JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, by Sri Thakur Nar Singh Ji Maharaj, Birajman Mandir in Mohalla Matan Tola, Qasba Lakhna, Pargana Bharthan, of district Etawah, through Sri Gopi Nath, Manager, for a direction that the Additional District Judge of Allahabad has no jurisdiction to hear First Appeal No. 248 of 1953 (Sri Thakur Nar Singh Maharaj v. Chandan Singh). There is also the prayer that the appeal be withdrawn from the Court of the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, to be heard by the High Court itself. 2. The applicant had instituted a suit in forma pauperis against Chandan Singh, defendant, for possession of the temple after his ejectment therefrom and also for recovery of ornaments and other articles worth Rs. 100/-. The suit was valued at Rs. 5,435/- and was instituted on 12.7.1949. After permission was granted to sue in froma pauperis, the plaint was registered as suit No. 5 of 1950. Chandan Singh contested the suit and filed his written statement on 15.5.1950. The suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Etawah, on 29.11.1952 and against this decree the applicant preferred an appeal before the High Court which was registered as First Appeal No. 248 of 1953. 3. The U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1954 (to be referred hereinafter as the `Act of 1954') came into force on 30.11.1954 and as a result of the amendments made in the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, appeals in suits of a valuation upto Rs. 10,000/- lay before the District Judge. Prior to the commencement of the Act of 1954, the District Judge could entertain appeals in suits of valuation upto Rs. 5000/- only. Sometimes in 1962 the Chief Justice of this Court transferred many First Appeals including the present First Appeal to the District Judge of Allahabad with directions that he shall hear the appeals himself or transfer them to any of the Additional District Judge at Allahabad for disposal. The transfer of the appeal to the District Judge and its hearing by the Additional District Judge at Allahabad has been challenged; and for purposes of record a certified extract of the order has now been placed on the record. The transfer of the appeal to the District Judge and its hearing by the Additional District Judge at Allahabad has been challenged; and for purposes of record a certified extract of the order has now been placed on the record. The order runs as below :- "It is hereby ordered that the first appeals pending in the Court and specified in the list annexed hereto are transferred to the court of the District Judge, Allahabad, who may decide these cases himself or transfer them to any of the Additional District Judges at Allahabad for disposal." 4. In the application under Article 227, as originally moved, this order of the Chief Justice and the consequential jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge were challenged on two grounds; firstly, that the District Judge was not competent to hear the First Appeals filed in the High Court; and secondly, that under Section 24, Civil Procedure Code, the High Court and not the Chief Justice had the power to transfer cases. It was also pleaded in this connection that the Chief Justice passed the order of transfer in chambers on administrative side without hearing the applicant and consequently it was without jurisdiction. 5. The validity of a similar order of the Chief Justice was challenged before the Supreme Court after a Division Bench of this Court expressed the opinion that the order was not without jurisdiction and that appeals of the present nature could be transferred to the District Judge for hearing and such appeals could be heard by him. This Supreme Court case is Lakshmi Narain v. First Additional District Judge Allahabad, and others, and Miss A. Nihal Singh (Intervener) 1963 A.L.J. 515. In view of Section 3(1) of the Act of 1954, the Supreme Court held that the appeals already instituted were to be heard by the Court before whom such appeals had been filed. In other words, the order of the Chief Justice transferring the appeals already instituted before the High Court was held to be without jurisdiction. 6. The State legislature then passed another law, namely U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Amendment Act, 1963 (to be referred hereinafter as the `Amendment Act of 1963'). It received the assent of the Governor on March 5, 1963, and was published in the U.P. Gazette of March 8, 1963. 6. The State legislature then passed another law, namely U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Amendment Act, 1963 (to be referred hereinafter as the `Amendment Act of 1963'). It received the assent of the Governor on March 5, 1963, and was published in the U.P. Gazette of March 8, 1963. However, it was given a retrospective effect and as mentioned in Section 1(2) thereof shall be deemed to have come into force on November 30, 1954, the date when the Act of 1954 had come into force. The Amendment Act of 1963 is a brief one and the material provisions thereof can here be reproduced:- 7. Under Section 2 of the Amendment Act of 1963 sub-Section (1-A) was added to Section 3 of the Act of 1954 between sub-Sections (1) and (2) thereof. The new sub-section runs as below:- "(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Section (1), the High Court may transfer to any District Judge or Additional District Judge or Additional District Judge subordinate to it, any appeal from an