AMBALAL SHIVLAL v. D. M. VIN — 1963 DIGILAW 93 (GUJ)

N. M. MIABHOY, M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Petitioner is Ambalal Shivlal. Respondent No. 1 was at the relevant time the Officer presiding over the 1st Labour Court Ahmedabad. Petitioner was running at Ahmedabad an establishment for manufacturing bidis. Respondents Nos. 2 and 9 (hereafter called respondents simpliciter) were petitioners employees. The wages payable to respondents were governed by an award of the Industrial Tribunal. On 20th of January 1956 petitioner gave a notice that respondents shall be paid at the rate of Rs. 2-8-0 per 1000 rolls. The rate so offered by petitioner was lower than the rate fixed by the Industrial award. By their reply dated 4th February 1956 respondents refused to accept the variation in the rate. Thereafter there was some further correspondence between the parties and ultimately on 13th of February 1956 petitioner gave a notice to respondents in which he said that respondents had declined his offer and that therefore they were deemed to have left his service of their own accord and though originally his offer stood till 28 of February 1956 he had acquired a right to withdraw it and that he was not bound to wait till that date for the acceptance of his offer. Petitioner further contended in the notice that under the circumstances of the case he was not bound to give notice pay to respondents but that in spite of this he was giving to respondents the notice pay. Petitioner further stated in the notice that he was not under an obligation to pay any retrenchment compensation on the above grounds and also on the ground that sec. 25p of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereafter called the Act) was ultra vires the Constitution. Petitioner ended the notice by stating that however if any competent authority decided that retrenchment compensation should be given to respondents petitioner was prepared to do so. Respondents did not take any steps after this notice E On 3rd April 1959 each of the respondents filed a separate application in the Court of the 1st respondent under section 33c sub-sec. (2) of The Act. Respondents alleged therein that they were retrenched with effect from 13 of February 1956 and that they had not been paid retrenchment compensation as provided for in sec. 25p of the Act. (2) of The Act. Respondents alleged therein that they were retrenched with effect from 13 of February 1956 and that they had not been paid retrenchment compensation as provided for in sec. 25p of the Act. Therefore respondents claimed under the aforesaid section that the amount of their compensation should be determined by respondent No. 1 and that steps should be taken to recover the amount so determined under the provisions of the Act. Petitioner contested the applications. He contended that respondents were not retrenched but that the correct factual position was that petitioners establishment had been closed. Therefore he contended that respondents were not entitled to receive any compensation amount from petitioner. Petitioner also raised the question about the amount of the retrenchment compensation claimed by each respondent. He also contended that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide both or any of the aforesaid two questions and that those questions fell within the purview of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Respondent No. 1 found against all the aforesaid three contentions of petitioner. He held that he had jurisdiction to decide the question whether respondents were or were not retrenched and so he had also jurisdiction to determine the amount at which the retrenchment compensation should be computed. Respondent No. 1 also found that respondents were retrenched and that the establishment was not closed. Respondent No. 1 then determined the amount of compensation payable to each of the respondents and passed a suitable order to enable respondents to take steps necessary for the purpose of recovering the amount. Respondent No. 1 had consolidated all the 8 applications of respondents and he delivered one common judgment disposing of all the aforesaid applications. The present writ application is directed against that order of respondent No. 1 passed on 31 of October 1961. Petitioner prays that the proceedings in the recovery applications made by respondents herein and the records thereof be called by this Court from the file of respondent No. 1 and that a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction quashing the impugned order dated 31st October 1961 be issued. ( 2 ) MR. Vyas appearing on behalf of petitioner raised four questions for the decision of this Court. The first three points were the same which were raised before respondent No. 1. In addition to that Mr. ( 2 ) MR. Vyas appearing on behalf of petitioner raised four questions for the decision of this Court. The first three points were the same which were raised before respondent No. 1. In addition to that Mr. Vyas submitted that there was no evidence before respondent No. 1 on the basis of which he could have held that petitioners establishment was not closed and that therefore the finding of respondent No. 1 on that subject was vitiated by the fact that it was recorded on no evidence. ( 3 ) IN our judgment the contention of Mr. Vyas that on the facts of the case the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether respondents were or were not retrenched is valid and that the petition deserves to be allowed on that ground. In view of our this conclusion it is not necessary for us to consider the validity or