Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the mortgagee judgment debtor under a decree for redemption. Compensation for improvements on the land had been adjudged in the decree dated May 29,1952, on the basis of a commissioners report dated August 9,1948 (25121123 M. E.) at Rs. 1100 odd. In execution, after the commencement of the Travancore-Cochin Act X of 1956, the appellant claimed revaluation of the compensation due to him; and a commission was issued, whose report dated November 15,1957, has neither been accepted nor rejected by the court so far. Both parties have taken exception to parts of its contents. After the Kerala Act, XXIX of 1958, came into force, the appellant put in another application for the issue of a fresh commission to value the compensation due to him under that Act. That has been rejected by the executing court and the same upheld by the Subordinate Judge in appeal. Hence this second appeal. 2. Under S.5(3) of Act XXIX of 1958 "the amount of compensation for improvements made subsequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree and the revaluation of an improvement, for which compensation has been so adjudged, when and in so far as such revaluation may be necessary with reference to the condition of such improvement at the time of eviction" have to be determined by the executing court, which is empowered to vary the decree accordingly. The expression ‘the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged* has been interpreted by a Full Bench of this Court in Mathai v. Narayana Pillai 1960 K. L. T. 1192 F. B., where, without a discussion, it was held: "....the idea of using the words 'the date upto which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree' was to strip the decree of the normal presumption that it resolves all rights up to the date on which it is given, and permit the court to award compensation for the improvements, if any, effected subsequent to the date on which the commissioner, for example, valued the improvements." A contrary view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Ammu v. Nagappan Nair (A. I. R.1936 Madras 653): "The argument for the appellant is that because S.6(3) of the Act refers to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree, when no such date is given in the decree, the executing court is at liberty to go behind the decree and ascertain from the evidence the date on which the valuation was actually made and allow a re-valuation with reference to any increment in value between the date of the valuation and the date of eviction. It is argued that this is the practice which is in vogue in certain courts in Malabar and I am asked to give sanction to this practice, which to my mind strikes at the root of the principles upon which the decrees of a Court are executed. When a court's decree for eviction embodies an award for compensation for improvements and says nothing about the date on which those amounts are valued, the natural inference is that the award concludes any claim between the parties on the date of the decree. The mere fact that S.6(3) of the Act provides for re-valuation does not give to the judgment-debtor a right to go behind the decree and by looking into the evidence to find out when the crop was last valued and re-open the whole matter by having a further valuation made immediately after the decree has been passed. The mere fact that S.6(3) of the Act provides for re-valuation does not give to the judgment-debtor a right to go behind the decree and by looking into the evidence to find out when the crop was last valued and re-open the whole matter by having a further valuation made immediately after the decree has been passed. It is of course open to a court in passing its decree to say that the value of improvements on such and such a date is so much and that any increment in value may be worked out in execution by are-valuation. But in the absence of any such provision the amount awarded for the value of improvements in the decree must be taken to be the decision of the Court as to their value on that date." Personally I would have agreed with the above observations of Wadsworth, J., and held "the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree" to mean normally the date of the trial court's decree; but I am bound by the observation of the Full Bench of this Court cited above. It may be unfortunate that the ruling of the Madras High Court was not brought to the notice of the Full Bench in the aforesaid case. What the Full Bench would have held if that ruling was then cited is a matter for speculation that I do not like to venture in. In the light of the Full Bench ruling, I must now hold that the date up to which compensation has been adjudged in the decree is the date of the commissioner's visit to the property, it follows that the appellant is entitled to valuation of all improvements effected subsequent to August 9,1948. 3. Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff states that improvements effected up to November 15,1957, have been the subject of assessment by a commissioner and they need not now be revalued. A commissioner's report cannot conclude the parties. As the said report of the commissioner has not been accepted by the court so far and a valuation of improvements effected upto date has now to be made, I would direct the court below to determine, after issuing a fresh commission at the expense of the appellant, the value of improvements effected on the property subsequent to August 9, 1948. and to amend the decree according to that determination as provided for in S.5(3) of Act XXIX of 1958. There will be no order as to costs in this Second Appeal.