N. M. MIABHOY, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiffs Second Appeal directed against the decree dated 28th January 1960 passed by the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No. 400 of 1958 from the decree in Civil Suit No. 1702 of 1956 by which the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge dismissed the appeal with costs and confirmed the decree passed by the learned Third Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division) Ahmedabad dismissing the suit of plaintiff-appellant with costs. Plaintiff is a limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act. The defendantsrespondents are Union of India State of Gujarat Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Bombay and Provident Funds Inspector Ahmedabad. The main dispute between plaintiff and defendants is about the applicability to plaintiff of the Employees Provident Funds Act 1952 Act No. 19 of 1952 (hereafter called the Act ). In order to understand the dispute between the parties it will be useful to state a few facts. At the relevant time plaintiff was engaged in manufacturing three items viz. (i) shuttles (ii) wire healds and (iii) reeds. Plaintiff started manufacturing shuttles in 1948 in the compound of Navbharat Mills at Ahmedabad. It gave the prescribed notice for starting the factory to the Factory Inspector in connection therewith on 1st October 1948. That factory got burnt in 1949 and in January 1950 plaintiff started manufacturing shuttles in a building situated in the compound of the Ambica Oil Mills in the Gomtipur locality at Ahmedabad. The prescribed notice of occupation of these premises was sent to the Factory Inspector on 10th February 1950. In the latter part of 1950 plaintiff started manufacturing wire healds in separate building situated in the same compound but adjoining the building in which shuttles were manufactured. Regular production for wire healds was started on 4th November 1951 when the prescribed notice of occupation was given to the Factory Inspector. Plaintiff started manufacture of reeds on or about 20th November 1954 again in a separate building but situated in the same compound in which the manufacture of the other two articles viz. shuttles and wire healds was carried on and notice of occupation of this building was also given by plaintiff to the Factory Inspector on the same day. Plaintiff started manufacture of reeds on or about 20th November 1954 again in a separate building but situated in the same compound in which the manufacture of the other two articles viz. shuttles and wire healds was carried on and notice of occupation of this building was also given by plaintiff to the Factory Inspector on the same day. Sometime in 1954 which time however has not been made definite either in the pleadings or in the evidence plaintiff ceased manufacturing wire healds in the aforesaid compound and shifted to a place called Amraivadi the manufacture of wire healds which place is about a mile away from Gomtipur in which formerly plaintiff was carrying on the aforesaid activities. On 15th May 1956 a Provident Fund Inspector appointed under the Act wrote a letter to plaintiff enquiring about the number of workers employed in the manufacturing of the aforeaid three articles and thereupon correspondence ensued between plaintiff and the Provident Fund Department at the end of which that Departments on 28th September 1956 required plaintiff to introduce the Provident Fund Scheme under the Act with effect from 1st September 1954 on the ground that it was in the month of August 1954 that the total number of workers employed by plaintiff in the manufacture of the aforesaid three articles exceeded the number 50. Thereupon plaintiff gave the requisite statutory notice to the persons concerned and filed the suit on 28th October 1956 from which this Second Appeal arises. Plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the Act was not applicable to any one of the three activities with which it was concerned and asked for a permanent injunction restraining respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Act against plaintiff. Two questions arose for determination in the suit. The first question was as to whether the Act did or did not apply to any one of the three activities in which plaintiff was engaged. The second question was whether plaintiff was right in contending that in fact there were three factories each independent of the other and that therefore the number of the workers engaged by plaintiff should be calculated in respect of each factory separately and that the number of workers engaged in each of the so-called independent factory was not to be totalled up for the purpose of determining the total number of workers for the purposes of the Act. The trial Court dismissed the suit of plaintiff with costs. Plaintiff went in appeal to the District Court at Ahmedabad. The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge who decided the appeal dismissed the same with costs. As already stated it is against this appellate decree that the present Second Appeal has been filed. ( 2 ) IN support of this Second Appeal Mr. Nanavati has raised the same two questions for decision which I have already indicated above although the arguments which were addressed in support of the Second Appeal were not necessarily the same as they were advanced in the two lower Courts. ( 3 ) IN order to understand the first point raised by Mr. Nanavati it is necesary to read a few sections of the Act in the first instance. The Act came into operation on 4th March 1952. It has been amended by several amending Acts from time to time. However it is common ground that in the present appeal I am concerned with the Act as it stood amended on the date on which the present suit was filed. Therefore in the course of this judgment I propose to confine my attention only to the provisions of the Act as they stood amended on the relevant date and I do not propose to refer to the subsequent amendments except when they are necessary for some purpose relevant for the decision of the points in dispute. Section 1 sub-section (3) of the Act provided that subject to the provisions contained in section 16 which section it is common ground is not relevant for the purposes of the appeal the Act applied in the first instance to all factories engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I in which fifty or more persons were employed. Schedule I originally mentioned only six industries. Under sec. 4 of the Act the Central Government had the power to add any other industries to that Schedule in respect of the employees whereof it was of opinion that a provident fund scheme should be framed under the Act. The section provided that thereupon the industries so added shall be deemed to be an industry specified in Schedule I for the purposes of the Act. In accordance with this power the Central Government added a number of industries in Schedule I from time to time. The section provided that thereupon the industries so added shall be deemed to be an industry specified in Schedule I for the purposes of the Act. In accordance