otherwise of the other submissions made by Mr. Vyas. ( 4 ) NOW as already stated the petition was made under section 33c sub-sec. (2) of the Act. Section 33c is as follows:-"33c (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA the workman may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the amount at which such benefit should be computed may subject to any rules that may be made under this Act be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1 ). (4) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit the Labour Court may if it so thinks fit appoint a commissioner who shall after taking such evidence as may be necessary submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case. The contention of Mr. Vyas is that the question as to whether respondents are or are not retrenched is a question which falls within the special jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal that that question does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and that therefore the Labour Court has no jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act to decide the question as to whether respondents were or were not retrenched. In support of these contentions Mr. Vyas relies upon sections 7 and and 7-A of the Act which deal with the jurisdictions of the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal respectively. Section 7 enacts that the appropriate Government may by a notification in the official gazette constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. Section 7a enacts that the same Government by a similar notification may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. Against item No. 6 in the Second Schedule matters mentioned as coming within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court are: All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule. In the Third Schedule the following matters are mentioned against item No. 10:-"retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment"from the above provisions it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is wider than that of the Labour Court in the matter of industrial disputes. Its jurisdiction extends to all industrial disputes. It is also equally obvious that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not so wide and does not include all industrial disputes. It has no jurisdiction to deal with matters which are mentioned in the Third Schedule. Its jurisdiction extends to all industrial disputes. It is also equally obvious that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not so wide and does not include all industrial disputes. It has no jurisdiction to deal with matters which are mentioned in the Third Schedule. However in addition to the matters mentioned in the Second Schedule the Labour Court has been given the power to perform functions assigned to it under the Act. Therefore it is crystal clear that whereas the Industrial Tribunal can deal with all industrial disputes which can be dealt with by the Labour Court the Labour Court cannot deal with those industrial disputes which are included in the Third Schedule. Thus the jurisdiction of the Labour Court embraces only those matters which are mentioned in the Second Schedule and those functions which are assigned to it by the Act and does not include any other powers and functions. On the other hand the Industrial Tribunal enjoys a plenary jurisdiction over industrial disputes but does not appear to have been given the power to perform functions specially assigned to the Labour Court. ( 5 ) THE contention of Mr. Vyas the learned counsel for petitioner is based on item No. 10 in the Third Schedule which mentions Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment. The contention is that the questions relating to retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment are within the special jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that therefore they did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. ( 6 ) THE contention of Mr. Daru the learned counsel for respondents is based upon section 33-C (2) of the Act. The contention is that though the Second Schedule does not mention the above two questions sec. 33c (2) gives implied power to the Labour Court to deal with them. It is the validity of this contention which requires to be examined in the case. ( 7 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of section 33c confers jurisdiction upon the Labour Court to determine the amount at which a benefit is to be computed. The primary function assigned under that sub-section to the Labour Court is the determination of the amount of benefit. Thus the sub-section deals with benefit. If we compare the language of sub-sec (1) with that of sub-sec. (2) we find that sub-section (2) is wider in some respects than sub-section (1 ). The primary function assigned under that sub-section to the Labour Court is the determination of the amount of benefit. Thus the sub-section deals with benefit. If we compare the language of sub-sec (1) with that of sub-sec. (2) we find that sub-section (2) is wider in some respects than sub-section (1 ). The two sub-sections confer right upon an individual workman to obtain relief from the authorities mentioned therein. Whereas sub-section (1) confers right to recovery money sub-section (2) confers right to recover benefit which need not necessarily be money itself but which is capable of being converted into money. Sub-section (1) limits the jurisdiction of the authority only to the question as to whether the money claim is or is not still due at the date when the application for its recovery