Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. The appellant brought a suit for declaration that the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Tata Workers Union held on the 29th April, 1961, and the vote of no confidence passed on the plaintiff, who was then Deputy President of that Union, were void, illegal, ultra vires and not binding upon the plaintiff. He asked for an injunction restraining the defendants, namely, the Union, the other office bearers and the members of the Executive Committee, from interfering with the discharge of his duties as Deputy President of the Union. Alternatively, he also asked for damages from the defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial court, but on appeal by the defendants, it was reversed, Hence, the plaintiff has come in second appeal to this Court. 2. The plaintiffs grievance was that a proper notice according to the constitution of the Union for holding the Executive Committee meeting on the 29th April, 1981, had not been given to all the members. The constitution provides a notice of such meeting to be given clear 48 hours before the tune scheduled for the meeting. Learned counsel contended that the service of such, notice on each and every member of the Executive Committee must be before 48 hours before the time of holding the meeting. This contention is wholly unacceptable, because the relevant provision in the constitution is as follows:- - "Article IX, Clause (a)--The General Secretary shall call the ordinary Executive Committee meeting by giving clear 48 hours notice to its members and stating therein the business to be transacted at such meeting. Any member willing to move any resolution, amendment or interpolation on any of the items of the agenda shall submit a notice of the same clear 24 hours before the time fixed for the meeting." It cannot be said that each member of the Executive Committee will have to receive a notice of the Executive Committee meeting 48 hours before. What I understand this rule to mean is that the notice for holding an ordinary meeting of the Executive Committee must be issued 48 hours before the time scheduled for holding the meeting. In this case, a notice was issued ten days before, that is, on the 19th of April, 1961 (Ex. 5).
What I understand this rule to mean is that the notice for holding an ordinary meeting of the Executive Committee must be issued 48 hours before the time scheduled for holding the meeting. In this case, a notice was issued ten days before, that is, on the 19th of April, 1961 (Ex. 5). 3 The next point urged by learned counsel was that no confidence motion was no part of the agenda, and as such, it could not have been moved in the Executive Committee meeting. The rule quoted above shows that any member of the Executive Committee willing to move any resolution on any item of the agenda circulated shall submit a notice of such resolution clear 24 hours before the time liked for the meeting. In the present case, one Sahdeo Khan had given nut ice of the no confidence motion against the plaintiff on the 27th of April, 1961. Learned counsels further argument was that this should have been notified to each and every member of the Executive Committee also by the General Secretary. There is no provision in the rules or the constitution of the Workers Union that such further notice of the amendment would be given to each and every member. The very fact that it was open to a member to give notice of an amendment or a resolution on any item of the agenda only 24 hours before the time of the meeting clearly indicates that it was not intended to be circulated to all the members. We were told that the Executive Committee itself consists of 180 members. It is inconceivable that within 24 hours preceding the meeting any notice could be circulated to such a large body. 4. The third contention on behalf of the appellant is that no confidence resolution was not placed on the agenda, which was considered in the meeting of the Executive Committee on the 29th April. That again is unfounded, because if the rules permit a resolution on any item of the agenda and if that had been received in time by the General Secretary and if that was considered in the meeting, as it appears from the proceedings of that days meeting, there was no illegality in the consideration of such a resolution. 5.
That again is unfounded, because if the rules permit a resolution on any item of the agenda and if that had been received in time by the General Secretary and if that was considered in the meeting, as it appears from the proceedings of that days meeting, there was no illegality in the consideration of such a resolution. 5. The other contention was that according to the rules, such resolution passed by the Executive Committee will have to be ratified by the general meeting, and the defendants case was that it was ratified in such a meeting held on the 17th May, 1961. Learned counsel wanted to controvert that. But the finding has been against him by the lowest appellate court, and we were not shown anything how that finding can be called perverse so as to be interfered with by us at this stage. 6. It is true that no confidence motion is not an ordinary feature of a meeting, much less of an Executive Committee meeting. Usually, better safeguards arc provided in the constitution of an organisation for dealing with such resolution or such motion of no confidence. But unfortunately, in the constitution made for the Tata Workers Union, that aspect does not appear to have been taken into consideration with care and caution. Learned counsel was right to some extent when he contended that ordinarily a no confidence motion cannot be taken to be one by way of an amendment, as contemplated in Article IX, Clause (e). But unfortunately the wording of that article is very wide and general, and it refers to "any resolution". The third item in the agenda for the Executive Committee Meeting of the 29th April, 1961, was "to consider and take decision on the letter, dated 4th February, 1961, addressed to the President by the Deputy President (that is, the plaintiff). Arising from that item, the resolution of no confidence motion was notified by one member of the Executive Committee, and the evidence discloses that the General Secretary pasted that no confidence motion on the notice board of the Union. From the minutes of that day we find that there was an elaborate discussion on this no confidence motion as well as on the letter written by the plaintiff on the 4th February, 1961, which was item No. 3 on the agenda.
From the minutes of that day we find that there was an elaborate discussion on this no confidence motion as well as on the letter written by the plaintiff on the 4th February, 1961, which was item No. 3 on the agenda. There was counting of votes on the no confidence motion, and when challenged by the plaintiff, the votes were recounted by him along with the President and the General Secretary. Only two persons voted against the no confidence motion. In such circumstances, it appears that the plaintiff himself participated in the discussions on item No. 3 of the agenda and also in the voting on the no confidence motion. In absence of any special provisions for dealing with the no confidence motion in the constitution, one has to be guided only by Article IX, Clause (e), as if it was like any other resolution. From that point and on the finding of the lower appellate court on the relevant facts, there does not appear to be any illegality either in the agenda or in the notice of the meeting or in the no confidence motion or in its passing in that meeting, and lastly, in its ratification by the general meeting held on the 17th May, 1961. 7. I, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal, and accordingly it is dismissed, but without costs in the circumstances of the case. A.B.N.Sinha, J. 8 I agree.