with this power the Central Government added a number of industries in Schedule I from time to time. I am not concerned in the present appeal with any of these added industries. However one of the industries which was originally mentioned in the Schedule was the following:- Electrical mechanical or general engineering products. The case of respondents is based on the allegation that all the three activities in which plaintiff is engaged is covered by this item in Schedule I. An Explanation was inserted to Schedule I by section 18 of the Amending Act 37 of 1953. This explanation inter alia stated that without prejudice to the ordinary meaning of the aforesaid expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products items Nos. 1 to 26 specified in that Explanation were included in that expression. It appears that no reliance was placed upon this Explanation by the department in any of the two lower Courts. However in this Court Mr. Sompura the learned Assistant Government Pleader contended that the aforesaid three activities of plaintiff were covered by items Nos. 7 20 24 and in any case by item No. 25 read with item No. 7. However as already stated in the two lower Courts the contention of the department was that the aforesaid three activities of plaintiff were covered by the general expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products. Plaintiffs contention was that they were not so covered. According to it the aforesaid three articles-shuttles wire healds and reeds-were not either electrical mechanical or general engineering products. Mr. Sompura conceded before me that the aforesaid three articles could not be regarded as electrical products. ; However his contention was that in any case the aforesaid three articles were either mechanical or general engineering products. Now before I consider the validity of the rival submissions made by the parties as to whether the three articles aforesaid are or are not covered by the aforesaid part of the general expression mechanical or general engineering products. I would first of all dispose of the alternative argument of Mr. Sompura the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the aforesaid three articles or some of them are included in the aforesaid specified items Nos. I would first of all dispose of the alternative argument of Mr. Sompura the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the aforesaid three articles or some of them are included in the aforesaid specified items Nos. 7 20 24 and 25 read with 7 mentioned in the Explanation to Schedule I already referred to. ( 4 ) ITEM No. 7 is as follows:- machinery used in industry (including textile machinery) other than electrical machinery and machine tools. Item No. 20 is as follows:- wires pipes tubes and fittings. Item No. 24 is drums and containers and item No. 25 is parts and accessories of products specified in items 1 to 24. Mr. Sompuras contention was that all the three items aforesaid were machinery used in textile industry and therefore would come within the purview of item No. 7. His further contention was that wire healds and reeds were wires within the meaning of item No. 20 and that all the three articles shuttles wire healds and reeds were fittings within the meaning of the said item. He also contended that the shuttles were containers within the meaning of item No. 24. In any case Mr. Sompura contended that even if the aforesaid three items were not machinery used in textile industry they must be regarded to be parts or accessories of such machinery and as such would be included in item No. 25 read with item No. 7. Now Mr. Nanavatis contention was that such was not the case which was put by the department either in the pleadings or in the evidence or at the time of the arguments in any of the two lower Courts and that therefore there was no factual basis for the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Sompura. In the present case whatever evidence documentary or oral relevant on the aforesaid question has been adduced mainly by plaintiff. The documentary evidence adduced in the case is not very helpful for the purpose of deciding as to whether the aforesaid articles would or would not fall within the purview of any of the aforesaid four items. The oral evidence in the case is that of witness Champaklal Purshottamlal Mehta. The positive evidence of this witness as regards shuttle is that it is no part of textile machinery. The oral evidence in the case is that of witness Champaklal Purshottamlal Mehta. The positive evidence of this witness as regards shuttle is that it is no part of textile machinery. There is nothing positive however in the evidence to show that the other two articles wire healds and reeds were either textile machinery or part thereof. In the plaint the aforesaid articles have been described as mill store items. In the evidence of Mr. Mehta the aforesaid items are also described as mill store items. Mr. Nanavati seems to be right in contending that this admission by plaintiff that the three items were mill store items would not necessarily mean that they were textile machinery or I parts thereof. In my judgment it would not be proper to tie down plaintiff by its mere admission that the aforesaid items were mill store items and conclude that they were parts of textile machinery specially because having regard to the fact that such a definite case was not put up by the department plaintiff had no chance obviously of pointing out the distinction if there was any between textile machinery and mill store items. As regards the contention that the wire healds and reeds are wires and that all the three items are fittings it is true that the evidence of Mr. Mehta establishes that wires are used in the aforesaid first two items. But reading the Explanation as a whole it does not appear that item No. 20 deals with wires as raw materials. The evidence of Mr. Mehta in effect is that wires are used by plaintiff as raw materials for the purpose of manufacturing wire healds and reeds. According to him wires are purchased in the open market by plaintiff and in the preparation of wire healds they are cut and given shape and in the preparation of reeds they are cleaned and cut. Therefore it cannot be stated that the evidence establishes that plaintiff is engaged in the manufacture of wires. Mr. Sompura however relied upon the definition of the word manufacture as given in section 2 clause (ia) and he contended that this definition would include the aforesaid operations in regard to wires. Therefore it cannot be stated that the evidence establishes that plaintiff is engaged in the manufacture of wires. Mr. Sompura however relied upon the definition of the word manufacture as given in section 2 clause (ia) and he contended that this definition would include the aforesaid operations in regard to wires. In my judgment the latter question is entirely different from the question as to whether the item wires is or is not an item which would bring that item under the expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products As to whether the aforesaid operations which have been