is made. On the other hand sub-section (2) confers jurisdiction upon the Labour Court to determine the amount at which the benefit is to be computed. Under sub-sec. (1) the money claim must arise under one of three heads-a settlement an away or under Chapter V-A of the Act. There is no such limitation in sub-section (2) in regard to the source of benefit. In addition to the aforesaid three sources benefit may arise from any other source also. The authority which is entitled to grant relief under sub-section (1) is the appropriate government whereas under sub-section (2) the authority is the Labour Court. Therefore under sub-section (2) it is quite clear that the primary function which is assigned to the Labour Court is to determine the amount at which benefit is to be computed so that the workman concerned may be enabled to recover it in the manner provided in sub-section (1 ). Thus the Labour Court has undoubted jurisdiction to decide all questions relating to the computation of the amount of benefit. But the question which arises for our consideration is as to whether that Court has or has no jurisdiction to determine the existence of the benefit on the basis of which the amount is sought to be computed. In other words when the employer disputes the right of the workman to a benefit on the basis of which the workman founds his claim the question arises whether under sub-section (2) aforesaid the Labour Court has got jurisdiction to determine the source on the basis of which the claim is made. In other words when the employer disputes the right of the workman to a benefit on the basis of which the workman founds his claim the question arises whether under sub-section (2) aforesaid the Labour Court has got jurisdiction to determine the source on the basis of which the claim is made. ( 8 ) NOW this subject came up for consideration before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in Central Bank of India Ltd. and others v. Rajagopalan and Others 1962 11 Labour Law Journal page 89. The question which arose for decision in that case was whether when the employer disputes the right of the workman on the basis of which right the claim is made under sub-sec. (2) aforesaid the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide about the existence of that right. Their Lordships held on two grounds that the Labour Court had such jurisdiction. Firstly they held that the first clause of sub-section (2) did not mean that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine the amount at which the benefit is to be computed only in those cases where the right on the basis of which the benefit was claimed was admitted by the employer. Secondly they held that if any such construction were to be adopted then it would place the jurisdiction of the Labour Court at the mercy of the employer. Their Lordships also referred to that canon of interpretation of statutes which says that where an Act confers jurisdiction it also grants impliedly the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution which canon is referred to in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at p. 350. Therefore there is no doubt whatsoever that the question as to whether the Labour Court has or has not the power or jurisdiction to determine the question about the existence of the right on the basis of which the amount at which the benefit is to be computed has been finally determined by the Supreme Court. Therefore in our judgment it cannot be now disputed that the Labour Court has got the jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the right on which the benefit is sought to be claimed is or is not in existence in any case where the employer disputes that particular right. Mr. Therefore in our judgment it cannot be now disputed that the Labour Court has got the jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the right on which the benefit is sought to be claimed is or is not in existence in any case where the employer disputes that particular right. Mr. Vyas does not dispute this proposition But his contention is that this power or jurisdiction of the Labour Court is subject to a limitation which Their Lordships themselves haste mentioned in the above case and according to him that limitation applies to the facts of the present case. Before dealing with the scope and ambit of section 33c (2) Their Lordships traced the legislative history of that sub-section and also some other allied sections and then made the following observations:-"the legislative history to which we have just referred clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes on the basis of collective bargaining the legislature recognized that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights. and so inserted section 33a in the Act in 1950 and added section 33c in 1956. These two provisions illustrate the cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to sec. 10 of the Act or without having to depend upon their Union to espouse their cause. Therefore in construing sec. 33c we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations. The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of sec. 33c cases which would fall under sec. 10 (1 ). Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively and their employers they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act as for instance. by reference under sec. 10 (1 ). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of sec 33 Similarly having regard to the fact that the policy of the legislature in enacting section 33c is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words though in determining the scope of sec. In other words though in determining the scope of sec. 33c we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under section 10 (1) of the Act for instance cannot be brought within the scope of sec. 33c". ( 9 ) THE contention of Mr. Vyas is based on the above observations of their Lordships. He contends that inasmuch as the question about the retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment falls within the special jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal the questions whether respondents were or were not retrenched or whether the establishment was or was not closed can be dealt with only by the Tribunal or the Labour Court under section 10 (1) and that in such a case a reference on the subject was necessary by the appropriate government under that section. Mr. Vyas contends that the jurisdiction to decide the aforesaid questions belongs to the Tribunal and that too only if a reference is made in respect thereof by the appropriate government and that if the conditions mentioned in the proviso to section 10 (1) are fulfilled then the Labour Court will have jurisdiction to decide those disputes provided a reference is also made to it by the appropriate Government It is not disputed before us that the conditions mentioned in the proviso to sec. 10 (1) are satisfied on the facts of the present case and that the appropriate Government could have made a reference under section 10 sub-sec (1) to the Labour Court. However under that section the Labour Court cannot take cognizance of those disputes unless a reference thereon is made by the appropriate Government. Therefore the contention of Mr. Vyas is that no reference having been sought on the aforesaid disputes and no reference having been made to the Labour Court by the appropriate. Government on the subject the question as to whether respondents have been retrenched or whether petitioners establishment has been closed cannot dealt with by the Labour Court. ( 10 ) MR. Darus argument is that the above contentions are based upon an incorrect reading of the observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above quoted passage. Government on the subject the question as to whether respondents have been retrenched or whether petitioners establishment has been closed cannot dealt with by the Labour Court. ( 10 ) MR. Darus argument is that the above contentions are based upon an incorrect reading of the observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above quoted passage. His submission is that the aforesaid passage must be read in the context of the main point which Their Lordships were called upon to decide and which they have decided. He contends that the main point which Their Lordships have decided in the above case is that sec. 33-C has been designed to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights. His submission is that the correct interpretation of the above passage is that if there is an existing right and the workman seeks a money claim in enforcement of such a right then within the framework of that existing right the Labour Court has the fullest jurisdiction to determine all questions which may be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the right which is already in existence. His submission is that it is only when there is no existing right and the workman seeks the benefit of the industrial law dehors any such existing right then the limitation which Their Lordships have mentioned in the aforesaid passage would come into play. His submission is that the effect of the aforesaid passage is that if in order to enforce his claim the workman does not rely upon an existing right but seeks to make good his claim under the industrial law which will create a new right for him as a result of which only the claim can be awarded to him then resort to the machinery laid down in sub-section (1) of section 10 is necessary and it is only then that the limitation which Their Lordships have imposed in the aforesaid passage comes into play. In other words the contention is that if the law has created or a contract between the parties grants a right to compensation on retrenchment and the source of that benefit is that law or that contract then the condition precedent which is laid down in the first clause of sub-section (2) of section 33-C has been satisfied and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is attracted and if in the exercise of such jurisdiction the question arise whether the workman is or is not retrenched that is whether the right which is already in existence inheres in a particular workman then that narrow question can be decided by the Labour Court and it does not come within the purview of sec. 10 sub-section (1) of the Act. He submits that in that contingency a reference to an Industrial Tribunal or in cases where the conditions laid down in the proviso are satisfied to the Labour Court is not necessary at all. If the law or the contract confers the right to compensation for retrenchment or if the right is already in existence and is not required to be brought into existence by a reference to an industrial authority then there is no question of the application of section 10 sub-section (1) at all. He submits that the case would then be similar to the case of the Central Bank which Their Lordships were dealing with. In that particular case the claim was based on the basis of an award. and the question which had got to be determined was whether the workmen who claimed the benefit under the award were or were not the workmen to whom the benefit had been given. Mr. Vyas contends that the