Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the landlord, since 1946, of the plaint schedule property, 1139.96 acres in extent; & respondents 1 to 12 are its tenants. In December 1957, the latter sold the standing trees on 30 acres of the property to the 13th respondent, who felled and removed them. The appellant's suit for damages for that removal of trees, which a commissioner deputed by the court estimated at Rs. 24219.83, has been dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, who found that the terms of the tenancy entitled the respondents to cut and appropriate the trees on the land. 2. The relevant deed of tenancy is the 'Kanom Kuzhikanom' deed, Ext. A1, dated September 13,1934 executed by the appellant's assignor to respondents 1 to 4 and their late brother Gopalan Nambiar whose legal representatives are respondents 5 to 12, It refers to a prior 'Kuzhikanom' deed, copy of which is Ext. B6, dated September 6,1921, in favour of Kuberan Ezhunnalliyedath, who assigned it in 1929 to respondents 1 to 4 and Gopalan Nambiar. Ext. B6 was for a term of 48 years; and Ext. A1 is for 35 years being almost the unexpired period under the former. Ext. A1 recites that the landlord had sued for eviction of the tenants and that that suit was being compromised by its execution as the instrument of further tenancy between them. The clauses in Ext. A1 material for purposes of this appeal and the corresponding clauses in Ext. B6 run thus: (Other differences between the two deeds - payment being of Manusham (non-returnable advance) Rs. 1000/- under Ext. B6, and of Kanom (returnable advance) Rs. 2000/- under Ext. A1; Purapad stipulated being Rs. 500/- in Ext. B6 and Rs. 200 in Ext. A1- are not relevant here). 3. Counsel for the respondents contended that Ext. A1 is in effect a renewal of Ext. B6 for its unexpired period, and therefore the above-quoted clauses, in them must be taken to bear the same import. I do not think it right. The circumstance of the parties having fallen out in litigation and then come to a compromise culminating in a fresh formulation of the future relation between them in Ext. A1 indicates that any change of expression in that instrument as compared with that in its predecessor instrument (Ext. B6) must have been deliberate. Instead 'of the words (cut and take) in Ext. A1 indicates that any change of expression in that instrument as compared with that in its predecessor instrument (Ext. B6) must have been deliberate. Instead 'of the words (cut and take) in Ext. B6, those used in Ext. A1 are (cut and remove - the word 'remove' being in the sense 'shift to another place'). 4. The addition in Ext. A1 of the recital I " meaning "there is no assignment of plantation,' is very significant. In the context it must mean that the recitals in Ext. A1 should not be taken to imply an assignment of plantation by one party to the other. It obviously negatives the susceptibility of the words 'cut and remove' to imply a right to appropriate. 5. Counsel for the respondents contends that the expression aconic as it is, could not have been meant seriously by the parties, and argued that since the destination of the trees 'cut and removed' is not indicated in the instrument (Ext. A1) the tenants may take them anywhere and therefore for themselves. Even in modern England, the Modern Law Review says, "It is notorious that laymen are in general unskilled in expressing precisely in writing their intentions with regard to any particular matter". [1963] 26 Modern Law Review, page 88. In instruments executed by laymen, without legal assistance, as Ext. A1 obviously is, it is too much to expect a precision of expression that may stand proof against the critical analysis of trained lawyers accustomed to subtleties. The question should not therefore be 'why such and such a provision or recital was not made', but should be 'what is the purport of the terms actually used'. "As in the construction of other documents", observed the Supreme Court, "so in the construction of an agreement to lease, regard must be had to all the relevant and material terms; and an attempt must be made to reconcile the relevant terms if possible and not to treat any of them as idle surplusage." AIR. 1959 S.C. 620, 625. To me the expression put at the very end of the instrument, immediately before the signature of its executants, the landlords, appears to have been put advisedly to destroy the susceptibility of the recitals in the body of the instrument to imply anything contrary wise. 6. 1959 S.C. 620, 625. To me the expression put at the very end of the instrument, immediately before the signature of its executants, the landlords, appears to have been put advisedly to destroy the susceptibility of the recitals in the body of the instrument to imply anything contrary wise. 6. 22 W.R. 523, cited by counsel for the respondents, concerned a lease of a "jungle land" by the Government "for the express purpose of bringing it into cultivation" in four years. Nothing was mentioned in the deed about the trees on the land. It was held that the case at hand was "wholly distinguishable from an ordinary tenancy" & stood "upon its own circumstances.. [I]t must be presumed that, in order to carry out the purposes for which the lease was granted, it must have been necessary to cut down trees of all descriptions ... [T]he only construction we can put upon that lease is that the tenant was wholly unrestricted. The terms of the lease do not expressly restrict him; and the general rule of law that a tenant cannot cut any timber trees whatever could not possibly be applied to this case, as it would defeat the very object of the lease itself." 