ORDER Jaganmohan Reddy, J.- This Revision is from the Order of the Munsif-Magistrate, Masulipatam, in, Criminal M.P. No. 1 of 1959 dismissing an application filed by the petitioner under section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Madras Act XIX of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Endowments Act). When this revision petition came up for hearing before our learned brother, Mohamed Mirza, J., he referred it to a Bench having regard to conflict of opinion which required consideration. The petitioner is a trustee of Sri Rameswaraswamy Varu alias Ramalingeswaraswamy Varu Temple, situate at Kuchipudi. Respondents 1 and 2 and the archakas and respondents 3 and 4 are tenants from the said archakas. The tenants claimed occupancy rights under the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called as the Inams Abolition Act) and tenancy rights under the Andhra Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act). In order to appreciate the scope and ambit of the points which fall for consideration in this revision, it may be necessary to state the chequered history of this case, and the several occasions on which it reached the High Court. An application was filed by three trustees of the temple under section 87 of the Endowments Act and the Deputy Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department gave notice to respondents 1 and 2 in 1955, to show cause why a certificate under section 87 should not be issued. Respondents 1 and 2 having appeared and the Deputy Commissioner having heard their arguments as well as those of the then trustee, issued a certificate (Exhibit P-2) on 5th December, 1955 under the said section. Thereafter the trustee filed M.C. No. 29 of 1955 for eviction of the respondents. This petition however was dismissed for default. The trustee again filed M.C. No. 4 of 1956 on 1st February, 1953. This was dismissed on the ground that though the certificate was granted in the names of three persons, only one trustee had filed the application, and secondly that in S.A. No. 1216 of 1940 Horwill, J., had held that the inam in favour of the archakas was burdened with service, and so the trustees were precluded from taking possession in the property. Against this order, a revision was filed before the District Court, being Criminal M.P. No. 7 of 1956. But this was dismissed on28thSeptember, 1956. Against this order, a revision was filed before the District Court, being Criminal M.P. No. 7 of 1956. But this was dismissed on28thSeptember, 1956. As against that order a revision was filed before the High Court, being Criminal R.G. No. 456 of 1956. Our learned brother, Basi Reddy, J., allowed this revision petition and directed the petitioner to implead respondent 3 and 4. After this, M.C. No. 5 of 1958 was filed impleading all the respondents, i.e., respondents 1 and 2, the archakas, and their tenants, respondents 3 and 4. But after the petition was filed, the trustee-petitioner died, and as such it was dismissed The Deputy Commissioner, Vijayawada, appointed the present trustee, Pasumarthi Subrahmanya Sastry, on 2nd December, 1958 by his order (Exhibit P-1) . This trustee then filed Criminal M.P. No. 5 of 1959, on the basis of that certificate, impleading all the parties as heretofore, with a prayer to evict them. This petition was allowed and eviction was ordered on 10th February, 1959. Against this order, a revision was filed by respondents 3 and 4 to the High Court in Criminal R.C. No. 108 of 1959, which came up before Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J. The learned Judge allowed the petition and remanded the case to the lower Court for enquiry as to whether respondents 3 and 4 have set up a bona fide right in themselves under the Tenancy Act and the Inams Abolition Act. This judgment was pronounced on 24th June, 1959. At this stage, it may be stated that a prior suit, O.S. No. 32 of 1948, filed by the trustees against the archakas for a declaration that the grant of the inam was to the institution and not to the archakas burdened with service, was decreed. An Appeal, A.S. No. 815 of 1954, was preferred to this Court, which came up for hearing by a Bench consisting of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and one of us. The Bench held on 31st July, 1959, a month or so after the judgment of remand of Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., that the grant of the inam was to the deity and not to the archakas burdened with service. The Bench held on 31st July, 1959, a month or so after the judgment of remand of Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., that the grant of the inam was to the deity and not to the archakas burdened with service. After the remand order in Criminal R.C. No. 108 of 1959, when the matter went back to the lower Court for enquiry, the Munsif-Magistrate, Masulipatam, by his order dated 6th April, 1960, held (i) that both under the Tenancy Act as well as under the Inams Abolition Act , the archakas are entitled to be in possession so long as they perform service, and that in the instant case they have not ceased to perform the service ; (ii) that the tenants had acquired rights and consequently they could not be evicted under section 87 of the Endowments Act ; and (iii) that a patta had been issued to the tenants by the Tahsildar, purporting to be under section 7 (1) of the Inams Abolition Act. We shall however deal with the specific contentions later, but for the present we are only confining our narration to the salient features of the case. As against the order of the Magistrate, a revision was filed in the District Court, Masulipatam, and the District Judge by his order in Criminal R.C. No. 15 of 1960 dated 5th December-, 