JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over an agricultural land and for possession in the alternative. The plaintiffs claimed that they were occupancy tenants of the land in suit before the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and became sirdars thereafter. They alleged that the defendant succeeded in getting certain entries made in his favour in the village papers and was trying to interfere with the plaintiff's possession on the strength of those entries. The defendant contested the suit claiming that he was a sub-tenant of the plaintiffs and thus acquired the rights of a sirdar under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He further claimed to have become a sirdar by virtue of being recorded as an occupant in the records of 1356 F. and again by virtue of having been in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli. The trial Court decreed the suit, but on appeal the learned Civil Judge dismissed it with the finding that the defendant was formerly a sub-tenant of the plots in suit as alleged by him, has been in continuous possession thereof since 1353F. and had acquired the rights of a sirdar. 2. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge clearly indicates that the findings recorded by him are largely based on the entries in the village records particularly khasras of 1355, 1356, 1358 and 1359 Faslis in which the defendant is shown as a sub-tenant. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the entries relating to sub-tenancy were not in the hand-writing of the village patwari but in that of the defendant himself. It is noted in the judgment of the trial court that the defendant's counsel admitted that the entries of sub-tenancy in the above mentioned khasras were not in the hand-writing of the patwari but he suggested that the partwari appeared to have taken the assistance of some other persons in the preparation of the village records on account of over-work. While the trial court did not definitely find that the said entries were in the hand-writing of the defendant himself, it felt doubtful about their genuineness and observed that at any rate the value of the entries was in the circumstances of the case greatly diminished. While the trial court did not definitely find that the said entries were in the hand-writing of the defendant himself, it felt doubtful about their genuineness and observed that at any rate the value of the entries was in the circumstances of the case greatly diminished. The learned Civil Judge did not however attach much value to this feature of the entries and relied on them for the conclusions reached by him. I must say that this aspect of the case deserved greater attention than was given to it by the learned Civil Judge as it raised a question which may vitally affect the result of the case. 3. In order that an entry in a public record may be receivable in evidence it is imperative that it should have been made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such record is kept. That is the obvious requirement of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act under which the entry is relevant. If, therefore, the entry has not been made by a public servant one of the essential ingredients constituting relevancy is lacking in it and the mere fact of its existence in a public record would not impart to it the character of evidence. It is certainly true that if an entry is found in a public record it may be presumed to have ben made by the public servant entrusted with the preparation of the record but if it is admitted or clearly proved that the entry is not in the hand-writing of the public servant so entrusted, it will have to be established either by evidence or by circumstances that despite the entry not being in his hand-writing it was really `made' by him inasmuch as it was at his instance and on his direction that the entry came to find place in the record. It may be conceded that in demanding that an entry, to be recognisable as evidence, should be made by the public servant concerned, the law does not insist that it should be in the hand-writing of that public servant; but there can be no manner of doubt that the law does make it an essential prerequisite for the relevant of the entry that it should represent an act of the public servant on whom the responsibility for the entry has been made to rest. The public servant may make the entry on his personal observation or knowledge, or on the basis of information received from others; but the entry has always to be his personal act in the sense that it is either in his own hand-writing or written on his dictation and direction. The duty to make the entry is cast by the law relating to it on a particular individual by reason of the office he holds and the trust for a faithful discharge of that duty is reposed in him. It is, therefore, he who has to perform the duty and carry out the trust, and nobody else can be a substitute for him unless the law so provides. If this were not so and if an entry made by a person other than the public servant concerned were to be regarded as acceptable in evidence the consequences will really be most startling and disastrous. However, it cannot be disputed that a vicarious performance of the duty in regard to the making of an entry in a public record is not contemplated by Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. 