JUDGMENT T.K. Joseph, J. These appeals arise from orders passed by the Additional District Judge of Trichur in the course of the winding up proceedings of the Sitaram Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited. A.S.No. 28 of 1964 may be considered first. The appellant, a creditor, claimed before the official liquidators that the company was indebted to him in the sum of Rs. 3,32,867. Evidence was adduced before the liquidators who admitted the claim in respect of Rs. 2,02,193-3-6 and rejected the rest. The appellant moved, the court by M.P. No. 878 of 1956 claiming the disallowed part of the debt. The matter was enquired into and on 20th July 1959 the court passed an order allowing a further sum of Rs. 21,833-2-3. On 10th October 1960 the first respondent filed M.P. No. 707 of 1960 challenging the order passed and asking for reopening the matter and examining afresh the nature and extent of the claim. The appellant raised certain preliminary objections against the maintainability of the application which were overruled by the court by order dated 21st August 1963 against which this appeal is filed. The order directed that M.P. No. 707 of 1960 be posted for further enquiry. The first respondent, the petitioner in M.P. No. 707 of 1960, has raised a preliminary objection that the order passed is not appealable. It is urged that the court has only directed enquiry into the petition and that it is open for the appellant to prefer an appeal if aggrieved by the final order. The dispute between the parties has, no doubt, not been finally decided by the court below. Section 483 which corresponds to section 202 of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 provides for appeals from any order made or decision given, in the matter of winding up of a company by the court. There is one view that even though the overruling of preliminary objections may not amount to "orders" they are decisions within the meaning of section 483. However, as the decision appealed from involves a question of jurisdiction of the winding up court, and thus is a fit matter for revision, we do not consider it proper to dismiss the appeal on this ground. After hearing both sides we are satisfied that the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration of the points raised by the appellant as preliminary objections in the court below. After hearing both sides we are satisfied that the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration of the points raised by the appellant as preliminary objections in the court below. The question for decision mainly depends on construction of rule 157 of the Travancore-Cochin Rules under the Indian Companies Act. Rule 152 provides for the official liquidator fixing a date for proving the debts, and rule 153 provides for notice by the official liquidator to the creditors to prove their debts. The official liquidator is to examine the proofs under rule 154 and to admit or reject the claims in whole or in part. A creditor whose claim is disallowed is given an opportunity under rule 155 to move the court for reversing or varying the decision of the liquidator. The liquidator also is given an opportunity under rule 156 to move the court for expunging the debt or reducing its amount. Rule 157 (1) provides that the judge may expunge or reduce the debt on the application of a creditor or contributory if the liquidator declines to interfere in the matter. It is rule 157 which is material for the decision of this case. According to the appellant the stage for moving the court is over as the court has already adjudicated on the claim. What happened in this case is that after the liquidator submitted the list of creditors, several applications were moved for varying the order of the liquidator in regard to the admission of debts. The court passed a tentative order in 1956 accepting the list subject to objections. Thereafter the claim of the appellant was investigated by court and the order dated 20th July 1959 was passed. The appellant contends that another shareholder had unsuccessfully moved the court for varying the order and that in view of these two orders, the first respondent has no right to ask for modification of the order. In fact his contention is that the right of a contributory under rule 157 is to object to the amount as admitted by the official liquidator and not to a judicial order passed thereafter by the court on specific objections raised by the creditor. In fact his contention is that the right of a contributory under rule 157 is to object to the amount as admitted by the official liquidator and not to a judicial order passed thereafter by the court on specific objections raised by the creditor. We may make it clear that the appellant is not relying on the acceptance of the list of creditors by the court but on the fact that there was an adjudication of the question by court after hearing the creditors and the liquidator. We are not very much impressed by the reasons urged by the court below. The learned Judge assumes that proving of debts takes place only when the court passes an order in that behalf. This does not seem to be warranted by rule 157. The learned Judge refers to rule 162 which provides that a creditor who fails to prove his debt within the time specified in the notice under rule 153 may apply to the judge for relief and that the Judge may adjudicate upon such debts himself or direct the liquidator to do so, and concludes that the creditor in such circumstances will be in a more favourable position. This reasoning does not appear to be quite correct. The order passed under rule 162 will be after hearing the official liquidator who represents the creditors and contributories. There does not seem to be any warrant for the assumption that rule 157(1) applies also to a case adjudicated on by the Judge under rule 162. Proof of debt is to be before the liquidator and not before court. As the matter now stands, mere seems to be some force in the objection that what the first respondent seeks is a review of the order dated 20th July 1959. Any way this is a matter for further consideration. The appellant had another objection also, namely, that the first respondent was a share-holder who held fully paid up shares in the company and that he could not therefore be treated as a contributory. This does not appear to have even been noticed by the court. We feel that the matter has not received proper attention at the hands of the judge. We therefore set aside the order and remand the matter for fresh consideration of the preliminary objections raised by the appellant. This does not appear to have even been noticed by the court. We feel that the matter has not received proper attention at the hands of the judge. We therefore set aside the order and remand the matter for fresh consideration of the preliminary objections raised by the appellant. The observations made above shall not be taken as adjudication of the questions raised, and the court below is free to come to independent conclusions thereon. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. AS. No. 29 of 1964: So far as this case is concerned, there has not been any judicial order fixing the amount due to the appellant. There is thus nothing improper in having, directed an enquiry into the petition. We therefore decline to interfere. The appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.