ORDER 1. This order will also govern the disposal of C. R. No. 384 of 1963. 2. These two revision petitions arise out of two suits for ejectment filed by Premchand separately against the petitioners Tribhuwandas and Sarafali on the allegation that the petitioners were in occupation of portions of a house as tenants at the time when the house came to his share in a partition between him and his father Fakirchand, and that he needed the accommodation for his own purposes. Each of the petitioners raised the preliminary objection that in view of the provisions of section 12 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the plaintiff's suit for eviction on the ground specified in clause (f) of section 12 (1) was not maintainable as more than one year had not elapsed from the date of the acquisition of property by him. The learned Civil Judge, Second Class, Khandwa, who is trying the suits, overruled the objection on holding that as the house in question was allotted to the plaintiff in a partition, it could not be regarded as any property or accommodation acquired him by transfer, and that therefore, the bar specified in section 12 (4) did not operate. Hence these two revision petitions by the defendant-tenants. 3. Sections 12 (1) sets out the grounds on which a landlord can file a suit against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation let out to him. Clauses (e) and (f) of section 12(1) enable a landlord to sue for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation if it is required by the landlord for the purposes stated in those clauses. Sub-section 4 of section 12, however, provides that- "Where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) or clause (f) therefore, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition." On these provisions, therefore, the common question that arises for determination in these two cases is whether property allotted to a coparcener in a partition can be treated as property acquired by him by transfer. The question turns on the meaning of the word "acquire" and "by transfer". The question turns on the meaning of the word "acquire" and "by transfer". The plain meaning of the word "acquire" in the law of contracts and descents is to become owner of property. The term "transfer" means to convey or pass the right of one person over to another. Acquisition by transfer of a property is, therefore, an act or transaction by which the property of one person becomes vested in another. Now, it is firmly settled by numerous decisions of the Privy Council that partition in Hindu law is severance of joint status and as such, it is a matter of individual volition, and once a member of a joint family has clearly and unequivocally intimated to the other members ids desire to himself from the joint family, his right to "obtain and possess the share to which he admittedly has a title is unimpeachable." In this connection, it is sufficient to refer to Girja Bai vs. S. Dhudirai, 6 MPLC 172=AIR 1916 PC 104. When there is partition of a joint Hindu family property, the members of the joint family do not acquire any right to any property which the family did not possess. Partition only alters the form of enjoyment of joint property by the coparceners. It is thus a division made between the coparceners of joint property, which belongs to them as coparceners, so that each becomes the sole owner of that part. which is allotted to him. There is no conveyance but only transformation of the form of enjoyment of property. A coparcener gets a separate allotment by virtue of his antecedent title as coparcener. There is no acquisition of property in another independent right. Partition is thus neither a convey nee or an exchange and the allotment therein of any item of properly is not any act or transaction by which property of another person is conveyed or transferred to the allottee. That being so, it cannot be held that for purposes of section 12 (4) the allotment to a person of a house constitutes an acquisition by him of accommodation by transfer. 4. Learned Counsel referred me to several decisions in which the question whether partition is a "transfer of property" under section 5 and 53 of the Transfer of Property Act has been considered. In some decisions it has been held that partition is a transfer of property. 4. Learned Counsel referred me to several decisions in which the question whether partition is a "transfer of property" under section 5 and 53 of the Transfer of Property Act has been considered. In some decisions it has been held that partition is a transfer of property. In others a contrary view has been expressed. In some case it has been held that even if partition is not a transfer for the purposes of section 53 of the Transfer of property Act, the principle of the section would apply (see Vinayak Shamrao vs. Moreshwar Ganesh, ILR 1944 Nag. 342=AIR 1944 Nag. 44. I do not think any useful purpose would be served by examining those cases when the rule of construction is that the meaning of one section in one Act cannot be ascertained from the meaning and effect of another provision in another Act. When the Court has to construe a positive enactment of a statute, construction founded upon analogy is scarcely permissible. In my judgment, construing the words "acquired" and "by transfer" according to their plain and natural meaning and having regard to the concept and legal consequences of partition in Hindu law, there can be no doubt that when a coparcener gets an item of property in partition there is no acquisition by him of that property by transfer. 5. For these reasons, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge rightly held that section 12 (4) of the Act did not apply to the two suits filed by the plaintiff and that they were maintainable even if they were filed within one year of the date on which the property in question was allotted to the plaintiff in a partition between him and his father. Both those revision petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee in each case is fixed at Rs. 50/-.