Judgement OAK, J. : This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment. In 1940, Kedar Math appellant filed a suit against the present respondents for their ejectment under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act (hereafter referred to as the Tenancy Act). That suit was decreed; and the appellant obtained possession. Subsequently the respondents were reinstated under S. 27 of U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act (No. X of 1947 - hereafter referred to as the 1947 Act). Soon after the respondents' reinstatement, the appellant, filed the present suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen. This civil suit for the defendants' ejectment was decreed by the First Additional Munsif of Gorakhpur. The defendants appealed. The appeal was allowed by the learned Civil Judge of Gorakhpur; and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The learned Civil Judge held that a person who was reinstated under S. 27 of the 1947 Act is not liable to be ejected again. Kedar Nath plaintiff has, therefore, come up in second appeal. 2. When the second appeal came tip for hearing before a learned Single Judge, the appellant relied upon a decision by a Division Bench of this Court in "Sri Ram Pathak v. Board of Revenue, U.P. 1956 All LJ 343. The learned Single Judge considered that that decision required reconsideration. He, therefore, referred the case, to a Division Bench. When the matter was considered by a Division Bench, the Bench also thought that the previous decision of this Court in Sri Ram Pathak's case, 1956 All LJ 343 is not correct. The case has, therefore, been referred to a Full Bench. 3. The main question for consideration in this case is whether, in the light of Sub-Section (5) of S. 27 of the 1947 Act, the subsequent suit for ejectment of the respondents is maintainable. The head note of S. 27 of the 1947 Act is : "Reinstatement of certain ejected tenants." But the operation of S. 27 is not confined to tenants. Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-Section (1) of S. 27 deal with ex-tenants. But cl. (c) deals with persons ejected under S. 180 of the Tenancy Act. In other words, cl. (c) provides for reinstatement of former trespassers. Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-Section (1) of S. 27 deal with ex-tenants. But cl. (c) deals with persons ejected under S. 180 of the Tenancy Act. In other words, cl. (c) provides for reinstatement of former trespassers. Sub-Section (5) of S. 27 of the 1947 Act run thus : "On reinstatement the rights and liabilities of the applicant existing on the date of his ejectment or dispossession in respect of the holding or any part thereof from which he was ejected or dispossessed, shall revive subject to the proviso to Sub-Section (3)." In the instant case the proviso to Sub-Section (3) of S. 27 has no application. The question is whether, after their reinstatement under Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of S. 27, the respondents remained liable to be ejected again by virtue of Sub-Section (5) of S. 27. 4-5. That question came up for consideration in 1956 All LJ 343. It was held in that case that, trespassers who had not completed even two years at the time when they were previously ejected would be liable to be ejected upon a fresh suit. 6. It was urged for the defendants-respondents that, upon the view taken by the Court in Sri Ram Pathak's case, 1956 All LJ 343 reinstatement under S. 27 of the 1947 Act would prove futile. Reference was made to Sub-Section (4) of S. 27. Sub-Section (4) lays down that, the applicant shall not be reinstated in a holding unless he pays to the land-holder compensation for improvements. It was contended that, it would be futile to pay compensation to the land-holder, if the applicant is again liable for ejectment in a fresh suit. One must, however, remember that it is for the applicant to decide whether it is worthwhile obtaining reinstatement under S. 27 of the 1947 Act. If the appellant apprehends fresh ejectment, he need not avail of the relief provided to S. 27 of the 1947 Act. 7. In Sri Ram Pathak's case, 1956 All LJ 343 it was pointed out that, by S. 32 of the 1947 Act, the period of limitation for ejectment of a trespasser has been reduced from three years to two years. The result is that certain trespassers, who have been reinstated under S. 27 of the 1947 Act, cannot be ejected again Reinstatement under S. 27 gives a trespasser temporary relief at least. The result is that certain trespassers, who have been reinstated under S. 27 of the 1947 Act, cannot be ejected again Reinstatement under S. 27 gives a trespasser temporary relief at least. It is open to him to pursuade the land-holder to admit the applicant as a tenant, and permit him to continue in possession. I, therefore, do not think that reinstatement of a trespasser under Cl. (c) of Sub-Section (1) of S. 27 read with Sub-Section (3) is altogether futile. 