1960, dismissed the revision agreeing with the Magistrate that the tenants had acquired rights under the the Inams Abolition Act. He further held that the archakas are entitled to remuneration, and that the)‘are entitled to remain in possession as they were performing the service. One other fact may be adverted to here, viz., that the Tahsildar in an enquiry under section 3 (1) of the Inams, Abolition Act held that the lands were inam lauds in an inam village held by an institution. Thereafter under a suo motu enquiry initiated by him under section 7 (1) of the Inams Abolition Act and after due notices to the trustee and the archakas, he granted a joint patta in favour of the institution and the archakas, and the tenants were shown as having occupancy rights. This order was challenged in appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, who, after considering the matter in great detail, held that the Tahsildar was not justified in granting joint patta to the archakas, or in declaring the tenants to have occupancy rights. This order was challenged in appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, who, after considering the matter in great detail, held that the Tahsildar was not justified in granting joint patta to the archakas, or in declaring the tenants to have occupancy rights. Against this order, we understand, a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution has been filed, and is pending before this Court. In this revision petition, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. C. Padmanabha Reddy, contends inter alia that after the remand order directing an enquiry to be held by the Magistrate, the Magistrate erred in holding that the archakas were entitled to be in possession, or that they had a right to grant leases, or that the tenants could set up a claim of their own by virtue of those leases under the two enactments, or otherwise by reason of their possession. It is, in our view, unnecessary to consider in this case the question whether it is permissible for the Magistrate to go behind the certificate granted under section 87 of the Endowments Act, having regard to the order of remand passed by Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., or to conduct an enquiry after due notice to all persons concerned, because of the previous order of our learned brother, Basi Reddy, J., directing the impleading of all the parties, and determining the case only thereafter. The order of Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J. had specifically directed an enquiry to be held to decide the question whether the tenants had rights under the Acts specified above. The questions that we have to consider in this case are whether the archakas, respondents 1 and 2, are persons entitled to be in possession of the properties; whether having regard to the scope of section 87 of the Endowments Act it can be said that respondents 3 and 4 are persons claiming or deriving title from a trustee, officeholder or servant of the religious institution and claiming in good faith to be in possession on their own account, or on account of some person not being a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office. The learned Advocate for the respondent-tenants, Mr. The learned Advocate for the respondent-tenants, Mr. Venkatarama Sastry, contends that the archakas by reason of their rendering archakatvam service for which they are entitled to be remunerated, have a right to be in possession, and consequently to lease out the lands. Apart from this, he states that in the plaint in O.S. No. 32 of 1948, the trustee had specifically averred that he is not entitled in praesenti to possession of the suit properties which are in the possession of the archakas who are rendering service, and as such the plaintiff-trustee in that case merely prayed for a declaration and not for possession. This averment, according to Mr. Venkatarama Sastry, recognised the right of the archakas to remain in possession, and a right to possession, he contends is as much a right as a right of ownership, and consequently the archakas were entitled to lease out the land and induct into possession the tenants, respondents 3 and 4. If this right is recognised, argues the Counsel, then the right of the tenants is protected under the Tenancy Act, which is being extended from time to time, and on the date when the petition was filed, the tenants could resist any attempt to evict them. Similarly, he contends that under section 8 of the Inams Abolition Act also, they are entitled to occupancy rights and the Tahsildar had, therefore jurisdiction to enquire into the matter and make a note of the fact in the patta. He also contends that the oldest registered lease deed is Exhibit D-2 dated 7th May, 1947, and there are registered lease deeds, Exhibits D-3 to D-5, dated 15th May, 1947, 20th February, 1954, and 25th February, 1954, under which respondents 3 and 4 were inducted into possession by the archakas, and that in spite of the fact that they continued as tenants under those leases, the trustee did not challenge those leases nor urge that the leases were invalid. In order to determine these rival contentions, it is first necessary to examine the scope of section 87 of the Endowments Act, which runs as follows; “Where a person has been appointed- (a) as trustee or executive officer of a religious institution; or (b) to discharge the functions of a trustee of a religious institution in accordance with the provisions of this Act ; or (c) as manager under section 56 or in any scheme framed by the Board before the commencement of this Act ; and such person is resisted in, or prevented from, obtaining possession of the religious institution or of the