JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by three petitioners, praying for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order dated 26th September, 1961, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation purporting to act in exercise of his powers under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as it stood at that time and prior to the subsequent amendments by which the language of Section 48 of that Act was altered. 2. The ground, on which the writ is sought, is that, under Section 48 of the Act, a Director was empowered to interfere with an order made by any officer other than an arbitrator if, after calling for the record, the Director found that in the case decided or proceedings taken by the officer he had exercised jurisdiction not vested in him or had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or had acted in exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity. This language used in Section 48 of the Act came up for interpretation in various cases before some Single Judges of this Court and it was held that the scope of Section 48 of the Act was co-extensive with the scope of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so that the Director, under Section 48 of the Act, could exercise jurisdiction and powers only under the same circumstances under which a High Court could exercise powers of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A learned Single Judge, before whom this writ petition came up, was of the view that those decisions required re-consideration because, in his opinion, those decisions did not take into account fully the nature of the proceedings out of which revisions under Section 48 of the Act could arise and could be brought before the Director. He particularly referred to proceedings where the only question before the subordinate officers might be of allotment of chaks and adjustment being made of the plots at the time of allotment between the various allotees. He particularly referred to proceedings where the only question before the subordinate officers might be of allotment of chaks and adjustment being made of the plots at the time of allotment between the various allotees. He felt that, in such circumstances, Section 48 should not be given the same narrow meaning as has been given by treating it as analogous to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure because, by the very nature of the proceedings out of which the revisions would arise, Section 48 of the Act would not be capable of being invoked at all in cases of this type. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are unable to accept the view which is to be inferred from the referring order of the learned Single Judge that Section 48 of the Act should be held to have a wider scope than that already given to it in decisions of this Court. The language of Section 48 of the Act is almost identical with the language of Section 115, C.P.C. The only difference is that Section 48 of the Act, when giving powers of interference inter alia, refers to `substantial irregularity', while Section 115, C.P.C. use the expression `material irregularity.' It seems to us that the words `substantial' and `material', as used in the two different enactments, cannot make any difference in the scope of this section. Interference in revision by a Director under Section 48 of the Act must, therefore be confined to those very cases which are similar to cases in which the High Court can interfere in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 115, C.P.C. 4. The scope of the powers of the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C. has been clearly defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria and others, 1953 SCR 136 . It was laid down in that case that the High Court can exercise its powers under Section 115, C.P.C. only under three circumstances. One circumstance is where a subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it which means that it had seized jurisdiction which the law did not confer on it; the second is where it may have refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, and the third circumstance is where, while exercising jurisdiction vested in it, the court committed a procedural error. The words `illegally' and `material irregularity' in exercise of jurisdiction were held not to cover either errors of fact or law in the decision itself but were confined to cases where there have been material defects of procedure. That scope of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as defined by the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in holding, must also be the scope of Section 48 of the Act, so that the Director, when acting under Section 48, cannot exercise those powers unless the circumstances laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case cited above are found to exist. We do not think that simply because some parties may move the Director in revision under Section 48 of the Act in cases where the only question is as to whether a particular plot should be in one chak or in another can be a sufficient ground for giving a different interpretation to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act. It is to be noticed that Section 48 is in general terms and permits revisions being entertained by the Director against any order of any subordinate officer provided the requisite conditions exist. Such conditions could come into existence under various circumstances and in various proceedings. For example, if there had been proceedings under Section 12 of the Act, circumstances could arise where the powers of revision of the Director under Section 48 of the Act may be invoked. It is not necessary that every order passed by a subordinate officer must be open to revision by the Director. It seems that, in using the language which the legislature actually did in Section 48 of the Act, the legislature laid down the policy that the revisional powers should be confined to those cases only where the nature of the proceedings was such that there would be a possibility of those conditions arising which would justify exercise of the revisional powers by the Director. In cases where those conditions would not come into existence, it can be inferred that the legislature's intention was to give finality to the order of the subordinate authority without conferring any jurisdiction on the Director to interfere in revision and, consequently the scope of Section 48 need not necessarily be widened to cover every order by a subordinate authority so as to include within its scope even cases where none of those conditions has come into existence. 