JUDGMENT : NEWASKAR J. ( 1. ) The only point raised in this second appeal which arises out of an execution proceedings is whether a decree passed on an award creating charge upon an immovable property is a nullity in case the award is not registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act. ( 2. ) The question arose when the decree-holders in such a case sought to execute the decree based on the unregistered award and got the house of the judgment-debtor sold in execution and purchased it themselves. The judgment- debtor objected to the sale on the ground that the decree was a nullity as the award had not been registered. The executing Court overruled that contention and confirmed the auction sale. The judgment-debtor thereupon appealed to the learned Additional District Judge, Dhar, before whom two Division Bench decisions of the Nagpur High Court reported in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(T943 NLJ 154=AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293) and Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583), were cited, considered that the latter of the two decisions ought to prevail, followed that decision and held that the decree was a nullity and consequently the sale. He consequently quashed the entire execution proceedings and dismissed the execution petition. ( 3. ) In this second appeal Mr. Sanghi for the appellants relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Jaisri v. Rajdewan( AIR 1962 S.C. 83 ), where their Lordships laid down the principle to be followed in case of conflict among decisions of Division Benches of the High Court. ( 4. ) In the earlier of the two cases it was held by Grille C. J. and Vivian Bose J. :- "In our opinion, the same principle applies in respect of decrees consequent on an award as does in the case of all other decrees. The executing Court cannot go behind it. It is true there are cases which hold that when the jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree is questioned, the executing Court can consider the matter; also when it is contended that the decree is a complete nullity and as a matter of fact that was the contention here. The executing Court cannot go behind it. It is true there are cases which hold that when the jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree is questioned, the executing Court can consider the matter; also when it is contended that the decree is a complete nullity and as a matter of fact that was the contention here. But in our opinion a decree given on the basis of an unregistered award is no more a nullity than a decree obtained in an ordinary suit on an unregistered mortgage or sale deed which requires registration." ( 5. ) In the latter case however Grille C.J. and Puranik J., observed in para. 5 of the report at page 312 :- "It is, however, strongly contended, on behalf of the appellant that, as the award has been superseded by a decree and the decree itself does not require registration, the execution of the decree cannot be refused, as an executing Court is not entitled to question the validity of the decree. We agree that such is the general rule, but where it is patent that the decree is in fact passed without jurisdiction or is a nullity the executing Court is entitled to question the validity of the decree. It is said that the executing Court is not entitled to go into the necessarily complicated question whether an award in which a charge is created is registrable or not when a Court in which the award was filed has passed a decree in terms of it. When, however, there is a definite decision of a Full Bench of this Court, vide Mohd. Azizullah Khan v. Mohd. Noorullah Khan(1939 NLJ 375=AIR 1939 Nag. 233=ILR 1939 Nag. 607), that no decree can be passed on the basis of an award which requires registration it must follow that such a decree in respect of the charge is a nullity in that it was one which the Court was incompetent to pass; and in these circumstances it is immaterial whether the fact is deducible from the actual wording of the decree or not, since the absence of jurisdiction can be ascertained without an enquiry into facts, vide Laxman Madhoji v. Dhamori Co-operative Credit Society(AIR 1933 Nag. 211)." ( 6. ) It seems from this later pronouncement that reliance was sought to be placed upon the Full Bench decision of the same High Court reported in Mohd. 211)." ( 6. ) It seems from this later pronouncement that reliance was sought to be placed upon the Full Bench decision of the same High Court reported in Mohd. Azizullah Khan v. Mohd. Noorullah Khan(1939 NLJ 375=AIR 1939 Nag. 233 =ILR 1939 Nag. 607), which, while dealing with the propriety of decree in a proceeding under para. 20 of the second schedule of the Civil Procedure Code (regarding arbitration) held that the Court required to pronounce judgment under para. 21 of the 2nd schedule has no power to do so if for doing it it required to use an unregistered award affecting immovable property. ( 7. ) It seems that their Lordships in Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao (1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583), considered this reference to lack of power while dealing with a matter under para. 20 of the schedule as tantamount to want of jurisdiction and not a mere error of law which had no bearing on the power of the Court to decide rightly as well as wrongly. ( 8. ) In the earlier decision in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal (1943 NLJ 154=AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293), their Lordships distinctly had held that in such a case the decree is no more a nullity than it would be in a case where a decree is granted on the