JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - These two connected special appeals have been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Inspector General of Police, Meerut Range, and the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar, against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court by which two writ petitions, filed by the respondents Hari Shanker Kaushik and Ram Deo Sahgal, were allowed and the orders of appellants 1, 2 and 3 resulting in dismissal of the respondents, were quashed. 2. Both the respondents were employed as Sub-Inspectors of Police in Uttar Pradesh and against both of them proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act were started. In those proceedings enquiries were held by appellant No. 4, the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar, who after the enquiries sent his findings to appellant No. 3, the Deputy Inspector General of Police Meerut Range. Appellant No. 3, thereupon, gave notices to both these respondents to show cause why they should not be dismissed and, after giving a right of hearing to the respondents, he passed orders dismissing both the respondent. The respondents filed appeals to appellant No. 2, the Inspector General of Police, and they were dismissed. Thereafter there were representations by them to appellants No. 1, the State of Uttar Pradesh, and these representations were also dismissed. Consequently, the respondents approached this Court. 3. The learned Single Judge held that no illegality was committed in taking into account the evidence of witnesses who were not examined by the Superintendent of Police himself as it was permissible under paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations to admit into evidence statements of witnesses recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the course of preliminary enquiries. The learned Single Judge was, however, of the view that, even though the evidence of these witnesses was admissible under paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations, the procedure prescribed by the Regulations in this behalf did not afford an adequate opportunity to the persons charged to show cause as required by Article 311 of the Constitution because principles of natural justice rendered it necessary that only that evidence should be taken into account which had been recorded in the presence of the persons proceeded against. He consequently, held that in this case the orders passed against the respondents of the two respondents. Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellants have filed these special appeals. 4. He consequently, held that in this case the orders passed against the respondents of the two respondents. Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellants have filed these special appeals. 4. During the course of arguments it has appeared to us that the particular question of law, on the basis of which the learned Single Judge proceeded to decide the two writ petitions, need not be gone into in these cases. Para 490 of the Police Regulations lays down the manner in which evidence has to be recorded in proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act. It is the admitted case of the parties and it also appears from para 477 of the Police Regulations that para 490 contains provisions, which had been framed under Section 7 of the Police Act, and have statutory force. Para 490 lays down that the evidence, which is to be adduced to establish a charge under Section 7 of the Police Act, may be either oral or documentary, and must be material to the charge. The manner in which the oral evidence is to be recorded is thereafter laid down and it says that it must be recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself in the presence of the party charged who will be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. An exception is, however, provided in the next sentence by laying down that "Statements recorded by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer in the course of preliminary enquiries into the conduct of the party charged should be admissible and need not be recorded again, if they are read out and admitted by the witness in the presence of the party charged and the party charged is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses." In the instant case, it was alleged on behalf of the two respondents that the proceedings taken against them under Section 7 of the Police Act were vitiated because there had been non-compliance with these requirements for recording oral evidence. Admittedly, the evidence of a number of witnesses was taken into account and was relied upon for recording findings against the respondents whose evidence had not been recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself. Admittedly, the evidence of a number of witnesses was taken into account and was relied upon for recording findings against the respondents whose evidence had not been recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself. The orders made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Inspector General of Police show that the statements of the witnesses, which had not been recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself in the presence of the respondents, were held to be admissible under the provision contained in the exception mentioned above. In giving this decision, however, it appears that both the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Inspector General of Police either did not read at all or had no knowledge at all of the exact provision made in this exception. The exception applies only when reliance is placed on statements recorded "by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer in the course of preliminary enquiries." Neither the Deputy Inspector General of Police nor the Inspector General of Police, in spite of a specific objection having been taken to that effect, cared to see whether the statements of witnesses, that were being taken into account, had been recorded by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer. In fact there was no suggestion that those statements had been recorded by any Magistrate. The statements were relied upon as having been recorded by a Gazetted Police Officer viz. the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the course of preliminary enquiries. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition it was specifically stated that the statements, which were taken into account,had not been recorded by a Deputy Superintendent of Police but had been written out by the witnesses themselves and handed over to the Deputy Superintendent of Police holding the preliminary enquiries. In the counter affidavit this allegation, made on behalf of the respondents, was admitted. There was thus a clear admission in these petitions that the statements, that were admitted in evidence, had not been recorded by a police officer at all. They were statements which had been written out by the witnesses themselves and merely handed over to the Deputy Superintendent of Police making preliminary enquiries. It was not even suggested that those statements were recorded by the witnesses in the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police or under his control and supervision. They were statements which had been written out by the witnesses themselves and merely handed over to the Deputy Superintendent of Police making preliminary enquiries. It was not even suggested that those statements were recorded by the witnesses in the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police or under his control and supervision. Consequently, it is clear that these statements did not fall within the exception to the general rule that oral evidence must be recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself. 5. In this case the fact to be kept in view is that this rule contained in para 490 of the Police Regulations specifically and distinctly is for the purpose of laying down how evidence in proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act