Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the defendant from a decree in a suit for recovery of the amount due under a pronote executed by the defendant to deceased Vydianatha Iyer the father of the plaintiff on 3-4-1952 in renewal of a pronote executed by him on 26-8-1124. The plaintiff's father died. The plaintiff, as manager of the joint family has filed this suit for recovery of the amount alleging that the defendant had not paid the amount in spite of demand. The defendant contended that Vydianatha Iyer had another son, P.W. 2, that there was a partition between the plaintiff, his brother P.W. 2 and their father in 1120 by which they divided the properties of the joint family, that the note was taken by the father after the partition, that the assets of Vydianatha Iyer devolved on the plaintiff and his brother by succession as tenants-in-common, that the plaintiff alone was not entitled to recover the amount, that P.W. 2 was a necessary party to the suit and that the suit was not maintainable. 2. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff alone was not entitled to maintain the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff the lower appellate court gave a decree to the plaintiff in respect of one-half of the amount due under the promissory note. It is against this decree that the defendant has filed the appeal. 3. Therefore the question for consideration is whether the suit was maintainable. It is well-settled by authorities that though the right of a deceased person vests in his legal representatives in several shares, so far as the ancestor's debtor is concerned, they take as one unit, and a suit to enforce the right must be instituted by all of him. The plaintiff, his brother P.W. 2 and their father were divided under Ext. P5 partition and were no longer members of a joint Hindu family. Ext. P1 was executed in favour of the plaintiff's father long after the partition, and therefore the property therein cannot be considered as co¬parcenary property in the hands of the plaintiff and P.W. 2. 4. In Abinsa Bibi v. Abdulkhader Saheb (ILR. P5 partition and were no longer members of a joint Hindu family. Ext. P1 was executed in favour of the plaintiff's father long after the partition, and therefore the property therein cannot be considered as co¬parcenary property in the hands of the plaintiff and P.W. 2. 4. In Abinsa Bibi v. Abdulkhader Saheb (ILR. 25 Madras 26) Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., has considered the question of the maintainability of the suit by one of the heirs and this is what the learned judge says: "On his death his right devolved upon all his heirs in several shares which are regulated by the Muhammadan law of inheritance. Though as between themselves their rights are several, yet so far as the ancestor's debtor is concerned his obligation is single and cannot be split up without his consent. The numerous heirs of the deceased creditor are only jointly entitled to enforce the right which the deceased creditor, if alive, could singly enforce. If by the death of the creditor the right and the correlative obligation are, as under the civil law, split into several, so that each one of the heirs of the creditor can enforce the payment to him of his share of the debt, and the debtor is under a distinct obligation to each of the heirs of the creditor to discharge his several shares in the debt When a right accruing to a single person from a covenant in his favour devolves, on his death on two or more of his heirs in several shares, no question can possibly arise as to whether the covenant was joint or several, and the only difference caused by the death of the covenantee is that the cause of action which resided in one person, is, by operation of law transferred to a number of parceners, who, as observed by Tindal C.J., in Decharms v. Horiwood (10 Bing. 526 at p. 529), constitute one heir. In other words, the claim which was possessed by one individual is now possessed jointly by a number of individuals, who are his legal representatives and all must therefore join in a suit to enforce that claim. 526 at p. 529), constitute one heir. In other words, the claim which was possessed by one individual is now possessed jointly by a number of individuals, who are his legal representatives and all must therefore join in a suit to enforce that claim. If one or more of such joint claimants do not join as plaintiffs, the course to be pursued in India, according to long established course of decisions is for the claimants bringing the suit to join, as party defendants, those who do not join as plaintiffs." It was held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kundhiya Lal v. Chandar (ILR. 7 All. 313), Mahmood, J., dissenting, that when upon the death of the obligee of a money bond the right to realise the money had devolved Upon his heirs each of such heirs cannot maintain a separate suit for recovery of his share of the money due under the bond. To the same effect are the rulings reported in Rameshwar Bux v. Ganga Bux (AIR. 1950 Allahabad 598), Appu Pillai v. Gnanaprakasam Pillai (12 Law Weekly 532), Siluvaimuthu Mudaliyar v. Muhammad Sahul (51 M.L.J. 648, 649) and Adiveppa v. Rachappa (AIR. 1948 Bombay 211). In view of these rulings I would have held that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for recovery of either the whole or his share of the amount due under the note. But the plaintiff has produced a succession certificate Ext. P. 6, authorising him to collect the whole amount due under the note. The court below did not act upon that certificate on the ground that the certificate was applied for and obtained after the expiry of the period of limitation for the institution of the suit, and that it could not revive a claim which was already barred by limitation. The lower appellate court says: "The cause of action for enforcing the right of P.W. 2 having become barred long before the date of the succession certificate, the subsequent production of the same is totally ineffectual. An effectual impleading of P.W. 2 after the period of limitation was not possible." The succession certificate was produced in court on 16-11-1958: the certificate is dated 14-11-1953. The suit was instituted on 4-4-1955, the previous day being Sunday. An effectual impleading of P.W. 2 after the period of limitation was not possible." The succession certificate was produced in court on 16-11-1958: the certificate is dated 14-11-1953. The suit was instituted on 4-4-1955, the previous day being Sunday. It is therefore clear that the succession certificate was applied for long after the period of limitation for instituting a suit on the note had expired. The effect of the succession certificate is that the person in whose favour it is granted gets authority to collect the debt due from the debtor of the deceased person. The debtor gains immunity from further claims by other persons in paying the amount to the person mentioned in the succession certificate as authorised to collect the amount. (See ILR. 7 Allahabad 313). I do not think that the mere fact that the certificate was obtained after the period of limitation for a suit on the basis of Ext P1 had expired, is material. Succession certificate need only be produced in court at the time of the passing of the decree. But it was argued for the appellant that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff in his alleged capacity as manager of the joint family and not as the legal representative of deceased Vydianatha Iyer, and therefore the production of the certificate was of no avail to the plaintiff. It may be recalled that the main plea of the defendant was that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount due under the note only as a legal representative of the deceased Vydianatha Iyer along with P.W. 2. Soon the basis of the contention put forward by the defendant a decree could have been given to the plaintiff as he had produced the succession certificate. The true basis on which the plaintiff could have obtained the decree was pleaded by the defendant himself, and therefore the fact that the plaintiff had not put forward the claim that he was entitled to recover the amount as legal representative of Vydianatha Iyer is of no consequence. Quite apart from this an application for amendment of the plaint claiming the amount as legal representative of deceased Vydianatha Iyer was made by the plaintiff in this court. After hearing the parties I allowed that application. So in any view of the matter, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree. Quite apart from this an application for amendment of the plaint claiming the amount as legal representative of deceased Vydianatha Iyer was made by the plaintiff in this court. After hearing the parties I allowed that application. So in any view of the matter, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree. As I have already said, the court below granted a decree to the plaintiff only for his one-half share in the note amount. He has not preferred a cross-appeal against that decree claiming recovery of the whole amount due under the note. In these circumstances, I confirm the decree of the lower appellate court. 5. In the result, the decree of the court below is confirmed, and the appeal dismissed, but I make no order as to costs in this appeal.