8. Sub-Section (5) of S. 27 lays down that, on reinstatement the rights and liabilities of the applicant existing on the date of his ejectment shall revive. Sub-Section (5) refers to "the applicant" and not "the tenant". We have seen that Sub-Section (1) provides for reinstatement of former trespassers as well as ex-tenants. So the expression "the applicant" used in Sub-Section (5) cannot be confined to ex-tenants. Sub-Section (5) applies to former trespassers also. According to Cl. (7) of S. 3 of the Tenancy Act, "holding" means a parcel or parcels of land held under one lease, engagement or grant or in the absence of such lease, engagement in grant under one tenure and, in the case of a Thekedar includes the Theka area. In the case of a trespasser, there is no lease, grant or a Theka. There is no holding as defined in cl. (7) of S. 3 of the Tenancy Act. But that definition must be understood as subject to anything repugnant in the subject or context. So, in the case of a trespasser, the word 'holding' has to be understood in a broad sense. In the case of a trespasser, 'holding' means the land previously occupied by him. According to Sub-Section (5) of S. 27 of the 1947 Act, on reinstatement, the rights and liabilities of a trespasser existing on the date of his ejectment are revived. In the case of a tenant, his tenancy rights are revived. In the case of a trespasser, there is no question of revival of tenancy rights. But even a trespasser has certain rights and liabilities in the land. If a trespasser has been in peaceful possession for a long time, he will be entitled to reap the crop sown by him. He will be entitled to remain in possession till he is evicted in accordance with law. A trespasser is liable for ejectment in appropriate proceedings. But even a trespasser has certain rights and liabilities in the land. If a trespasser has been in peaceful possession for a long time, he will be entitled to reap the crop sown by him. He will be entitled to remain in possession till he is evicted in accordance with law. A trespasser is liable for ejectment in appropriate proceedings. He is also liable to pay damage or mesne profits. These are the rights and liabilities of a trespasser. There is hardly any ambiguity in Sub-Section (5). I have explained above that reinstatement of a trespasser under S. 27 is not futile. The Court should, therefore, give effect to the plain meaning of Sub-Section (5) of S. 27. According to S. 27(5), on reinstatement of a former trespasser, his liability for ejectment in an appropriate proceeding is revived. 9. That being the legal position, we have to consider whether the respondents were liable to be ejected in the present suit The material facts are these. In the previous suit under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, the appellant obtained a decree on 20-8-1940. That decree was executed : and the appellant obtained possession through Court. I do not know the date, on which the appellant obtained possession. But obviously he must have obtained possession long before the 1947 Act came into force. For facility of reference. I shall assume that the appellant obtained possession over this land in October 1940. On 14-11-1950, the defendants-respondents were reinstated under S. 27 of the 1947 Act. The present civil suit was filed in 1950 soon after the respondents' reinstatement. 10. Section 31 of the 1947 Act has some bearing on the problem. The 1947 Act came into force on 14-6-1947. The headnote of Section 31 is : "disposal of pending suits and appeals." We have to ascertain the position on 14-6-1947. Sub-Section (1) of Section 31 states : "All proceedings, suits, appeals and revisions pending under the said Act (U.P. Tenancy Act) on the date of the commencement of this Act and all decrees and orders passed thereunder which have no been satisfied in full, shall be decided or executed as the case may be, and where necessary such decrees and orders shall be amended in accordance with the provisions of the said Act amended by this Act." The suit under Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act was decided in August 1940. That decree was executed in October 1940. No suit or execution was pending before the Court on 14-6-47. There was no question of amendment of the decree dated 20-8-1940. The first proviso to Sub-Section (1) of S. 31 ran thus :- "Provided firstly that if such a decree or order cannot to be so amended, or the execution of or the appeal or revision from such an amended decree or order cannot be proceeded with, it shall be quashed. In the present case the decree was passed in 1940; and that decree was executed long before 1947. There was, therefore, no question of quashing the decree or the execution under the first proviso. The fourth proviso to Sub-Section (1) of S. 31 ran thus : "Provided fourthly, that all suits, appeals and revisions pending under S. 180 of the said Act, on the date of the commencement of this Act for the ejectment of any person. . . shall be dismissed, and all decrees and orders for the ejectment of such persons which have not been satisfied in full on the date of the commencement of this Act, shall be quashed." In the instant case the suit under Section 180 of the Tenancy Act was decided in 1940. The decree was satisfied long before 1947. So the decree or the execution cannot be quashed under the fourth proviso. The present case is not hit by any provision of S. 31 of the 1947 Act. Section 31 did not affect either the decree dated 20-8-1940 or its execution before 1947. 