Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by special leave under S.417 (3) Crl. P.C. to quash the order of acquittal passed by the District Magistrate of Trivandrum in Calendar Case No. 24 of 1962. The complainant Sri. G. Chandrasekhara Pillai is an Ex-Minister, a member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly and was the President of the Trivandrum District Textile Printing and Allied Mills Industrial Co-operative Society Limited (shortly stated the society). The accused Sri G. Raman Pillai is the Editor, Printer and Publisher of a weekly called 'Navasakthi' having a fairly good circulation in Trivandrum City and other places. 2. The appellant filed a complaint before the District Magistrate, Trivandrum against the respondent alleging that he had defamed him by publishing in his weekly paper, an article purporting to be from one R. Sankara Pillai entitled "An alarming hoax" with a sub heading "Attempted swindle of eight lakhs of rupees" and for having circulated the same among the public. The case of the appellant is that the allegations contained in the article in so far as it refers to him are absolutely false and baseless and was made and published with intent to defame and harm his reputation. 3. The article Ext. P-1(a) refers to an attempted conspiracy to swindle eight lakhs of rupees from the Government. The names of four persons have been mentioned as parties to the fraud, one of whom is described as a high-headed Trivandrum Leader, "a permanent stay vakil" who later became 'a Minister' and now 'an M.L.A.' with wife by name Sarada. The article stated that the records of the society showed that there were 26 share-holders who were said to have contributed a some of Rs. 75,000/- as capital and because of the undue pressure exerted on the District Industries Officer the society happened to be registered. The article continued to state that forty cents of land with a shed and 210 looms were shown as having been purchased for a sum of Rs. 86,000/- that on the strength of this investment a loan of rupees eight lakhs was applied for, that the application was presented directly to the Minister and when it was referred to the Industries Department the Director of Industries did not favour the granting of the loan. 86,000/- that on the strength of this investment a loan of rupees eight lakhs was applied for, that the application was presented directly to the Minister and when it was referred to the Industries Department the Director of Industries did not favour the granting of the loan. Subsequently, complaints reached the Central Government and the State Government and on the matter being referred to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, an audit was conducted when it was disclosed that it was only 'a pocket society', that all the cash transactions shown in the Society's books were false, that none of the persons had paid the share money and that the entries that the share capital had been collected is false. The article further stated that when the property was revalued the land value was fixed at Rs. 250/- percent, that the Public Works Department reported that the value of the building is in excess by Rs. 5,000/-, that when the looms etc., were got valued only 50 looms were seen and for a property and equipments which would fetch only Rs. 20,000/- a sum of Rs. 86,000/- was shown as having been paid, that this is a clear attempt to swindle the public money, that there was a conspiracy to defraud and cheat the Government and for facilitating the commission of the offence false documents had been prepared, offence punishable under the Penal Code. The article concluded by saying that this is one of the many instances in which swindlers (robbers) and exploiters who are so placed as to be able to apply pressure, have taken away amounts set apart by the benign Government to encourage the poor textile workers and that it is the duty of the people to prevent such happenings. 4. On the publication of the article the appellant caused a lawyer's notice to be sent to the accused demanding a public withdrawal of the allegations and an apology and requesting him to furnish the full address of the person who is shown as the author of the article. On the failure of the accused to do so, a criminal complaint was filed before the District Magistrate, Trivandrum. On the failure of the accused to do so, a criminal complaint was filed before the District Magistrate, Trivandrum. The complainant and another witness were examined on the side of the prosecution and after the examination of the prosecution witnesses the accused was questioned and he admitted the publication of the article and stated that he had no intention to defame the complainant, that he was very friendly with him, that the article was published with the best of intentions after due care and caution and it was done for the public good and in the interests of the weavers and the public in general. He also stated that similar allegations were published in other papers and that this was the subject matter of a discussion on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. A charge under S.500 I.P.C. was framed and witnesses were further cross-examined and four defence witnesses were examined. On a consideration of the evidence both oral and documentary the learned District Magistrate earns to the conclusion that the article was per se defamatory, but upheld the contention of the accused that he was protected by exceptions 1 and 9 to S.499 I.P.C. and acquitted the accused. The correctness of the conclusion reached by the learned District Magistrate is challenged in this appeal. 