JUDGMENT S.K. Verma, J. - These are seven connected applications. The facts giving rise to them may be, briefly, summarised as follows. One Lala Luchman Das was the owner of Ram Chand Lachhman Dass Ice Factory and Ram Chand Lachhman Dass Iron Foundry, situate in Mohalla Free ganj, Agra. He died on the 28th of April 1956, leaving behind him two sons, Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar, and a widow, Rukmani Devi, step-mother of the two sons. On the 1st of April 1958 Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar executed a sale-deed in favour of Shri Bhagwan, son of Rai Bahadur Kan, haiya Lal in respect of the Ice Factory. On the 5th of April 1958 Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar executed another sale-deed in favouri of Shri Bhagxvan in respect of the Iron Foundry. On the 22nd of April 1958 the vendee, Shri Bhawan, executed two leases in favour of the vendors, Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar. All the four documents, that is to say, the two sale deeds and the two lease deeds, were registered on the same date, that is on the 24th of July 1958. On the Ist of May 1958 two documents were executed by Shri. Bhagwan in favour of the vendors undertaking to reconvey the Ice Factory and the Iron Foundry to the vendors if they paid the money within a certain specified period. Shri tri Bhawan treated the leases granted in favour of Ram Charosey Lal and Kailash Shankar to be manufacturing leases and he, therefore, served a six months' notice for ejectment upon them which was received on the 28th of August 1962. Six months would have expired in February 1963. In the meantime Rain Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar filed suit No. 155 of 1962 in the court of the Civil Judge, Agra, on the 6th December 1962. It was originally' filed against Shri Bhawan and Rukrriani Devi, the latter being a proforma defendant. The relief originally claimed was for a declaration that the sale-deeds and the lease deeds were mere sham transactions and the plaintiffs were not bound by the transactions. Subsequently, on the 13th of March 1963 an application for the amendment of the plaint was filed by Rain Bharoey Lal and Kailash Shankar. It was sought to make Shri Bhagwan's father, Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal a defendant in the suit. Subsequently, on the 13th of March 1963 an application for the amendment of the plaint was filed by Rain Bharoey Lal and Kailash Shankar. It was sought to make Shri Bhagwan's father, Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal a defendant in the suit. A number of other changes were prayed for. The reliefs were also sought to be amended. On the 15th of March 1963 Shri Bhagwan filed suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 against Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash hankar in the Court of the Civil k Judge, Agra, for their ejectment from Wit Ice Factory and Iron Foundry and also for arrears of rent. On the 5th of April 1963 Rain Charosey Lal and Kailash Shankar filed an application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying that suits, nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 should be stayed, as the matter in the said suits were directly and substantially in issue between the same parties in the previously instituted suit, No. 155 of 1962. On the 13th of April 1963 the learned Civil Judge of Agra granted e application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and stayed the trial of suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963. Shri Bhagwan had, on the 26th of March 1963, applied for the appointment of a receiver over the Ice factory and the Iron Foundry. Objections were filed by Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar. The application came up for hearing before the learned Civil Judge on the 13th of April 1963, after he had passed the order staying the proceedings in suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963. preliminary objection was taken to he effect that, as the trial of the two its had been stayed under Section 10 the Code of Civil Procedure, the court had no longer any jurisdiction Ito pass any order for the appointment of a receiver. The learned Civil Judge held that the order under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was no bar to his power to consider the application for the appointment of a receiver. This order passed on the same date, that is, on the 13th of April 1963. On 'the 11th of May 1963 the application filed by Rain Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar for the amendment of the plaint was allowed. After the amendment, Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal was added as defendant No. 1. This order passed on the same date, that is, on the 13th of April 1963. On 'the 11th of May 1963 the application filed by Rain Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar for the amendment of the plaint was allowed. After the amendment, Rai Bahadur Kanhaiya Lal was added as defendant No. 1. There were numerous other amendments in the plaint and in one of then the plaintiff's allegations was that the two sale deeds and the two deeds of lease were executed merely as simple security for the advances already made or to be made by defendant no. 1 and the other members of his family. After the amendments the reliefs claimed in the plaint of suit no. 155 of 1962 read as follows : (1) That it be declared that the plaintiffs are the owners of the properties and are in possession as such of the properties as mentioned in Para 7 and detailed at the foot of the plaint and defendant nos. 1 and 2 have no right to eject the plaintiffs from the properties mentioned above and deeds mentioned and detailed in para 10 of the plaint (all registered on 24-7-1.958), create no proprietary title or interest in favour of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 but were got written to secure repayment of the money found payable along with interest to the defendant no. 1 in his name and in the names of defendant no. 2 and members of their family, and the property specified below be redeemed. Or in the alternative If the documents mentioned in Para. 10 of the plaint be found to be operative and binding on the plaintiffs the defendant no. 2 be ordered to reconvey the properties mentioned in para 7 of the plaint in favour of the plaintiffs on payment of such money as the Court may decide. (2) That the costs of the suit be awarded." 