described by Mr. Mehta do or do not bring it within the meaning of the expression mechanical or general engineering products I propose to discuss it a moment hereafter. But for the present the question is as to whether the aforesaid operations described by Mr. Mehta would bring the articles wire healds and reeds within the item wires used in item No. 20. In my judgment having regard to the aforesaid evidence it is impossible to agree with Mr. Sompuras contention specially when the same happens to be raised for the first time in this Court. In my opinion unless there is some more evidence on the subject it is not possible to agree with the aforesaid contention off-hand. As regards the contention that the three items came within the purview of the expression fittings Mr. Sompuras contention was that all the three items aforesaid were intended for the purpose of being fitted to the mechanisms of a textile machinery and should be so regarded. It is not necessary for me to determine the question as to whether the term fittings takes its colour from the three words wires pipes and tubes with which it is juxtaposed. But even assuming that the term fittings as Mr. Sompura contends has a general connotation and includes all items which are used as fittings even then I am not convinced that there is anything on the record which would show that the aforesaid items were used as fittings for textile machinery. I have been taken through the whole of the evidence of Mr. Mehta and I am not convinced that there is anything in his evidence which would justify the aforesaid conclusion. As regards the contention that shuttles are containers Mr. I have been taken through the whole of the evidence of Mr. Mehta and I am not convinced that there is anything in his evidence which would justify the aforesaid conclusion. As regards the contention that shuttles are containers Mr. Sompuras argument was that the hollow space in the shuttle is used for the purpose of fitting a bobbin therein and that having regard to that fact the shuttle must be regarded to be a container for a bobbin which according to Mr. Sompura is used as a part of textile machinery. Here again in my judgment the contention must be rejected for want of proper evidence on the subject. Having regard to the fact that serious consequences follow from any conclusion which may be reached on the aforesaid subject and having regard to the fact that both the parties had enough opportunity to plead their respective cases in the trial Court it would be improper to decide the question on the aforesaid new ground specially when the parties could have submitted specific pleadings on the subject and led evidence on that point. Mr. Nanavati seriously disputed the propositions on which the submission of Mr. Sompura was based and having regard to the fact that the point is raised for the first time in the Second Appeal I do not propose to rest my judgment on that new ground. Having regard to my conclusion that the evidence does not establish that the aforesaid three articles were textile machinery or parts thereof the argument that the three articles came within the purview of item No. 7 read with item No. 25 must also be rejected. ( 5 ) THAT brings me to the main question in dispute between the parties as to whether all or any of the aforesaid three items came within the purview of the general expression mechanical or general engineering products. Mr. Nanavatis contention was that there was no evidence in the case to establish that the aforesaid three articles or any of them was either a mechanical or a general engineering product. But before one can answer this question it is quite clear that one must understand as to what exactly the Legislature meant by a mechanical or a general engineering product. Now on this subject Mr. But before one can answer this question it is quite clear that one must understand as to what exactly the Legislature meant by a mechanical or a general engineering product. Now on this subject Mr. Nanavati very strongly relied upon the observations made by Mehrotra J. of the Allahabad High Court in Great Eastern Electroplaters Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner U. P. A. I. R. 1956 Allahabad 495. In this case the question which Mehrotra J. had to decide was whether a torch-case was or was not an item which was included in the aforesaid general expression. The contention which the learned Judge was considering was whether the term electrical product meant anything produced through electrical process. In repelling this contention the learned Judge made the following observations :-"in my opinion such a wide meaning cannot be given to the words electrical mechanical or general engineering products. If such a wide meaning is to be given then it will include even chemical products and textile goods. There may be many textile goods and chemical products which are being produced by means of electrical process or mechanical process. The words electrical and mechanical have not in my opinion been used in the Schedule only in contradistinction with the hand-made products but they have to be given a narrower meaning. From the nature of the articles mentioned in the amended Schedule it will be clear that the scope of the words electrical and mechanical products is not to cover all products which are made by means of mechanical or electrical process but it means products which are utilised for purposes of producing electricity or implements and other apparatus and machinery or goods like fans radio and battery shells. A torch case is only an article for purposes of keeping batteries and not for purposes of generating electricity. The fact that torch cases are produced by cutting shaping and soldering brass and iron sheets by means of machineries does not make them mechanical or electrical products. " ( 6 ) FROM the aforesaid passages it appears that the learned Judge laid down one negative and one positive test for determining the connotation of the general expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products. The negative test was that it did not include all product produced by means of electrical or mechanical process. " ( 6 ) FROM the aforesaid passages it appears that the learned Judge laid down one negative and one positive test for determining the connotation of the general expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products. The negative test was that it did not include all product produced by means of electrical or mechanical process. The positive test was that it was the use for which the product was made for producing electricity or implements and other apparatus or machinery or goods like fans radio and battery shells that determined the connotation of the word In fairness I may mention that though Mr. Nanavati strongly pleaded for the adoption of the negative test he did not rely upon the positive test which was laid down in this case. It appears that the positive test was formulated on a perusal of the various items mentioned in the Explanation. Mr. Sompura on the other hand contended that the decision of Mehrotra J. was reversed in appeal