JUDGMENT 1. The facts in this case are shortly as follows: There are 8 petitioners in this application, of whom, I am informed, the petitioner No. 8, Ashoke Kumar Sarkar, has since left the employment of the Life Insurance Corporation. Before the nationalisation of the Life Insurance Companies in India, the petitioners had become apprentices under the New India Assurance Company limited of Calcutta, being an "insurer" under the Life Insurance Corporation act, 1956. It appears that the said 'insurer' brought forward a scheme which is contained in a booklet entitled "your Career Chart". The scheme was that the insurer took in a number of young men as apprentices for learning the work of Life Insurance especially 'field work', and they were given a certain stipend and were trained for a period roughly of 2 years. The training was to be given by specially trained instructors and these trainees were classified into various grades depending on merit. At the end of the training period, it was proposed that they should be absorbed as permanent employees of the insurer. At no time during the apprenticeship period, were they to be given any salary. The only payment that they were entitled to receive was described as a 'stipend'. In fact they would have to pay for their boarding and lodging from their own pocket, if it was in excess of their stipend. On the 30th December, 1955 the petitioners were given letters of appointment (Annexure 'a') as apprentices of the Company with effect from the 2nd January, 1956 in terms of the prospectus and the training scheme mentioned above. It was distinctly stated therein that the arrangement was temporary and that only a stipend amounting to Rs. 75/- per month will be given and no salary. This stipend was to be increased after the practical training was completed, subject to merit. It is quite clear from a perusal of annexure 'a' that this agreement did not make the apprentices employees of the insurer. The Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1956 nationalised the life insurance businesses in India with effect from the 19th January 1956, Subsequently, the Life Insurance Corporation was established, From the appointed day, namely, the 1st September 1956, all assets and liabilities of insurers vested in the said Corporation. The Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1956 nationalised the life insurance businesses in India with effect from the 19th January 1956, Subsequently, the Life Insurance Corporation was established, From the appointed day, namely, the 1st September 1956, all assets and liabilities of insurers vested in the said Corporation. After the life Insurance Corporation came into existence, and sometime in November, 1956 the petitioners were taken into the services of the Corporation and were posted in the development side as "probationary inspectors". It is said that this was done to encourage them to qualify for their proper place at the time of categorisation, under the said act, which is a process to categories the employees of the Corporation into different categories. Strictly speaking, however, the petitioners do not come into the scope of the categorisation order, which is only meant to apply to the employees of insurers. The idea was to fit them into the scheme of service of the Life Insurance Corporation. Letters were issued to the petitioners appointing them as "probationary inspectors" and they accepted this appointment and acted as such without any objection (Annexure 'b'. Later on, the petitioners were informed that their scale of pay, etc. would depend on the result of their work, that is to say, the extent to which they realised the quota of business expected from field workers (Annexure 'c'. It appears that the petitioners' record of work were not considered satisfactory and they were transferred to the office. They did not object to these transfers, but later on they resented the fixation of the basic and other salaries which they were entitled to receive from the said Corporation and that is what has given rise to this application. The application has been framed in the following manner: 2. The petitioners say that they were employees of the insurers even before the appointed day, as apprentices, and therefore they are entitled to invoke the provisions of section 11 of the said act. The application has been framed in the following manner: 2. The petitioners say that they were employees of the insurers even before the appointed day, as apprentices, and therefore they are entitled to invoke the provisions of section 11 of the said act. Section 11 (1) provides that every "whole-time employee" of an insurer whose controlled business had been transferred to and vested in the Corporation and who was employed by the insurer wholly or mainly in connection with his controlled business immediately before the appointed day shall, on and from the appointed day, become an employee of the Corporation and shall hold office therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions as he would have held if the said Act had not been passed and would continue to do so until his employment in the Corporation is terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions have duly been altered by the Corporation. Under sub-section (2) of section 11, power is given to the Central Government to alter such terms in order to secure uniformity in the scale of remuneration and conditions of service applicable to employees of insurers whose controlled business had been taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation. A number of applications have come up before the Court, made on behalf of the employees of insurers who have complained that their terms and conditions of service have not been continued in the fashion that is required under sub-section (1) of section 11. Various orders have been passed by the Central Government by which the terms and