Judgment Misra, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Patna, in a proceeding under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant, Nath Bank Ltd., obtained a decree against the respondents, Amitava Das Gupta and Benoy Kumar Sen Gupta, for a sum of Rs. 29,610/5/5 besides interest at the rate of 6 per cent., per annum until realisation. The decree was passed by the High Court of Calcutta in a suit which was numbered as O.T. Suit No. 122 of 1951. The Nath Bank Ltd. brought the suit against the respondents, originally, at Patna on the 3rd March, 1949, which was being tried by the Additional Subordinate Judge as Money Suit No. 17/10 of 1949/1951, on the basis of certain transactions between the parties. The plaintiff, Nath Bank Limited, however, went into liquidation as a result of a petition filed by two of the creditors of the Bank on the 27th of March, 1950. Winding up of the Bank was ordered by the Calcutta High Court under the provisions of Sec.162 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, read with Sections 38 and 39 of the Banking Companies Act 1949. Under Sec.39 of the Banking Companies Act, the Reserve Bank of India was appointed the Official Liquidator of the said Bank. The order was dated the 19th of July, 1950- 2. The respondents appeared in the suit and raised an objection to its maintainability on the ground of jurisdiction. Evidence was recorded in part. The Reserve Bank of India was thereafter substituted as the plaintiff in place of the Nath Bank Limited. The plaintiff made an application in the Calcutta High Court under Sec.11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950 (Act 20 of 1950) for transfer of the suit pending in Patna to the Calcutta High Court. The records were accordingly transmitted to the Calcutta High Court where the suit was re-numbered, as mentioned before, as Original Trial Suit No. 122 of 1951. The suit was tried there resulting in the decree against the respondents for the aforesaid amount. 3. The records were accordingly transmitted to the Calcutta High Court where the suit was re-numbered, as mentioned before, as Original Trial Suit No. 122 of 1951. The suit was tried there resulting in the decree against the respondents for the aforesaid amount. 3. The decree-holder applied for execution of the decree in the Calcutta High Court and prayed for attachment of a house in Patna known as "Ganga Villa" situate in Mohalla Naya Tola, and a precept was accordingly sent to the Court of the District Judge, Patna, by the Calcutta High Court. Sometime after that, it was followed by the transfer of the decree itself to the Court of the District Judge for execution under Sec. 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Later on, the execution case was placed before the Subordinate Judge, before whom a number of objections were raised. Two miscellaneous cases arose out of the objections under Order 21, Rule 58, and Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which the objectors urged that the property sought to be attached, viz., Ganga Villa, belonged to them. Miscellaneous Case No. 108 of 1958 was started on the objection filed by Smt. Tripti Basu and Miscellaneous Case No, 5 of 1959 on the objection by Rabindra Nath Basu, On the 19th May, 1959, both these applications were dismissed. On the 3rd June, 1959, respondents Amitava Das Gupta filed an application under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the decree sought to be executed was null and void and as such incapable of execution. Hence, the execution case was fit to be dismissed. That gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 55 of 1959. On the 6th April, 1960, one Devasis Gupta also filed a petition under Order 21, Rule 58, of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that he had an interest in the property "Ganga Villa" and that Amitava Das Gupta and Benoy Kumar Sen Gupta, against whom decree was passed, had no right, title or interest in the house known as "Ganga Villa" and, therefore, it should be released from attachment. That was disposed of on the 30th of August. 1960. That was disposed of on the 30th of August. 1960. Amitava Das Gupta filed a further objection in the execution case which gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 20 of 1960, in which he alleged that the plaintiff suppressed an important fact in the suit in so far as it did not disclose that the loan which was obtained by the respondents was secured by hypothecation of the goods belonging to M/s. Dossenta, a firm functioning in Calcutta, and the judgment-debtors were neither proprietors nor in partnership of the firm, but mere agents That firm belonged to another person, Sachi Prasad Sen Gupta. A plea of limitation was also brought in by way of amendment on the 6th of August, 1960. The objection of the judgment-debtors under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, succeeded and the learned Subordinate Judge has held that the decree passed by the Calcutta High Court was null and void and as such incapable of execution. He has also held that the decree was barred by limitation when the execution was taken out and as such the execution was to be dismissed even on this ground. The decree-holder has challenged the correctness of the decision of the Court below on both the grounds. 4. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in holding that the decree passed by the Calcutta High Court was incapable of execution as it was beyond the jurisdiction of that Court to entertain the suit. In order to understand the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant and that urged on behalf of the respondents, it is relevant to refer to the various Acts bearing on Banking Companies under which the suit was transferred from Patna to Calcutta and was disposed of by that Court. The proceedings for winding up of the companies including the Banking Companies were originally governed by the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, when a special enactment was necessitated in the shape of the Banking Companies Act in 1949 (Act No. 10 of 1949). The proceedings for winding up of the companies including the Banking Companies were originally governed by the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, when a special enactment was necessitated in the shape of the Banking Companies Act in 1949 (Act No. 10 of 1949). That Act, however, while it made provisions for several matters relating to the Banking Companies, did not make any specific provision in regard to liquidation proceedings in the matter of claims by or against Banking Companies which continued to be governed by the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (Act VII of 1913), ft was followed in 1950 by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, which incorporated the provisions of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, which was promulgated on the 19th of September, 1949. It amended further the Banking Companies Act of 1949. Under Sec.10 of the new Act, it was provided that after Part III of Act 10 of 1949, Part IIIA would be inserted, which would be read as Sections 45A to 45H, This Act received the assent of the President on the 18th of March, 1950. Sec. 45B of the Act reads thus: "45B. Power of Court to decide all claims by or against banking companies.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), or in any other taw for the time being in force, the Court shall have full power to decide all claims made by or against any banking company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India) and all questions of priorities and all other questions whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of the banking company coining within the cognizance of the Court. (2) There shall be a right of appeal from every order or decision made under this section which so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with respect to any matter in controversy, and the Court may make rules prescribing the manner in which and the conditions subject to which any such appeal may be filed and heard. (3) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such order or decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the banking company and, on the other hand, all persons who are parties thereto and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them". Sec.11 of the Act which is also relevant stands as follows: "11. Transfer of pending proceedings in winding up to the Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act.--Where any proceeding for the winding up of a banking company or any other proceeding, whether civil or criminal, which has arisen out of or in the course of such winding up, is pending in any court immediately before the commencement of this Act, it shall stand transferred on such commencement to the Court which would have had jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding if this Act had been in force on the date on which the proceeding commenced, and the Court to which the proceeding stands so transferred shall dispose of the proceeding as if this Act and the amendments made thereby were applicable thereto." The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to order the transfer of the suit pending in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna, to that Court, because the Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna, is not subordinate to the Calcutta High Court and as such the Calcutta High Court could not take into its jurisdiction a suit which was pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Patna. He has held further that Sec.11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, also would not be available to the decree-holder in support of the step taken by the Calcutta High Court. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha has contended that Sec. 45A of the new Act defines "the Court" as the High Court exercising jurisdiction where the registered office of the Company which is being wound up is situated. Admittedly, the registered office of the Nath Bank Limited was situate in Calcutta and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court would be the Court where winding up proceeding could be started. Admittedly, the registered office of the Nath Bank Limited was situate in Calcutta and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court would be the Court where winding up proceeding could be started. Sec. 45B would cover this case completely inasmuch as it provides that the Court shall have full power to decide ail claims made by or against any banking company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India) and all questions of priorities and all other questions whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of the banking company. Thus, the High Court of Calcutta where the winding up proceeding was going on was competent to decide all claims of the Company in liquidation. The claim of the Nath Bank Limited against the respondents, therefore, would be fully within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court Referring to Sec.11, he has urged that it provided for automatic transfer of all such proceedings to the High Court where the winding up proceeding of the banking company was going on. Accordingly, the Court below was wrong in holding that Sec.11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, would not govern the position. I may state that Mr. A.K. Bose appearing for the respondents has not supported the view of the Court below so far as the application of Section 11 of the Act is concerned. The Court below is of the opinion that Sec.11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act is not applicable because the application for transfer of the suit was filed at a time when the Reserve Bank of India was substituted, as the plaintiff in place of the Nath Bank Limited, the cause title of the suit before the Subordinate judge having stood unaltered. If it had been amended as "the Nath Bank Limited in Liquidation through the Reserve Bank of India