5. The fact that the imputations contained in the article refer to the complainant is amply proved and cannot be seriously disputed. The appellant has in his evidence referred to the various portions of the article which would indicate that the reference is to him. There has been no serious cross-examination on the point and this was not specifically denied either in the reply notice or when he was questioned under S.342 Cr. P.C. The accused never put forward the plea that the article does not refer to the appellant. Similarly, the fact that the article in question is per se defamatory cannot for a moment be doubted. The article says that the appellant was a party to a conspiracy to defraud the Government, to fabricate false documents and records, that the entire money transactions were false and untrue and that the complainant brought to bear on the minister and officers undue pressure to achieve the so called objects of the conspiracy and made an attempt to get the loan sanctioned. Graver charges could not have been brought against any man than these and there can be no question that the writer of the article and the accused who published it knew or must have known that these imputations would lower the reputation and character of the complainant in the mind of any one who reads the article. That it is per se defamatory is the finding of the District Magistrate. Again the fact of publication was also not disputed and the accused has taken the full responsibility for the publication and sought to justify his conduct by asserting that the article was true and was published for public good. So the only question for decision now is whether the finding of the learned Magistrate that the accused is protected under any one of the exceptions to S.499 I.P.C. is warranted on the evidence in the case. 6. Now it cannot be disputed that the burden is on the accused to make out that his case would come under any one of the exceptions. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act when a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the general exceptions in the Indian Penal Code or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Code is upon him and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It may be that the burden that is cast on the accused in a criminal case by virtue of S.105 is not so onerous as the primary burden cast on the prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if the accused who pleads an exception satisfies the court of the probability of what he has been called upon to establish and that if on the evidence it appears probable that the defence set up is true he is entitled to a decision in his favour even though he may not have succeeded in proving the truth of his version beyond reasonable doubt. But it is not sufficient if the accused is able to create a doubt that the statement may or may not be true. As stated by Harries, C.J., in Lalmohan Sing v. The King (AIR. 1950 Cal. 339), if what is said is true then that is a defence. But it is not sufficient if the accused is able to create a doubt that the statement may or may not be true. As stated by Harries, C.J., in Lalmohan Sing v. The King (AIR. 1950 Cal. 339), if what is said is true then that is a defence. On the other hand if there is doubt as to whether it is true or not, there is no defence at all and as the matter tends to bring the person defamed into contempt it is defamatory under S.500 I.P.C. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that in the circumstances of this case the appellant must be deemed to be a wrong-doer in respect of the transaction of sale and that the burden would be on him to prove that the transaction is valid. Reference was made to a decision of the Madras High Court in Mrs. Nellie Wapshare v. Pierce Leslie and Co. (AIR. 1960 Mad. 410) and also to a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 14, page 625. The argument is that the appellant is a person who occupies a fiduciary position in respect of this matter as he is the promoter of the society and its president. The fallacy in this argument consists in proceeding on the basis that the appellant is a wrong-doer. What is being enquired into in this case is whether the accused has succeeded in proving that the appellant is a wrong-doer as stated in the article. The appellant was no doubt the president of the society, but the facts of this case, as I shall presently mention, would show that the sale was decided upon by the Board of Directors of the Society after complying with all the procedural requirements and after obtaining necessary sanction. It is not as if the appellant by himself purchased the property with any ulterior motives or to help the Secretary and his people. There is also no allegation of any unjust enrichment. It cannot, therefore, be presumed that the appellant is a wrong-doer so as to shift the onus of proof on him. Equally untenable is the contention that S.106 of the Evidence Act would apply in this case. There is also no allegation of any unjust enrichment. It cannot, therefore, be presumed that the appellant is a wrong-doer so as to shift the onus of proof on him. Equally untenable is the contention that S.106 of the Evidence Act would apply in this case. There can be no doubt that in a case of this nature when the accused specifically pleads an exception that he is protected under any one or the other of the exceptions under S.499 I.P.C., then the burden of proving the exception would be on the person who pleads the exception. 7. Before going into the merits of the case, I will deal with an argument raised by the learned defence counsel that the charge has not been properly framed in this case, that a mere general reference to the article or a few passages is not enough and that all the passages on which the prosecution seeks to rely in support of the charge of defamation should have been separately mentioned in the charge in order that the accused may know exactly what case he had to meet. The contention is that the charge does not conform to the provisions of S.222 Crl. P.C. and so the whole trial is vitiated. In this connection reference was made to the decision in B. Agarwalla v. Bhatnagar (AIR. 1943 Cal. 478). There, the accused who was charged for defamation was acquitted on the finding that he was not actuated by any malice, hatred or jealousy against the complainant. The High Court set aside the acquittal and ordered a retrial observing: "There is no doubt that the above mentioned article contains a number of statements which were clearly defamatory and by which the accused must have intended prima facie to harm the complainant or by using which he had reason to believe that the imputation contained in such statements would harm the reputation of the complainant. This being the case, it is clear