4. As said above, ordinarily it is not necessary to prove that a particular entry really represents an act of the public servant concerned because this may reasonably be presumed from the fact that he was in charge of the preparation of the record in which the entry finds, place, but the presumption is destroyed by admission or clear proof of the fact that the entry in question is not in the hand-writing of that public servant. In such a case it is not possible to receive the entry in evidence unless there is proof either direct or circumstantial that it does, in reality, constitute an act of the public servant whose duty it was to prepare the record containing the entry. In such a case it is not possible to receive the entry in evidence unless there is proof either direct or circumstantial that it does, in reality, constitute an act of the public servant whose duty it was to prepare the record containing the entry. To presume from the mere existence of an entry in a public record that it was made by a public servant despite admission or clear proof that it was not in his hand-writing would amount to curtailing the express requirement of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am alive of the difficulty which may at times be insurmountable of proving that an entry in a public record, although not in the hand writing of the public servant charged with its preparation, is still an entry `made' by him in the sense indicated above. But the danger of receiving in evidence an entry admitted or clearly proved to be not in the hand-writing of the public servant concerned just because it finds place in a public record cannot also be overlooked. A public servant may be careless, negligent or corrupt, and he might have allowed or suffered others to perform his functions and prepare his official records or make entries therein; unauthorised persons might have obtained access to his records and might have without his knowledge made entries therein. Can it be said that the entries so made would still be regarded as or presumed to be entries made by the Public servant concerned and considered admissible. The answer must clearly be in the negative and indeed it is furnished by Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act itself. For the view that I take on this question I find support from the case of Dasi Ram and another v. Emperor A.I.R. 1947 Alld. p. 429. The question involved in that case related to the admissibility of an extract from the birth register of a village Chaukidar. While holding, after a review of the cases bearing on the point, that the register in question was admissible in evidence, Raghubar Dayal, J. laid down a condition precedent to its admissibility at the end of the judgment in the following words:- "We may note that if this extract be from the Chaukidar's book and the entry be not made by the Chaukidar himself this extract will be inadmissible in evidence." 5. I may mention here that the head-note given to the above decision in the report is obviously in accurate and it misses the significance of the above quoted observation. 6. It also appears to me that the provisions of the Land Records Manual indicate that the patwari should himself prepare the record which he is directed to maintain and he cannot either delegate the function to or allow it to be performed by someone else. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that there are provisions in it for the appointment of an assistant patwari which clearly indicate that it is not open to the patwari to take the assistance of any person of his choosing in the preparation of the records and that it is only a person appointed as an assistant patwari in the manner provided by the Manual who can assist him. In the present case, as stated above, it was admitted by the counsel for the defendant in the trial court that the entries in the sub-tenant's column of the khasras for the years 1355, 1356, 1358 and 1359 Faslis were not in the hand-writing of the patwari. It was not suggested that any assistant patwari had been appointed for this village. There was no proof that although the entries were not in the hand-writing of the patwari they were made on his dictation and direction and represented the acts of the patwari himself. As such, it is clear that the entries could not be regarded as falling within the purview of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and should, therefore, have been excluded from considered. 7. The findings of the learned Civil Judge are primary based on the above entries in the village records. Although there is reference in his judgment to the oral evidence led by the parties, it cannot be determined as to what his findings would have been if the entries in the khasras for the years 1355, 1356, 1358 and 1359 Faslis had been eliminated. In these circumstances the finding recorded by him cannot be accepted and it is necessary that the case be sent back for a re-hearing. In these circumstances the finding recorded by him cannot be accepted and it is necessary that the case be sent back for a re-hearing. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case it is proper that the defendant should have an opportunity of adducing, in the light of the observations made in this judgment, such evidence oral and documentary as may be necessary for proving that although the entries referred to above are not in the hand-writing of the village patwari, they can still be said to have been made by him. The plaintiff too should be permitted to examine a hand-writing expert if he so desires and further to produce evidence, if any, brought by the defendant. 8. I may note I should not be understood as having expressed any opinion regarding the conclusions of fact which may follow as a result of the rejecting or acceptance of the entries in question and the lower appellate court has itself to determine fresh the rights of the parties. 9. The appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower appellate court for being reheard and disposed of in accordance with the directions given above. Costs will abide the result.