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1964 DIGILAW 1 (ORI)

BISWANATH DAS v. JAGANNATH MISRA

1964-01-02

R.L.NARASIMHAM

body1964
JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal u/s 44 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951, against the appellate judgment of the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments rejecting the claim of the Appellants to be declared as hereditary trustees of the endowments of two Deities named Shri Gateswar Deb and Shri Jogeswar Thakurani. 2. The origin of the temple is not known but the Appellants stated that their ancestors were hereditary trustees of the Temple, but that in 1866 they left the place to make out their livelihood elsewhere and subsequently some sebaks managed the institution. Sometime in 1890 some Mahantis and Misras obtained mortgage of the endowed properties from the sebaks and remained for all practical purposes as the trustees of the Temple. In the revisional settlement they were recorded as marfatdars of the Deities. It was subsequently alleged that the Appellants' family returned to the village and assisted in the management of the Temple. In 1938 and 1941 two sebasamarpan patras were executed in their favour by the descendants of the original mortgagees and the recorded marfatdars. 3. The trial Court, namely the Assistant Endowments Commissioner held that the Appellants family were not in uninterrupted management of the institution as trustees. He further held that the mortgagees somehow acquired trustees' interest and remained in possession of the Deities' properties in that capacity until the transfer to the Appellants' family by the two sebasamarpan patras of 1938 and 1941. He thought that the Appellants acquired hereditary trusteeship by prescription. 4. The lower appellate court rightly pointed out that the trial court committed an error of law in holding that hereditary trusteeship can be acquired by prescription under the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The definition of the expression 'hereditary trustee' in the new Act (see Section 3(6)) is very restricted and does not admit of acquisition of any such right by prescription. The distinction between the definition of "hereditary trustee" under the old Endowments Act and the new Act has been pointed out in two Division Bench decisions of this Court reported in ILR 1961 Cutt 196 and 27 C.L.T. 437, and it is unnecessary to refer to it in detail here. The distinction between the definition of "hereditary trustee" under the old Endowments Act and the new Act has been pointed out in two Division Bench decisions of this Court reported in ILR 1961 Cutt 196 and 27 C.L.T. 437, and it is unnecessary to refer to it in detail here. It is sufficient to say that a person cannot succeed in his claim to be a hereditary trustee unless he shows that from the time of the founder of the institution his family has been holding the office of trustee as of hereditary right, provided further that such a scheme of succession has been in force all along. In the later decision 27 C.L.T. 437, it was further pointed out that if there is any interruption in the trusteeship, there can be no question of acquisition of hereditary right of trusteeship in view of the narrow definition given in the new Act. 5. Here on the finding of the trial court (which has also been endorsed by the lower appellate court) it must be held that there was interruption for several years in the Appellants' family holding the office of trustees of the endowments in question. The mortgagees from the sebaks, namely the Mahantis and Misras who were recorded as the marfatdars in the Revisional Settlement held the office of trustees of the Temple for several years, until the execution of the two sebasamarpan patras in 1938 and 1941. In view of this interruption, the aforesaid Division Bench decisions would apply with full force. 6. Mr. Ray, however, urged relying on some observations in 26 C.L.T. 293, that where the origin of the institution is unknown (as in this case) and it is found that the members of the family have been trustees for several generations, the principle of lost grant may be applied, and it may be inferred that they were hereditary trustees of the institution within the definition given in the new Endowments Act. But the fundamental distinction between that case and the present case lies in the fact that there was no finding that there was any interruption in the members of the family holding the office of trustees of the deity. But once there is interruption the later Division Bench decision would apply. But the fundamental distinction between that case and the present case lies in the fact that there was no finding that there was any interruption in the members of the family holding the office of trustees of the deity. But once there is interruption the later Division Bench decision would apply. For these reasons the judgment of the lower appellate court is maintained and the appeal is dismissed but with costs to Respondents 1 and 2 only. Final Result : Dismissed