from the terms of S.499 Penal Code, that the opposite party should have been found guilty under S.500, Penal Code, unless he was able to bring himself within any of the exceptions to S.499 of the said Code. This being the case, it is clear from the terms of S.499 Penal Code, that the opposite party should have been found guilty under S.500, Penal Code, unless he was able to bring himself within any of the exceptions to S.499 of the said Code. The question whether or not his case fell within any of those exceptions was not considered by the learned Magistrate and the finding on which the acquittal is based is altogether irrelevant on the question whether or not the article falls within any of the exceptions to S.499 Penal Code." A passing reference was made to the form of the charge that the charge merely contained a reference to the article without drawing attention to the particular passages which were alleged to be defamatory and that the alleged precise defamatory statements on which the prosecution relies should have been separately mentioned in the charge so that the accused may know exactly what case he has to meet, Sarat Chandra Das v. The State (AIR. 1952 Orissa 351) was a case of slander and it was held that it was essential that the words alleged to be defamatory should have been precisely set out in the charge and the accused should have been given notice of what he is charged with. These decisions have no application to the facts of this case. I would point out that the charge in this case is clear and although all the different defamatory passages have not been separately detailed in the charge, there is no ambiguity and the accused has not been misled in any way. The whole article had been marked in the case and the several passages in the article which, according to the prosecution, were defamatory have been specifically mentioned by the complainant in giving his evidence and therefore the accused could not have been under any disability in knowing what were the defamatory passages which he had to justify. The learned District Magistrate also refers to these passages in Para.8 of his judgment. I would now refer to S.225 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned District Magistrate also refers to these passages in Para.8 of his judgment. I would now refer to S.225 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is in the following terms: "No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice." The charge, undoubtedly, could have been more explicit and all the passages referred to by the complainant in his evidence could have been set out in the charge framed by the court, but the defect, if there is any in the charge would amount only to an irregularity which would not materially prejudice the accused or vitiate the trial. How the defect in framing charges would affect the trial had been elaborately considered by the Supreme Court in the case in Willie Slaney v. State of M.P. (AIR. 1956 SC. 116). In that case their Lordships considered the question whether the charge is to be regarded as a ritualistic formula so sacred and fundamental that a total absence of one, or any departure in it from the strict and technical requirements of the Code, is so vital as to cut at the root of the trial and vitiate it from the start, or whether it is not one of many regulations designed to ensure a fair and proper trial so that 'substantial', as opposed to purely technical, compliance with the spirit and requirements of the Code in this behalf is enough to cure departures from the strict letter of the law. Their Lordships observed that the Code is a code of procedure and, like all procedural laws, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. The object of the Code, their Lordships stated, is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well-established and well understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice. The object of the Code, their Lordships stated, is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well-established and well understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice. If he does, if be is tried by a competent court, if he is told and clearly understands the nature of the offence for which he is being tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair opportunity of defending himself, then, provided there is 'substantial' compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes in procedure, mere inconsequential errors and omissions in the trial are regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not vitiated unless the accused can show substantial prejudice. That, broadly speaking is the basic principle on which the Code is based. Their Lordships then referred to S.225 of the Code and stated that when there is a charge and there is either error or omission in it or both, and whatever its nature, it is not to be regarded as material unless two conditions are fulfilled both of which are matters of fact, one that the accused has 'in fact' been misled by it, and secondly it has occasioned a failure of justice. The principle of this case has been followed in later cases by the Supreme Court. As stated already there could not have been any prejudice in this case and particularly so, where the accused was defended by competent counsel and the accused knew just what he was being tried for and knew what was being alleged against him and wanted no further particulars. The fact that he had no difficulty in knowing what case he had to meet is also proved by the fact that no grievance was made by him or by his advocate on this score before the learned District Magistrate who tried the case. In such circumstances the only thing that has to be seen is whether prejudice has, in fact, been occasioned. This is clear from the provisions of S.537 of the Code as amended by Act 26 of 1955. In such circumstances the only thing that has to be seen is whether prejudice has, in fact, been occasioned. This is clear from the provisions of S.537 of the Code as amended by Act 26 of 1955. In Slaney's case referred to above all the learned judges were in agreement that S.537 and 535 cover every case in which there is a departure from the rules set out in Chap.19 ranging from error, omission and irregularity in charges that are framed. I am satisfied that the charge framed in this case neither caused nor could have caused any prejudice to the accused as to vitiate the trial and I overrule the objection raised by the learned counsel for the defence. 