as Official Liquidator", the position would have been different and the suit could possibly be treated as transferred automatically by virtue of Section 11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950. The ground upon which the view of the learned Subordinate Judge is based is a technical one. The ground upon which the view of the learned Subordinate Judge is based is a technical one. It is clear, however, that if Sec.11 would be applicable, it would be immaterial in whose name as plaintiff the suit stood, inasmuch as Sec.11 provided for automatic transfer of all suits and proceedings in which the banking company in liquidation was interested to the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act which would be the Calcutta High Court in this case. Moreover, such a defect in nomenclature would be a mere irregularity and would not affect the substance of the proceeding, vide Kent V/s. La Communate and Co., 1930 AC 220. Mr. Gupta, however, has proceeded upon a different ground which is that in terms of Sec. 45B the High Court in seisin of the liquidation proceedings can decide all claims by or against the banking company concerned, which might arise in the course of the winding up of the company. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff Bank in the Court of the Subordinate Judge long before the winding up proceedings commenced. According to the specific wording of Sec. 45B, therefore, a suit like the present one would be governed by Sec.171 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which covers such a situation. It may be stated that the application of Sec.171 is misconceived as it was a suit by the Nath Bank and not against it, so that S, 171, which provides for stay of all suits or proceedings against the company, is wholly irrelevant. He has. however, endeavoured to show that Sec.11 does not relate to a suit which is pending in any civil court and which should be conducted by the liquidator in accordance with the provisions of Sec.179 of the Indian Companies Act which empowers the liquidator to prosecute: or defend any suit etc., with the leave of the Court. What shall stand transferred automatically to the Calcutta High Court, as in this case, would be any winding up proceeding or the banking company pending in any other Court, as was provided for under Sec.3 of the Indian Companies Act, when the District Judges jurisdiction also was not completely ousted, or any other proceeding which has arisen out of the winding up proceeding and connected with such winding up. Sec.11, therefore, cannot be invoked to justify the order of transfer passed by the Calcutta High Court in the present case of the suit pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge for trial on the original side of that Court. There is apparently some substance in the contention, because the suit which was filed much before the commencement of the winding up proceeding cannot be regarded as a suit arising out of of in the course of the winding up proceedings, though it may well be that the subject matter of the suit is one that may be relevant to the ascertainment of the amount of assets of the hanking company. The application of Sec.11, therefore, in terms, on a narrow construction, may be ruled out. The Court below has referred to the decisions in Associated Banking Corporation of India Ltd. V/s. Nazralli Kassambhai and Co., AIR 1952 Bom 223 and Jadunath Roy V/s. Bank of Calcutta Ltd., AIR 1952 Cal 506 (SB). The view of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court as laid down in that decision is that where a suit is instituted by the Official Liquidator, as happened in the facts of that case, elsewhere, it should be triable in the High Court itself. In that case the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that the suit was not one arising out of the winding up proceedings nor was it relating to the winding up proceedings and as such it was not competent for the Bombay High Court on the original side to try that suit as the subject matter was below Rs. 25,000/-. On appeal, however, the learned Judges took the view that a suit by the Official Liquidator would have to be filed in terms of Section 45B in the High Court itself where the winding up proceeding was afoot, inasmuch as it was a matter "relating to the winding up" even if not "arising out of the winding up". Mr. Rose has contended that that case was, however, one where the suit was Filed by the Official Liquidator himself and the cause of action was sought to be enforced by him after the commencement of the winding up proceedings. Mr. Rose has contended that that case was, however, one where the suit was Filed by the Official Liquidator himself and the cause of action was sought to be enforced by him after the commencement of the winding up proceedings. Unlike that, in the present case the suit had already commenced and neither Sec. 45B nor Sec.11 would be applicable to such a case; and even the liberal interpretation given to the words "relating to winding up" by their Lordships would not be of any avail in sustaining the order of the Calcutta High Court. In the Calcutta case also, the Special Bench was dealing with a situation in which the petitioners filed a suit for partition for certain immoveable properties against the Bank of Calcutta Ltd. A preliminary decree was passed and proceedings for effecting partition by metes and bounds by the appointment of a commissioner were going on. Thereafter a compulsory winding up order against the Bank was made. The Liquidator of the Bank was added as a party. The petitioners thereafter made an application to the Court to pass an order directing the commissioner to file the final report in respect of the partition of the property. It was held by the Calcutta High Court that the petitioners who were plaintiffs in the Court of the Subordinate Judge V, Alipore, could not continue the suit in that Court; and the learned Subordinate Judge who held that he could not go on with the suit in view of the liquidation