strength of an unregistered sale deed or a mortgage deed. It seems from this that the award of decree in such a case was considered to be no more than one passed by committing an error of law, which if it had been assailed in a manner permissible by law, could have been corrected but that it could not have been considered to proceed from any inherent lack of jurisdiction. ( 9. ) No later decision of a larger Bench of this Court has been pointed out to me which has preferred one or the other of these conflicting views. ( 10. ) While dealing with such conflicting decision in the same High Court their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jaisri v. Rajdewan( AIR 1962 S.C. 83 ), referred with approval the observations in the Fall Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Seshamma v. Venkata Narasimharao(AIR 1940 Mad. 350 =ILR 1940 Mad. 454 at p. 474). ( 10. ) While dealing with such conflicting decision in the same High Court their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jaisri v. Rajdewan( AIR 1962 S.C. 83 ), referred with approval the observations in the Fall Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Seshamma v. Venkata Narasimharao(AIR 1940 Mad. 350 =ILR 1940 Mad. 454 at p. 474). "Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of differences of opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled. It sometimes happens that an earlier decision given by a Bench is not brought to the notice of a Bench hearing the same question and a contrary decision is given without reference to the earlier decision." Their Lordships further pointed out that :- "The better course would be for the Bench hearing the case to refer the matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflicting authorities without taking upon it self to decide whether it should follow the one Bench decision or the other." ( 11. ) In view of this pronouncement of their Lordships and also even as a matter of prudent practice I would refer the question set out at the outset to a Full Bench and direct that the matter be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for constitution of a Full Bench for the purpose to resolve the conflict. OPINION.- ( 12. ) This reference has been made by one of us (Newaskar J.) for resolving the conflict between the decisions in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(1943 NLJ 154 =AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293) and Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583). ( 13. ) The material facts are that on the basis of an unregistered award a money decree for Rs. 900 creating a charge on a house belonging to the respondent was passed in favour of the appellants. In execution proceedings of that decree, the house was sold and purchased by the decree-holders themselves. Thereupon, the respondent objected to the sale on the ground that the decree itself was a nullity inasmuch as the award had not been registered as required by section 17 (1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. This objection was overruled by the executing Court. Thereupon, the respondent objected to the sale on the ground that the decree itself was a nullity inasmuch as the award had not been registered as required by section 17 (1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. This objection was overruled by the executing Court. It, however, prevailed in appeal which the judgment- debtor filed in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Dhar. The learned Additional District Judge, following the decision in Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583), held that the decree was a nullity and consequently the sale was also nullity. ( 14. ) The decree-holders then filed a second appeal in this Court. During the course of the hearing of the second appeal, the question arose as to which of the two decisions of the Nagpur High Court the learned single Judge had to follow in deciding the question whether the decree was or was not a nullity as the award had not been registered. The learned 3ingle Judge, therefore, following the observations of the Supreme Court in Jaisri v. Rajdewan(AIR 1962 B.C. 83.), adopted the course of referring the matter to a Full Bench without taking upon himself the responsibility of deciding whether he should follow one Division Bench decision or the other. ( 15. ) There is no dispute that the award, which embodied a charge on the property of the respondent, required registration under section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act and was not registered ; and that the award not having been registered could not under section 49 of the Act be received as evidence in the proceedings for the filing of the award which led to the decree in favour of the appellants. The decree that was passed in the appellants favour was thus in contravention of the provisions of the Registration Act. The short question, therefore, that arises for determination is whether the decree is a nullity because the Court passing it ignored the provisions of the Registration Act and an objection that the decree being a nullity is not executable could be taken in execution proceedings of that decree. On this point, in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(1943 NLJ 154=AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. On this point, in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(1943 NLJ 154=AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293), a Division Bench consisting of Grille C. J. and Vivian Bose J., expressed the following view :- "In our opinion, the same principle applies in respect of decrees consequent on an award as does in the case of all other decrees. The