conditions of service of employees of insurers whose businesses have vested in the Corporation have been sought to be controlled. The chief amongst them is the Categorisation Order known as the "blue Order" dated the 1st June, 1957. Briefly speaking therefore, the case made on behalf of the petitioners is that they were employees of the Insurers, as mentioned in section 11 (1)and that their terms and conditions of service have been altered and not made consistent with the provisions of section 11 (1), and it is also urged that it is not in consonance with the order promulgated under sub-section 2, namely the blue order. In my opinion, this application is misconceived. To start with, the petitioners are not at all employees of insurers whose businesses have vested in the Corporation. In my opinion, this application is misconceived. To start with, the petitioners are not at all employees of insurers whose businesses have vested in the Corporation. In any event, they are certainly not "whole-time employees" for whom the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 11 are intended. They were mere apprentices. They never received any salary but only stipends. Therefore, it is impossible to bring them within the scope of section 11 (1) or (2. Even assuming that the point is arguable, sub-section (3) of section 11 is a bar to such a contention. That sub-section provides that if any question arises as to whether any person was a whole-time employee of an insurer, that question shall be referred to the Central Government whose decision shall be final. In the present case, no such question was referred to the Central Government and I do not think that this Court can go into this question, ignoring the bar provided in the statute. By analogy we may refer to a Supreme Court decision (1) The state of Andhra Pradesh v, Abdul Khader, a. I. R. (1961) S. C. 1467. Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act 1955 provides that if any question arises as to whether an Indian citizen has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority and in such manner as may be prescribed. The authority prescribed is the central Government. It has been held that the Central Government is the only authority which can decide whether an Indian citizen hat: acquired pakistani citizenship, and the Court cannot, in an application for a high prerogative writ, take away this right from the Central Government or deal with the matter ab initio. Upon an analogy, a dispute of this description, namely, as to whether the petitioners are whole-time employees within the meaning of section 11 (1) and (2), cannot be agitated in this Court without referring the matter to the Central government and obtaining its decision. 3. Mr. Ray appearing on behalf of the petitioners has tried to bring in section 7 of the said Act in aid of his clients. Section 7 of the said Act lays down that, after the appointed day, all the assets and liabilities of the existing insurers would vest in the Corporation. 3. Mr. Ray appearing on behalf of the petitioners has tried to bring in section 7 of the said Act in aid of his clients. Section 7 of the said Act lays down that, after the appointed day, all the assets and liabilities of the existing insurers would vest in the Corporation. Ho argues that the apprenticeship agreement is a 'liability', and therefore this liability vested in the Corporation. Even assuming that this is so, I do not see where it leads to. All that might be said is that even after the Life Insurance Corporation took over the business of the insurers, they were under an obligation to carry out the terms of the apprenticeship agreements. There is no application before me on the footing that the terms of apprenticeship have been violated, or for enforcement thereof. The petition is on the footing that as a result of the agreement, the petitioners became employees of the insurer and therefore became employees also of the Corporation. As I have mentioned above, that approach is basically wrong. Next, let us consider how the matter would stand even if the petitioners were entitled to agitate in this application the question of their apprenticeship agreement. After the appointed day, it is not as if the corporation immediately got rid of the petitioners. They continued to be there, and when they were appointed "probationary inspectors", they calmly accepted the same without objection. They continued to do field work but proved themselves un-meritorious, with the result that they were transferred to the office. Here again they did not object. In fact, they do not even now object to be in the office, but their grievance is that the emoluments are not in accordance with law. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, I do not think that the petitioners can improve their position by taking recourse to section 7. It was argued at one stage that the categorisation order dated the 1st June 1957 applied and the fixation of salary etc. was not done in terms thereof. Obviously the categorisation order does not apply, because it only applies to employees of insurers whose controlled businesses have been transferred to the Corporation. It was argued at one stage that the categorisation order dated the 1st June 1957 applied and the fixation of salary etc. was not done in terms thereof. Obviously the categorisation order does not apply, because it only applies to employees of insurers whose controlled businesses have been transferred to the Corporation. With regard to new employees who were inducted by the Corporation, it is a matter of contract between them and if there is any breach, the parties are at liberty to agitate their disputes in ordinary course of law. An application in this jurisdiction cannot be maintained. The result is that for the reasons given above this application must fail and must be dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.