must be recorded and the fist direction given is that it must be recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself in the presence of the party charged who is to be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. This rule thus embodies the well recognised principle of natural justice that as far as possible all evidence taken into account in proceedings against the party charged should be recorded in his presence permitting him the right of cross-examination. An exception is made where statements may have been previously recorded by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer in the case of preliminary enquiries. This exception does not cover statements which the witnesses choose to writ themselves and hand over either to a Gazetted Police Officer in the course of preliminary enquiries or even to the Superintendent of Police who may himself be conducting the proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act. The purpose of excluding such a course seems to be obvious. If a statement is recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself or even by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer in the course of preliminary enquires, it can be presumed that the witness is giving a voluntary statement himself and is not, at that stage of statement, being of a statement by a Superintendent of Police, a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer seems to have been laid down to ensure that the statement which is taken into account is the statement of the witness without his coming under other extraneous influences. In the case of statements which the witnesses might writ out themselves and which they might hand over to the Superintendent of Police, Magistrate or other Gazetted Police, Officer, there is no such certainty. In fact, for all that we know, the statements, that were actually handed over to the Deputy Superintendent of Police holding the preliminary enquiries, may have been recorded by the witnesses when they were being actually prompted by some other persons or may even be record of statements which others asked them to record as their statements while they were not in fact their statements at all. While such possibilities exist, it is impossible to hold that the statements that were admitted in evidence satisfied the requirements of the rule contained in paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations. While the statements did not even comply with the requirements of the exception, the only course open to the Superintendent of Police was to record the statement of these witnesses himself which he did not do. When his findings were received by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, he proceeded on the assumption that the statements of the witnesses, which were being taken into account, had been recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police without at all caring to see whether this was in fact so and the same negligence was repeated by the Inspector General of Police when he upheld the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Reliance on those statements was thus clearly contrary to the provisions of the rule contained in this paragraph itself, so that the findings recorded in the proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act on the basis of such evidence are clearly vitiated in law. In this view, it appears to us, unnecessary to go into the question whether, if the statements had really been recorded by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer in the course of a preliminary enquiry and had been admitted in evidence, there would still be an illegality or not. 6. In this connection, learned Junior Standing Counsel urged before us that the provisions of paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations are merely directory and not mandatory, so that non-compliance with its provisions would not vitiate the enquiry or the orders passed on the enquiry unless it was shown that the persons charged had been prejudiced by such non-compliance. 6. In this connection, learned Junior Standing Counsel urged before us that the provisions of paragraph 490 of the Police Regulations are merely directory and not mandatory, so that non-compliance with its provisions would not vitiate the enquiry or the orders passed on the enquiry unless it was shown that the persons charged had been prejudiced by such non-compliance. We are unable to accept this submission because proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act result in consequences which are very serious for the persons charged and it appears that it was in view of this seriousness that it was considered necessary to frame a statutory rule laying down the manner in which the oral evidence must be brought on record. The main provision uses the expression "must be recorded" indicating the mandatory nature of the provision. The fact that an exception is laid down in respect of statements recorded by a Magistrate or a Gazetted Police Officer in the course of preliminary enquiries again indicates that the first part requiring the evidence to be recorded by the Superintendent of Police himself in the presence of the party charged was intended to be mandatory because it would not be necessary to lay down exceptions in respect of a provision which is only directory. 7. Further, there is another clause in paragraph 490 which makes this position clear. That deals with a case where the Superintendent of Police considers that special circumstances exist which would justify departure from this rule. Examples of such special circumstances are where the officer charged has absconded or is in prison or that a witness whose statement has been recorded only by a non-gazetted officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector has died or disappeared. It lays down that, if such special circumstances exist, a departure from any of the rules contained in the earlier provisions of para 490 will be justified. In such circumstances the Superintendent of Police is required to record his reasons for departure from this rule and to show in his finding that the officer charged has not been prejudiced by this departure from the usual procedure. In such circumstances the Superintendent of Police is required to record his reasons for departure from this rule and to show in his finding that the officer charged has not been prejudiced by this departure from the usual procedure. This provision itself shows that the earlier provisions of this paragraph have been treated as mandatory and, where a departure is permitted from it, the duty is cast on the Superintendent of Police first to satisfy himself that special circumstances exist justifying the departure, secondly, to record a finding to that effect in his decision, and thirdly to record a further finding that the officer charged has not been prejudiced by this departure from the usual procedure. This stringent requirement for departure from the general rule laying down the procedure shows that the rule is mandatory and not merely directory and is to be departed from only under those very special circumstances laid down in the paragraph. In this case, the Superintendent of Police did not resort to this exceptional provision because the statements which were admitted in evidence had not been recorded even by a non-gazetted officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector and further because the Superintendent of Police himself, the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Inspector General of Police all committed the error of treating the statements as having been recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the course of preliminary enquiries. In fact they had not been recorded by him at all. This defect in the procedure therefore, itself vitiated the finding which was arrived at, so that on this ground alone the order made by the Learned Single Judge is justified. 8. As a result both the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.