This revision is directed against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority Udaipur, dated the 3rd December, 1962 whereby he partially accepted the appeal filed by Shri Juvaru against an interlocutory order of the Asstt. Collector, Bhilwara dated the 13th August, 1962, and confirmed the temporary injunction granted by him in respect of Khasra Nos. 231 and 247 in village Rampuria, Tehsil Sahada against the petitioners. The facts of the case are that Juvara who has since expired had filed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction against the petitioners in the Court of the Asstt. Collector, Bhilwara on the 6th July, 1962. Simultaneously, he moved the Court under O. 39, R. 1 of the C.P.C. for the grant of a temporary injunction to restrain the petitioners from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff-opposite party in the suit lands. The trial Court heard both the parties, and vide its order dated the 13th August, 1962 directed the petitioners not to interfore with the half share of the plaintiff-opposite party in Khasra Nos. 231, 232 and 247. When an appeal against this order was preferred before the appellate Court by plaintiff opposite party, the latter modified the order as stated above in view of its finding that the order of the trial Court was ambiguous and in-consistent with the argument developed by the Court. The appellate Court vacated the injunction in respect of the half of Khasra No. 232 and confirmed the same in respect of Khasra Nos. 231 and 247, as it found that the plaintiff opposite-party were in possession of the same according to the Khasra Girdawari of St. year 2018. As regards Khasra No. 232 it felt that it would not be proper to issue injunction for half the share as this would cause confusion, the plaintiff opposite party having failed to establish specifically the area in his possession. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the plaintiff-opposite party had not satisfied the ingredients of S. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act under which the order was finally passed by the trial Court. It was urged that the plaintiff-opposite party had not been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit lands were in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by the petitioners. It was urged that the plaintiff-opposite party had not been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit lands were in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by the petitioners. Nor had it been proved that the petitioners in any way proposed to dispose of the said property in order to defeat the ends of justice. It was also argued that in a case under Sec. 145 of C.P.C. between the same parties and in respect of the same lands the criminal court had ordered the suit lands to remain in the possession of the petitioner on the basis of the admission made by the opposite party. On the other hand, it was stated on behalf of the plaintiff opposite-party that the view that the temporary injunction could be granted for only the reasons enumerated in sec. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act had since been modified by the Board of Revenue. It is now settled law that a revenue Court can invoke its inherent powers where the circumstances so warrant and that the revenue courts are not restricted in exercise of the inherent powers in the grant of a temporary injunction which can be granted in appropriate cases to restrain a party from interfering in the possession of the applicant. Sec. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is not exhaustive and cannot be supposed to cover all possible eventualities. Therefore, where ends of justice so require, inherent powers can be invoked. It was argued that the present case is such a one as according to the Khasra Girdawri and the revenue records, prima facie the possession vests in the plaintiff opposite party and the petitioners were threatening to invade the same. As regards the admission of the plaintiff opposite party in the case under Sec. 145 of the Cr. P.C. to the effect that he had been dispossessed of the suit lands on the 19th August 1961 it was argued that the finding of a criminal court could not restrict the scope of an enquiry in a revenue suit, and, the admission of the plaintiff oppsite party could certainly not be used as a waiver against him and could not bar him from seeking legitimate redress from a revenue court. It was urged, that the order of the criminal court could not adversely effect the claim of the plaintiff-opposite party, which was based on the revenue records, as the proceedings in the criminal court were primarily in the nature of a remedial measure to prevent the breach of the peace between the parties, and that the plaintiff opposite-party was well within its right to seek the temporary injunction against the invasion of the petitioners, in a revenue court, as now applied for. I find that there is sufficient force in this argument and that there is no ground to interfere with the order of the lower appellate Court. I, therefore, reject this petition for revision. Before concluding, however, I would like to invite the attention of the lower Courts to a very important matter relating to the defacement of the stamps. A look at the copy of order of Asstt. Collector, Bhilwara in file No. 927 of 1962 of Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur at page A/7 would show that two punched stamps have been reaffixed on the same. This a very serious matter, which effects the revenue of the State. As these stamps had been punched earlier, the mischief could be detected, but if stamps are not punched, but simply crossed or cancelled by over-writing they can be used again without detection. It is, therefore, very necessary that the practice to punch the stamps should be universally adopted. In the present case, the Asstt. Collector should make enquiries into the matter and take suitable action against the delinquent officer under intimation to the Board of Revenue.