original decree or order in a case the valuation whereof does not exceed ten thousand rupees." Section 3 of the Amendment Act of 1963 validates acts or things done before the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette. Section 3 is as below:- "3. Validation of certain proceedings. Any act or thing done before the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette, which would have been validly and legally done if the amendment made in the principal Act by this Act had been in force on all material dates, shall be deemed to have been validly and legally done." 8. After the passing of the Amendment Act of 1963, the applicant moved an application for the amendment of the application under Article 227 to enable him to challenge the validity of the above mentioned Act. This Act is challenged chiefly on the ground that the assent of the President was not obtained as required under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India on account of there being repugnancy between this Act and Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Act is challenged chiefly on the ground that the assent of the President was not obtained as required under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India on account of there being repugnancy between this Act and Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also contended that the Amendment Act of 1963 did not make the District Judge competent to hear First Appeals filed in the High Court before the enforcement of the Act of 1954 and that the transfer of such appeals to the District Judge or Additional District Judge could not enable him to hear and dispose of such appeals. Another point raised is that an administrative order of the High Court could not be validated retrospectively by the legislature. As the validity of an Act passed by the U.P. State legislature was in issue, notice was given to the Advocate General and the State has put in appearance through the Standing Counsel. 9. It is not in dispute that the State legislature had the jurisdiction to pass the Amendment Act of 1963; but its validity, one may say its enforceability, is challenged on the ground that the assent of the President had not been obtained as required under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. As provided in Clause (2) of Article 254 the law made by the State legislature with respect to one of the matter enumerated in the Concurrent List containing any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter shall prevail in that State only if it was reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent. Clause (2) comes into operation only if there exists a repugnancy and not if the State Legislature has merely made a law on a matter on which there already existed a law made by the Parliament or there was an existing law. Repugnancy as contemplated by Article 254 does not necessarily mean contradiction by implication. Where an Act passed by the Parliament or the existing law permits the co-existence of another enactment having inconsistent provisions, it cannot rightly be said that the new law is repugnant to the law made by the Parliament or the existing law as the case may be. Repugnancy as contemplated by Article 254 does not necessarily mean contradiction by implication. Where an Act passed by the Parliament or the existing law permits the co-existence of another enactment having inconsistent provisions, it cannot rightly be said that the new law is repugnant to the law made by the Parliament or the existing law as the case may be. Regugnancy implies that the new legislation, is one may say, hostile to the Central law or the existing one. When the Central law or an existing law permits the State legislature to make a different law on the subject, the law as made cannot be said to be repugnant. Special law prevails over the general law and, consequently, the special law shall be applicable to matters covered by that law, while the general law to other matters. 10. The question of repugnancy was considered by the Federal Court in three cases to which a reference can now be made. In United Provinces v. Atiga Begum A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 16 : 1941 A.L.J. 170, the scope of Sections 4 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was considered and it was held that in view of the saving clause contained in both these sections, the provisions of the new Act, the U.P. Regularization of Remissions Act, 1938, could not be said to be repugnant to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The material observations on the point are a below:- "Similarly, the objection that the Act bars a civil remedy and therefore conflicts with Section 9, Civil Procedure Code, has no force. In the first place, even if there were repugnancy, the Act would under Section 107(1) be void only to the extent of the repugnancy. Section 9, therefore, cannot stand in the way of its applicability to a revenue case. In the second place, Section 9 itself contains an exception in favour of suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Section 4 Civil Procedure Code also contains a saving clause." Similar observations were made in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 27. In the second place, Section 9 itself contains an exception in favour of suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Section 4 Civil Procedure Code also contains a saving clause." Similar observations were made in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 27. These decisions were followed in Mukunda Murari Chakravarti v. Pabitramoy Ghosh A.I.R. 1945 F.C. 1, where it was observed that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code must be read subject to Section 4(1) of the Code which saves any special power conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force, and that when the provisions were so read, no question of repugnancy between the provisions Civil Procedure Code and the Provisions of the Bengal Act could arise. 11. Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly lays down that "in the absence of any specific provisions to the contrary, nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for the time being in force." 12. With regard to the transfer and hearing of appeals there exists no specific provision to the contrary in the Code of Civil Procedure and, consequently, the State legislature can make a law even though in variation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by conferring special jurisdiction or power on an authority. The learned Advocate for the applicant wants me to give a restricted meaning to the words "jurisdiction or power" and to hold that the special jurisdiction or power contemplated by Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the one conferred on a court other than the civil court. When the legislature used general words, the Courts must give such words a general meaning. The Courts cannot restrict the scope of general words on supposed intention of the legislature which does not appear from the enactment itself. I am thus of opinion that special jurisdiction or power contemplated by Section 4 can be conferred on any court including a civil court. In other words, if under the Code of Civil Procedure the District Judge has the jurisdiction to hear some case, such power can be taken away under a special law. I am thus of opinion that special jurisdiction or power contemplated by Section 4 can be conferred on any court including a civil court. In other words, if under the Code of Civil Procedure the District Judge has the jurisdiction to hear some case, such power can be taken away under a special law. Conversely, if the District Judge does not have, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the power to hear a case, the special law can confer on him the jurisdiction or power to hear and dispose of that case. 13. When Section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code does not disentitle a competent legislature to make a special law on points covered by the Code of Civil Procedure, the law, if made, cannot be deemed to be repugnant to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the circumstances, Section 2 of the Amendment Act of 1963 cannot be said to be repugnant to Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. Sections 20 and 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts, 1887, have a similar saving clause. Section 20 begins with the words "save as otherwise provided by any enactment of the time being in force." The words "save as aforesaid" in Section 21 have reference to similar words used in Section 20 and, in the circumstances, Section 2 of the Amendment Act of 1963 cannot be said to be repugnant to the provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. When there exists no repugnancy, no assent of the President was necessary before the law made by the State legislature could be valid and enforceable. 15. In view of the above finding it is not necessary to consider whether there exists any inconsistency between sub-Section (1-A) of Section 3 of the Act of 1954 and Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, to make this judgment complete it can be observed that the two provisions cannot be said to be inconsistent or materially different from each other. This view can be formed by reading these two sections along with Section 21 of the Bengal, Agar and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Cl. However, to make this judgment complete it can be observed that the two provisions cannot be said to be inconsistent or materially different from each other. This view can be formed by reading these two sections along with Section 21 of the Bengal, Agar and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Cl. (a) of Section 24(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives power to the High Court to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same. Under Section 3(1-A) of the Act of 1954 an appeal pending before the High Court, arising out of a suit of a valuation not exceeding rupees ten thousand, can be transferred to a District Judge or Additional District Judge. In so far as such appeals are concerned, the two provisions are similar and the only difference is that Section 24(1), and not Section 3(1-A), speaks of transfer to a District Judge competent to dispose of the same. In view of Section 21(1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts, 1887, District Judges have now the power to entertain and hear appeals arising out of suits the valuation of which does not exceed rupees ten thousand. When such appeals lie to the District Judge it means that he has the power to hear such appeals and he is competent to dispose them of. In this view of the matter Section 3(1-A) of the Act of 1954 cannot be said to be materially different to the corresponding provision of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. To get over this difficulty it was contended on behalf