executing Court cannot go behind it. It is true there are eases which hold that when the jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree is questioned, the executing Court can consider the matter ; also when it is contended that the decree is a complete nullity and as a matter of fact that was the contention here. But in our opinion a decree given on the basis of an unregistered award is no more a nullity than a decree obtained in an ordinary suit on an unregistered mortgage or sale deed which requires registration. ( 16. ) When a similar question arose in Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583), another Division Bench consisting of Grille C.J. and Puranik J. expressed itself thus :-"It is, however, strongly contended, on behalf of the appellant that, as the award hag been superseded by a decree and the decree itself does not require registration, the execution of the decree cannot be refused, as an executing Court is not entitled to question the validity of the decree. We agree that such is the general rule, but where it is patent that the decree is in fact passed without jurisdiction or is a nullity the executing Court is entitled to question the validity of the decree. It is said that the executing Court is not entitled to go into the necessarily complicated question whether an award in which a charge is created is registrable or not when a Court in which the award was filed has passed a decree in terms of it. When, however, there is a definite decision of a Full Bench of this Court, vide Mohd. Azizullah Khan v. Mohd. Noorullah Khan(1939 NLJ 375=AIR 1939 Nag. 233=ILR 1939 Nag. When, however, there is a definite decision of a Full Bench of this Court, vide Mohd. Azizullah Khan v. Mohd. Noorullah Khan(1939 NLJ 375=AIR 1939 Nag. 233=ILR 1939 Nag. 607), that no decree can be passed on the basis of an award which requires registration it must follow that such a decree in respect of the charge is a nullity in that it was one which the Court was incompetent to pass; and in these circumstances it is immaterial whether the fact is deducible from the actual wording of the decree or not, since the absence of jurisdiction can be ascertained without an enquiry into facts, wide [Laxman Madhoji v. Dhamori Cooperative Credit Society(AIR 1933 Nag. 211).] ( 17. ) It is plain that the two decisions are conflicting. Whereas in the case of Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(1943 NLJ 134=AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293), it has been held that a decree passed on the basis of an unregisterad award embodying a charge is not nullity, in the case of Uttamchand Motilalji v.Wasudeo Deorao(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583), it has been ruled that such a decree is a nullity. Now, the well settled rule is that an executing Court must take and execute the decree as it stands except where it is shown that the Court passing the decree had no jurisdiction to pass it. If a decree is passed by a Court without jurisdiction, then its validity can be questioned whenever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan(AIR 1954 S.C.340). ( 18. ) A distinction must, however, be drawn between a decree which is a nullity and decree which is not according to law in that the Court passing the decree ignored certain provisions of the law. The equally well settled rule with regard to the power of the executing Court to question the legality or correctness or validity of a decree is that a decree may not be according to law, yet it is binding and conclusive between the parties until it is set aside either in appeal or in revision, and the executing Court has no jurisdiction to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that it is not according to law. [See V. Ramaswami v. Kailasa Thevar(AIR 1951 S.C.189), Jnanendramohan v. Rabendranath(AIR 1933 P.C 61) and Bhagsingh v. Govindram(1943 NLJ 486 =AIR 1943 Nag 325=ILR 1943 Nag. 757)]. If a Court passing the decree had jurisdiction to pass it, then even if the decree is contrary to certain provisions of law, it would not be a nullity and a plea about the illegality of the decree cannot be entertained in execution proceedings. This matter has been put by Gajendragadkar J.(as he then was) in Harkishandas v. Gulabdas( AIR 1956 Bom. 513 ), thus- "In determining the jurisdiction of the executing Court to entertain pleas under S.38, Civil P.C, it is always necessary to make a distination between pleas that tend to show that the decree in question is a nullity and pleas that merely challenge the validity or the propriety of the decree on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of law. If the plea is that the decree is a nullity and so cannot be executed, it would be open to the executing Court to entertain the plea. On the other hand, if the plea is that the decree is contrary to law in the sense that in passing the said decree certain provisions of the law have been ignored or contravened that would not necessarily make the decree a nullity and allegations about the impropriety or the illegality of the decree cannot be entertained in execution proceedings." ( 19. ) Now, when proceedings in a Court are initiated for the filing of an award after it is rendered, the jurisdiction of the Court to investigate and determine matters relating to the award before filing the award and passing a decree on it or refusing to file it does not depend in any way on the fact whether the award is one which does or does not require registration under the Registration Act, 1908. In other words, where an award requires registration under section 17 (1) (b) of the Act, the fact of its registration is not a "jurisdictional