aforesaid contention ignores two other limitations which according to him have been mentioned by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Central Banks case. On the other hand Mr. Daru contends that those two limitations are nothing but illustrations of the wider principle that the Labour Court must act within the framework of an existing right and must not travel beyond it. The two illustrations which Their Lordships have given are firstly the illustration of a dismissed or demoted employee whose case is that his dismissal or demotion is wrongful and secondly the illustration of an employee claiming wages on the basis that a settlement had come to an end. The two illustrations which Their Lordships have given are firstly the illustration of a dismissed or demoted employee whose case is that his dismissal or demotion is wrongful and secondly the illustration of an employee claiming wages on the basis that a settlement had come to an end. Their Lordships have pointed out that in these two cases the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was barred. In our judgment the submission to Mr. Daru is right. Both the instances are the illustrations of the wider principle that when a claim is based not on an existing right but on a right which is yet to be brought into existence by means of an award of an industrial authority then the Labour Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. When an employee contends that his dismissal or demotion is wrongful and claims a salary or wages on that basis then it is quite clear that he makes the claim not on the basis of the contract of service but dehors the same. The basis of his claim is the wrongful act of the employer in dismissing or demoting him. In the second illustration the basis of the claim is outside the settlement and not the settlement already arrived at between the parties. In both these cases before the wages can be given to the employee a reference to the industrial authority will be necessary. As has been held in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal Bombay and others (1949) Federal Court Reports page 321 at page 345 an Industrial Tribunal does not adjudicate according to the strict law of master and servant but that The award of the Tribunal may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute which no Court could order if it was bound by ordinary law but the Tribunal is not fettered in any way by these limitations. Their Lordships have further observed in the same case as follows:-"in Volume I of Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining by Ludwig Teller it is said at page 536 that industrial arbitration may involve the extension of an existing agreement or the making of a new one. or in general the creation of new obligation of modification of old ones while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements". or in general the creation of new obligation of modification of old ones while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements". Therefore in our judgment the mere fact that a certain point which arises for determination in an application under sec. 33c (2) is a point which is mentioned as a matter in Schedule No. 3 does not necessarily mean that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to deal with that point. If there is a pre-existing right which confers a benefit upon a workman or the class to which the workman belongs then the Labour Court will have jurisdiction to determine all questions irrespective of the fact that it can be also dealt with by the Industrial Tribunal under its special jurisdiction. It will not deprive the Labour Court of its jurisdiction to deal with that point provided the question which the Labour Court has got to consider is in relation to the individual right of the workman which right is sought to be enforced by him. In other words if there is the framework of an existing right and if the worker claims the enforcement of that right within that particular framework and the only question which has got to be determined is whether the right which is claimed on the basis of which the amount is sought to be computed does or does not inhere or vest in that particular employee then the Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine the narrow question as to whether the particular workman is or is not the person in whom the right vests and is or is not the person who is entitled to the benefit of that right. This interpretation follows from the plain language of sub-section (2) to sec. 33c. The condition precedent for computation of a benefit is stated to be the title to receive that benefit. The workman can claim to have his benefit computed only if he is able to establish the benefit i. e. if there is already a pre-existing right vesting in him which confers a benefit sought to be computed. 