Order: These are connected petitions to quash the same order of the State Transport Authority dated 12th June, 1961, setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority, dated 30th April, 1957, which granted the variation of the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal, in favour of Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. The State Transport Authority directed the Regional Transport Authority to dispose the application of Swami Motor Transports (P) Ltd. afresh according to the law. By G.O. Ms. No. 3199 Home dated 16th November, 1956 the State Government in the purported exercise of its power under section 43-A(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 directed the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore to vary the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses. The Government made this order as a result of three petitions, two of them in July, 1956 by two member of the local Legislative Assembly and the third on 6th August, 1956 by Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. The Regional Transport Authority relied on this Government Order and in keeping with it, so was it stated, granted the variation of the route in respect of two buses MDO-1959 and MDO-1960 of Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. Raman and Raman (P) Ltd. who was an objector and not an operator on the route, filed a revision petition to the State Transport Authority against that order. The State Transport Authority was of the view that the order should be set aside on two grounds: (1) that the Regional Transport Authority should not have relied on the Government Order, as a direction to grant the variation in favour of Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. But it should have called for applications from all the existing operators on the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam ana chosen one or more applicants, according to the need and merits of the case and (2) that Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd., itself being an applicant for variation, the Regional Transport Authority was wrong in issuing to it a notice under section 48-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for which there was no need. Since in its view the Regional Transport Authority did not properly interpret the order of the Government, the State Transport Authority set aside the order and remanded the matter for fresh disposal according to the law. Since in its view the Regional Transport Authority did not properly interpret the order of the Government, the State Transport Authority set aside the order and remanded the matter for fresh disposal according to the law. Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd., in W.P. No. 843 of 1961 seeks to quash the order of the State Transport Authority on the ground that the revision petition was not competent and on the further ground that the State Transport Authority was not right in its view of the propriety and effect of the notice under section 48-A of the Act to Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd., on the order of the Regional Transport Authority. In my opinion, neither of the grounds can be sustained. Section 64-A provides for a revision to the State Transport Authority against an order of a Regional Transport Authority from which no appeal lies. Section 64(1) allows appeals to the prescribed authority, which is the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in specified cases, two of them being by a person aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him or being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof, or by any condition attached thereto. Learned Advocate-General for Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd., submits that an appeal from the order of the Regional Transport Authority under section 57(8) lies under section 64(1)(f) relating to the second category of the two cases I have mentioned. Section 57(8) enjoins that an application to vary a condition of a stage carriage permit by inclusion of a new route should be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. The effect of this is that an application should be disposed of by complying with the procedure for the grant of such carriage permits. According to learned Advocate-General, the deeming clause implies also a right of appeal to an aggrieved objector who provides transport facilities, to any condition attached to a permit. The effect of this is that an application should be disposed of by complying with the procedure for the grant of such carriage permits. According to learned Advocate-General, the deeming clause implies also a right of appeal to an aggrieved objector who provides transport facilities, to any condition attached to a permit. In Krishnamurthy v. C.D.A. Transport Co.1, this Court rejected a contention based on Rule 208 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, namely, that the applications made by the appellants in that case should be treated as applications for the grant of a permit as laid down by that rule and if so treated, the refusal to grant the extension should be deemed to be a refusal to grant a permit and it would be an appealable order under section 64(1)(a). The ground was that as was held in Attorney-General v. Sillem2, the creation of a new right of appeal was plainly an act which required legislative authority but section 64(1) did not provide for an appeal from an order varying a condition of a permit. Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ., observed at page 324: “If the rule in question does not in terms confer a right of appeal against an order refusing to vary the conditions of a permit, can it be said that it impliedly confers such a right? As has been pointed out above, a right of appeal must be expressly conferred by a statute and cannot be inferred by implication. It is not within the competence of the rule-making authority constituted under section 68 of the Act to confer a new right of appeal not recognised or granted by section 64 of the Act.” Learned Advocate-General says that what was a rule has since been embodied in sub-section (8) of section 57 and this will make a difference to maintainability of an appeal against such an order under section 64(1)(a) or (f). I am unable to accept this view. In my opinion, the only effect of the deeming provision in sub-section (8) of section 57 is to attract to the disposal of an application for variation of a condition the procedure applicable to the grant of permits. Section 64(1) does not expressly provide for an appeal from an order under section 57(8). I am unable to accept this view. In my opinion, the only effect of the deeming provision in sub-section (8) of section 57 is to attract to the disposal of an application for variation of a condition the procedure applicable to the grant of permits. Section 64(1) does not expressly provide for an appeal from an order under section 57(8). Nor is or can such a ;right of appeal be implied in section 64(1) merely because an application for variation should be disposed of as if it was for a new permit. There is no room for such an implication. Further with respect I agree with Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan JJ., that a right of appeal cannot be inferred by implication. A right of appeal is not a common law right but it springs from express legislative authority. Lion Automobile Service v. State Trasnsport Authority, Madras1, is not in point as that was a case of a counter-signature and section 64(1)(d) gives a right of appeal to an aggrieved person against a refusal to counter-sign. Nor did W.A. Nos. 43 and 58 of 1958 decide the point. Upon my view I have indicated, I hold that the revision-petition before the State Transport Authority was competent. There is also a further point why the petitioner’s objection to the jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority should fail. The objection was not taken before that Authority itself. There is authority with which I respectfully agree that Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. cannot be permitted to take the objection at this stage either on the ground of acquiescence or from the standpoint of certiorari, the ground not having been taken before and therefore not dealt with by the State Transport Authority. Its order cannot be quashed on the ground of error. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation of Madras2, decided by a Full Bench of three learned Judges of this Court held: “Failure to object to jurisdiction before the lower Court is a bar to obtaining a writ of certiorari, whether the objection to jurisdiction is based on a pure point of law or based on facts which ware or should have been within the knowledge of the applicant during the proceedings in the lower Court.” In support of this proposition, the learned Judges relied on a number of English decisions. Dealing with a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Messrs. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India3, observed that if the petitioners before it had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred, they were not entitled to raise the objection before the Supreme Court under that Article. The Supreme Court then observed at page 412: “It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court.” Learned Advocate-General however urges that since the question of jurisdiction went to the root of the matter, this Court could deal with it under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the point is not so much of the Court’s power but the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under that Article. This Court in Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. v. Raman and Raman (Private) Ltd4. held that the very Government Order relied on by the Regional Transport Authority was extraneous or irrelevant to the proceedings before it and that it was also improper and irrelevant in the circumstances it was made. In W.P. No. 96 of 1961 this Court again examined the question of relevancy of such an order and was of the view that not only an order of the Government passed in exercise of its power under section 43-A(2) would be irrelevant to a quasi-judicial consideration by the Regional Transport Authority of grant or refusal of a variation of a condition of a permit by extension of a route but if the order of the Government directing the extension of a route was passed pending quasi-judicial consideration of the very question at any stage or after the quasi-judicial authority had decided the question, such an order would itself be improper and in excess of the powers of the Government under section 43-A(2) of the Act. It follows, therefore, that the Transport Authority was right in setting aside the Regional Authority’s order which was passed on the order of the Government under section 43-A(2). It follows, therefore, that the Transport Authority was right in setting aside the Regional Authority’s order which was passed on the order of the Government under section 43-A(2). In passing, it may be noted that the view of a Full Bench of this Court that route was not a part of the condition of a permit and therefore section 57(8) did not cover a variation of a route by extension, no longer holds the field in view of the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1964. The point of Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. based on section 48-A is in my view not substantial. I think the State Transport Authority was correct in its view that it being an applicant for variation, no notice to Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. under that section was necessary. That disposes of W.P. No. 843 of 1961. W.P. No. 189 of 1962 is by Raman and Raman (P) Ltd. to quash that part of the order of the State Transport Authority remanding the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh disposal. The only ground urged in this petition is that since the entire matter was based on directions in G.O. Ms. No. 3199 Home dated 16th November, 1956 and this order has since been held to be invalid, the State Transport Authority ought to have quashed the entire proceedings. I do not think that the result follows from the invalidity of the Government Order. Its only effect is that the Regional Transport Authority, while disposing of the matter afresh, should pay no regard to the said Government Order but apply its mind independently of it to the matter under section 47(1) and the merits on record placed before it. Both the petitions are dismissed but with costs in neither. V.K. ----- Petitions dismissed.