proceedings was right. In that ease also, their Lordships had to interpret the words "in the course of or relating to winding up" The conclusion was that Sec. 45A created an exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court and Sec. 45B gave power to the Court to deal with the matters which would arise out of the winding up or which may in any way be related thereto Accordingly, they said: "In the course of means during the winding up. As soon as an order for winding up was made and the liquidator appointed, it became necessary to make the Liquidator a party to the proceeding. Why was it necessary? Because without him the suit could not further proceed. It was also necessary to obtain leave of the Court. Why was it necessary? Because under Sec.171 of the Indian Companies Act, the suit could not proceed without the leave. Why was it necessary? Because without him the suit could not further proceed. It was also necessary to obtain leave of the Court. Why was it necessary? Because under Sec.171 of the Indian Companies Act, the suit could not proceed without the leave. These steps had to be taken because there was the winding up of the company. If there had been no winding up, these steps need not have been taken. So it is clear that all proceedings in the suit subsequent to the winding up arise in the course of winding up. The test seems to be that if at any stage of a proceeding the liquidator becomes a party to it, it arises in the course of the winding up." Mr. Boses endeavour to distinguish this case cannot succeed. In this case also the suit for partition was instituted before the passing of the Banking Companies Act and a preliminary decree by consent was passed on the 4th of June, 1948; a compulsory order for winding up of the Bank was made, by the Calcutta High Court and on the 1st April, 1949, a Liquidator was appointed. Leave was obtained under Sec.171 of the Companies Act to continue the suit. On the 27th November, 1950, an objection was filed by the Bank in liquidation to the effect that the Judge had no longer any jurisdiction over the title suit and that it stood transferred to the High Court, which objection was upheld by the learned Subordinate Judge. In the present case also, no doubt, the suit was instituted prior to the passing of the Banking Companies Act as also that of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, and a winding up order was also passed appointing a Liquidator on the 19th July, 1950. It was after the appointment of the Official Liquidator that the High Court was moved and it ordered the transfer of the suit from the file of the Subordinate Judge, Patna, to its own jurisdiction on the original side. It was after the appointment of the Official Liquidator that the High Court was moved and it ordered the transfer of the suit from the file of the Subordinate Judge, Patna, to its own jurisdiction on the original side. The Calcutta High Court held on those facts that whatever steps could have been taken in the suit prior to the order of winding up would be immaterial for determining the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with these matters, inasmuch as whatever remained to be done in a suit to which the banking company is a party must stand automatically transferred to the jurisdiction of the High Court, because the subject matter of the suit is one which, if not arising out of the winding up proceeding, at any rate, relates to the winding up proceeding in which the banking company is interested. The view of the learned Subordinate Judge in the present case, therefore, that Sec.11 of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1950, cannot be invoked is incorrect in so far as the above Calcutta decision is concerned. It is true, no doubt, that the cause title of the suit was amended by bringing on the record of the suit the Liquidator as a party. That, however, is hardly a ground of distinction, because in that case the matter went to such an extreme that leave was granted under Sec.171 of the Indian Companies Act to the Liquidator to continue the suit. Even then the Calcutta High Court decided that Sec.171 of the Companies Act could not be a bar to the operation of Sec.11 of the Act of 1950. It must be ruled, therefore, that the order of the Calcutta High Court requesting the Subordinate Judge, Patna, to transmit the records of the case to that Court is in the nature of a formal information and the Subordinate Judge was right in transmitting the records to that Court. This decision of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court followed another decision of that Court in Bharat Central Bank Ltd V/s. Ratindra Nath, 54 Cal WN 975. This decision of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court followed another decision of that Court in Bharat Central Bank Ltd V/s. Ratindra Nath, 54 Cal WN 975. I see no reason not to follow the above decision of the Calcutta High Court inasmuch as the object of the Legislature in incorporating Sections 45A and 45B as Chapter IIIA of the Act of 1949 and Sec.11 of the Act of 1950 clearly was to facilitate disposal of all claims by or against the banking companies in liquidation in the self-same forum where winding up proceedings would be going on at the time. 5. Apart from the above consideration, further amendment was made in the Banking Companies Act by Act 52 of 1953, replacing Part IIIA of 1949 Act by a recast Part IIIA, by which Sec. 45C was incorporated in the Act providing for the procedure to be followed by the High Court regarding the transfer of pending proceedings to that Court from any other Court relating to the affairs of the banking companies in liquidation. This became law on the 30th December, 1953. Section 45C provides as follows: "45C. Transfer of pending proceedings.