ORDER S. Rajan, Member The Appellant is an oil mill which purchases oil-seeds from registered and unregistered dealers, extracts oil from the oil-seeds, sells the oil locally and also exports some oil outside the State. The Sales Tax Officer on 20-2-1959 passed an order imposing tax on the" purchases made by the Appellant u/s 4 (6) of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the old Act). The appellant filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner stating that Section 4 (6) of the old Act was ultra virus in view of the provisions of Article 289 of the Constitution and prayed that the order levying a tax on the purchases u/s 4 (6) of the old Act may be set aside. On 4-2-1963 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner issued a notice in Form XXVIII appended to the rules made under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the new Act) asking the Appellant to show cause why an enhancement may not be made in the tax to be levied on the purchases made by the Appellant. On 16-3-1963 the Appellant presented an application before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner requesting him to allow the withdrawal of the appeal as section 4 (6) of the old Act has been held to be intra virus by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not allow the withdrawal of the appeal presented before him and on 28-3-1963 passed an order enhancing the tax to be levied on the purchases made by the Appellant. The Sales Tax Officer in his calculations of the tax found out the price of the oil-seeds having a weight equal to the weight of the oil exported by the Appellant and having this as the basis he calculated the tax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on the other hand, found out that the price of that quantity of oil-seeds which would have yielded the amount of oil exported outside the State and on this basis the Appellate Assistant Commissioner calculated the tax. The Appellant has come up in second appeal to the Board of Revenue against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The counsel for the Appellant argued that when the Appellant submitted an application for withdrawing the appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wrong in passing an order enhancing the tax to be paid on the purchases made by the Appellant. The counsel for the Appellant argued that when the Appellant submitted an application for withdrawing the appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wrong in passing an order enhancing the tax to be paid on the purchases made by the Appellant. The counsel for the Appellant could not show any ruling to the effect that the appellate authority loses its jurisdiction as soon as an application for withdrawal of appeal is made by the Appellant. In fact there cannot be any such ruling. Once an appeal is filed the appellate authority can only do one of the three things mentioned in Section 38 (5) of the new Act and no other. The three lines of action that the appellate authority can take are as follows- (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both; or (b) set aside the assessment or the penalty or both, and direct the officer whose assessment order, has been appealed against to make a fresh assessment, after such further inquiry, as may be directed; or (c) pass such orders, as it may think fit. Items (a) and (b) mentioned above are quite clear. Even in Item (c) the words used are "pass such orders, as it may think fit". So Item (c) shows that the appellate authority using its discretion may pass any orders which it deems proper. So Item (e) also shows that the appellate authority has full control over the disposal of the case. Wherever the Legislature wanted to say something on the subject of withdrawal it has stated so. For instance according to Item (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the new Act a person may withdraw his application for reference to the High Court when the Tribunal refuses to make a reference. So it is clear that the Appellant has no right to withdraw his appeal and there is nothing illegal in the appellate authority deciding the appeal disregarding the application for withdrawal. This view is supported by the ruling given in Rex v. Special Commissioner (1). Thus the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did nothing wrong in passing his order in the appeal without allowing the appellant to withdraw it. This view is supported by the ruling given in Rex v. Special Commissioner (1). Thus the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did nothing wrong in passing his order in the appeal without allowing the appellant to withdraw it. The second point urged by the counsel for the Appellant is that when action u/s 11-A of the old Act or u/s 22-B of the old Act are barred by limitation it was not legal on the part of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to enhance the assessment thus destroying the valuable rights got by the Appellant by way of limitation. If any provision of law prescribes a certain period of limitation for a particular action, then it only means that after (I) (1936) 1 KB 487. the period of limitation no action as mentioned in that provision of law could be taken and the period of limitation mentioned in that provision of law has absolutely nothing to do with another action mentioned in a different provision of law, although it may so happen that the ultimate result of the two lines of action may be the same. The ultimate object in action u/s 11-A of the old Act or in Section 22-B of the old Act or any appellate proceedings u/s 38 of the new Act is the same namely, that the correct amount of tax should be levied but the limitation prescribed for any one course of action has nothing to do with respect to another course of action. Each course of action is governed by its own period of limitation if there be any. When an appeal is filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner he gets jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the appeal and it is his duty to dispose of the appeal according to law without bothering to find out whether the Sales Tax Department could or could not take any action to stop the leakage of tax. Once an appeal is filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner he had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of appeal till its disposal. So there is no question of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner patching up the Government's interest when action in other provisions of law were barred by limitation. Once an appeal is filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner he had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter of appeal till its disposal. So there is no question of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner patching up the Government's interest when action in other provisions of law were barred by limitation. Concerning the assessment for the period in question mentioned in the order of the assessing authority the appellate authority has full powers to pass orders as indicated in Sub-section (5) of Section 38 of the new Act. It was again urged by the counsel for the Appellant that when the ground of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that Section 4 (6) of the old Act was ultra virus the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to question the method of assessment adopted by the assessing officer. The grounds of appeal mentioned in the memorandum of appeal are only arguments showing the incorrectness of the impugned order and there is nothing to bar the appellate authority from coming to a conclusion based on arguments not mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. The sole duty of the appellate authority is to find out the legality or otherwise of the impugned order and it is not bound to stick to those arguments mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. The relief prayed for in the memorandum of appeal is "setting aside the levy of purchase tax". The Appellant only stated that the levy of purchase tax was ultra virus. The appellate authority while examining this point of view surely can also see whether the assessing officer has levied properly the tax on purchases. Thus there is nothing in the argument mentioned above of the counsel for the Appellant and it is rejected. Now there remains only one thing, that is, to find out whether the method of assessment followed by the Sales Tax Officer is correct or whether the method of assessment followed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is correct. For this purpose it is necessary to read Section 4 (6) of the old Act very carefully. Now there remains only one thing, that is, to find out whether the method of assessment followed by the Sales Tax Officer is correct or whether the method of assessment followed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is correct. For this purpose it is necessary to read Section 4 (6) of the old Act very carefully. Omitting clauses which are not required for the purpose of this case, Section 4 (6) of the old Act will be as follows- Where any goods are purchased by a registered dealer as being goods specified in such dealer's certificate of registration as intended for use by him as raw materials in the manufacture of any goods for sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State and such goods are utilised by him for any other purpose the price paid by him for such goods shall be included in his turn-over and be liable to tax in accordance with the provision of this Act. The important words in Section 4 (6) are "the price paid by him for such goods". Coming to the present case did the Appellant pay any price for the oil ? Certainly he did not pay any price for the oil. The Appellant only purchased oilseeds and not oil. So the words "such goods" occurring in the phrase "price paid by him for such goods" refers only to oil-seeds and not the oil. So we have to find out what price the Appellant paid for the oil-seeds. In determining the quantity of oil-seeds for which the price was paid by the Appellant, naturally we should take that quantity of oil-seeds which would produce on extraction the quantity of oil exported outside the State. There is no point in calculating the price of the oil-seeds having a weight equal to the weight of the oil exported, because that weight of oilseeds will not produce that amount of oil which is exported. It is just commonsense that no weight of oil-seeds will produce an equivalent weight of oil. Thus the method adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is quite rational and the method adopted by the Sales Tax Officer for assessing the tax on purchases is obviously wrong. For the reasons given above the appeal is rejected. Final Result : Dismissed