of the applicant that the jurisdiction, in other words, the competency of the District Judge to hear an appeal shall depend upon two factors: firstly, that the appeal arose out of a suit of a valuation not exceeding rupees ten thousands and secondly that the appeal had been preferred before him. Stress was laid upon the words "shall be" used in Section 21(1) of the Bengal. Agra and Assam Civil Courts, 1887. If this contention is accepted, it would mean that an appeal preferred before one District Judge cannot be transferred to another District Judges for the simple reason that the appeal did not lay before, i.e. was not presented before the transferee District Judge. Agra and Assam Civil Courts, 1887. If this contention is accepted, it would mean that an appeal preferred before one District Judge cannot be transferred to another District Judges for the simple reason that the appeal did not lay before, i.e. was not presented before the transferee District Judge. In my opinion, the words "shall lie" do not place any restriction on the jurisdiction of the District Judge. They simply show that the District Judge can hear appeals presented before the naturally he can also hear appeals of similar valuation if transferred to him. To put it differently District Judges are now competent to hear appeals from the original decrees in suits of a valuation not exceeding rupees ten thousand and when they are competent to hear such appeals, they can be transferred to District Judges even thought initially presented before the High Court. 17. The order of transfer passed by Chief Justice was declared invalid in view of Section 3(1) of the Act 1954 but since after the incorporation of sub-Section (1-A) of Section 3 of the act of 1954 the order must be held to be valid. A perusal of sub-Section (1-A) makes it clear that sub section is to prevail even if there exists anything to the contrary in sub-section 3 of the Act of 1954 made a clear provisions that any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by such Court. Consequently appeals ready instituted before the High Court had to be heard by the High Court and such appeals could not be transferred to District Judges for hearing. But after the passing of the Amendment Act of 1963 the effect of sub-Section (1) disappears as soon as the High Court passed an order of transfer under sub-Section (1-A). When sub sections (1) and (1-A) are read together, it shall have to be held that for so long the High Court does not transfer any appeal to a District Judge or an Additional District Judge the appeal already instituted shall be heard and decided by that Court but after an order of transfer is passed under sub-Section (1-A) the provisions of sub-Section (1) shall no longer be in force. 18. 18. To get over this difficulty it was contended that sub-Section (1-A) of Section 3 of the act of 1954 contemplates the transfer of appeals but does not confer jurisdiction or power on the District Judge or Additional District Judge to hear or dispose of the same when the intention of the legislature was to make a law for quick disposal of the appeals it cannot at the same time be said that the legislature had the intention to merely transfer appeals to District Judges or Additional District Judges without any possibility of their being heard. In my opinion, no two opinions can be formed as to the intention of the legislature. The State legislature had in mind not only to transfer such appeals to District Judges for Additional District Judges but also to give special jurisdiction or power to them to hear and dispose of such appeals as were transferred to them. 19. Course of law have the power to add words to an enactment where without such a recourse it will lead to absurdity not contemplated by the legislature. Words are added by the Court not to fill in lacuna in the enactment but to give effect to the intention of the legislature which is apparent and beyond question. 20. A reference may now be made to the provision of another enactment where under the transfer of a case necessarily implies the hearing and disposal of the case so transferred Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs the transfer of criminal cases. Cls. (1) to (e) of Sub-Section (1) thereof narrate the grounds which can justify the transfer of a case, but the order of transfer is passed under the subsequent provisions contained therein. Clauses (i), (iii) and (iv), thereof speak of inquiry into or trial by the Court to which the case is transferred but similar words have not been used in Clause (ii) where under any case appeal or class of cases or appeals can be transferred from one criminal court to another criminal court of equal or superior jurisdiction. If such cases or appeals can not be heard and disposed of by the transferee court the very provision for transfer shall become infructuous. If such cases or appeals can not be heard and disposed of by the transferee court the very provision for transfer shall become infructuous. A few other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall also make it clear that the power of inquiry or trial can be assumed from the fact of mere institution or presentation. It must therefore be held that whenever any appeal is transferred under sub-Section (1-A) of Section 3 of the Act of 1954 the transferred court can not only entertain the appeal but hear and decide it. 21. The other points for consideration are whether the order of transfer passed by the Chief Justice is judicial order or an administrative one whether the Chief Justice has the power to pass an order which under the law the High Court could pass can the chief Justice pass the order suo motu without notice to the parties and whether such an order of the Chief Justice can be validated by the State legislature. 