fact" which must be first established for giving to the Court jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter of the filing of the award. In other words, where an award requires registration under section 17 (1) (b) of the Act, the fact of its registration is not a "jurisdictional fact" which must be first established for giving to the Court jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter of the filing of the award. If the Court is one competent and having jurisdiction to deal with the matter of the filing of the award intended to be filed, then no matter whether the award is registered or unregistered, the Court gets jurisdiction to proceed with the matter of the filing of the award when an application for that purpose is made. It is thus plain that if an award requires registration under section 17 (1) (b) of the Act and has not been registered and the Court still files it and passes a decree on its basis, then the decree cannot be said to be one passed by a Court having no jurisdiction. The decree may be invalid, it may not be according to law ; but once it is passed, it is binding and conclusive between the parties until it is set aside either in appeal or in revision. If such a decree is not a nullity, then clearly an executing Court cannot refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the Court passing it ignored certain provisions of law. ( 20. ) The view, therefore, taken in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(1943 NLJ 154 =AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293), is in entire accord with the two settled principles, namely, first, where there is a lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing a decree, the decree is null and void and the executing Court can refuse to execute the decree ; and, secondly, if the Court had inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree, then even if the decree is not according to law or is one passed in contravention of some provision of law, yet it would not be a nullity but would be binding and conclusive between the parties and the executiug Court has no jurisdiction to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that it was not according to law. If we may say so with respect, the matter was succinctly put by the learned Judges deciding Lakhmichands case (1), when they said : ". If we may say so with respect, the matter was succinctly put by the learned Judges deciding Lakhmichands case (1), when they said : ". .a decree given on the basis of an unregistered award is no more a nullity than a decree obtained in an ordinary suit on an unregistered mortgage or sale deed which requires registration." ( 21. ) With great respect for the opinion of the learned Judges deciding the case of Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag. 311=ILR 1946 Nag. 583), the view taken by them that a decree passed on the basis of an award which requires registration is a nullity if the award is not registered is not correct. The Full Bench decision in Mohd. Azizullah Khan v. Mohd. Noorullah Khan(1939 NLJ 375=AIR 1643 Nag. 233=ILR 1939 Nag. 607), relied on by them only holds that no decree can be passed on the basis of an award which requires registration. It does not lay down the proposition that a decree passed on the footing of an unregistered award which required registration is a nullity. The observation in Uttamchand Motilaljis case(2), that as no decree can be passed on the basis of an award which requires registration, the decree is a nullity in that it is passed by the Court incompetent to pass it overlooks the great difference between want of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise of it. No doubt, if an award requires registration, a Court cannot and should not pass a decree, on its basis. But if the Court passes a decree, then there is an erroneons exercise of jurisdictional power on the part of the Court and nob any lack of jurisdiction in the Court in passing the decree It may be noted that the decision in Uttamchand Motilaljis case(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag.311=ILR 1943 Nag. S83), was given without reference to the earlier decision. 11. For the foregoing reasons, our opinion is that the view expressed in Lakhmichand v. Biharilal(1943 NLJ 154 =AIR 1943 Nag. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293), that the decree given on the basis of an unregistered award is not a nullity and cannot be questioned in execution is correct; and the latter decision, namely, Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag.311=ILR 1943 Nag. S83), does not contain a correct enunciation of the law on the point. 165=ILR 1943 Nag. 293), that the decree given on the basis of an unregistered award is not a nullity and cannot be questioned in execution is correct; and the latter decision, namely, Uttamchand Motilalji v. Wasudeo Deorao(1946 NLJ 317=AIR 1946 Nag.311=ILR 1943 Nag. S83), does not contain a correct enunciation of the law on the point. The appeal came up for hearing before Newaskar J. who allowed it passing the following order on 4-9-1964. "The appeal is consequently allowed and the case is sent back to the lower appellate Court for considering it on other points which were left undetermined. The lower appellate Court shall expedite the hearing of the appeal. It is open for it to consider as to whether it should finally dispose of the matter or to send the same to the Court of first instance for consideration of any question of fact which, according to it, the Court of first instance might have left undetermined. The appellants are entitled to their costs of this appeal from the respondent." Reference answered accordingly.