in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner U. P. Kanpur v. M/s. Great Eastern Electroplator Ltd. A. I. R. 1959 Allahabad 133 and that therefore the aforesaid observations of the learned Judge were no longer good law even in the Allahabad Court. However a perusal of the appellate judgment in the case shows that Mehrotra J. was reversed on the ground that a torch-case came within the purview of item No. 24. It is on this ground that Mehrotra J. was reversed and there is nothing in the judgment of the Division Bench which suggests that the test which was laid down by Mehrotra J. was not approved. However Mr. Sompura was perfectly justified in contending that the aforesaid two tests which have been laid down by Mehrotra J. have not been approved by a judgment delivered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which judgment is binding on this Court too. The case is The Nagpur Glass Works Ltd. v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner 59 Bombay Law Reporter 760. Mudholkar J. in delivering the judgment in that case made the following observations at page 762 in regard to the tests laid down by Mehrotra J. in the Allahabad case:-"in that case it may be mentioned. The case is The Nagpur Glass Works Ltd. v. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner 59 Bombay Law Reporter 760. Mudholkar J. in delivering the judgment in that case made the following observations at page 762 in regard to the tests laid down by Mehrotra J. in the Allahabad case:-"in that case it may be mentioned. the learned Judge observed that a torch-case is only an article for purposes of keeping batteries and not for purposes of generating electricity and the unit which produced this article did not fall within the schedule. The learned Judge has not stated why in his opinion the products which are made by means of electrical and mechanical process are excluded from the expression Electrical mechanical or general engineering products. With utmost respect to the learned Judge we find it difficult to agree with the interpretation placed by him on the expression. In our opinion as already stated the words electrical mechanical and general have reference to the process of manufacture and not to the use to which the articles produced could be put. " ( 7 ) UNDER the circumstances it is impossible for me to uphold the contetion of Mr. Nanavati as to the correct meaning of the aforesaid expression based upon the Allahabad case. The Nagpnr Glass Works Ltds case however has interpreted the aforesaid general expression and Mr. Sompura is again right in contending that that interpretation is binding on this Court. In an earlier passage at page 761 this is what Mudholkar J. has stated regarding the general expression:-"the question is whether the expression Electrical mechanical or general engineering products includes metal lamps or burners. . . . . Now the expression Electrical mechanical or general engineering products is a very wide one and even though metal lamps and burners are not included in the Explanation to the Schedule it would seem that they would fall within the general expression. The only limitation that could be placed on the product is that it must be an engineering product. The adjective electrical means according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary relatting to or connected with electricity; while the adjective mechanical means in this context according to that Dictionary Acting worked or produced by a machine or mechanism. The only limitation that could be placed on the product is that it must be an engineering product. The adjective electrical means according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary relatting to or connected with electricity; while the adjective mechanical means in this context according to that Dictionary Acting worked or produced by a machine or mechanism. Thus the expression Electrical mechanical or general engineering products means engineering product relating to or connected with electricity or engineering products acting or worked or produced by a machine or mechanism or products produced by a craftsman employing a certain design or invention. " ( 8 ) MR. Nanavati was ultimately constrained to concede that this interpretation was binding on this Court too. But his contention was that though the aforesaid passage explains the two Adjectives electrical and mechanical it does not explain what an engineering product was and according to Mr. Nanavati those two words are the core of the general expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products. It appears from the aforesaid passage that the three words electrical mechanical or general have been construed as being adjectives to the expression engineering products and therefore though a product may be related or connected with electricity or may be acting worked or produced by a machine or mechanism still it would not come within the purview of the general expression unless it is also an engineering product. Therefore Mr. Nanavati appears to be right in contending that the expression engineering products is the core of the aforesaid expression. The same view has been taken by the Punjab High Court in Shibu Metal Works Jagadhri v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Punjab Ambala Cantonment A. I. R. 1963 Punjab 19. Dua J. in delivering the judgment of the Bench observed as follows:-"construing the expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products in the light of what has just been stated I am inclined to hold that the legislative emphasis is intended to be more prominent on the words engineering products which represent the core of the entry and the words electrical mechanical and general have to be construed as qualifying the words engineering products. " ( 9 ) THE aforesaid interpretation would also do away with the difficulty which was envisaged by Mehrotra J. in pointing out that if a wide meaning were to be given to the aforesaid expression it would include chemical and textile products and consumer goods of all kinds. ( 10 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion it is crystal clear that in order that an article may come within the purview of the aforesaid general expression it is necessary to be established in the first instance that it is an engineering article. However Mr. Nanavati is not wholly right in contending that the latter expression has not been interpreted by Their Lordships in The Nagpur Glass Works Ltd. s case. The following passage in the judgment deals not merely with the expression the general article but directly deals with a general engineering article: -. . products produced by a craftsman employing a certain design or invention. However Mr. Nanavati is right in contending that though the aforesaid passage may relate to an interpretation of the words general engineering products there is no discussion whatsoever in the judgment itself as to why and how the aforesaid test is laid. On the other hand Mr. Sompura contends that though there is no definition of the expression engineering products to be found in any of the books which he has consulted