Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. This Is a miscellaneous first appeal under Sec.30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (Act IX of 1923), hereafter to be called the Act, by the workman concerned whose claim under Sec.10 of the Act has been dismissed by the learned Commissioner under the Workmens Compensation Act. Although the order of the learned Commissioner Is a short one it appears that the petition has been dismissed on the ground of limitation on the finding that no sufficient cause had been made out within the meaning of the last proviso to Sub-section (1) of Sec.10 of the Act. 2. The facts ought to have been stated in the order under appeal in a bit detail as the learned commissioner ought to have noticed that his order is an appealable one. Be that as it may, the following facts which have been given to me by the learned Advocate for the appellant may be stated for the disposal of this appeal. 3. The accident occurred on the 16th of December 1959. The appellant was injured in that accident. He remained disabled (perhaps it was a case of temporary partial disablement) up to the 9th of May 1960. He joined his duty in the factory on the 10th of May 1960. He retired on the 22nd of January 1963. The appellant claimed compensation for the Injury sustained by him in the accident of 1959 from the Company perhaps because his claim for extension of service was refused by the company. The Company did not entertain the claim stating that he had not made the claim at the appropriate time when the workmen had been asked to prefer claim after the accident. When the appellants claim made before the company in August or October 1963 was not entertained, he filed the application under Sec.10 of the Act on the 7th of November, 1963. In his application he has stated that the appellant was in hospital up to the 9th May, 1960 and he had been permanently disabled in his leg which could not be bent. In his application he has stated that the appellant was in hospital up to the 9th May, 1960 and he had been permanently disabled in his leg which could not be bent. Then in paragraph 3 he stated that he approached several times his departmental bosses by whom he was assured that he would be paid all compensation in respect of the injury on his retirement, and since he was misled by them, he could not prefer his claim within the period of two years from the date of the accident as required by Sub-section (1) of Sec.10 of the Act. The learned Commissioner does not seem to have been satisfied by these allegations and no evidence was adduced before him in support of the allegation. 4. In my opinion, no case of sufficient cause has been made out within the meaning of the last proviso to Sub-section (1) of Sec.10 of the Act by this vague allegation that he was assured and misled by his bosses when he asked for compensation from them. It is not stated in the petition that before whom he had made such claim, when and how. The argument put forward in this court by the learned Counsel for the appellant is appreciably different. His submission based upon two decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Salamat V/s. Agent, East Indian Rly., AIR 1938 Cal 348 and in Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd, V/s. Bal Govind, AIR 1953 Cal 667 is that the appellant could not afford to displease his bosses when he was allowed to join his service on the 10th of May 1960 and so long as he remained In service, and it was only after retirement that he could lay his claim for compensation for his disablement caused to him by the accident of 1959. In my opinion, there is no foundation of fact stated in the petition in support of this argument. Even stretching the allegations of fact In favour of the appellant, I find the fact which can be assumed in his favour is only this that merely because he was allowed to join his work he could not afford to make a claim for compensation under the Act. Even stretching the allegations of fact In favour of the appellant, I find the fact which can be assumed in his favour is only this that merely because he was allowed to join his work he could not afford to make a claim for compensation under the Act. In AIR 1938 Cal 348 it is no doubt true, it has been said that since the workman was allowed to join his work on the same wages as before his failure to make a claim under the Act during the period of his employment would not disentitle him to make an application under Sec.10 of the Act as that cause by itself could be a sufficient cause for not bringing proceedings under the Act within the period of six months of the accident as was them the law provided under Section 10 of Act. This view of the law has not been approved by the Calcutta High Court in National Tobacco Co. (India) Ltd. V/s. Hardit Singh, AIR 1952 Cal 752 and the case of AIR 1938 Cal 348 has been distinguished. Following the decision of the English Court in Lingley V/s. Thomas Firth and Sons Ltd., (1921) 1 KB 655 it has been held that the mere fact that the workman elected to continue in service did not constitute sufficient cause so as to entitle the workman to make his claim beyond the period of limitation provided for in the Act. To the similar effect is the view expressed By the same Bench in another case in Kamarhatty Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Samad, AIR 1953 Cal 74 . The view of Law as broadly expressed by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1933 Cal 348 does not seem to have found favour with another Bench of Calcutta High Court which decided the case of AIR 1953 Cal 667 on which reliance was placed before me on behalf of the appellant. The view of Law as broadly expressed by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1933 Cal 348 does not seem to have found favour with another Bench of Calcutta High Court which decided the case of AIR 1953 Cal 667 on which reliance was placed before me on behalf of the appellant. It was pointed out in that case that it was not merely a case of continuing in the old employment and nothing more but the broad facts of that case were that "the workman suffered an injury which reduced his working capacity; that the employers, Knowing of that injury and knowing of the reduced working capacity continued to employ him and paid him the game wages; and the most important of all is the fact that they put him on a lighter job." No such facts are alleged in the case in hand. In my opinion, the decision of the learned Commissioner on the question of limitation is correct on the facts and in the circumstances of this case and is not contrary to law. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but I would make no order as to costs.