-- (1) Where a winding up order is made or has been made in respect of a banking company, no suit or other legal proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in respect of which the High Court has jurisdiction under this Act and which is pending in any other court immediately before the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, or the date of the order for the winding up of the banking company, whichever is later, shall be proceeded with except in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) The official liquidator shall, within three months from the date of the winding up order of the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953, whichever is later, or such further time as the High Court may allow submit to the High Court a report containing a list of all such pending proceedings together with particulars thereof, (3) On receipt of a report under Sub-section (2), the High Court may, if it so thinks fit, give the parties concerned an opportunity to show cause why the proceedings should not be transferred to itself and after making an enquiry in such manner as may be provided by rules made under Sec. 45U, it shall make such order as it deems fit transferring to itself all or such of the pending proceedings as may be specified in the order and such proceedings shall thereafter he disposed of by the High Court. (4) If any proceeding pending in a Court is not so transferred to the High Court under subsection (3), such proceeding shall be continued in the Court in which the proceeding was pending. (5) Nothing in this section shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court." A reference to the wording of Sec. 45C puts it beyond doubt that where a winding up order has been made no proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in respect of which the High Court has jurisdiction and which is pending in any other Court, shall be; proceeded with except in the manner thereinafter provided. Whatever view might be taken of Sec.11 or 45B of the amending Act of 1950, Sec. 45C of Act 52 of 1953 is clear and categorical and as such a suit cannot be proceeded with in any other Court. It is only when in terms of Sub-section (4), if any proceeding pending in a Court is not so transferred to the High Court under Sub-section (3), that such a proceeding shall be continued in the Court in which it was pending. It is true no doubt, that Sub-sections (2) and (3) lay down the manner in which these proceedings shall be transferred to the High Court; but the jurisdiction of the High Court to transfer to itself all such suits or proceedings pending in any other Court has been widened and put beyond doubt. It is true no doubt, that Sub-sections (2) and (3) lay down the manner in which these proceedings shall be transferred to the High Court; but the jurisdiction of the High Court to transfer to itself all such suits or proceedings pending in any other Court has been widened and put beyond doubt. Under Sub-section (4) of this section if such suits or proceedings are not transferred to the file of the High Court, they shall be continued in the Court in which the proceedings were pending but there is power in the High Court to call to its file all suits or proceedings, civil or criminal, of which jurisdiction has been conferred on the High Court where the winding up order has already been made or is simultaneously made. Obviously, the object of the Legislature in putting on the statute book this further amendment of the Banking Companies Act is to set at rest all doubts in regard to the construction to be put upon Sections 45A, 45B and 11 of the Act of 1950, among others. 6. Mr. Bose for the respondents has, however, contended that Sec. 45C of Act 52 of 1953 also can be of no avail to the appellant Bank inasmuch as there is nothing on regard to show that the procedure provided for in Clauses (2) and (3) of this section was followed; nor is there anything to show that any notice was given to the parties, particular the respondents, giving them an opportunity to show cause why the proceedings should not be transferred. No enquiry was held by the Calcutta High Court in such manner as is provided for by the rules made under Sec. 45U. Learned counsel accordingly contended that in view of the absence of any evidence on the record to show that any notice was given to the respondents and that the enquiry contemplated under Clause (3) was conducted, there could be no jurisdiction in the High Court to proceed under Sec. 45C. In my opinion, however, the argument of the learned counsel does not take into account the crucial words in Clause (3) which are "if it so thinks fit" which should govern both the giving of opportunity to the parties to show cause as also the holding of an enquiry. In my opinion, however, the argument of the learned counsel does not take into account the crucial words in Clause (3) which are "if it so thinks fit" which should govern both the giving of opportunity to the parties to show cause as also the holding of an enquiry. The intention of the Legislature obviously seems to be that there may be cases in which the High Court may have to decide the usefulness of ordering the transfer of particular proceedings to its own file or allowing the proceedings to continue in the Court where they are going on, instead of an automatic transfer which was contemplated under Sec.11 of the Act of 1950. In cases, however, where the position is beyond doubt, the High Court even without the necessity of an enquiry might order the transfer of the proceeding in which the banking company in liquidation is interested, to its own file. A case where the High Court might not be inclined to order the transfer of any proceeding to its own file would be like the one referred to in the judgment of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court (cited supra) where the matter has reached the stage of a final decree and the High Court might find it more convenient to allow the suit or proceeding to go on in the forum where it is pending. In any case, the words "if it so thinks fit" are sufficiently wide to justify the order of transfer by the High Court in a particular case without the formality of[ issue of notice to the parties concerned and the making of an enquiry as to the desirability of the transfer. Even in this view of the matter, no attack can be made upon the decree which was passed on the 8th January, 1954, by the Calcutta High Court. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also urged that in any view of the matter, after the transfer of the suit to the Calcutta High Court it should have issued notice to the respondents of such transfer so that proper objections to the plaintiffs claim could be made. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also urged that in any view of the matter, after the transfer of the suit to the Calcutta High Court it should have issued notice to the respondents of such transfer so that proper objections to the plaintiffs claim could be made. Since no notice was issued to the respondents, they were precluded from bringing to the notice of the Court and leading evidence to prove that the respondents were acting merely as agents of the firm M/s. Dossenta and they signed the bank papers in regard to the loan advanced by it as agents. Amitava Das Gupta took good care to sign all the documents in favour of the bank relating to the transaction of the subject matter of the suit by mentioning that he was the agent of the bank for which the words used were "per pro Dossents". Reliance has been placed in support of this contention on a number of decisions to the effect that where a suit or a proceeding has been decreed without issuing notice to the party against whom the order has been passed, the order or decree would be beyond jurisdiction as having violated the principle of natural justice of audi alterem partem or hearing the other side. Reference has been made to Craies on Statute Law (5th edition page 112) in which it is stated that where no notice is provided for, failure to serve it will amount to deprivation of jurisdiction. Reference has also been made to Freeman on Judgment (5th edition Vol. I, pages 793 and 828); Crane and Sons V/s. Wallis, (1915) 2 Ir R 411; Rajkishore Prasad V/s. Subak Narain Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 89 and Hira Lal Patni V/s. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 . In my opinion, however, these cases need not be gone into in detail because the burden lay upon the respondents to establish that notice of the Original Trial Suit No. 122 of 1950 was not issued by the Calcutta High Court to the respondents, Mr. Guptra assisting Mr. In my opinion, however, these cases need not be gone into in detail because the burden lay upon the respondents to establish that notice of the Original Trial Suit No. 122 of 1950 was not issued by the Calcutta High Court to the respondents, Mr. Guptra assisting Mr. Lal Narain Sinha raised the question that notice was issued by the Calcutta High Court to the respondents even after the transfer of the suit The decree having been passed duly, onus lay upon the respondents to challenge the validity of the decree by bringing on record circumstances which in this case would be, mainly, the order sheet of the above suit in the Calcutta High Court to show that notice was not served on them. The order sheet of the suit has not been brought on record and in the absence of that document the argument raised by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents cannot be sustained. If the order sheet had been brought on the record, and if it would show that no notice was issued to the respondents by the Calcutta High Court, which prevented them from appearing in the suit, the appellant might derive some support for this argument. There would yet be a further point of consideration as to whether it was necessary to issue a fresh notice to the respondents who had already appeared in the suit at Patna or whether in view of the order passed in their presence by the Subordinate Judge, Patna, transmitting the records to the Calcutta High Court after fixing a date it would be sufficient to apprise the respondents of the fact so that they should have arranged for their appearance in the Calcutta High Court through a lawyer without the necessity of a fresh notice to them. This latter consideration, however, is out of place in the absence of anything on record to show that the Calcutta High Court did not inform the respondents of the date fixed for hearing in the Suit. 8. Apart from the above, the learned Subordinate Judge has also held that execution of the decree is barred by limitation inasmuch as execution was taken out in the Calcutta High Court sometime in 1958 and intimation was sent by the Calcutta High Court to the District Judge, Patna, for attaching the house "Ganga Villa", Naya Tola, Patna, on the 10th of February, 1958. Thus, execution was started beyond three years of the date of passing of the decree which was 8th of January, 1954. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that if Article 182 of the Limitation Act (Act 9 of 1908) would apply to this case which provides for a period of three years for execution of a decree, the execution proceedings would be barred by limitation, and the learned Subordinate Judge has in that case rightly accepted the contention of the respondents. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha for the appellant has, however, contended that the ease is governed not by Article 182 but by Article 183 of the Limitation Act, which provides for a period of 12 years for the bar of limitation to apply in a decree passed on the original side of the High Court. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether the decree passed in Original Trial Suit No. 122 of 1951 by the Calcutta High Court which entered its jurisdiction as a result of the operation of the Banking Companies Act either of 1950 or 1953, as stated above, can be regarded as a decree passed on the original side of the Calcutta High Court or in its special jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that, at the highest, the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under the Banking Companies Act can be regarded as a special jurisdiction and not by way of original civil jurisdiction provided for in Clause 44 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. That Clause stands as follows: "44. And we do further ordain and declare, that all the provisions of these our Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council and also of the Governor-General in Council under Section 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and also of the Governor-General in cases of emergency under Section 72 of that Act, and may be in all respects amended and altered thereby." The original jurisdiction of the High Court has been defined in Clauses 11 and 12 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that since jurisdiction under the Companies Act is not covered by Clause 12, it may be regarded as a special jurisdiction but not ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that since jurisdiction under the Companies Act is not covered by Clause 12, it may be regarded as a special jurisdiction but not ordinary original civil jurisdiction. But the answer to that is that the ordinary original jurisdiction is distinct, from the appellate jurisdiction as also from the extraordinary original jurisdiction. Extraordinary original civil jurisdiction is that part of the jurisdiction of the High Court which is conferred on it for trying or hearing any matter which in the normal circumstances would be triable by a Court subordinate to it under Clause 13. Appellate jurisdiction under Clause 16 of the Letters Patent refers to the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear appeals from the decisions of the Courts subordinate to it and so also Clause 15 refers to appellate jurisdiction. The expression "special jurisdiction" is unknown to the Letters Patent. Any matter, therefore, which is to be disposed of by the High Court must come under either original jurisdiction; extraordinary jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under the Banking; Companies Act to dispose of any suit or proceeding has been rightly placed under the original jurisdiction of the High Court and the suit has been labelled as O. T. Suit (original trial suit), which in fact it is. It is true, no doubt, that when Letters Patent were issued to the various High Courts, original jurisdiction was defined as it was then contemplated. But since that jurisdiction could be amplified by subsequent legislation, the trial which is to be held in the first instance in the High Court itself must also be included within the ambit of its original jurisdiction. In my opinion, therefore, the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under the Indian Companies Act is original jurisdiction and the decree passed by the Calcutta High Court must accordingly have the consequences for limitation which are attached to a decree passed on the original side. As a matter of fact, this was the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court also in regard to the construction of Clause 35 of the Letters Patent in the case of Banaras Bank Ltd. V/s. Jyoti Bhushan AIR 1951 All 362 wherein also a similar question arose. That too was a case of a banking company. As a matter of fact, this was the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court also in regard to the construction of Clause 35 of the Letters Patent in the case of Banaras Bank Ltd. V/s. Jyoti Bhushan AIR 1951 All 362 wherein also a similar question arose. That too was a case of a banking company. I agree with respect entirely with the view of the Allahabad High Court in the above case. Reference may be made also to the following decisions: Jyoti Bhushan Gupta V/s. Banaras Bank Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 403 ; P.T. Munia Servai V/s. Hanuman Bank Ltd., AIR 1958 Mad 418 and Navivahoo V/s. Turner, 16 Ind App 156 (PC). It may be mentioned, however, that the point is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1962 SC 403 in which the matter has been settled and it has been laid down that the jurisdiction which was not conferred on the High Court by Clause 16 of the Charter Act, 1861, and Clause 35 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court, initially, could be conferred by legislation within the competence of the Governor-General in Council. The jurisdiction to deal with the claims of Companies having been ordered to be wound up was conferred by the Indian Companies Act upon the High Court and to that extent the Letters Patent were modified. It was held by the Supreme Court affirming the judgment of the Allahabad High Court that an order passed by the High Court for payment upon a contributory is an order passed in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court by Sec.3 read with Sec.187. Hence an application for execution of the order made under Sec.187 read with Sec.199 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, by the High Court would be governed by Article 183, and not Article 182, of the Limitation Act. In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court the contention raised on behalf of the respondents by the learned counsel on the ground of limitation must be overruled. The decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1958 Mad 418 which was referred to is also an authority in support of tins conclusion. 9. It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge under appeal is wrong, both on the question of jurisdiction and that of limitation. The decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1958 Mad 418 which was referred to is also an authority in support of tins conclusion. 9. It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge under appeal is wrong, both on the question of jurisdiction and that of limitation. The appeals are allowed, the decision of the Court below is set aside and the execution case shall now proceed in due course A.B.N.Sinha, J. 10 I agree. 11. In a post-script the Judges remarked that an application for action under Section 476A, Code of Criming Procedure against Amarnath Nandi should be dismissed.