2. After the application for the amendment of the plaint in suit no. 155 of 196;9 was allowed, Shri Bhagwan filed applications in suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963, claiming that because of the amendment of the plaint in suit no. 155 of 1962, the stay order passed in suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 stood automatically vacated. These applications were dismissed by the learned Civil Judge on the 15th of October 1963. 35 and 36 of 1963, claiming that because of the amendment of the plaint in suit no. 155 of 1962, the stay order passed in suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 stood automatically vacated. These applications were dismissed by the learned Civil Judge on the 15th of October 1963. Shri Bhagwan had also applied for the appointment of a receiver in suit no. 155 of 1962 in which he was the defendant. Civil Revisions nos. 605 and 606 of 1963 have been filed by Shri Bhagwan against the orders of the learned Civil Judge staying the trial of suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963. Civil Revisions Nos. 104 and 120 of 1964 have been filed by Shri Bhagwan against the orders of the learned Civil Judge refusing to hold that the order under Section 10 in suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 stood automatically vacated. Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 239, 240 and 241 of 1963 are applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by Rain Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar against the decision of the learned Civil Judge to the effect that he had jurisdiction to consider the applications for the appointment of a receiver in the three suits. 3. I will take up Civil Revisions Nos. 605 and 606 of 1963 first. 4. Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows : "10. No court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the re lief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or, continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction,, or before the Supreme Court. Explanation.-The pendency o a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action." 5. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has contended that, if he succeeds in Suit no. 155 of 1962, suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 were bound to fail. He has contended, further, that the matter in issue in suits nos. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has contended that, if he succeeds in Suit no. 155 of 1962, suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 were bound to fail. He has contended, further, that the matter in issue in suits nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 are directly and substantially in issue it the previously instituted suit and' that, therefore, Section 10 of the Code$ of Civil Procedure applies. A number of decisions have been relied upon by the learned counsel and I shall now proceed to consider them, 6. In Ayilada Appalanaidu v. Ranuthu Chinnam Naidu, A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 14 a learned Single Judge held that if the conditions prescribed by Section 10 existed the Court had no option but to the trial of the suit and it was no permissible to pass a stay order subject to certain conditions. 7. In Shorab Merwanji Modi v. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Calcutta 727 it was held that in order to attract the provisions of Section 10 all that was necessary was that the matter in issue i the two suits must be substantially the same though different relief might have been claimed by the two plaintiffs in respect of their respective cases. It was held that the words 'same parties' in Section 10 meant the parties as between whom the matters substantially in issue ha arisen and had to be decided. Coin applets identity of the subject-matter or of the parties was not require It was, therefore, held that the existence of an additional party in the subsequently instituted suit would not by itself make Section 10 of the :ode of Civil Procedure inapplicable. 8. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 527 its was held that Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not become; inapplicable even if the previously' instituted suit was vexatious or had been instituted in violation of some of the conditions of the contract entered into between the parties. 9. 8. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 527 its was held that Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not become; inapplicable even if the previously' instituted suit was vexatious or had been instituted in violation of some of the conditions of the contract entered into between the parties. 