5. Applying this principle to the present case, we find that, in this case, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, exercising powers of the Director under Section 48 of the Act, interfered with the appellate order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on grounds which could not justify the exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Act. The order passed by the Deputy Director shows that the reason for his interference was that an adjustment, directed to be made by him in exercise of his revisional powers, would be more equitable and the chak allotted to respondent No. 3, who was the applicant before the Deputy Director, would be improved by removing the irregularity from it. He further held that the holders of chaks nos. 116 and 133 will not suffer due to this adjustment. The grounds for interference given in the order of revision were thus not such on which the revisional powers could have been exercised. The Deputy Director nowhere held that the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), whose order had come up in revision, had exercised jurisdiction not vested in him or had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or had committed any error of procedure amounting to illegality or substantial irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Consequently, it is clear that the Deputy Director interfered with the order of the Settlement officer (Consolidation), exercising powers which were not justified by Section 48 of the Act under which he purported to exercise the powers. 6. The question, however, that still remains is whether, even though we have come to the conclusion that the Deputy Director exercised powers which he was not justified to do under Section 48 of the Act, this Court should interfere in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman. It was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman. Ltd., 1952 SCR 583 that "Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction "or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, .error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice." In the present case, the first condition laid down is satisfied inasmuch as we have already come to the conclusion that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, in allowing the revision, acted in excess of jurisdiction vested in him under Section 48 of the Act. We have, however, yet to see whether that exercise of jurisdiction has also resulted in manifest injustice. The writ jurisdiction of this Court is an equitable jurisdiction which is to be exercised in the interest of justice and not merely for the purpose of enforcing the technicalities of law. In the present case, after hearing learned counsel for the petitioners, we are unable to find any material at all on the record of this writ petition to show that any injustice at all has been done to the petitioners by the order of the Deputy Director. All that was done was that some plots, which were in the chaks of the petitioners, were removed from their chaks and instead other plots of land were included in their chaks. It is nowhere stated in the petition or in the affidavits that, when the Deputy Director did so, the plots allotted were not equal in value to the plots that were taken out of the chaks. The only point, which learned counsel for the petitioners could urge before us, was based on paragraph 10 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition where it was stated that plot No. 1690 was goind land having bamboo clumps, two mango trees, the charni and pipe of the petitioners and was appurtenant to their house and yet it had been allotted to the chak of respondent No. 3. The affidavit was filed by petitioner No. 1 alone and not by petitioners Nos. The affidavit was filed by petitioner No. 1 alone and not by petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 in the petition and, in the affidavit filed in support of it, it was stated that chak No. 133 belonged to petitioner No. 1. There was no mention as to which chak belonged to petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. The counter-affidavit filed showed that plot No. 1690 was not part of chak No. 133 which belonged to petitioner No. 1, so that, even though this plot No. 1690 was included in the chak of respondent No. 3, no material was provided in the writ petition or in the affidavit filed in support of it to show how that order had adversely affected the rights of the petitioners. Learned counsel, however, drew our attention to one of the annexures to the affidavit from which it appears that C.H. Form No. 25 was issued in favour of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 in respect of chak No. 116 and this plot No. 1690 was originally in their chak. On this basis, it was urged that this Court should hold that this removal of plot No. 1690 from chak No. 116 had resulted in injustice. It is to be noticed that in para 10 of the affidavit, plot No. 1690 was alleged to be adjacent to the house of petitioner No. 1 but not to the houses of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. The grievance thus made out in para No. 10 of the affidavit was mainly on the ground that a plot adjacent to the house of petitioner No. 1 had been removed from his chak while, in fact, this plot was never in his chak, was in the chak of petitioners nos. 2 and 3 and there was no assertion that this plot was also appurtenant to the houses of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. In addition, it appears from the order of the Deputy Director that what he did was to allot only a part of plot No. 1690 to respondent No. 3 while another part of plot No. 1690 was left in possession of the chakholders of chak No. 116. The area left with them was .36 acres while the area allotted to respondent No. 3 was 3 acres. The area left with them was .36 acres while the area allotted to respondent No. 3 was 3 acres. There is no assertion anywhere in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners that the area of 3 acres, which was allotted to respondent No. 3, was also adjacent to the house of any of the petitioners, nor was there any clear assertion that this area comprised within it the bamboo clumps two mango trees, the charni and pipe of the petitioners. In fact, the finding recorded by the Deputy Director that the chak-holders of chaks Nos. 116 and 133 will not suffer due to the adjustment directed by him implies that the area, which was being taken out of their chak out of plot No. 1690, was not such as to materially affect their rights or interests and that would imply that the transfer of that area to chak No. 213 of respondent No. 3 did not deprive the petitioners of the valuable items, such as bamboo clumps, two mango trees the charni and the pipe. The adjustment was made clearly for the purpose of giving effect to the principles and policy laid down by the Act so as to make the chak of respondent No. 3 regular when, prior to that order, it had an irregular shape. The order was, therefore, a proper, equitable and just order and, consequently, we hold that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction of issuing a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of setting aside the equitable order and restoring a position which was not fair to the parties. 7. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we direct parties to bear their own costs of this petition.