8. Now coming to the facts of this case we will see under what circumstances the society was started. It has come out in evidence that on 10-7-60 there was a preliminary meeting of the promoters of the society and in that meeting the feasibility of starting a textile mill on a cooperative basis was discussed. It was resolved to register a society for the purpose. Draft bye-laws were prepared and at the meeting they were discussed and passed. The said bye-laws were sent to the District Industries Officer and they were approved and the society was registered. On 17-10-60 the first general body meeting was held and the first set of directors were elected and the appellant became the President. At that meeting it was resolved to prepare a scheme for the establishment of a textile bleaching, printing and calendering plant and to apply for governmental aid. At the next meeting the draft scheme was discussed and approved. The Board then appointed a sub committee to make enquiries and purchase a concern to start a linen factory in the first instance and decided to collect necessary share capital. The sub committee inspected and reported that the site, building, furniture, equipments etc., of the Sri Chitra Textiles be purchased. They valued the looms and its accessories and recommended the purchase after paying a goodwill of Rs. 15,000/-. The recommendations of the sub committee were discussed thread-bare at the Board of Directors meeting and they decided to purchase the same. The building was got valued by the executive engineer and the land was got valued by the Tahsildar. They valued the looms and its accessories and recommended the purchase after paying a goodwill of Rs. 15,000/-. The recommendations of the sub committee were discussed thread-bare at the Board of Directors meeting and they decided to purchase the same. The building was got valued by the executive engineer and the land was got valued by the Tahsildar. The proposal to purchase the factory was then sent up to the District Industries Officer who after verification approved the purchase of the land and building and its equipment. The scheme was then prepared in the required proforma and was submitted to the Government. On receipt of the scheme the Director of Industries after having the scheme examined by Sri. O.T. Krishnan the Textile Expert and after obtaining the remarks of the District Industries Officer recommended for the sanction of the loan. In his report the Director of Industries has stated that the proposed factory is well laid out and is equipped with all necessary looms and accessories required for starting the linen weaving factory which the society proposes to take up in the initial stages. The Director came to the conclusion that the scheme was a sound one and recommended that the required financial aid for the venture may be sanctioned. The statement in the article that the petition was presented directly to the Minister and when it came to the Industries Department the Director of Industries did not recommend the loan is untrue. Then the matter was referred to the Director of Small Scales Industries to ascertain whether linen weaving, textile printing, finishing etc., would come within the approved category for purposes of loan under the Small Scale Industries Aid Scheme. After some correspondence the matter was referred to the Textile Commissioner, Bombay. It was when the correspondence about this matter was in progress that the Government received an anonymous petition forwarded to them by the Special Police Establishment containing certain allegations about the formation and the conduct of the society. On receipt of this the Joint Secretary to Government in the Industries Department sent confidential D.O. letters to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for an audit and an enquiry into the conduct of the society; to the Collector for the valuation of the land; to the Chief Engineer for valuation of the buildings; and to the Director of Technical Education for the valuation of the machinery, looms etc. The same Tahsildar who had valued the land in the first instance at Rs. 300/-per cent has put the valuation of the property at Rs. 250/- per cent. He has not been examined and could not be questioned as to how he put a reduced valuation. The Executive Engineer valued the buildings at Rs. 34,000/- and odd. This shows that there was no over valuation as stated in the article. The Principal, Institute of Textile Technology, Trivandrum valued the cost of the completed looms and dyeing equipments at Rs. 9565/-, but as stated in the report itself he has not included in the valuation statement the value of the dismantled heap of looms stocked in the shed. A senior Inspector of the co-operative department conducted an audit and he expressed his opinion that the valuation was excessive, that there was no justification for the payment of any amount for goodwill, that most of the persons were not real textile workers and he doubted whether the share amount had, in fact, been collected and whether they were not mere book entries and he suggested that a detailed enquiry be conducted under S.45 of the Co-operative Societies Act. In forwarding the report to the Government the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies without any independent enquiry remarked that there was reason to suspect that there was a conspiracy by the promoters to falsify the accounts for the purpose of inducing the officers of the Industries department to give financial assistance to the society. The accused examined the Deputy Registrar of Co-oparative Societies as Dw. 1, the Joint Secretary as Dw. 2, Sri. K. Ananthan Pillai one of the share-holders as Dw. 3 and the Senior Auditor as Dw. 4 in support of their case. The accused examined the Deputy Registrar of Co-oparative Societies as Dw. 1, the Joint Secretary as Dw. 2, Sri. K. Ananthan Pillai one of the share-holders as Dw. 3 and the Senior Auditor as Dw. 4 in support of their case. Arguments were addressed by the learned counsel for the defence that the allegations in the article were those that were contained in the report made by responsible Government servants and the truth of the statements could very well be taken as having been established and the accused would come within the exceptions contained in S.499 I.P.C. It was also contended that there were various circumstances from which an inference could be drawn that all was not well with the society and that was sufficient justification for characterising the society as 'a pocket society' and as the complainant was the president of the society the accused was justified in making the imputations against the complainant. 9. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Inspector's audit report and the confidential report made by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies ought not to have been admitted in evidence at all. Dw. 4 is the Senior Auditor. When he was examined, a copy of the confidential report made by the Joint Registrar to the Government was filed. It is true that in the report it was stated that there was reason to believe that there was a conspiracy among the promoters to falsify the accounts for the purpose of inducing the Industries department to give financial assistance to the society, but it will be seen that the Joint Registrar had not conducted any enquiry. How he was justified in making the observation cannot be stated as he has not been examined in court and no opportunity had been afforded to the appellant to show that his findings are based on no evidence. The opinion expressed by him is, therefore, practically of no value and I feel that the report ought not to have been admitted in evidence. There is considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is a highly prejudicial and onesided report ignoring the fact that the scheme had been properly scrutinised and approved by the officers of the Industries Department. There is considerable force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is a highly prejudicial and onesided report ignoring the fact that the scheme had been properly scrutinised and approved by the officers of the Industries Department. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that the second valuation made by the Executive Engineer is in fact, higher than the value paid for by the society, and as far as the land is concerned it was the self same Tahsildar who had fixed the price at Rs. 300/- per cent who had shown a reduced rate. As for the report of the Principal of the Textile Technology learned counsel pointed out that the report itself shows that the entire looms were not valued, that the Principal who has given the report has not been examined and no opportunity given to show that his report cannot be the last word on the subject. It was also stated that there is nothing wrong in paying for the goodwill and that even Government has on certain occasions paid for goodwill. In any view the price had been paid only after sanction had been obtained from the department. It was further argued by the appellant's learned counsel that no evidence had been adduced from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the complainant was a party to inflate the valuation or that he was a party to any conspiracy to defraud the Government. All that any president of a society under such circumstances could have done is to appoint a committee to fix the valuation which has been done in this case and the sub committee's report was carefully considered by the Board and it was only after getting the approval of the District Industries Officer that the transaction was concluded and the money was paid. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the assertions made by the senior auditor that the share amount had really not been collected is based on no evidence that he had not questioned all the share-holders or recorded their statements and that it is impossible to believe that the share money had not been collected when the owners had, in fact, been paid for and they had executed the sale deed. It is true that consideration had not been paid by cheque or that the share amount had not been remitted into the bank & that price had not been paid before the Registrar at the time of registering the document. But from these circumstances it cannot be asserted that it was a purely sham transaction. Reliance was placed by the defence on the evidence of Ananthan Pillai who has given evidence that even though shares worth Rs. 1000/- were allotted to him and shown as having been paid for by him he had in fact paid only Rs. 50/- and that he had intimated that he was not in a position to pay the balance amount. It may be, that what the witness says is true or it may be as suggested by the prosecution that the witness is giving evidence to help the accused. Whatever that may be, merely because one of the share-holders has given evidence that he had not paid the full amount of the share money that by itself is no, reason to conclude that none of the share-holders would have paid their share amount. None of them have been examined in the case and none of them had made any complaint. It was pointed out that most of the shareholders were not weavers by profession and by including them as members and applying for a loan intended for the benefit of the weavers it would be an attempt to commit fraud on the Government. Pw.1 has stated that the application forms were filled in by the applicants and that he did not notice whether they were or were not really textile workers. The learned Magistrate has observed that the appellant has not exercised due diligence and care expected of him. Assuming it to be so, it will afford no justification for saying that the appellant was a party to any fraud or conspiracy to cheat the Government. It has come out in evidence that whenever a loan is sanctioned and paid over to any society the entire loan amount would have to be deposited in the bank and the society would be able to draw the money for necessities only with the counter-signature of the District Industries Officer. What benefit the appellant could have had by misleading and getting the loan sanctioned is not explained. 