and may be taken from the following definition of the expression mechanical engineering which is to be found in the Dictionary of Terms used in the Theory and Practice of Mechanical Engineering by J. G. Horner seventh Edition Revised and Enlarged by Staton Abbey. The definition on which Mr. Sompura relies is to be found at page 222 of the book and it is as follows :-"the art of construction of mechanism generally comprising both prime movers and machines. It embraces designing drawing pattern-making moulding smiths work turning boring drilling shaping planning fitting millwrights work boiler and platers work and erecting. " ( 11 ) IT is difficult to accede to the request of Mr. Sompura specially in view of the fact that the definition on which he relies is not of the expression engineering article but of mechanical engineering. " ( 11 ) IT is difficult to accede to the request of Mr. Sompura specially in view of the fact that the definition on which he relies is not of the expression engineering article but of mechanical engineering. But at the Same time it cannot be denied that in the absence of any other guide the Court may bear in mind the aforesaid definition for the purpose of determining the exact connotation of the expression engineering product. Before I deal further with the question as to what the expression engineering product connotes I may dispose of an argument made by Mr. Nanavati based upon the aforesaid passage in The Nagpur Glass Works Ltd. s case which deals with general engineering product. Mr. Nanavati contends that even if the aforesaid definition is taken as the norm that definition is not satisfied by the facts of the present case. Mr. Nanavati contends that there is no evidence that the aforesaid three products were produced by craftsmen and that there is also no evidence that a design or an invention was employed in their production. Mr. Nanavati is right in contending that there is no evidence that the aforesaid three products are the handiworks of craftsmen. In fact the trend of the evidence is that all the aforesaid three products were being manufactured by machines. The expression manufacture has been defined in the Act in section 2 (ia) as meaning making altering ornamenting finishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use sale transport delivery or disposal. It is true that this definition does not necessarily envisage the process of manufacturing by machine and that a product may be the result of the handiwork of a craftsman. But at the same time there is no reason to believe on the evidence that the aforesaid articles were being manufactured by the hands of craftsmen and that machinery was not employed therein. Nor is there any definite evidence in the caseto show that there was any design or invention in the making of the production of those articles. However in advancing the aforesaid argument Mr. Nanavati confuses a general engineering product with an engineering product. Nor is there any definite evidence in the caseto show that there was any design or invention in the making of the production of those articles. However in advancing the aforesaid argument Mr. Nanavati confuses a general engineering product with an engineering product. It may be that the distinction between an electrical or a mechanical engineering product on the one hand and a general engineering product on the other may consist in the fact that in the latter class of products the article may be one which is made by a craftsman. But that is not the test for the purpose of determining as to what an engineering article is. As the whole of the aforesaid expression shows an engineering article is one which may be either an electrical or a mechanical or a general article. Therefore the aforesaid passage which has been used by Their Lordships in the above judgment can hardly be applied as a test for determining what an engineering article is. Therefore in my judgment though the aforesaid passage is useful for the purpose of determining what an engineering article is the passage cannot be used as a test for determining what an engineering article is and that in any case it cannot be regarded as an exhaustive definition of that kind of article. Having regard to the fact) that there is no definition of the expression engineering article in the Act nor is any definition of any such expression brought to my notice in any of the standard books it is obvious that it will be risky to hazard an exhaustive definition of that particular expression. However one thing is quite certain that the whole of the expression which is the subjectmatter of construction is not either a technical expression or an expression of art. There is internal evidence in the Act itself which shows that the Legislature regarded that expression as having an ordinary meaning. This is quite clear from the fact that in the Explanation the Legislature itself has stated that the various items as specified by it are included in that expression without prejudice to the ordinary meaning of the expression. Some indication as to the connotation of the expression engineering article can be had also from the various items which have been included in that definition in the Explanation itself. Some indication as to the connotation of the expression engineering article can be had also from the various items which have been included in that definition in the Explanation itself. A perusal of those items shows that an engineering product is not necessarily an article of use only but it may be an article which may itself be used as a means of producing articles of use. For example items No. 1 2 and 7 are not engineering products in the sense that they are products which are the results of an activity designed to produce articles of use. They are themselves items which are used for the purpose of producing some other electrical mechanical or general engineering products. On the other hand the list contains such articles as bolts nuts rivets drums and containers which themselves do not produce articles of the aforesaid nature but which are articles which are used in industries for the purpose of either producing or marketing articles. On the contrary a perusal of the aforesaid list shows that the common bond which binds all the aforesaid articles in the expression electrical mechanical or general engineering products is that in the production of those articles engineering knowledge or skill has to be employed. Therefore broadly speaking whenever you have an article in the production or the making of which a higher type of knowledge or skill which one associates with the profession of an engineer has to be employed and not merely ordinary knowledge or skill which one associates with a mere artisan then that article would be an engineering article. Although as already stated it would be hazardous to formulate an exhaustive definition of the aforesaid expression in my judgment for the purposes of the present case the above may be regarded as a useful test for determining the nature of the three articles in question. In the two lower Courts the plaintiff laid emphasis upon the test that an