9. In Ram Narain v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1962 Allahabad 108 a learned Single Judge of this court held that complete identity of the subject-matter was not required to attract the provisions of Section 10 and, if the matter directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit was directly and substantially in issue in a later suit, then the later suit must be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. In Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsi Ram Bhagwandas, AIR 1953 Bombay 117 it was held that the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not contemplate an identity of issues in the two suits, nor did it require that the matter in issue in the two suits should be the same or identical. What the section required was that the natter in issue in the two suits should directly and substantially be the same, and proper effect must be given to the language used by the legislature in Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held, further, that the identity required was a substantial one. 11. In Nem Kumar Agarwal v. Nemkumar, AIR 1958 Allahabad 207, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows: "Sec. 10 requires that a suit must be stayed if the matter directly and substantially in issue in it is also directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit that is pending. The criterion for deciding whether the subsequent suit be stayed or not is whether there is identity of the matters directly and substantially in issue in the two suits; if there is, the subsequent suit must be stayed and if there is not, it will not be stayed". 12. Learned counsel for the applicants has, on the other hand, contended that the entire matter in controversy in the two suits must be the same and Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply merely because one or more issues in the two suits are common. 13. 12. Learned counsel for the applicants has, on the other hand, contended that the entire matter in controversy in the two suits must be the same and Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply merely because one or more issues in the two suits are common. 13. In Hathi Ram v. Hazi Mohammad, AIR 1954 Allahabad P. 141 a Division Bench of this Court said this: "It has been held in a number of cases that the words, "matter in issue" in Section 10, Civil Procedure Code mean the entire matter in controversy and not one of several issues in the case." 14. In Gargi Din Misra v. Debi Charan, AIR 1929 Allahabad 805 a Division Bench of this Court made following observations: 15. On behalf of the applicant it is contended that Section 10, Civil Procedure Code applied to this case and the lower court was bound to stay the proceedings. We do not think that this contention can prevail. Under Section 12 of the Old Act, which corresponds to the present Section 10, it was clearly held by this Court that, unless the subject matter in the two suits is identical and the reliefs are also the same, that section would be inapplicable. (1889 11 Alld. 148). The words "for the same reliefs" have been omitted from the new section and there are a few other slight alterations; but it is note-worthy that, while Section 11 provides that no Court shall try any suit or issue etc., Section 10 merely says that no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit etc. It follows that the mere fact that one issue is common in the two suits would not necessitate the stay of the subsequent suit. Al-though the words matter in a suit" cannot be held necessarily to mean the subject-matter in dispute, it seems clear that they must mean the entire matter in controversy, and not one of several issues in the case. Had the intention of the legislature been to widen the scope of Section 10 so as to make it co-extensive with Section 11 the language employed would have been identical." (italics are mine) 16. Had the intention of the legislature been to widen the scope of Section 10 so as to make it co-extensive with Section 11 the language employed would have been identical." (italics are mine) 16. I have already referred to Nem Kumar Agarwal v. New Kuinar and have quoted the observations of a Division Bench of this Court to the effect that the criterion for deciding whether the subsequent suit should be stayed or not was whether there was identity of the matters directly and substantially in issue in the two suits. 17. In Kota Sreeramulu v. Kota Sreeramulu, AIR 1922 Madras 304, it was held that where some of the issues alone were common to two suits between the same parties Sec, 10 did not apply. It was held, further, that the words "the matter in issue" in Sec 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure had reference to the entire subject matter in controversy between the parties. 18. In Bepin Behary Mozumdar v. Jogendra Chandra Ghosh 36 I.C. 641, Sir Asutosh Mukerji and Mr. Justice Cuming of the Calcutta High Court held that the expression "the matter in issue" in Section 10 had reference to the entire subject-matter in controversy between the parties. 19. In Sheikh Mohammad Yasin v. Sheikh Mohd. Abdur Razaque, AIR 1954 Patna 10, a Division Bench held that the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not be attracted unless all the matters in dispute were substantially the same in the two suits. It was held, further, that the mere fact that the question of title was raised in both the suits and decided in the first suit was not sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. In Thakur Sital Singh v. Thakur Sital Baksh Singh, 50 I.C. 212, a Division Bench of the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court observed as follows: "It is undeniable that the decision of the present suit will be largely affected by the result of the Privy Council appeal and if it is sufficient for the application of Section 10 that the two suits should have a common issue, then undoubtedly the subordinate Judge's decision is correct. It has, however, always been held that more than this is necessary to constitute that identity of the "matter in issue" in the two suits which Section 10 requires. 