JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This second appeal raises the vexed question of jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain certain kinds of suits with respect to agricultural land. 2. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was filed in 1957 in the civil court. The reliefs sought by the plaintiffs were: (1) a declaration that the plaintiffs were Sirdars of the land in suit, (2) a declaration that they were owners of the crops standing on the land at the time of the institution of the suit, and (3) a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession over the land in the suit. In view of the fact that the judgment and the decree in appeal have not been assailed on any other ground except that of jurisdiction it is unnecessary to set out the respective cases of the parties. I may only mention that the defendant denied the title and possession of the plaintiffs, claimed that he was Bhumidhar in possession of the disputed land and further pleaded that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court of first instance dismissed the suit but on appeal its judgment was reversed by the learned Civil Judge who decreed the suit and granted to the plaintiffs' relief (1) and (3). Declaration regarding the ownership of the crop had been rendered unnecessary by the removal of the crop after the institution of the suit. 3. For a proper appreciation of the question of jurisdiction which, as I have stated, is the only question involved in this appeal and for a correct understanding of the basis on which the decisions of this Court relating to the question have proceeded it is necessary to have a comparative view of the provisions in regard to this matter in the various Tenancy Acts and in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 4. 4. The relevant provision in the N.W.P. Tenancy Act of 1901 (Act II of 1901) was contained in Section 167 which was as follows:- "All suits and applications of the nature specified in the fourth schedule shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts and, except in the way of appeal as hereinafter provided, no Court other than a Revenue Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which any such suit or application might be brought or made." In the Agra Tenancy Act (Act III of 1926) the corresponding section was Section 230 which was in the following terms:- "Subject to the provisions of Section 271, all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts, and no courts other than a Revenue Court shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which adequate relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Explanation - If the cause of action is one in respect of which adequate relief might be granted by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked from the Civil Court may, not be identical with that which the Revenue Court could have granted." The section dealing with this matter in the U.P. Tenancy Act (Act XVII of 1939) was Section 242 of which the portion relevant for the purposes of this discussion was as follows:- "Subject to the provisions of Section 286 all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court, and no court other than a revenue court, shall except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application, or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Explanation I - If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical with that which the revenue court could have granted." 5. It will be observed that all these provisions were divided into two parts, the first part conferring jurisdiction upon the revenue court and the second excluding the jurisdiction of all other courts. In each of these provisions the part which conferred jurisdiction was confined in suits and application of the nature specified in the relevant schedule. That part standing alone would not have been sufficient to deprive the civil court of its jurisdiction and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court was really effected by the express prohibition contained in the second part. This was however not all that the second part of these provisions did. The second part in each of them operated as a bar to the cognizance by the civil court not only of suits and applications of the nature specified in the relevant schedule but of other suits as well. The description of those other suits which were taken out of the jurisdiction of the civil court varied in the various enactments, but the area of exclusion of jurisdiction was made wider with each change of the law. The change, which had the most far reaching effect on the question of jurisdiction, was made through the explanation added to Section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act. Not only was a similar explanation added to Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act but the word `adequate' was omitted in the main section as well as in the explanation. By an amendment subsequently made in the Act the word `any' was inserted to qualify the word `relief' in the main section. It is thus obvious that there was an increasing extension of the sphere of exclusion and a correspondingly increasing extension of the jurisdiction of the revenue court. 6. Now, an examination of the authorities bearing on the question will show that in all of them stress was laid on the second part of the provisions quoted above and on the explanations to the main sections of the last two enactments. 6. Now, an examination of the authorities bearing on the question will show that in all of them stress was laid on the second part of the provisions quoted above and on the explanations to the main sections of the last two enactments. Whenever it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred even in regard to those cases which were not of the nature specified in the relevant schedule, it was not because of the first part of the provisions but because of the second part and, in cases arising under the last two enactments, also because of the explanations. 