article comes within the purview of the aforesaid definition only if it is so regarded in the commercial or the industrial world and the plaintiffs case was based upon the testimony of Mr. Mehta which according to plaintiff showed that it was not so regarded in the commercial and the industrial world. However this test was not pressed for acceptance in my Court. Mr. Mehta which according to plaintiff showed that it was not so regarded in the commercial and the industrial world. However this test was not pressed for acceptance in my Court. Mr. Nanavati very fairly conceded that that test was not a satisfactory or a reliable test as the result of it would be to abdicate the function of this Court to the opinion of more or less interested persons. The evidence given by Mr. Mehta was very strongly relied upon by Mr. Nanavati in support of his proposition that that evidence definitely established that none of the three articles was an engineering article. Now if the evidence of Mr. Mehta is to be read for the purpose of reaching the negative conclusion that they were not engineering articles I have no doubt whatsoever that that evidence is not at all useful As regards the shuttles the evidence of Mr. Mehta is that the shuttle consists of the shuttle proper the tips iron hooks iron toungues and iron pins. His evidence is that the last four articles are not manufactured in the plaintiffs factory but they are produced in the open market and that all that plaintiff does in regard to those four articles is to fix them in the shuttles. As regards the wire healds the evidence of Mr. Mehta is that wires are puschased by plaintiff in the open market and all that plaintiff does is to cut them and give a certain shape to those wires in order to constitute them into wire healds. As regards the reeds Mr. Mehtas evidence is that plaintiff purchases wires in the open market cleans them cuts them and then fixes them into the reeds. As regards the shuttles Mr. Mehtas evidence is that no engineering work is being done in regard to them in the factory. As already stated he has also deposed that shuttle is not a part of textile machinery. However Mr. Mehta in conformity with the pleadings does state that all the three articles are items of mill stores. Now it is difficult to rely upon the mere ipsi dixit of Mr. Mehta that in regard to shuttles no engineering work is being done by the factory and it is not an items of textile machinery. No details are furnished in regard to the operations as to how shuttles are prepared by the factory. Now it is difficult to rely upon the mere ipsi dixit of Mr. Mehta that in regard to shuttles no engineering work is being done by the factory and it is not an items of textile machinery. No details are furnished in regard to the operations as to how shuttles are prepared by the factory. It is also difficult to rely upon the mere negative evidence that shuttles do not constitute a part of textile machinery. But apart from these unsatisfactory features of Mr. Mehtas evidence there is enough in the description of the various processes given by Mr. Mehta to lead one to conclude that the aforesaid three articles are engineering articles. In the first instance some of the operations which have been described by. Mehta would certainly come within the purview of the definition of the word manufacture as given in the Act itself. Aid can also be derived from the definition of mechanical engineering which has already. been reproduced on which Mr. Sompura relied. What distinguishes the work of an ordinary artisan from that of an engineering is that in performing his work an engineer resorts to such devices as designing drawing moulding shaping and such other operations which require the skill of an engineer. It may be that in making the shuttles plaintiff may be purchasing some of the articles from outside. But the operations which are done with respect to the purchased articles and the wooden part of the shuttle all show prima facie that they do demand the knowledge or the skill of an engineer. Even though wires may be purchased from outside the skill of an engineer or his knowledge would be necessary in cutting cleaning and shaping those wires for the purpose of converting them into wire healds and reeds. That reeds articles are not merely articles produced by an ordinary artisan is also quite clear from the fact that these articles are used not as ordinary consumer goods. but they are used as items of mill stores. It is not disputed by Mr. Nanavati that shuttles are used for the purpose of weaving cloth and that wire healds and reeds are used for the same purpose. but they are used as items of mill stores. It is not disputed by Mr. Nanavati that shuttles are used for the purpose of weaving cloth and that wire healds and reeds are used for the same purpose. Having regard to the purposes for which these articles are used the nature of those articles and the skill and the knowledge which required to be employed for the purpose of producing them-it is obvious that they are not ordinary articles such as are used for the purposes of consumption in the ordinary day-to-day life but are articles which constitute parts of a mechanism used for the purpose of producing cloth. Under the circumstances prima facie there is good evidence in the case to show that the articles are engineering articles and the evidence given by Mr. Mehta apart from rebutting the presumption which arises from the nature of the articles to a certain extent supports the aforesaid conclusion. ( 12 ) IN the final analysis the argument of Mr. Nanavati boiled down to this that having regard to the fact that plaintiff alone had led evidence in the case and that there was no positive evidence adduced by defendants defendants must be taken to have failed to discharge the burden which lay on them of proving a positive fact namely that the articles were engineering articles. Therefore Mr. Nanavati very strenuously contended basing himself upon a passage in the judgment delivered in Shibu Metal Works Jagadhri v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Punjab Ambala Cantonment already referred to that it was for the department to make out the case that the industry was a shuttle industry. I do not think that the approach suggested by Mr. Nanavati would be the correct approach. The suit is filed by the company. It is the company which seeks a declaration to the effect that it is not liable under the Act and also seeks a permanent injunction restraining the department from enforcing the provisions of the Act. Therefore the reliefs which plaintiff claims are equitable reliefs and it is quite clear that the initial burden of proving that it is entitled to these equitable reliefs is upon plaintiff. It is quite clear that if no evidence were led on either side the suit would come to be dismissed and the aforesaid reliefs would not be granted. Therefore the reliefs which plaintiff claims are equitable reliefs and it is quite clear that the initial burden of proving that it is entitled to these equitable reliefs is upon plaintiff. It is quite clear that if no evidence were led on either side