7. A grant of Kuzhikanom tenancy in 1934 did not normally involve a right to cut the trees on the land. Ext. B1, an earlier Kuzhikanom deed of 1910, to another tenant in respect of the same property expressly provided that he should not cut any tree on the land without the written consent of the landlord. Ext. B6 expressly conferred a limited right on the tenant to cut and take trees from spots to be cultivated or planted. The Malabar Tenancy Act, 1930, which admittedly governs the tenancy concerned here, defines Kuzhikanom to mean and include "a transfer by a landlord to another of garden lands or of other lands or of both, with the fruit-bearing trees, if any, standing thereon at the time of the transfer, for the enjoyment of those trees and for the purpose of planting such fruit-bearing trees thereon", and S.56 of the Act saves "the rights of a janmi in any of his holdings ... to cut and remove the trees or enjoy the usufruct of trees and pepper vines belonging to him" subject to a proportionate reduction of michavaram or rent if by the exercise of such right the tenant's profits are decreased. If the landlord has the right to cut and remove the trees belonging to him, - the trees, fruit-bearing or otherwise, on the land on the date of the tenancy must belong to him - the tenant also cannot have the same right. The latter can claim such right only under an assignment of the landlord. Counsel for the respondents contended that the trees sold to the 13th respondent were the tenant's plantation. That question has not been decided by the court below. The report of a Commissioner deputed by the court is to the effect that the trees were "all aged about 60 and above". However, even if the trees were plantation of the tenants, they cannot appropriate them with immunity in view of the rights of the landlord recognised in S.10 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, I of 1900, re-enacted in S.8 of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958. 8. I am clear that the terms of tenancy, embodied in Ext. Al, do not entitle the respondents to appropriate the trees on the property demised. The appellant is therefore entitled to damages in respect of the trees cut and taken away by the respondents. The decree under appeal has to be discharged and the suit remitted for fresh disposal after trial of the other issues in the case. Judgment accordingly, with costs to the appellant, excepting the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal which will be refunded to him. Raman Nayar, J. 9. I agree. In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, a lessee may not fell or sell standing timber whether the trees were there when he entered on the property or came into existence subsequently. The court below has found a contract to the contrary in the clause in Ext. Raman Nayar, J. 9. I agree. In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, a lessee may not fell or sell standing timber whether the trees were there when he entered on the property or came into existence subsequently. The court below has found a contract to the contrary in the clause in Ext. A1 extracted in Para.2 of the judgment of my learned brother, Now it seems to me that all that this clause allows the lessee to do is to clear the land actually required by him for cultivation - it is not disputed that the 30 acres of land which the defendants have cleared is land of this description - felling and removing - "move" rather than 'remove" conveys the true meaning of the word for "remove", according to the context, can imply a measure of control over the thing moved which does not - from that land such trees as may be necessary for the purpose. The words are qualified by the word Irjn Bhiyambn and the clause means that the lessee may do such felling as may be required for bringing the land under cultivation, not as the court below seems to think that the lessee may fell trees as he pleases. It is true that the clause does not say what is to be done with the trees after they have been felled and removed from the land required for cultivation or indicate their destination. But, I do not think that from this it can be implied that the lessee is at liberty to remove them where he pleases or do what he likes with them, in other words, appropriate them, and I see nothing in the clause which in any way affects the title to the trees. Rotun Ram Doss v. The Collector of Sylhet on behalf of Government (XXII Weekly Reporter 523) was decided on very special facts and I do not regard it as authority for the proposition that whenever permission to fell trees is granted (whether expressly or by implication) the grant implies, in the absence of provision to the contrary, a right to appropriate the timber. That will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and, in this case, I think there are two features that clearly negative any such implication. That will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and, in this case, I think there are two features that clearly negative any such implication. The first is the clear departure from the language of the previous lease, Ext. B6, which Ext. A1 replaced. In Ext. B6 the language used was (fell and take) which can be read as meaning, fell and appropriate, whereas, in contrast, Ext. A1 uses the expression an expression which cannot be construed as including a right to appropriate. It seems to me that the implication is that the right to appropriate conferred by the earlier lease was taken away. The second feature is that at the end of Ext. A1 there appears