records, accounts and properties thereof, by a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office or is otherwise not entitled to be in possession or by any person claiming or deriving title from such trustee, office-holder or servant, not being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person not being such trustee, office-holder or servant, any Magistrate of the First Class in whose jurisdiction such institution or property is situated shall, on application by the person so appointed, and on the production of the order of appointment, and where the application is for possession of property of a certificate by the Commissioner in the prescribed form setting forth that the property in question belongs to the religious institution, direct delivery to the person appointed as aforesaid of he possession of such religious institution or the records, accounts and properties thereof, as the case may be: Provided however, that before issuing any such certificate in respect of any property, the Commissioner shall give notice to the trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution, as the case may be, of his intention to issue the certificate and consider the objections, if any, of such trustee, officeholder or servant: Provided that for the purpose of proceedings under this section , the certificate aforesaid shall be conclusive evidence that the properties to which it relates belong to the religious institution; Provided further that nothing contained in this section shall bar the institution of a suit by any person aggrieved by an order under this section for establishing his title to the said property. Explanation: A person claiming under an alienation contrary to the provisions of section 29 or 35 shall not be regarded as a person claiming in good faith within the meaning of this section.” A bare reading of this section shows that this is a summary remedy given to the trustees or managers of an institution to expeditiously evict a trustee, office-holder or servant of a religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from office or is otherwise not entitled to be in possession, subject to certain conditions specified therein. Under this provision, he could also obtain records or accounts from such persons. This section has a history and is the successor to section 78 of the Madras Act II of 1927 which was similarly enacted in public interest to enable the trustee of a temple to recover its properties expeditiously from recalcitrant ex-trustees or other servants of the temple. Even under that section, as in the present section 87, third parties having a bona fide claim in their own right were excluded from the purview of the provision. In Dandaian v. Venkatarama1 a Bench of the Madras High Court considered the history of this legislation and the several cases which interpreted section 78 of the old Act from time to time leading up to the enactment of section 87. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, observed at page 507 thus: “In section 87 of Act XIX of 1951 the Legislature attempted to get over the defects pointed out by the learned Judges in the aforesaid case. section 87 practically re-enacted section 78 with some necessary amendments. Instead of the Court, the Magistrate was directed to put the petitioner in possession of the properties. This was obviously intended to be a more expeditious method of restoring properties to public institutions. But the Magistrate is authorised to give possession only if the Commissioner, who is substituted for the Religious Endowments Board in the Act, gives a certificate setting forth that the property in question belongs to the religious institution. The Commissioner shall give notice to the affected parties and consider the objections before issuing a certificate. This provision gives an opportunity to the affected office-holder prima facie to establish that the properties are his and the certificate so issued is made conclusive evidence for the purpose of its proceedings under section 87. The Commissioner shall give notice to the affected parties and consider the objections before issuing a certificate. This provision gives an opportunity to the affected office-holder prima facie to establish that the properties are his and the certificate so issued is made conclusive evidence for the purpose of its proceedings under section 87. This preliminary enquiry and the certificate issued after hearing parties was thought by the Legislature to be a sufficient guarantee against arbitrary eviction. Under the section the aggrieved party can file a suit for establishing title to the suit property. This section is therefore an improvement on the earlier section; whereas in the earlier section the enquiry was contemplated by the Religious Endowments Board, under this section the Commissioner is authorised to make a judicial enquiry for the purpose of ascertaining prima facie whether the office-holder or the servant as the case may be, has any title to the property. His decision is not final for the aggrieved party can always file a suit to establish his title in a civil Court. The other conditions laid down in section 87 are similar to those found in section 78 of the earlier Act. If the conditions are complied with, the Magistrate is bound to direct delivery of the properties and the records to the applicant.” The conditions for eviction under section 87, therefore are: (1) that the person in possession of the property of the religious institution or of the records, accounts and properties thereof, is a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from the office; (2) even where such persons are not dismissed from office, they arc otherwise not entitled to be in possession ; or (3) that the person in possession are claiming or deriving title from such trustee, office-holder or servant or such trustee, office-holder or servant who is not entitled to possession, and that such person is not a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person not being such trustee, office-holder or servant. The parenthetic clause in the section excludes third parties and also a person setting up a bona fide claim in his own right. Of course, it is contended that this bona fide right may be set up even by a person deriving title from a dismissed trustee or office-holder or servant. The parenthetic clause in the section excludes third parties and also a person setting up a bona fide claim in his own right. Of course, it is contended that this bona fide right may be set up even by a person deriving title from a dismissed trustee or office-holder or servant. It is however unnecessary for us to determine this question, because in the present case the archakas are still rendering services to the deity. In what circumstances, if, any, can a person deriving title from any of the persons enumerated in the section can set up claim in his own right in good faith is a matter which must be left to some other occasion, when the facts and circumstances justify such consideration. This analysis of the section is also fortified by the observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) who said that the section has no concern with third parties. The next question for consideration is whether the archakas have any rights in the endowed properties ; i.e., whether it is a grant in favour of the archakas burdened with service, or whether it is a grant for service with emoluments attached thereto, or whether by reason of the archakatvam service rendered, the archakas are entitled to possession thereof and consequently have a right to resist eviction. In so far as the first aspect of their right is concerned, the judgment of a Bench of this Court in A.S.No. 815 of1954 (Exhibit P.5) concludes the matter. In that appeal, the question which arose for determination was stated as follows: “The only question to be determined is whether the suit lands, item 1 and 1 (a) are inam lands and the absolute property of the deity - 1st plaintiff’, or are they granted to the first defendant's ancestor burdened with the archakatvam service to the deity.” After considering the Inam Fair Register and the relevant evidence and the documents in the case, the Bench held that, “there can be little doubt that the grant of Acs. 11-76 cents apart from the 3 acres for the Rathotsavam, was by the agraharamdars to the deity Sri Rameswaraswamy Varu for the Nitya Naivedya Dhupa Deeparadhana etc., and if possession has been given to the archakas to perform those services, it is certainly not a grant burdened with the archakatvam service.” It cannot, therefore, be said that the grant was to the archakas. In coming to the conclusion, the Bench relied on column 22 of the Inam Fair Register, under the heading ‘Decision of the Inam Commissioner or his Assistants — whether it was confirmed in the names of the managers for the time being of the temple’ it was mentioned that out of Acs. 14-76 cents, Ac. 0-66 cents had been deducted and only Acs. 14-10 cents have been confirmed, and in column 13, the name of the original grantee was shown as Sri Ramaswami Varu alias Ramalingaswami Varu, whose name has also been shown in the registers prepared according to the Regulation 31 of 1802 and in the permanent settlement accounts. The name of the deity was also entered in the certificate and subsequent accounts. The description of the inam has been stated to be for daily service and annual festivals of the God. This decision is conclusive as to the rights of the temple, and negatives the claim of the archakas that it was a grant to them burdened with service. A reference to the various entries in the columns of the Inam Fair Register would also negative the second contention, viz., that it was granted for performance of service to which the emoluments are attached, i.e., that the grant is to the office of archaka, with emoluments attached thereto. A recent decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., in Punniah v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy varu1, classified Devadayam inams into three classes, viz., (i) grants to the institution, (ii) grants to an office to serve as emoluments annexed to that office and (iii) grants to named individuals burdened with service. Since there is already a decision binding on the parties and on us that the inam in question is only to the institution and not to named individuals burdened with service, Mr. Venkatarama Sastry contends that the mam is a grant to the office, to serve as emoluments annexed to that office. Since there is already a decision binding on the parties and on us that the inam in question is only to the institution and not to named individuals burdened with service, Mr. Venkatarama Sastry contends that the mam is a grant to the office, to serve as emoluments annexed to that office. But this contention also cannot be accepted, because, on a perusal of the entries in the Inam Fair Register, the conclusion is irresistible that the inam was one granted to the managers of the temple and confirmed as such. The mere fact that the services were mentioned generally does not indicate that the grant is for any particular service. It is elementary that when a grant is made to the deity, the deity has to be maintained by its servants and by the various services and consequently the income from the property has to be spent for those services. Unless the intention of the grantor is to grant specifically to a particular service or attach