10. What benefit the appellant could have had by misleading and getting the loan sanctioned is not explained. 10. There is no material to show that any information beyond the audit report was in the possession of the accused when the statement was published. No evidence was led to show that the accused made any independent enquiry or investigated into the truth of the charges that had been made in the article. The audit report and the confidential report made by the Joint Registrar may be privileged communications made in the course of the discharge of their official duties but that will not help the accused. Even if the auditor had used identical language which had been indulged in by the accused the publication of a similar imputation would have given to the accused no protection. It was not a case of the accused publishing a verbatim report of the auditor's report. He had made various assertions of fact and unjust comments and no attempt has been made to prove the truth of these statements. The accused cannot justify a defamatory statement on the ground that such report had appeared elsewhere or that rumours to that effect were a float. Every repetition of a libel is a new libel and each publisher is answerable for his act to the same extent as if the calumny originated from him. The publisher of a libel is clearly responsible, irrespective of the fact whether he is the originator of the libel or is merely repeating it. So reliance on the audit report is totally insufficient for founding the various charges made in the article and there can be no justification for the various assertions of fact made by the accused in the article. Reference may in this connection be made to the decision in Mohammed Nazir v. Emperor (AIR. 1928 All. 321), wherein Mears, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Bench stated: "For more than 60 years it has been settled law that the publication of a defamatory "rumour" is as actionable as if the statement were published without qualification. The matter was considered in the case of McPherson v. Daniels (10 B & C 263 (272) and later in Watkins v. Hall (9 B & S 279). The matter was considered in the case of McPherson v. Daniels (10 B & C 263 (272) and later in Watkins v. Hall (9 B & S 279). Those cases lay down in clear terms the proposition that it is no defence to a civil suit that the person who published the libel or slander did not originate it but heard it or received it from another, nor is it a defence that it was a current rumour and, the person publishing it bonafide believed it to be true. As was said in McPherson v. Daniels (10 B & C 263 (272) ): "As great an injury may accrue from the wrongful repetition as from the first publication of slander; the first utterer may have been a person insane or of bad character. The person who repeats it gives greater weight to the slander." "Similarly Chief Justice Best, in DeCrespigny v. Wellesley (2 M & P. 695) shows how the editor of a newspaper is as much responsible for a defamatory letter published in his columns as if he had originally penned it. The fact that it is a letter communicated by a member of the public, with a request that it shall be published in the paper, is no exoneration to the editor who thereby disseminates defamatory matter. As far as the speeches in the Assembly are concerned an absolute immunity attaches to the speeches made on the floor of the House. The members of the Assembly and Parliament may be absolutely privileged in making the speeches but this privilege however does not extend to a statement published by a member outside the House oven though it may be an exact reproduction of what was said during the debate. This question was considered in the case in Harbhajan Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR. 1961 Punjab 215) and it was there stated: "This matter was settled in England, in an early case R. v. Lord Abingdon, (1794) 5 R. R.783." In that case Lord Abingdon had delivered a speech in the House of Lords during the course of which he had indulged in libellous invective against the character of one Mr. Sermon, an attorney. Lord Abingdon sent the printed version of his speech for publication in the newspapers. Sermon, an attorney. Lord Abingdon sent the printed version of his speech for publication in the newspapers. Lord Kenyon observed, that the privilege claimed by Lord Abingdon was restricted to words spoken in the House of Lords and confined to its walls. Lord Abingdon was found guilty of having published the libel-charge and was sentenced to imprisonment and was also ordered to pay a fine. The same principle was reiterated in R. v. Creevey [1813] 14 R.R. 427. It was held that: "a member of the House of Commons may be convicted upon an indictment for a libel in publishing in a newspaper the report of a speech delivered by him in that House, if it contains libellous matter, although the publication be a correct report of such speech." Bayley, J., said: "A member of parliament has undoubtedly the privilege for the purpose of producing parliamentary effect to speak in parliament boldly and clearly what he thinks conducive to that end. He may even for that purpose, if he thinks it right cast imputations in parliament against the character of any individual; and still he will be protected. But if he is to be at liberty to circulate those imputations elsewhere, the evil would be very extensive. No member therefore is at liberty so to do." It should also be borne in mind that in the matter of defamation the position of newspapers is not anyway different from that of members of the public in general. The responsibility in either case is the same. The degree of care and attention is in no way less in the case of newspaper publications than that required from ordinary men. This is clear from the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Arnold v. King Emperor [1914 P.C.116] which are as follows: "Their Lordships regret to find that there appeared on the one side in this case the time-worn fallacy that some kind of privilege attaches to the profession of the press as distinguished from the members of the public. The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher. The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher. The responsibilities which attach to his power in the dissemination of printed matter may, and in the case of a conscientious journalist do make him more careful; but the range of his assertions, his criticisms, or his comments, is as wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject. No privilege attaches to his position." To bring the publication of a scandalous imputation under the Penal Law it is not necessary to prove that it was done out of any ill will or malice or that the complainant had actually suffered from it. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant. Every sane man is presumed to have intended the consequences which normally follow from his act. The accused a journalist of some standing, can very well be presumed to know or to have reason to believe that the imputation published by him would harm the complainant's reputation. No attempt has been made in this case to prove that when the application was made to the honourable Minister and was referred to the Industries Department the Director of Industries did not favour the granting of the loan. The truth is just the other way. Director of Industries had recommended the loan. There is no justification for asserting that the auditor's report showed that it was only a pocket society of the complainant and that none of the persons had paid the share money and that the entries that the share capital had been collected are false. Likewise no attempt was made to prove that there was any conspiracy to defraud and cheat the Government, or that the complainant was a party to it or that false documents were fabricated. No attempt was made by the accused to justify the serious imputations made against the complainant in the article, imputing that this was one of the many instances where swindlers and exploiters have cheated the Government. No attempt was made by the accused to justify the serious imputations made against the complainant in the article, imputing that this was one of the many instances where swindlers and exploiters have cheated the Government. Exception 1 to S.499 I.P.C. recognises the publication of truth a sufficient justification if it is made for the public good. But when truth set up as a defence it must extend to the entire libel and it is not sufficient that only a part of the libel is proved to be true. Here as already stated the truth of the allegations have not been attempted to be proved. I, therefore, cannot agree with the argument of the learned counsel or the conclusion of the learned District Magistrate that the imputations have been proved to be true. 11. The ingredients of the ninth exception on which the entire arguments had been rested are that the imputation on the character of another should be made in good faith and for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. So the accused has to prove that the publication was both in good faith and for the public good. The term good faith is defined in S.52 of the Indian Penal Code. It says that nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. So if an act is not done with due care and attention it cannot be said to be done in good faith. Good faith contemplates an honest effort to ascertain the truth of the facts. What would amount to fair comment has been considered by a Bench of this court in the case in Sankar v. State (1958 KLT.1158), wherein Raman Nayar, J., speaking for the Bench stated: "A mere perusal of exceptions 2,3 and 9 is sufficient to show that these exceptions which embody the defence compendiously known as 'fair comment', apply only to expressions of opinion or imputations on character, and not to assertions of fact. The latter can be justified only by truth. Comment must be on actual and not on imagined conduct; and even if the accused person genuinely believed the imputed conduct to be real that would be no defence. The latter can be justified only by truth. Comment must be on actual and not on imagined conduct; and even if the accused person genuinely believed the imputed conduct to be real that would be no defence. If the opinion or the imputation purports to be based on facts, then the person claiming the benefit of these exceptions must prove those facts. It is not enough for him to say that he believed those facts. When the allegations of fact are so in the present case, in themselves defamatory and those allegations are not proved to be true no defence of fair comment can possibly arise. For, 'fair comment' cannot justify a defamatory statement which is untrue in fact. "A comment cannot be fair which is built upon facts which are not truly stated." And as emphasised by Herschell, L.C. in Davis v. Shepstone (11 App. Case 187 at p. 190):... "There is no doubt that the public acts of a public man may lawfully be made the subject of fair comment or criticism, not only by the press, but by all members of the public But the distinction cannot be too clearly borne in mind between comment or criticism and allegations, of fact such as that disgraceful acts have been committed, or discreditable language used. It is one thing to comment upon or criticise, even with severity, the acknowledged or proved acts of a public man, and quite another to assert that he has been guilty of particular acts of misconduct" " The learned judge further stated: "With regard to the defence of fair comment, S.499 I.P.C. only codified the prevailing English law, what in Campbell v. Spottiswoode (122 English Reports, K.B. 288 decided in 1863) Blackburn, J., regarded as so clearly settled. Dealing with the defence of fair comment put forward in that case Cockburn, C.J., observed: "I think the fair position in which the law may be settled is this; that where the public conduct of a public man is open to animadversion, and the writer who is commenting upon it makes imputations on his motives which arise fairly and legitimately out of his conduct so that a jury shall say that the criticism was not only honest but also well founded, an action is not maintainable. But it is not because a public writer fancies that the conduct of a public man is open to the suspicion of dishonesty, he is therefore justified in assailing his character as dishonest."" Dealing with the same question in Joynt v. Cycle Trade Publishing Company (1904) 2 K.B. 292, Vaughan Williams, J. said that plea of fair comment could not be sustained: "Unless facts were proved which made it reasonable to make such a suggestion. That is the law as I understand it to have been laid down by Crompton, J., in Campbell v. Spottiswoode. She learned judge said: If he (the critic) imputes to the person whom he is criticising base and sordid motives, which are not warranted by the facts,1 cannot think for a moment that because he bonafide believes that he is publishing what is true, that is any defence in point of law." Bonafide belief might, in such a case have some bearing on the quantum of damages in a civil action; perhaps also on the question of sentence in a criminal prosecution; but otherwise it is irrelevant. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Privy Council in Arnold v. King Emperor (AIR. 1914 P.C.116). This decision brings out four principles: Firstly, that "good faith" means good faith and also the exercise of due care and attention; Secondly, that due care and attention means that the libeller should show that he had taken particular steps to investigate the truth and had satisfied himself from his enquiry, as a reasonable man, that he had come to a true conclusion; Thirdly, that the conduct of the accused, during the course of the proceedings in a court, is a relevant factor in determining his good faith; and Fourthly, that if there are several imputations good faith or truth must be proved with respect to every imputation, and, if he fails in substantiating truth or good faith in respect of any one imputation, conviction must stand. In this case as referred to earlier the accused has not said a word that he had investigated into the truth of the imputations which he made in the article. Exception nine applies only to an expression of opinion regarding character and not to assertions of fact which are in themselves defamatory. In this case as referred to earlier the accused has not said a word that he had investigated into the truth of the imputations which he made in the article. Exception nine applies only to an expression of opinion regarding character and not to assertions of fact which are in themselves defamatory. A publisher of a defamatory statement can only be protected if he shows that he had taken all reasonable precautions and then had a reasonable and well grounded belief in the truth of the statement. The plea of 'good faith', implies the making of a genuine effort to reach the truth, and a mere belief in the truth, without there being reasonable grounds for such a plea, is not synonymous with good faith. Exception 9, therefore, covers two matters, proof of good intention and the exercise of reasonable care and skill, having regard to the occasion and the circumstances. Mere subjective belief without any objective basis, is not a dependable criterion for substantiating the ninth exception; and unnecessary aspersion is indicative of want of good faith. The finding of the learned Magistrate is very halting and what is stated is that the accused has 'some' justification in claiming protection under the exception. But this will not suffice. The learned Magistrate has stated that a perusal of the whole article shows that there are unwarranted insinuations and references, but the learned Magistrate found that the intention of the accused was only to bring out the main facts before public and the Government. Again the learned Magistrate has stated that "the accused had made some embellishments, additions etc., in the article probably to meet the taste of the public and to attract their pointed attention to the main facts so as to make it an interesting readable matter." That would not exonerate the accused. 12. Even if the accused felt some suspicion about the society from the audit report and thought that the publication was necessary in this case it was clearly a case of excessive publication which would make the case out of the privilege conferred by exception 9 to S.499 IPC-Vide the decisions in Queen Empress v. Janardhan Damodhar Dikshit (ILR.19 Bom. 703) and Rama Rao v. Emperor (AIR. 1943 Oudh 1). I cannot understand how exceptions can have any application in this case. 703) and Rama Rao v. Emperor (AIR. 1943 Oudh 1). I cannot understand how exceptions can have any application in this case. Exception 8 reads: "It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation." So in order to establish a defence under this exception the accused would have to prove that the person to whom the complaint was made had lawful authority over the person complained against in respect of the subject matter of the accusation. Accusation before the public by publication in a newspaper is not the sort of lawful authority contemplated by the exception. So on a careful and anxious consideration of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the case I have no doubt in my mind that the accused is not protected under any one of the exceptions to S.499 IPC. It, therefore, follows that the accused is guilty of the offence charged against him. 13. It was finally argued that in an appeal against an order of acquittal this court should not interfere with the trial court's appreciation of oral evidence of the witnesses unless there are strong grounds to show that the trial court has grossly misconducted itself in the appreciation of the evidence on record. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are now well settled. It is only necessary to refer to the more recent decision of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1962 SC. 439 and AIR. 1963 SC. 200. So where as in this case there is a total absence of any justification for holding that any of the exceptions would apply in this case and where the order of acquittal is clearly wrong resulting in a miscarriage of justice, it becomes necessary to interfere with the order of acquittal. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal is set aside, the accused is found guilty and convicted under S.500 IPC. and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Time for payment of fine one month from this date. Allowed.