7. I have given this background in order to bring into prominence the significant omissions in Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as originally enacted, because it was before the amendment introduced in the said section that the suit giving rise to this appeal was filed. The relevant portion of Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or originally enacted was in the following form:- "Cognizance of suits, etc., under this Act- (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Col. 4 of Schedule II shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in Col. 3 thereof." The essential particulars in which this section differed from Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and also from Section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act are these: (1) The enabling provisions of the first part of Section 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and Section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act which conferred jurisdiction, and the disabling provisions of the second part which took away jurisdiction were both combined together in a compendious form in Section 331. (2) The exclusion of jurisdiction was limited to suits mentioned in Col. 3 of schedule II and it did not extend to other kinds of suits. (3) No explanation was added to Section 331. (4) The exclusion of jurisdiction in Section 331 was further limited to suits mentioned in column 3 of schedule II and did not cover suits of that `nature'. The narrow limits of the exclusion effected by Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as originally enacted can now be easily seen. (4) The exclusion of jurisdiction in Section 331 was further limited to suits mentioned in column 3 of schedule II and did not cover suits of that `nature'. The narrow limits of the exclusion effected by Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as originally enacted can now be easily seen. The section barred cognizance by the civil court of only those suits which were mentioned in Col. 3 of Schedule II and suits of every other description were left out of account and in respect of them no jurisdiction was conferred upon the revenue court. The result of the omission indicated above was later realised by the legislature and Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was amended by Act XXVIII of 1961. The relevant portion of this section as amended is as follows:- "Cognizance of suits, etc., under this Act- (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Col. 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure, Code, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceeding mentioned in Col. 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained be means of any such suit or application. Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Schedule II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof; Explanation-If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted." It cannot be disputed that the provisions quoted above from the various Tenancy Acts made it clear that it was the real as distinguished from the alleged cause of action, and the availability of relief and not the relief actually asked for, the determined jurisdiction. They required that the true object and purpose of a suit had to be discovered and the form in which the plaintiffs in the suit was couched was immaterial. They required that the true object and purpose of a suit had to be discovered and the form in which the plaintiffs in the suit was couched was immaterial. It was obvious from these provisions that if redress could be had by means of a suit in the revenue court the plaintiff had to seek it there and it was a matter of no consequence that the relief prayed for by him was more than or different from what the revenue court could grant. That this was the effect of the provisions may now be regarded as too firmly settled by authorities to need elaboration. I may only refer to the cases of Mst. Ananti v. Chhannu A.I.R. 1930 All. 193 F.B. under the Agra Tenancy Act and the case of Baiju v. Shambhu Saran 1963 A.L.J. 1064 under the U.P. Tenancy Act. In its amended shape Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is similar in scope and effect to the corresponding provisions in the above two Acts and the cases instituted after the amendment will be governed by the principles which have been laid down in the above decisions and in many others. But here I am concerned with a suit instituted while Section 331 was in force in its originally enacted form. 8. It appears to me that Section 331 as originally enacted created a bar against the cognizance by the civil court of such suits only as were mentioned in Col. 3 of Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the jurisdiction of the civil court in regard to suits which were not enumerated therein was not ousted either expressly or by implication. In suits belonging to the latter category and instituted before the amendment in Section 331, the nature of the suits and the reliefs claimed therein had to be taken as they were, for deciding whether they lay in the revenue court and whether the reliefs claimed could be obtained there. The section in its unamended for did not require or permit any enquiry into the true object of a suit, the real cause of action and the necessity or the superfluity of any particular relief claimed in the suit. The section in its unamended for did not require or permit any enquiry into the true object of a suit, the real cause of action and the necessity or the superfluity of any particular relief claimed in the suit. The suit had to be taken as such and the question had to be asked whether such a suit could have been filed in the revenue court. If the answer was in the negative the suit was cognisable by the civil court and the jurisdiction of the civil court could not be said to be barred because a suit on the same cause of action could be filed in the revenue court in some other form by claiming some other reliefs or by omitting to claim a relief actually asked for. I may here observe that although Section 331 contained a reference to column 3 for Schedule II, column 2 and 3 had to be read together and the scope of a suit which could be filed under a particular section could not be decreed to have been enlarged by the description given in column 3. 9. The present suit was for a declaration of Sirdari rights not against the landholder but against a person alleged as having no interest at all in the land in suit and also for a permanent injunction to restrain him from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. Further, there was a prayer for declaration that the crop standing on the disputed land at the time of the institution of the suit belonged to the plaintiffs. Under Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms, Act, as it stood before the amendment, there was nothing to compel the plaintiffs or the landholder even if they did not want to do so or to compel them to omit the relief of permanent injunction even if they felt that they needed it. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the civil court was competent to take cognizance of the present suit and had jurisdiction to decide it. A similar view regarding a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction instituted before the amendment in Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was taken by my brother Mathur, J. in Ram Shanker Lal v. Gaon Samaj Civ. Mis. Writ No. 842 of 1961 decided on 24.4.1962. 10. A similar view regarding a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction instituted before the amendment in Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was taken by my brother Mathur, J. in Ram Shanker Lal v. Gaon Samaj Civ. Mis. Writ No. 842 of 1961 decided on 24.4.1962. 10. The only point raised before me in this appeal, therefore, fails. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, I make no order as to costs in this Court.