an emolument to it, it cannot be said that it falls under class (ii) of the classes referred by the learned Judges in that case. The entries in the Inam Fair Register already referred to do not warrant such an inference being drawn. In fact, his Lordship the Chief Justice was considering, in the case referred to above entries similar to the ones which were considered in the judgment of the High Court in A.S. No. 815 of 1954. At page 218, his Lordship the Chief Justice, after referring to the columns, of the Inam Fair Register, stated that the inam was granted for the maintenance of servants entirely of the Pagoda of Sri Venkateswaraswami, which means for maintenance of all the servants of the temple; that columns 16 and 17 show Sri Venkateswaraswami as the enjoyer of the inam at the time of the inam enquiry, though the names ‘Kondamala, Tirupatigadu and Subbadu’ are coupled with that of the deity and that the inam was to be confirmed and continued free of tax so long as the Paricharakam service was rendered in the Pagoda of Sri Venkateswaraswami. After noting these particulars, his Lordship observed as follows: “We feel that the various entries indicate that the inam was made to the deity for its upkeep, since all the servants of the temple are intended to be maintained out of the income from the property. This is not a case of the inam being annexed to any particular service. It looks to us that it was granted for general services in the temple akin to an inam granted for Nithya Naivedya Deeparadhana in a temple interpreted by a number of decisions of the Madras High Court as a grant to the deity.” In the present case also the grant is for Nithya Naivedya Dhoona Deeparadhana of the Swamyvaru. It is, therefore, clear that the inam in question does not also fall under class (ii) of devadayam inams to which reference has been made, and the archakas cannot have any claim to the property, except to be remunerated for any services that they may have rendered. It is further to be considered whether because the archakas have beer rendering the archakatvam service and are entitled to remuneration, and the trustees of the temple having put them in possession in lieu of remuneration the archakas are entitled to any rights in the land, or resist eviction at the instance of the trustees. This question also is concluded by authority. In Venkatadri v. Seshacharyulu2 Happell and Shahabuddin, JJ., held thus: “Where a grant of lands is made to the temple there can be no question of the archakas acquiring any proprietary rights in the lands as against the temple by reason of their long possession of the lands. Whatever the origin of their possession may have been they must be held to have been in possession in a fiduciary capacity. The archakas are no doubt entitled to remuneration for their services but they are not entitled to appropriate for themselves any surplus that may be left after the expenses of the particular services which they render have been met. The question whether they should be left in possession of the properties of the temple is an administrative matter depending on the extent of income derived from the land. They cannot however claim to remain in possession as of right. There can be no question of adverse possession as between the temple and the archakas. The question whether they should be left in possession of the properties of the temple is an administrative matter depending on the extent of income derived from the land. They cannot however claim to remain in possession as of right. There can be no question of adverse possession as between the temple and the archakas. The possession of the archakas of the temple property is in a fiduciary capacity; they cannot prescribe against the temple.” Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Satyanarayana v. Venkatappayya1 expressed a similar opinion. S.R. Das, J., (as he then was) dealing with the submissions of the Attorney-General that the archakas who were rendering services faithfully from generation to generation should not, in equity, be ejected from the entire lands and that they should be allowed to remain in possession of the lands and be permitted to appropriate to themselves the expenses of the services and a reasonable remuneration and the rest of the income should be made over to the temple as its property, observed at page 197 thus: “In a proceeding for the framing of a scheme relating to a temple it may be permissible to take into account the claims, moral if not legal, of the archakas and to make some provision for protecting their rights, but those considerations appear to us to be entirely out of place in a suit for ejectment on proof of title. If the two decisions, i.e., Dandibhotla Kutumba Sastrulu v. Kontharapu Venkatalingam2 and Buddu Satyanarayana v. Dasari Butchayya3 lay down, as it is contended they do, that the principles which may have a bearing on a proceeding for framing of a scheme or for enforcing the scheme that is framed may be applied to a case of the kind we have now before us it will be difficult for us to uphold them either on authority or on principle…. Although they are archakas they actually asserted an adverse right in the face of the honest admission of their predecessors in title, made in the inam statement, Exhibit D-3. Although they are archakas they actually asserted an adverse right in the face of the honest admission of their predecessors in title, made in the inam statement, Exhibit D-3. Such conduct cannot but be regarded as disentitling them from any claim founded on equity……..Further, the giving of such equitable relief must depend on questions of fact, namely, the income of the property, the reasonable expenses and remuneration for the services, the