33c. The condition precedent for computation of a benefit is stated to be the title to receive that benefit. The workman can claim to have his benefit computed only if he is able to establish the benefit i. e. if there is already a pre-existing right vesting in him which confers a benefit sought to be computed. In our judgment therefore the fact that the subject of retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishments is within the special jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal cannot be a bar to the determination of the question as to whether respondents are or are not retrenched provided respondents are able to show that they have a pre-existing right to receive retrenchment compensation. In this connection it is noteworthy that the ratio of the case reported in Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Company Ltd. Akola v. Baliram 1963 Labour Law Journal page 400 decided by the Bombay High Court was approved by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Central Banks case already referred to. In that Bombay case Their Lordships were dealing with a claim arising out of a lay-off and the objection of the employer that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether there was or was not a lay-off was answered in the negative. Though Their Lordships of the Supreme Court state in Central Banks case that all the observations which the Bombay High Court made whilst considering sec. 33c (2) were not consistent with their own decision the actual decision of the Bombay High Court was approved. It is noteworthy that section 25c of the Act itself gives the right to the workman to receive compensation for being laid off. ( 11 ) HOWEVER Mr. Vyas alternatively contends that even if Mr. Daru is right in his aforesaid submission sec. 25p on the basis of which the right to retrenchment compensation is made does not create any such right in favour of respondents. Mr. Vyass submission is that unlike section 25c section 25p itself does not create any right in favour of an employee to receive nor does it impose any obligation upon an employer to give retrenchment compensation. He submits that sec. Mr. Vyass submission is that unlike section 25c section 25p itself does not create any right in favour of an employee to receive nor does it impose any obligation upon an employer to give retrenchment compensation. He submits that sec. 25p is based upon the assumption that every employer has got a right to retrench his employee and all that it does is to impose certain conditions precedent which must be satisfied before a workman is retrenched. He submits that the correct interpretation of that section is not that on a retrenchment being made a workman is entitled to receive retrenchment compensation on the scale mentioned in that section but the correct interpretation is that if the employer wishes to exercise his power of retrenchment then he shall do so only on those terms. His contention is that if a workman is retrenched and the retrenchment compensation is not paid then the true legal effect thereof is that there is no retrenchment in the eye of law that the order of retrenchment is null and void and that the relationship between the workman and the employer of master and servant continues and the workman will be entitled to receive his wages. In our judgment the contentions of Mr. Vyas are valid and must be upheld. ( 12 ) SECTION 25p is as follows:-"25fconditions prevent to retrenchment of workmen. NO workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (A) the workman has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service; (B) the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months and (C) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government". It will be noticed that the section does not say in terms that on retrenchment being effected retrenchment compensation must be paid by the employer to the workman of the type referred to in the section. The section only creates a bar to retrenchment without payment of the notice pay the retrenchment compensation and service of the prescribed notice to the appropriate government. The contention of Mr. Daru is that clause (b) of the aforesaid section creates a new right in favour of the above type of workman to receive compensation. In our judgment this contention is not valid. If we compare the language of sec. 25c already referred to with that of sec. 25p we find that whereas in section 25p it has been definitely stated that on a lay-off taking place the workman shall be paid the amount of compensation in sec. 25p no such right of receiving payment has been created by the section itself. All that the latter section does is to create a bar on the employer to retrench the workman of the kind mentioned therein without payment of retrenchment compensation In other words all that the section does is that if a workman of the type mentioned therein is to be retrenched at all it can be done only in the mode mentioned therein. This view of sec. 25p is supported by high authority. The same question arose for consideration of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha A. I. R. 1960 S. C. page 610. At page 612 Their Lordships have observed as follows:-"on a plain reading of sec. 25f (b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied. It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent non-compliance with the said condition would not render the impugned retrenchment invalid. The argument which appealed to Tendolkar J however was that the consequences of non-compliance with the requirement of section 25f (b) was not to render the impugned retrenchment invalid because he thought that by section 25-I a specific provision has been made for the recovery of the amount prescribed by sec. 25f (b ). The argument which appealed to Tendolkar J however was that the consequences of non-compliance with the requirement of section 25f (b) was not to render the impugned retrenchment invalid because he thought that by section 25-I a specific provision has been made for the recovery of the amount prescribed by sec. 25f (b ). Section 25-I provides for the recovery of monies due from employers under Ch. V and according to Tendolkar J. this provision covers the amount due to the workman by way of compensation under sec. 25f (b ). In our opinion this view is untenable. Having regard to the fact that the words