the suit would come to be dismissed and the aforesaid reliefs would not be granted. Therefore the question in all such cases is as to whether plaintiff has discharged the initial burden which lies upon it to prove that the Act did not apply. It is true that in considering the question as to whether the burden is discharged or not the Court must bear in mind the fact that plaintiff is called upon to prove a negative fact. It may be that very slight evidence may be sufficient to satisfy the Court that the burden has been discharged. It may be that in some cases slight evidence may be considered as sufficient to shift the burden of proof on to the other side. But the important point to notice is that there must be some such reliable evidence adduced by plaintiff in the first instance which would permit the Court to hold that the burden has either been discharged or that it has been shifted on to the other side. Approaching the case in this particular manner the evidence given by Mr. Mehta does not satisfy any of the aforesaid tests. Mr. Mehtas evidence is not quite forthright inasmuch as he does not disclose all the processes which are employed in the manufacturing of the aforesaid articles and the manner in which they are manufactured. Moreover as already stated by me Mr. Mehtas evidence itself shows that some of the processes described by him are such and specially the nature of the articles which have been produced and the use to which those articles are being put all converge to show that articles are more engineering articles rather than ordinary non-engineering ones. Therefore the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the three articles in question come within the purview of the expression mechanical or general engineering articles was correct and must be upheld. Therefore the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the three articles in question come within the purview of the expression mechanical or general engineering articles was correct and must be upheld. ( 13 ) AS regards the second point one important fact which has got to be borne in mind is that the question as to whether the number of workers employed by plaintiff exceeded fifty has got to be determined with reference to the point of time at which the dispute arose between the parties or in any case at the point of time when the suit was filed. Now on that subject the admitted facts are that even till to-day the buildings in which shuttles and reeds are being manufactured are situated in Gomtipur area in one and the same compound. As regards the building in which the wire healds are manufactured the plaintiffs case is that that building is now no longer being used for that particular purpose. But plaintiff admits that till 1954 the aforesaid building also situated in the same compound was being used for the same purpose. According to plaintiff it was sometime in 1954 that the manufacture of the wire healds was shifted to Amraivadi locality. But plaintiff has not stated anywhere nor has it clarified as to when the shifting took place. In the absence of any such clarification or evidence the present case must be decided on the footing that at the relevant time all the three articles were being manufactured in three buildings in Gomtipur locality situated within one compound. It is admitted by plaintiff that the number of workers which were employed in the three buildings aforesaid at the relevant time exceeded fifty. The plaintiffs case in the lower Courts appeared to be that after the shifting took place the workers engaged in the manufacture of wire healds should not be computed for counting the number required under the Act. However it is obvious that such an approach would not help plaintiff in obtaining the reliefs sought for. If in 1954 the number of workers in the three buildings exceeded fifty the Act would apply and it is not the plaintiffs case that the provisions of the Act would cease to apply to plaintiff or to the workers employed in the manufacture of wire healds by the mere fact of shifting the place for manufacturing wire healds. If in 1954 the number of workers in the three buildings exceeded fifty the Act would apply and it is not the plaintiffs case that the provisions of the Act would cease to apply to plaintiff or to the workers employed in the manufacture of wire healds by the mere fact of shifting the place for manufacturing wire healds. The question as to what exactly would be the legal effect of shifting the place of the manufacture of wire healds after 1954 was never put in issue and does not arise for consideration in the present appeal at all. Mr. Nanavati was on the horns of a dilemma in placing this part of plaintiffs case. Firstly having regard to the above position the Act would certainly apply to plaintiff and its workers. Secondly Mr. Nanavati admitted that even if the workers engaged in the manufacture of wire healds are excluded the workers engaged in the manufacture of shuttles and reeds exceeded fifty at all material times. Therefore it is obvious that the provisions of the Act would apply to plaintiff in regard to the workers engaged in the manufacture of those two articles and the suit would deserve to be dismissed. Therefore in order to escape the dilemma Mr. Nanavati urged that though the three or two articles were being manufactured in one and the same compound the buildings in which the articles were being manufactured must be regarded as distinct factories for the purposes of the Act inasmuch as each article was being manufactured in a separate building. Therefore Mr. Nanavatis contention was that even if all the three articles were manufactured in the same compound at the relevant period of time for the purpose of considering whether the provisions of the Act did or did not apply the correct legal position was that in fact there were three factories each engaged in the manufacture of one of the aforesaid three articles. Mr. Nanavati contended that in none of the aforesaid three factories the number had ever exceeded fifty and that therefore the provisions of the Act did not apply. Therefore the question for consideration is whether for the purposes of the aforesaid Act there were three separate factories each manufacturing a separate article or there was only one factory consisting of three separate buildings in which all the three articles were being manufactured. Therefore the question for consideration is whether for the purposes of the aforesaid Act there were three separate factories each manufacturing a separate article or there was only one factory consisting of three separate buildings in which all the three articles were being manufactured. The answer to this question must depend upon the definition of the word factory as given in the Act. That definition is as follows:- factory means any premises including the precincts thereof in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power. The crucial words in the aforesaid definition for the purpose of resolving the present controversy appear to be premises including the precincts thereof. According to Mr. Nanavati the expression premises means