amounts appropriated by them all this time and so forth which have not been investigated into in this case, because, no doubt, this question of equitable relief has been put forward as a last resort after having lost their battle. We do not think in the circumstances of the case any indulgence should be shown to the archakas even if it were permissible for the Court in a suit of this description to give such relief.” These two decisions leave no doubt that whatever may be the claim of the archakas to receive remuneration for performing services, they have no right to remain in possession and can be evicted. The learned Advocate for respondents 3 and 4, Mr. Venkatarama Sastry, then contended that these judgments were judgments rendered in a suit for ejectment and that the judgment of the High Court in A.S. No. 185 of 1954 was one in a declaratory suit. But we are not able to appreciate the force of this contention. The propositions laid down in these cases are firstly, that when the inam is granted to a deity or to an institution, notwithstanding the fact that the archakas were rendering service and were put in possession of the lands in lieu of remuneration for the services, they had no right to remain in possession as against the institution, and secondly, that their only remedy is to ask for and obtain remuneration which is an administrative matter. Whether these propositions are laid down in suits for ejectment or in declaratory suits, in our view, makes little difference. It may be stated that as a result of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a G.O. fixing a certain proportion of the hinds in the possession of the archakas to be allotted as their remuneration, and compensate the archakas to that extent and it was open to the archakas to have moved the Government. We are told that the Government had fixed a time limit. But notwithstanding this fact, there is nothing to prevent the Government from considering any application under that G.O. if made. The next question is whether the second or the third condition for the applicability of section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951) is satisfied. The second condition could only arise in respect of archakas, namely, whether they are otherwise entitled to be in possession. We have already found that they are not otherwise entitled to remain in possession by the force of the judgments referred to above, and if they are not otherwise entitled to remain in possession, could they create rights of tenancy in others e On principle and authority it appears to us that a person, who has no right in property, can equally create no rights in others. In other words, persons who are lessees from the archakas who have no right to lease, can be in no better position than the archakas themselves. This matter was considered in Dandiah v. Venkatarama1 to which a reference has already been made in another context. Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) dealt with this question at page 508, and after referring to the case-law concluded thus: “It therefore follows that an archaka is either an office-holder or servant within the provisions of section 87. If the other conditions of section 87 are complied with — and it is not suggested in this case that they have not been complied with - the trustee would certainly be entitled to take out an application before the Magistrate for directing the archaka to deliver possession of the properties specified in the certificate as those belonging to the temple. If the archakas can be directed to deliver possession under the section, the tenant claiming under him cannot be in a better position.” To the same effect is the decision of Anantanarayana Ayyar, J., who has reviewed all the case-law exhaustively in R.C. Abboyi v. K. Suranna2. Our learned brother observed at pages 147-148 thus: “Therefore, the service-holders including the archakas were only temple servants and not trustees. Consequently, they were not entitled to lease out the lands belonging to the temple. Our learned brother observed at pages 147-148 thus: “Therefore, the service-holders including the archakas were only temple servants and not trustees. Consequently, they were not entitled to lease out the lands belonging to the temple. Hence the contesting respondents only claim as deriving title from temple servants and not from a trustee who was competent to lease the temple lands. The temple servants themselves were not entitled to be in possession as against the managing trustee; for, the lands were properties belonging to the temple and not service inam lands. So, it cannot be said that the contesting respondents claim in good faith to be in possession on their own account or on account of some person not being trustee, office-holder or. servant.” It is then contended on behalf of the tenants that under the special Acts, namely, the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1958) and the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVIII of 1956) the tenants are entitled to remain in possession under the former Act as the Act is being extended from time to time, and are entitled to occupancy rights under the latter Act and, therefore, entitled to resist eviction. Section 2 ( c) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act defines a cultivating tenant as meaning a person who cultivates by his own labour any land belonging to another under a tenancy agreement, express or implied; but does not include a mere inter-meddler. This definition postulates a tenancy agreement and the tenancy agreement in turn implies that it is an agreement entered into with a person competent to deal with the property or effect any right in immoveable property. If the very basic condition of conferring the status of a cultivating tenant is the competence of the lessor to create a lawful right in the property, which competence we have held as wanting in the archaka, respondents 3 and 4 claiming the rights of tenancy only under the archakas cannot be deemed to be cultivating tenants within the meaning of section 2 ( c). In Pubbiri v. S. Govinda3 Ramaswami, J., who was construing the rights of the tenants of an archka under section 3 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955) observed that the archaka was not a person capable of creating a tenancy. In Pubbiri v. S. Govinda3 Ramaswami, J., who was construing the rights of the tenants of an archka under section 3 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955) observed that the archaka was not a person capable of creating a tenancy. Similarly, our learned brother, Anantanarayana Ayyar, J, in the case cited above, after referring to this judgment of Ramaswami, J., held that the properties belonging to an institution cannot be leased out by the archakas who are in possession of them but only by a managing trustee and that the tenants have no rights under the Act. With great respect, we agree with these decisions and hold that the respondents 3 and 4 have no rights as tenants. They cannot be allowed to assert a right under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act , and cannot be deemed to assert a right of their own within the meaning of section 87 of the Endowments Act. Under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVIII of 1956), as already observed, it appears that the Tahsildar had made an enquiry under section 7 and declared the occupancy rights of respondents 3 and 4. But that order was reversed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. It is stated that a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution is pending and that the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer has not become final. Even though a revision might be pending, it does not preclude us from determining this question which arises either directly or collaterally and is necessary for the disposal of this petition. A reference to section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVIII of 1956) makes the position clear. Even though a revision might be pending, it does not preclude us from determining this question which arises either directly or collaterally and is necessary for the disposal of this petition. A reference to section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVIII of 1956) makes the position clear. As such we may read that section which is as follows: “(1) In the case of an inam land held by an institution in an inam village, the tenant who is declared to be in occupation of the inam land on the 7th January, 1948, under section 5, or if there is no such tenant, the tenant in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of this Act, shall have a right of permanent occupancy in that land and the said right shall be heritable and shall be transferable by sale, gift or otherwise……….” The Magistrate, whose order is now under review, no doubt considered this section, but he has failed to notice its essential requirement viz., that the tenancy for the purposes of that sub- section is one created by an institution in an inam village, and not by any other person like an archaka. The qualifying words “an inam land held by an institution in an inam village” are the foundation for the applicability of that section, and where an institution has not created any rights of tenancy, no tenant can claim any occupancy rights under this section. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while considering a provision under the U.P. Tenancy Act, which is in pari materia, in Asa Ram v. Mst. Ram Kali1 also took a similar view. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed at page 187 thus: “The true scope of sub- section (a) of section 29 is that, it posits that there is on the date of commencement of the Act a person who is lawfully a tenant and proceeds to confer on him certain rights. It is, therefore, a condition precedent to the application of this provision that the person must have been admitted as tenant by a person who had the right to do so. It is, therefore, a condition precedent to the application of this provision that the person must have been admitted as tenant by a person who had the right to do so. Where however, the person who purports to grant the lease has no authority to do so, whatever the rights inter se between the lessor and the lessee as against the true owner, the latter does not, in law, acquire the status of a tenant, and section 29 (a) has no application to him.” These observations are applicable not only to the acquisition of occupancy rights under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXXVIII of 1956) but also to the rights to remain in possession under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act. In this view, since we have already held that the archakas have no right to lease, the tenants, respondents 3 and 4, can claim no rights of possession even under this Act, and as such they cannot be said to be persons claiming in good faith to be in possession on their own account or on account of some person being such trustee, office-holder or servant within the meaning of section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. The result is that, this revision petition is allowed and the order of the Magistrate is set aside. The Magistrate is directed to order delivery of the properties mentioned in the certificate to the petitioner under section 87. Crl. M.P. No. 801 of 1963 is ordered. G.S.M.-----Revision allowed; directions issued.