11. Under Sub-Section (5) of Section 27 of the 1947 Act, on reinstatement, the rights and liabilities, of the respondents existing on the date of their ejectment in respect of the land revived. One can hardly speak of rights and liabilities of a person after his ejectment. In order to make Sub-Section (5) effective the expression "existing on the date of his ejectment" should be understood in the sense of "existing immediately before the date of his ejectment." In the present case I have assumed that the respondents were ejected in October 1940. We may, therefore, ascertain the position, which obtained in September 1940. 12. In September 1940 the position was this. The plaintiff obtained against the defendants a decree for ejectment on 20-8-1940. That decree had not been executed by September 1940. We may, therefore, ascertain the position, which obtained in September 1940. 12. In September 1940 the position was this. The plaintiff obtained against the defendants a decree for ejectment on 20-8-1940. That decree had not been executed by September 1940. The defendants were liable to be ejected in execution of the decree dated 20-8-1940. That was the respondents' liability in September 1940. The question remains whether they could be ejected by filing a fresh suit against them. 13. According to Section 47, C.P.C., all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, in "Jugal Kishore v. Manaka Singh", AIR 1939 Pal 260 the plaintiffs obtained a decree for possession of laud, which was submerged under water during the rainy season, but could be cultivated in the rest of the year. They did not take possession of the land until execution of the decree was barred by limitation. They filed a fresh suit for the same purpose It was held that the second suit was barred under S. 47, C.P.C. That is the position in the present case. The plaintiff obtained against the defendants a decree for ejectment on 20-8-1940 under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. Although the decree was executed, that execution stood annulled as a result of Sub-Section (5) of S. 27 of the 1947 Act. On reinstatement of the defendants on 14-11-1950, their status was the same as in September 1940. They remained liable to ejectment in execution of the decree dated 20-8-1940. Since the respondents were liable to ejectment under a decree, another suit for their ejectment could not be filed either in the Revenue Court or in the Civil Court. The second suit is barred under S. 47, C.P.C. I express no opinion as to whether in the year 1950 execution of the decree dated 20-8-1940 would have been within limitation. 14. There is another reason why the civil suit must fail. Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act provided for suits for ejectment of trespassers from agricultural land. Section 242. The second suit is barred under S. 47, C.P.C. I express no opinion as to whether in the year 1950 execution of the decree dated 20-8-1940 would have been within limitation. 14. There is another reason why the civil suit must fail. Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act provided for suits for ejectment of trespassers from agricultural land. Section 242. U.P. Tenancy Act states : "Subject to the provsions of Section 286 all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a Revenue Court, and no Court other than a Revenue Court shall take cognizance of any such suit based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. A suit under Section 180 is mentioned in the Fourth Schedule. The question, therefore, arises whether notwithstanding S. 242, U.P. Tenancy Act, the appellant could file the present suit in the Civil Court. 15. Mr. R.B. Misra, appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, relied upon a decision by a Division Bench of this Court in "Ram Surat Koert v. Sri Lal," 1954 All LJ 699. The facts of that case were these. The plaintiffs filed a suit in the Court of Munsif for ejectment of the defendants from certain land on the ground that they were trespassers. The defendants pleaded that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction That plea was upheld by the trial Court. It was held that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court. In appeal that point was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The lower appellate Court remanded the case to the trial Court for decision on merits. The defendants filed a civil revision. The revision was dismissed by a Single fudge, who held that it was not open to some co-sharers to file a suit under S. 180 for ejectment of a trespasser. Consequently a suit by some co-sharers in the Civil Court is maintainable. After remand the Munsif decided the case on merits, and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The low appellate Court reversed that decision. The defendants filed a second appeal. The second appeal was allowed by this Court; and the trial Court's decision dismissing the suit was restored. 16. Consequently a suit by some co-sharers in the Civil Court is maintainable. After remand the Munsif decided the case on merits, and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The low appellate Court reversed that decision. The defendants filed a second appeal. The second appeal was allowed by this Court; and the trial Court's decision dismissing the suit was restored. 16. On page 701, the learned Judges observed : "If, therefore, only some out of the several co-sharers filed a suit for ejectment, it would not be a suit under S. 180 Whether such a suit can be filed in the Civil Court, with respect to tenancy land, is a matter on which we do not wish to express any opinion in this case. But in a suit filed in the Civil Court by only some co-sharers, the defendant can be ejected only if he is trespasser." 17. It will be seen that the learned Judges of the Division Bench assumed that, a civil suit by some co-sharers for ejectment of the defendants as trespassers was maintainable. It was made clear that, they were not expressing any opinion as to whether a suit relating to tenancy land can at all be filed in the Civil Court. This point was considered at an earlier stage by a Singe Judge, who took the view that the civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. It was difficult to reverse that view at a subsequent stage of the same suit. The Bench dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the defendants had become hereditary tenants. So, the judgment in Ram Surat Koeri's case, 1954 All LJ 699 should not be treated as a decision by the Division Bench that, under such circumstances, a civil suit for ejectment of a trespasser is maintainable. 18. It is the case of the present appellant that the land-holder could file a suit for ejectment of the respondents under Section 180, U.P Tenancy Act. But the plaintiff complained that there are other co-sharers in the land. They did not join the plaintiff in suing the defendants for their ejectment. In the absence of those co-sharers, it became impossible to file a suit for ejectment of the defendants under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. That was why the plaintiff was forced to file the present civil suit for ejectment of the defendants. 19. They did not join the plaintiff in suing the defendants for their ejectment. In the absence of those co-sharers, it became impossible to file a suit for ejectment of the defendants under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. That was why the plaintiff was forced to file the present civil suit for ejectment of the defendants. 19. I do not think that unwillingness on the part in of some co-sharers can be offered as a valid ground for not filing a suit in the Revenue Court under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. The appellant is claiming the relict of ejectment of the respondents. This relief could be granted by the Revenue Court in a suit properly brought under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. The cause of action is the same. So the mandatory provision of S. 242, U.P. Tenancy Act is attracted. The provision of S. 242, U.P. Tenancy Act cannot be defeated by pleading that, some co-sharers are not willing to join in a suit under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. The present civil suit is barred by S. 242, U.P. Tenancy Act. 20. To sum up : The decision in 1956 All LJ 343 is right in so far as it was held that, a person who obtained reinstatement under S. 27 of Act No. X of 1947 remains liable to ejectment again. But in the present case the plaintiffs' remedy was by way of execution of the decree dated 20-8-40. The present suit is barred under S. 47, C.P.C. The civil suit is also barred under S. 242, U.P. Tenancy Act. I, therefore, agree (although for different reasons) with the learned Civil Judge that, the present civil suit fails. 21. In my opinion, the second appeal should be dismissed with costs. 22. GYANENDRA KUMAR AND GANGESHWAR PRASAD, JJ. : We agree that the appeal must be dismissed with costs. 23. BY THE COURT : The second appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.