the recital which literally means that there is no sale (transfer) of the Kuzhikurs. In the context of a lease replacing an earlier lease, with the implied surrender of that lease, this can only mean that the rights of the respective: parties in respect of the kuzikurs on the property - in the present case, only trees - are unaffected. What this clause then means is that nothing said in the document (inclusive of the clause permitting the lessee to cut and remove trees) shall affect the rights of the parties in respect of the trees on the property. Therefore, despite the fact that the tenant is permitted to fell and remove certain trees, the rights of the parties in respect of the felled trees are unaltered. This seems to me clear and I am unable to discover any such doubt or ambiguity as to justify resort to the rule of construction against the grantor. 10. The suit has to go back for fresh trial on the remaining issues - including that portion of issue (2) on which we have not pronounced - for the purpose of determining the rights of the respective parties in the several trees felled (whether they were in existence in 1921 when the first tenancy commenced or came into existence later) and of assessing the damages, if any, to which the plaintiff is entitled. It might be as well to add that, for the purpose of this assessment, the value of the trees would be their value as standing timber and not the price they would fetch after being felled and transported to the market - the felling and transport in this case was done by the 13th defendant and no part of the expense was borne by the plaintiff. M.S. Menon, C.J. 11. I would dismiss the appeal. In Ext. B-6, the demise of 6-9-1921, the right granted to the tenant in respect of the trees is worded as follows: 12. The court below has come to the conclusion that the words in Ext. B6 and in Ext A-1 spell the same idea. It says: "It was strenuously argued that the above provision - the provision in Ext. A-1- is different from the provision contained in Exhibit B6 because while in Exhibit B6 the term used was the term employed in Ext. A-1 is I do not think that the parties intended to convey different meaning for those two terms." I am of the same opinion, and my conclusion is that the expressions are not different in content but identical in ambit and meaning. 13. It is agreed that the words in Ext. B6 gave the tenant the right to appropriate the timber after the trees were cut. The contention is that the use of the words n Ext. A1 is a conscious departure restricting the right to a bare cutting and removal and negativing the right of appropriation. 14. It is said that the words which occur in Ext. A-1 immediately after the schedule describing the area demised afford a support to this contention. I cannot agree. Those words were inserted - apparently by way of abundant caution - in order to avoid a future contention to the effect that the document involved a sale of the landlord's trees to the tenant. It is only when there is no such sale that a clause like the one we are construing becomes necessary. If the trees were conveyed to the tenant, they will belong to him, and there will be no need for a clause giving him permission to cut and remove them under certain specified circumstances. 15. If the words in Ext. A-1 do not spell the same idea as in Ext. If the trees were conveyed to the tenant, they will belong to him, and there will be no need for a clause giving him permission to cut and remove them under certain specified circumstances. 15. If the words in Ext. A-1 do not spell the same idea as in Ext. B6, I have no doubts that the words should be considered as ambiguous in character and construed against the grantor. What is to happen after the trees have been felled? That the tenant can remove the timber is certain. But to where? Should it be to some place within the area demised? Or to any place that the tenant desired? Within what time should the landlord claim the trees? Is he liable to pay the cost of cutting and/or removal? All these and other relevant matters are left unexpressed and in view of the ambiguity, the well-known principle of construing a grant against the grantor should apply. 16. Halsbury - Third Edition, Volume 11, Page 392 - sums up the approach as follows: "If a doubt arises upon the construction of a grant, and the doubt can be removed by construing the deed adversely to the grantor, this will be done. The words of a deed, executed for valuable consideration, are to be constructed, as far as they properly may, in favour of the grantee." Foot-note (u) says: "It is a maxim of the law that every man's grant shall be taken most strongly against himself. All the words of a deed shall be taken most strongly against him that doth speak them, and most in advantage of the other party." (Page 392); and that the rule operates in favour of a lessee. 17. That the rule is applicable to this country is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb (AIR. 1960 SC. 953). The Supreme Court said: "Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor's document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee." 18. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor's document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee." 18. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT The appeal is allowed with costs, except to the extent of the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal which will be refunded to the appellant; and the suit is sent back to the court below for trial and disposal of all the matters not covered by the decision in the appeal.