a building and not buildings or a series of buildings. Mr. Nanavati said that he was prepared to concede that if one article was being manufactured in a number of buildings situated in one and the same compound the same article being subjected to a number of processes in each of the aforesaid buildings then all the buildings would constitute premises within the meaning of the aforesaid definition. But Mr. Nanavati emphasised the fact that in the present case a separate article complete by itself was being manufactured and that all the processes which were necessary for the purpose of producing each of the aforesaid articles were complete in themselves in each building; that therefore each building must be regarded as separate premises and consequently a separate factory. Mr. Nanavati contended that the tests which were applied in the two lower Courts for determining this question were not proper or legal. He contended that the fact that the same company owned all the three units which manufactured the three articles was of no consequence. He contended that it was open to one and the same individual to start a number of factories and so long as he keeps the manufacturing process in respect of each of the articles in a separate way in a separate building each must be regarded to be a separate factory and not one and the same factory. He contended that plaintiff itself had regarded all the three as separate units and that this is borne out by a number of facts deposed to by Mr. Mehta. He contended that plaintiff itself had regarded all the three as separate units and that this is borne out by a number of facts deposed to by Mr. Mehta. For example according to Mr. Mehta separate muster rolls are kept for each kind of workers; that the timings of workers engaged in manufacturing each article differed from the timings of those manufacturing the other article; and that the workers were never transferred from one section to another. Mr. Nanavati contended that the facts that one set of books was employed for all the three manufacturing processes that a common balance-sheet was drawn up for all the three of them and that bonus was paid on the basis of profits earned by all the three units to the workers of all the three articles are absolutely irrelevant circumstances which do not have any bearing for the purpose of determining a question whether each one is a separate factory or not. In my judgment none of the circumstances on which Mr. Nanavati relies is determinative of the question in hand. As already stated by me the real question is determination of the connotation of the expression premises including the precincts thereof. Now the expression premises is a wide expression and takes within itself not merely a building but a series of buildings also. That this is so is also quite clear from the use of the word precincts which according to some authorities mean a place which is bounded by metes and bounds. Therefore the true test for the purpose of determining whether a particular place is or is not premises including the precincts thereof is whether the place is such as is defined by metes and bounds It cannot be disputed that the aforesaid expression does not merely include a building but also the place surrounding it such as the compound. The aforesaid expression therefore takes within its connotation not merely the building but the open area or the compound round about that particular building. If the latter is included in the connotation of the aforesaid expression in my judgment all buildings which are included in the precincts and which are defined by a common compound and separated by a common mete and bound must be regarded as one premises for the purposes of the Act. If the latter is included in the connotation of the aforesaid expression in my judgment all buildings which are included in the precincts and which are defined by a common compound and separated by a common mete and bound must be regarded as one premises for the purposes of the Act. Under the circumstances at the relevant time although the aforesaid three articles were being manufactured in separate buildings having regard to the fact that all the buildings were situated in one and the same compound and that each building was situated within the precincts of the other building all the three buildings must be regarded to be a single factory within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. That the term factory has got a wide meaning was held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Bombay v. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara A. I. R. 1962 Supreme Court 1536 as shown by the following passage in the judgment at page 1540:-"the defintion of the word factory prescribed by sec. 2 (g) of the Act shows that a factory means any premises including the precincts thereof in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power. Thus the word factory used in sec. 1 (3) (a) has a comprehensive meaning and it includes premises in which any manufacturing process is being carried on as described in the definition. This definition of the word factory shows that factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I cannot necessarily mean a factory exclusively engaged in the particular industry specified in the said Schedule. " ( 14 ) IN this case it was decided that the Act applies to a composite factory manufacturing more than one article provided that the activity producing the scheduled article was the principal or the main activity of the factory. In my judgment if a narrower interpretation were to be given to the word factory then it would introduce practical difficulties in the application of the aforesaid test laid down by Their Lordships. The matter can be tested in this way also. In my judgment if a narrower interpretation were to be given to the word factory then it would introduce practical difficulties in the application of the aforesaid test laid down by Their Lordships. The matter can be tested in this way also. supposing if all the three articles were being manufactured in one and the same building then it is crystal clear that for the purpose of computing the number of workers the workers engaged in the manufacture of all the three articles would be included. It does not stand to reason that the workers should be denied the benefit of the provisions of the Act by the mere fact that for economic or other reasons the employer accommodates the workers in separate buildings but in the same compound. This is apart from the question as to whether the separation was designed to avoid the provisions of the Act. Even apart from the latter question in the present case all the three buildings together must be regarded as constituting one factory having regard to the fact that they were situated in one and the same compound specially because when we find that plaintiff is engaged in the activity of producing articles which are used in one and the same industry namely the textile industry. ( 15 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons there is no substance in this appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .