions on this question. The Patna High Court dealt with the matter in two Division Bench decisions viz. 4. There is undoubtedly a sharp conflict of judicial decisions on this question. The Patna High Court dealt with the matter in two Division Bench decisions viz. AIR 1945 Patna 316 and AIR 1945 Patna 334, where the previous decisions were reviewed and it was held that even if the order of transfer passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate after - cause was shown, is irregular, it cannot render the subsequent proceedings before the transferee Magistrate wholly void. A contrary view has however been expressed by several other High Courts. These have all been reviewed in a single Judge Decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1950 Allahabad 475, where it was held that the transfer of a proceeding u/s 133, Code of Criminal Procedure in exercise of the power conferred by Section 192, Code of Criminal Procedure would be invalid and that the subsequent action taken by the transferee Magistrate would be without jurisdiction. The decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the subject are not uniform. But in a recent Division Bench decision of that High Court reported in AIR 1956 Calcutta 24, the Patna view seems to have been preferred though in a later single Judge decision of that High Court in AIR 1956 Calcutta 220, the Allahabad view has been followed. The Rajasthan High Court in a recent Division Bench decision has criticised the view taken in AIR 1945 Patna 334. 5. The main reasonings in support of the two opposite views have been exhaustively given in the Patna and the Allahabad decisions and it is unnecessary for me to discuss them in, this judgment. It is sufficient to say, with respect, that see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Patna High Court and also by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court which has been followed all along in this State. Here there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction either on the part of the Sub-divisional Magistrate or on the part of Mr. Negi. Mr. Negi was undoubtedly competent to hear the case as he is a First Class Magistrate and Section 133 Code of Criminal Procedure confers power on the Sub-divisional Magistrate to direct the Petitioners to show cause before Mr. Negi, who could thereafter have tried the case. Negi. Mr. Negi was undoubtedly competent to hear the case as he is a First Class Magistrate and Section 133 Code of Criminal Procedure confers power on the Sub-divisional Magistrate to direct the Petitioners to show cause before Mr. Negi, who could thereafter have tried the case. Hence what has really happened is that the Sub-divisional Magistrate while issuing preliminary notice omitted to direct the Petitioners to appear before Mr. Negi on 4-1-1961, to-which date the case was adjourned first. Subsequently he transferred the case to Mr. Negi's file on 1-8-1961. In essence therefore the order of transfer has been made at a later stage of the proceeding whereas in law the Sub-divisional Magistrate was entitled to transfer it at an earlier stage. But this may at best amount to irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the Sub divisional Magistrate who had undoubted powers of transfer and when the Petitioners did not object to Mr. Negi Nagi's hearing the case at any stage though the case was pending before him for more than a year and no prejudice has been shown to have been caused by his hearing the same, I do not think I will be justified in quashing the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The second contention of Mr. Murty is that though in the preliminary notice obstruction to the village channel was alleged to have been caused at Umrapalli in the final order of the Magistrate it was stated that the obstruction was in village Kushak. The name of the nullah was correctly given and even in the final order dated 26th September, 1962 Mr. Negi added as follows: I hereby proceed u/s 137(3), Code of Criminal Procedure and made the conditional order passed u/s 133, Code of Criminal Procedure absolute, by directing the members of the opposite party to remove the obstruction in the nullah. Thus, notwithstanding the slight-discrepancy as regards the name of the village where the obstruction was caused, the final order makes it clear that it was the preliminary order that was made absolute. This discrepancy is very trivial. For these reasons the revision petition is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed