ORDER R.C. Roy Poddar, President This case arose apparently from a number of applications from the cultivators of village Kosala regarding their rights of irrigation from certain tanks, the Sub-Divisional Officer initiated proceedings u/s 242 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and ordered a record to be made of the rights of irrigation of certain persons including the applicant from a tank named Konhari tank recorded in the village papers as khasra No. 432. It appears that in the same proceedings the Sub-Divisional Officer had also made enquiries and passed orders on various matters connected with the preparation of the Nistar Patrak u/s 234 of the Code. The non-applicant, who is the holder of the tank khasra No. 432, was aggrieved by the Sub-Divisional Officer's order giving irrigation rights from that tank to the applicant and certain other persons, and so he went and preferred an appeal before the Collector u/s 44 of the Code. The Collector on finding that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order was vitiated by certain serious procedural defects set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and remanded the case to him for passing proper orders according to law after holding fresh enquiries separately under Sections 234 and 242 of the Code. Against this order of the Collector the applicant preferred a second appeal before the Commissioner which was rejected. Hence this revision application. The Learned Counsel for the non-applicant raised a preliminary objection that all the parties interested in this revision have not been noticed as required by the provision in Section 50 of the Code, and therefore no order can be passed in the case as it stands now. The Learned Counsel on the other side replied that the parties interested in the revision are those who were parties to the proceedings before the Commissioner, and they are already on record as parties to the revision and have been duly noticed too. I think the objection of the Learned Counsel for the non-applicant has no force and has to be rejected. Taking the broadest view of the matter, the parties interested in this revision are those who can reasonably be expected to feel aggrieved by the rejection of the revision or by its being allowed. I think the objection of the Learned Counsel for the non-applicant has no force and has to be rejected. Taking the broadest view of the matter, the parties interested in this revision are those who can reasonably be expected to feel aggrieved by the rejection of the revision or by its being allowed. If the revision is rejected and the Commissioner's order is affirmed, the only party who will have any reason for grievance is the applicant who is the only party to challenge the Commissioner's order. The applicant has not only been noticed, but is present before me ready for a bitter show-down with his antagonist. If the revision is allowed and the Sub-Divisional Officer's order is affirmed, the only person who will have any reason to feel aggrieved is the person who had preferred an appeal against the Sub-Divisional Officer's order. That person is the non-applicant who also has not only been noticed, but is present before me although apparently not very keen on a show-down. The preliminary objection is therefore rejected. The only ground pressed before me by the Learned Counsel for the applicant is that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer u/s 242 of the Code was not appeasable, and according to Sub-section (3) of Section 242 the only remedy available to any person aggrieved by any entry made in the Wajib-ul-arz is to institute a suit in the civil Court to have such an entry cancelled or modified. The Learned Counsel, therefore, argued that the Collector's order passed in first appeal suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction, and the Commissioner had erroneously maintained that order. In reply the Learned Counsel for the non-applicant said that the order against which the appeal was preferred before the Collector did not make any record but only decided the rights of the parties while ascertaining the customs of the village. The Learned Counsel argued that under Sub-section (3) of Section 242 an appeal was barred only against an entry made in the Waji-ul-arz, but there is no bar to an appeal being preferred u/s 44 of the Code against an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer determining the rights of the parties in the course of the enquiry leading to the making of the record. The Learned Counsel further argued that since in the same order the Sub-Divisional Officer decided matters coming within the purview of Section 234 of the Code also, the order was appeasable under the Code and the Collector had rightly exercised his jurisdiction. On going through the records of the case, I find that the Commissioner's order has to be set aside on the short ground that it was passed in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction in a case where no appeal lay before him. The Collector had only remanded the case to the Sub-Divisional Officer for fresh enquiry and decision, and his order being undoubtedly an order of an interim nature no appeal lay against it u/s 46 of the Code. In fact this point was brought to my notice by the Learned Counsel for the non-applicant himself although his purpose in doing so was not to assail the order of the Commissioner but to reinforce its unassailability. The Learned Counsel's contention is that since no appeal lay before the Commissioner against the Collector's order which was an order of an interim nature, it should be deemed that the Commissioner had passed the impugned order in exercise of his provisional jurisdiction and, therefore, there could not be second revision in the same case before the Board. This contention of the Learned Counsel is without any force for two very strong reasons. One is that if the Commissioner were to exercise his revisional jurisdiction when there was only an appeal before him, the proper course for him would have been to pass a specific order converting the appeal into a revision after giving due notice to the other party of his intention to do so. There is no legal basis for the contention of the Learned Counsel that it is to be deemed that