22. The order of transfer detailed above is even though passed for administrative reasons a judicial order. Such an order is ordinarily not challenged before a higher Court but can be challenged as was done in the Supreme Court case referred to above. The power under Sub-Section (1-A) of Section 3 of the Act of 1954 can be exercised suo motu or on the application of party and consequently the order of transfer whether passed suo motu or on the application of a party shall standing in the same category. An order of transfer passed on an application on an party is without any doubt a judicial order and consequently a similar order passed on administrative grounds shall also be a judicial order. 23. On the second point Chapter V. Rule 1 of the Rules of Court 1952, is relevant. Rules of the Court have been framed by the Judges of the court and consequently any order passed in accordance with the rules can be deemed to be an in fact is an order of the High Court. Chapter V, rule 1 provides that - "Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from the time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions". Chapter V, rule 1 provides that - "Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from the time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions". The constitution of Benches and also the allotment of work is done by the Chief Justice and any order of the Bench so constituted is in the eye of law, an order of the High Court. When the Chief Justice can allot work to other judges he can allot work to himself. Consequently the Chief Justice can, if he so desire reserve to himself the power to pass an order of transfer under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code or section 3(1-A) of the Act of 1954. The order of the Chief Justice cannot therefore be declared invalid simply because it was passed by him and not by any other judge of the High Court. 24. There is nothing in Section 3 (1-A) of the Act of 1954 prohibiting the passing of an order of transfer suo motu without notice to the parties. An order of transfer passed suo motu is not to the disadvantage of any party. It is not for the party to choose a judge for the hearing of the appeal for so long as the appeal is heard by a competent judge in accordance with the law. When appeals instituted before the High Court can be head by District Judges it shall before the High Court in view of the Rules of the Court for the Chief Justice to decide whether the appeals shall be heard by the High Court or transferred to the District Judge or Additional District Judge for hearing. An order of transfer passed suo motu cannot thus be challenged on the ground that it was passed without notice to the parties. 25. In connection with the last point detailed above two questions arise for consideration: whether the order of transfer in question was passed under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code or can be deemed to be under the act of 1954 and secondly whether an illegal order can be validated by a subsequent enactment given a retrospective effect. 26. The order of transfer does not indicate whether it was passed under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Act of 1954. 26. The order of transfer does not indicate whether it was passed under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Act of 1954. Even if reference was made to one of the two Acts, the order could be declared valid if it were found that such an order could be passed under the other law. 27. The legislature has the power to validate acts or orders already done or passed though initially invalid, but this can be done by making a law and giving effect to it retrospectively. What Section 3 of the Amendment Act of 1963 lays down is that any act or thing done before the date of publication of the Act in the Gazette, shall be deemed to gave been validly and legally done if set act or thing done would have valid had the amendment the principal Act by this force on all the material dates is on the date of order. When it is possible for to make amendment enactment retrospective endments shall be deemed to be in force from the date the Amendment Act is given effect to. In such a case, I see no reason why any order of transfer, though illegal on the date it was passed but legal as a result of amendments made by an enactment given retrospective effect, be not considered valid after the Amendment Act was duly passed and notified. I understand that a Bench of five Judges of this Court has taken a similar view; but the learned Advocates for the parties were unable to give particulars of that decision on account of the case not having been reported yet. 28. To sum up, the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Amendment Act, 1963 is not invalid and the order of transfer of the First Appeal in question though passed before this Act received the assent of the Governor and was published in the U.P. Gazette, is valid since after the publication of the act and confers jurisdiction on the Additional District Judge to hear and dispose of the appeal. 29. The present application has thus not force and it is hereby dismissed. Costs on parts. The stay order is vacated.