used in section 25f (b) are mandatory and their effect is plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that section 25-1 Covered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified in sec. 25f (b) and it is obvious that there are several other cases in which monies become due from the employers to the employees under Ch. V; it is for the recovery of these monies that sec. 25-1 had been enacted. Therefore we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued sec. 25f (b) ( 13 ) IN our judgment therefore the correct interpretation of sec. 25p is that it imposes a limitation upon and subjects the power of the employer to retrench his workmen to certain conditions which must be satisfied before the power can be exercised and not that it creates a new right in favour of the workman of the type mentioned therein to receive retrenchment compensation. In that view of the matter the amount of compensation which is claimed by each of the respondents cannot be justified directly under sec. 25p We are not called upon to consider in the present case as to whether dehors sec. 25p respondents are or are not entitled to receive any compensation under any existing law or contract. All that we can say is that Mr. Daru did not refer us to any other law or any contract under which such a right can be supported. Thus all that we can say is that if respondents do lay any claim then it will be not within the framework of an existing right created by the Act. All that we can say is that Mr. Daru did not refer us to any other law or any contract under which such a right can be supported. Thus all that we can say is that if respondents do lay any claim then it will be not within the framework of an existing right created by the Act. Therefore if any claim is made that claim must be under the Industrial Law and having regard to item No. 10 in the Third Schedule and sub-section (2) of sec. 33c the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to determine the same as its jurisdiction is confined only to the determination of the amount of benefit arising out of an existing right. ( 14 ) WE may say that Mr. Daru had contended before us that it was optional for the workman when an employer purported to retrench him either to accept the retrenchment and to claim compensation. Having regard to the view which Their Lordships have taken regarding the correct interpretation of section 25p it is impossible to accept this argument. In our judgment when an order of retrenchment does not comply with the conditions laid down in section 25p the order is not voidable but it is void. That being so the order of retrenchment is null and void. It follows that till compensation amount is paid by the employer the relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee continues and the only legal right which the employee has is to receive his wages on the basis that he continues to be in service. ( 15 ) MR. Daru mentioned to us that even if there was a closure of establishment in law respondents were entitled to notice pay and to that extent the order of the Labour Court should be maintained. He contended that in any case we should make it clear that the right of respondents to claim notice pay was not affected. It is not possible for us to express any opinion on this aspect of the case. Unless and until the question is decided as to whether this was a case of retrenchment or closure it is not necessary to decide whether in law respondents are or are not entitled to notice pay. It is not possible for us to express any opinion on this aspect of the case. Unless and until the question is decided as to whether this was a case of retrenchment or closure it is not necessary to decide whether in law respondents are or are not entitled to notice pay. If they are so entitled the matter would be within the jurisdiction of the competent authority to decide it and it is not necessary for this Court to express any opinion on the subject. If the matter happens to be carried before the competent authority it will be for that authority to consider whether in the event of there having been a closure of establishment respondents are or are not entitled to receive notice pay. ( 16 ) WE may mention that the ultimate view which has prevailed with us is not directly in answer to the question raised by Mr. Vyas. Our ultimate conclusion is not based on the issues or the points raised by him but it is based on the finding that as there is no pre-existing right in the respondents to claim retrenchment compensation. If any retrenchment compensation is claimed for it must necessarily be claimed dehors any such existing right. Therefore we do not answer directly the point whether the question that respondents were or were not retrenched could or could not be dealt with by the Labour Court. The only finding that we record is that having regard to the fact that the retrenchment compensation cannot be claimed under section 25-P and must necessarily be claimed dehors that section the Labour Court has got no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As regards the determination of the amount of the compensation in our judgment there is also no doubt having regard to our aforesaid conclusion that the Labour Court will have no jurisdiction to do so as the right to retrenchment is not claimed under any existing law or award or settlement. ( 17 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons the petition must be allowed and the rule made absolute. In the circumstances of the case each party shall bear its own costs. Rule absolute. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. .