this was done. Secondly, there is nothing in Section 50 of the Code which debars the Board of Revenue from examining the record of any case decided by the Commissioner in revision to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed in the case, and from passing such order in reference thereto as the Board thinks fit. Secondly, there is nothing in Section 50 of the Code which debars the Board of Revenue from examining the record of any case decided by the Commissioner in revision to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed in the case, and from passing such order in reference thereto as the Board thinks fit. Thus it is clear that the Commissioner had decided a second appeal against an order of an interim nature which is not appeal able, and had in the result exercised a jurisdiction that did not vest in him under the law. On merits also the Commissioner's order cannot be maintained. The objection regarding the Collector's jurisdiction to hear the first appeal was raised before the Commissioner also. The Commissioner's decision on the point is as follows: What the learned Sub-Divisional Officer has done is to pass a preliminary order directing further action. It will not be quite correct to Bay that it is only a record which is not appeal able. At that stage it may not be a final order, but all the same it is an order and as such an appeal will be maintainable. It is obviously not a proper view of the law. The Commissioner seems to think that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order against which an appeal was preferred before the Collector was not a final order but only a preliminary order directing further action. In that case it was an order of an interim nature, which is not appeal able u/s 46(d) of the Code. The argument of the Learned Counsel for the non-applicant is that the order did not make any record but it finally decided the rights of the parties, and to that extent it was an order within the meaning of Section 56 of the Code which should, therefore, be treated as an appeal able order, I think this argument follows only the reasoning of the Commissioner in different words. It has to be pointed out that all orders within the meaning of the definition given in Section 56 are not appeal able, some of such orders being challengeable only in revision or review under Chapter V of the Code. It has to be pointed out that all orders within the meaning of the definition given in Section 56 are not appeal able, some of such orders being challengeable only in revision or review under Chapter V of the Code. The point is not that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer determining the rights of the parties in the course of the enquiry u/s 242 of the Code is not an order, the point is that it is an order that cannot be challenged in appeal. A distinction has to be made between the various orders that are passed in a case at various stages. It is only a final order passed in a case that is appeal able, all other orders passed from time to time at various stages in the proceedings are orders of an interim nature even though they may decide some rights or other of the parties. A final order is one after the passing of which there remains nothing more to be done in the case except to consign it to the record room. According to the Learned Counsel himself the record to be made u/s 242 had not yet been made in the case. If that is so then whatever order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was only an order of an interim nature against which no appeal lay but which could be challenged in revision according to law. As for the argument of the Learned Counsel for the non-applicant that the Sub-Divisional Officer had under, the same order decided matters which come within the purview of Section 234 of the Code and, therefore, the order was appeal able u/s 44, it is only necessary to point out that the appeal that was preferred before the Collector by the non-applicant was not directed against any order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer u/s 234 but was clearly directed against the Sub-Divisional Officer's order relating to a matter coming within the purview of Section 242 only. This is quite clear from the memo of appeal that was filed by the non-applicant before the Collector. This is quite clear from the memo of appeal that was filed by the non-applicant before the Collector. The very first clause of the memo reads: That this appeal is confined to orders relating to khasra No. 432 Konhari tank only." The order relating to this particular tank was an order determining the rights of certain persons to use the tank for irrigation purposes, and therefore the order was passed u/s 242 of the Code. This is what the Collector also has observed in his order as would appear the following passage: The appeal is in respect only of the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer prescribing the right of irrigation in favour of the Respondents (from tank khasra No. 432). Thus the Collector at least had no doubt in his mind as to the particular order against which the appeal was preferred before him, and the nature of that order and the provision of law under which that order could be passed. As I have pointed out above, there could be no appeal under the Code against any order passed in case u/s 242. If it is a final order making the record, the appeal will be barred under Sub-section (3) of Section 242, if it is anything other than an order making the record then it will be an order of an interim nature against which an appeal is barred u/s 46(d). In other words, the appeal that was preferred by the non-applicant before the Collector did not lie in accordance with the law, and therefore it has to be held that the order passed by the Collector in first appeal in this case is without jurisdiction and cannot be maintained. The Commissioner's order also cannot be maintained for it upholds an order that is a nullity in the eye of law, and also because the order was passed in exercise of a jurisdiction that did not vest in him according to the law. For the reasons stated above, the revision is allowed and the orders passed by the Collector in first appeal and by the Commissioner in second appeal are set aside. Final Result : Allowed