21. It has, however, always been held that more than this is necessary to constitute that identity of the "matter in issue" in the two suits which Section 10 requires. 21. In other words, what the learned Judges held was that the mere fact that the suit instituted subsequently would be largely affected by the suit instituted previously alone was not enough to attract the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22. After considering the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and on a consideration of the authorities cited by them, I am of the opinion that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties were given on the facts of those cases. Although some of them, for example, Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsi Ram Bhagwandas, contain broad general observations which might, on a superficial view, seem to justify the contention raised by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, the decisions really rested on the facts of those cases. The preponderance of authority seems to be in favour of the view that the entire matter in controversy, must be the same and the mere fact that some of the issues-even if they are important ones--are common to the two suits, would not attract the provisions of Sec 10 of the Code of Civil Procecure In any event, so far as this Court is concerned, it seems to be settled that the entire controversy in the two suits muse-the same Vide Gargi Din Misra v. Debi Charan, Haiti Rana v. Hazi Mohammad' and New Kumar Agarwal v. Nem Kumar. 23. I shall now proceed to consider whether the entire matter in controversy in the three suits is the same or not. There cannot be slightest doubt that, if suit No. 155 of 1962 were decreed for a declaration to the effect that the two sale deeds and the two lease deeds were invalid, suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 are bound to fail. Suit No. 155 of 1962 can, however, be decreed in a different way. The two sale deeds and the two lease deeds may be held to be, perfectly valid and yet the alternative relief claimed by the plaintiff, that is to say, for the re conveyance of the properties in dispute might be granted. Suit No. 155 of 1962 can, however, be decreed in a different way. The two sale deeds and the two lease deeds may be held to be, perfectly valid and yet the alternative relief claimed by the plaintiff, that is to say, for the re conveyance of the properties in dispute might be granted. In that event, Shri Bhagwan, the plaintiff in suits Nos, 35 and 36 of 1963 would be the owner of the properties in dispute and he would be entitled to claim ejectment and rent. Then, again, if suit No. 155 of 1962 were decreed for re conveyance on the payment of a certain sum of money within a particular period and the plaintiffs of that suit failed to pay the money within the time allowed, the plaintiff of suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 would remain the owner of the properties in dispute. Moreover, in suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 there is a claim for arrears of rent amounting to about Rs. 26,000/-. It should also be borne in mind that the alternative case of the plaintiff in suit No. 155 of 1962 was that the sale deeds and the lease deeds were nothing more than Simple security for the advances made or to be made by Shri Bhagwan and the other members of his family. I am, therefore, of the view that the entire controversy in the three suits is not the same and that, therefore, it Sec 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply. In consequence I allow these applications in revision, set aside the orders of the court below staying suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 24. It is, however, desirable that the issue with regard to the validity or to Tire wise of the two sale-deeds and the two lease deeds should be decided first, for, if it is decided in favour or-Ram Bharosey Lal and Kailash Shankar, suits Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 would automatically fail. I, therefore, direct the court below to consolidate the three suits. The defendants in suit Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 must be ordered to file their written statements as soon as possible. 35 and 36 of 1963 would automatically fail. I, therefore, direct the court below to consolidate the three suits. The defendants in suit Nos. 35 and 36 of 1963 must be ordered to file their written statements as soon as possible. Suit No. 155 of 1962 will be the leading suit and the evidence led it will be read as evidence in suits Nos, 35 and 36 of 1963. I, further direct that the issue with regard to the validity or otherwise of the two sale deeds and the two lease deeds shall be decided first. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs of these two civil revisions. 25. In view of the conclusions at which I have arrived in Civil Revisions Nos. 605 and 606 of 1963, Civil Revisions Nos. 104 and 120 of 1964 have become in fructuous and they are dismissed, but I make no orders as to costs. Similarly, in view of the decisions in Civil Revisions Nos. 605 and 606 of 1963, Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 239, 240 and 241 of 1963 have also become in fructuous and they too are dismissed, but I make no orders as to costs. 26. Learned counsel for Shri Bhagwan prays that the records of the three suits be sent down to the court below through a special messenger at his cost. Let this be done.