J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against the order of the First Labour Court Ahmedabad dated 28 August 1961 under which the petitioners application under sec. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been dismissed. The short facts which have given rise to this petition are as under :-The petitioner is an oilman working in the Power House run by the respondent No. 1 Vadnagar Municipality which is a District Municipality governed by the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 thereinafter referred to as the Municipal Act ). The respondent No. 1 on 2 July 1949 entered into a settlement under the Act during conciliation proceedings under which the salaries of the workmen including the petitioner were revised with effect from 1st July 1959. As the petitioner was not paid the revised wages from 1st July 1959 to 30th September 1959 the petitioner applied to the Labour Court under section 33-C clause (2) of the Act to compute the benefit to which he was entitled under the said settlement and to issue the requisite recovery certificate. The Labour Court has dismissed the said application on the ground that in view of the proviso (a) to section 46 of the Municipal Act the settlement was not enforceable unless it was approved by the Commissioner as in effect it altered he existing rules. The petitioner has therefore challenged the said order in the present petition. ( 2 ) THE short point which arises in this petition is whether the said settlement is enforceable without the approval of the Divisional Commissioner. Section 46 of the Municipal Act provides that every Municipality shall make and may from time to time alter or rescind rules but not so as to render them inconsistent with the Act (b) determining (ii) the staff of officers and servants to be employed by the Municipality and the respective designations duties salaries fees or other allowances of such officers and servants and the powers and duties delegated to them under section 37. Then proviso (a) provides that no rule made or alteration or rescission of a rule made under this section shall have effect unless and until it has been approved in the case of City Municipalities by the State Government or in other cases by the Commissioner. Then proviso (a) provides that no rule made or alteration or rescission of a rule made under this section shall have effect unless and until it has been approved in the case of City Municipalities by the State Government or in other cases by the Commissioner. It is not in dispute that the present Municipality is not a City Municipality and so for the alteration of any rule made under section 46 of the Act the approval of the Commissioner would be required. The Labour Court has come to the conclusion that when a settlement was made revising the salaries in sub stance and effect the rules regarding the salaries of the servants would be altered and such an alteration could not be done without the approval of the Commissioner. On that ground the Labour Court has held that the settlement in question was unenforceable. The Labour Court has not properly considered the scope and effect of the two relevant Acts. The Municipal Act deals with municipal affairs and the relevant rules which are to be provided for the municipal servants or the contracts which have to be entered into would have to be done as provided under the Municipal Act. But the Municipal Act does not deal with sphere of industrial disputes. This field is occupied by the Act. Therefore when the first contract of employment was made or the initial rules were made the matter would be governed by the Municipal Act. But after the workmen raised an industrial dispute for changing their existing conditions of employment the matter would be entirely governed by the Act which provides for settlement of industrial disputes by changing modifying or altering the existing conditions of service whether under a contract or under a rule. When therefore an industrial dispute arises the matter would have to be dealt with by the industrial law and the matter would be resolved by an industrial settlement or an award as the case may be. The two fields are thus totally distinct and the two Acts operate in different fields. The Labour Court was therefore obviously in error in coming to the conclusion that when an industrial settlement was arrived at what was sought to be done was an alteration of the municipal rules. The two fields are thus totally distinct and the two Acts operate in different fields. The Labour Court was therefore obviously in error in coming to the conclusion that when an industrial settlement was arrived at what was sought to be done was an alteration of the municipal rules. Whether the settlement was arrived at as required by law will have to be examined only from the provisions of the Act and not by recourse to section 46 of the Municipal Act which deals with alteration of municipal rules and which does not deal with any industrial dispute. Therefore section 46 of the Municipal Act would have no application whatsoever in considering the binding effect of the settlement arrived at under section 12 of the Act. ( 3 ) SECTION 12 sub-section (1) of the Act provides that where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended the conciliation officer may or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. Under sub-section (2) the conciliation officer shall for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute without delay investigate the dispute and matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and the amicable settlement of the dispute. Sub-section (3) then provides that if a settlement of the dispute or of any matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. Thus section 12 of the Act enables a conciliator in the course of a conciliation proceeding to induce the parties to come to a fair settlement of an industrial dispute and if such a settlement is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceeding the memorandum of the settlement has to be signed by the parties to the dispute. In the present case the dispute was between the workman of the Municipality which is a local authority and the Power House employees. In the present case the dispute was between the workman of the Municipality which is a local authority and the Power House employees. Now section 2 (g) (ii) of the Act defines an employer to mean in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority the Chief Executive Officer of that authority. Therefore the other party to the dispute viz. the employer was in view of section 2 (g) the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent No. 1. Mr. Patel does not dispute that under section 24 sub-clause (1) (b) of the Municipal Act the Chief Executive Officer of this local authority was the President of the Municipality. Therefore reading section 12 of the Act along with section 2 (g) in the present case the employer being the President of the Municipality the settlement had to be arrived at between the President and the woreman and that settlement on the employers side had to be signed by the President only as a party to the dispute. The present settlement is signed both by the President and the Vice-President. The settlement therefore has been properly arrived at as required under section 12 read with sec. 2 (g) of the Act. ( 4 ) MR. Patel however contends that a Municipal President was a creature of the Municipal Act and he could have no power to sign such a settlement ignoring the limitations under the Municipal Act. According to Mr. Patel if the rules of service had to be altered the municipal body itself even had to obtain the approval of the Commissioner. Mr. Patel contends that if the parent body had to obtain the approval the President could not sign such a settlement without obtaining first the approval of the Commissioner. We cannot agree with Mr. Patels contention. The President here was exercising the special power which vested in him by reason of the fact that he was the Chief Executive Officer of the local authority for the industrial law in cases of an industry run by a local authority invests such power as an employer to arrive at a settlement or to sign the settlement in such President in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer. This power therefore does not flow from the Municipal Act but from the provisions of the Act. This power therefore does not flow from the Municipal Act but from the provisions of the Act. No limitations whatsoever have been shown to us on the powers of the President to enter into and sign any such settlement. In fact the municipal law was not dealing with industrial disputes and no provision limiting hig power to enter into such a settlement could be found in the municipal Act. ( 5 ) MR. Patel however relied on section 165 (1) of the Municipal Act which provides that the Municipality may compound or compromise in respect of any suit instituted by or against them or in respect of any claim or demand arising out of any contract entered into by them under the Act. This provision is hardly applicable to the case of a settlement. The provision deals with suits or claims arising out of contracts while what we are concerned with is a provision regarding the settlement of industrial dispute to which section 165 (1) of the Municipal Act would have no application whatsoever. ( 6 ) MR. Patel then contends that under rule 62 (2) of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules 1957 the settlement shall be signed by- (a) in the case of an employer by the employer himself or by his authorised agent or where the employer is an incorporated company or other body corporate by the agent manager or other principal officer of such company or body. Relying on this rule 62 sub-clause (2) Mr. Patel contends that the Municipality being a corporate body the settlement must be signed by the agent. In view of section 2 (g) in case of a local authority the employer who is a party is the Chief Executive Officer who in the present case is the President himself and when the employer himself signs that is the President himself signs in the present case the settlement is duly signed as required under rule 62 clause (2) and no question arises of any agent signing on behalf of the employer. We therefore find no substance in the contention of Mr. Patel that the President was not the person authorized who can enter into a settlement under rule 62. The President got the power to enter into and sign the settlement by virtue of section 2 (g) read with section 12 of the Act itself. ( 7 ) MR. We therefore find no substance in the contention of Mr. Patel that the President was not the person authorized who can enter into a settlement under rule 62. The President got the power to enter into and sign the settlement by virtue of section 2 (g) read with section 12 of the Act itself. ( 7 ) MR. Patel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen and others A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 110 at page 119. In that case section 58 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 which dealt with the rule-making power of the Borough Municipality provided a similar proviso (a) to the effect that no rule shall be altered unless and until it has been approved by the State Government. The contention there raised was that under section 58 the Baroda Municipality had no power to make rules for the payment of bonus to its employees because the word 6 allowances did not include bonus; and even if such rules could be made they required the sanction of the State Government and therefore the claim of bonus could not be entertained. The Supreme Court held that the demand for bonus as an industrial claim was not dealt with by Municipal Act but it was dealt with by the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Therefore it was not a relevant consideration whether there were provisions in the Municipal Act with regard to payment of bonus. The provisions of the Municipal Act were relevant only for the purposes of determining the quality or nature of the municipal property or fund; those provisions could not be stretched beyond that limited purpose for defeating a claim of bonus. That decision could not help Mr. Patel. Mr. Patel wanted to make a distinction on the ground that in case of an award it was a judicial or quasi-judicial decision and such an award could be made inspite of the provisions of the Municipal Act but in case of a settlement the same position did not hold good. There is a clear misconception in this argument of Mr. Patel. Whether the industrial claim is resolved by a settlement or by an award the claim which arises under the industrial law has to be decided in accordance with the industrial law. The general municipal law dealing with municipal affairs does not occupy that field. There is a clear misconception in this argument of Mr. Patel. Whether the industrial claim is resolved by a settlement or by an award the claim which arises under the industrial law has to be decided in accordance with the industrial law. The general municipal law dealing with municipal affairs does not occupy that field. That decision would really completely destroy the argument of Mr. Patel that when the industrial claim for revision of salaries was granted it would amount to any alteration of the municipal rules so as to require any sanction as provided under the Municipal Act. The question which is decided under the industrial law is really dehors the contract or the rules and therefore no question arises of fulfilling the provisions under the Municipal Act for entering into a contract or for altering the rules for that purpose. We therefore do not find any substance in any of the contentions of Mr. Patel. ( 8 ) THE Labour Court was therefore patently in error holding that the present settlement was not enforceable as it had not been approved by the Commissioner. No such approval was necessary and the settlement was binding as it was duty arrived at under the Act by reason of sec. 18 of the Act. ( 9 ) IN the result the petition is allowed and the order of the Labour Court is set aside and the matter shall go back to the Labour Court to be disposed of in accordance with law. Rule made absolute with costs. Rule made absolute. .