ORDER 1. The facts which have given rise to this revision are that one Kalyan Vijay Jati advanced some money to the defendants-applicants who acknowledged the same on 22-6-53. Kalyan Jati died on 28-8-55 without any heir, On 1-2-58, the Additional District Judge Shajapur granted letters of administration of the property and credits of Kalyan Jati to Shri Hazarilal Gupta and granted permission to him to file the suit against the applicants on 9-2-59, Accordingly on 27-4-59 the suit was filed by Shri Hazarilal as administrator. Various objections were raised the most important of which and subject for consideration is a plea of limitation which has been held against the defendants. The Court has granted a decree in favour of the administrator. The defendants have now come up in revision. 2. The acknowledgment was on 22-6-53 and the suit would clearly be barred by time as it was filed on 27-4-59. But the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that Shri Gupta was appointed as an administrator; that on 28-8-55 Shri Kalyan Jati died and permission to institute the suit was given to Sri Gupta on 9-2-59. The suit was filed on 27-4-59. Under S. 17 of the Limitation Act, limitation therefore starts from 9-2-59 and the suit is therefore within time. 3. For the sake of convenience S. 17 (1) of the Limitation Act is reproduced below : – "Where a person who would, if he were living have a right to institute a suit or make an application dies before the right accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representation of the deceased capable of instituting or making such suit or application," 4. A bare-reading of the section would indicate that the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the same. For application of this section cause of action must arise after the person dies. When a legal representative comes into existence or is appointed he can take advantage of the section only if the cause of action has not arised during the life time of the person of whose legal representative he is appointed. The suit is based on acknowledgment on 22-6-53 and the cause of action had arisen on that day. 5. When a legal representative comes into existence or is appointed he can take advantage of the section only if the cause of action has not arised during the life time of the person of whose legal representative he is appointed. The suit is based on acknowledgment on 22-6-53 and the cause of action had arisen on that day. 5. The counsel for the plaintiff contended that there is a distinction between the right to institute a suit (as mentioned in this section) and the accrual of cause of action. I have not shown any authority on this. What the Full Bench of the Madras High Court decided in A. N. C. T. Subbiah Vs. N. R Samiappa AIR 1938 Madras 353 on which the learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied is that" there can be no cause of action until there is a party capable of suing and until there is a cause of action, there can be no question of the law of limitation, coming into operation." It was nowhere laid down that the right to sue is different from the accrual of cause of action. In fact the right to sue can only occur when there is a cause of action. If there is no cause of action there is no right to sue. This right accrues when the cause of action accrues. 6. In Dodhipatla Vs. Tarametla Umamahesh varam, J. has only observed :– "When there is no one competent to sue, there can be no cause of action and consequently limitation cannot run because there is no one against whom it can run" This is exactly the principle underlying in the Section. 7. Three things are essential for litigation (1) plaintiff (2) defendant, and (3) the cause of action. If one of the three things is missing there cannot be any lis in the Court. A plaintiff cannot sue if he has no cause of action or a right to sue has not accrued. Similarly a plaintiff cannot sue if there is no defendant whom he can sue. Section 17 of the Limitation Act incorporates this provision. 8. Kalyan Jati could have sued immediately after the acknowledgment of the debt by the defendant on 22-6-53. Therefore it cannot be said that be died before the right accrued to him. Similarly a plaintiff cannot sue if there is no defendant whom he can sue. Section 17 of the Limitation Act incorporates this provision. 8. Kalyan Jati could have sued immediately after the acknowledgment of the debt by the defendant on 22-6-53. Therefore it cannot be said that be died before the right accrued to him. The right accrued on 22-6-53 and he died subsequent to it: Therefore there is no question of application of S. 17 of the Limitation act. 9. Moreover if we read Section 9 of the Limitation Act, it is clear that when the cause of action starts it continues to run. It reads as under : – ''Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it. Provided that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the time prescribed for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues" 10. But this is not the position in the instant case. Therefore the appointment of Hajarilal Gupta as an administrator cannot give him any cause of action or it can not be said that the right to sue did not accrue before Kalyan Vijaya Jati died. 11. The learned counsel for defendant argued that Hajarilal, the administrator could not file the suit as he was not appointed before 1-2-58. This may be true but if an administrator is appointed he is not entitled to recover any time barred debt. His appointment does not authorise him to disturb the right which has accrued to the debtor on account of law of limitation. The suit should have been filed within 3 years from 22-6-53. By 22-6-56 the right accrued to the defendant, by virtue of Jaw of limitation for not paying the debt subsequent appointment of Hajarilal cannot therefore take away the same. 12. It was next argued by the plaintiff, though not before the trial Court that after the death of Kalyan Vijay Jati without any heir the property vested in the State and therefore the limitation that would be applicable to the case would be Art. 149 Limitation Act, that is a period of 60 years. But the pleadings however do not indicate that the plaintiff Hajarilal his filed a suit on behalf of the State. But the pleadings however do not indicate that the plaintiff Hajarilal his filed a suit on behalf of the State. No doubt in the plaint the plaintiff has stated that Kalyan Jati died issueless and his estate vested in the State, but while sueing he did not say that he has been sueing on behalf of the State. In fact there is no averment by the plaintiff that the suit was filed by the State. It may be that the property vested in the State, but unless the State comes forward and files a suit, Article 149 will not apply. This makes it clear that the suit must be by or on behalf of the Central Government or the State Government. It has not been stated that it was either by or on behalf of the Central or the State Government. 13. Ultimately it was argued by the plaintiff that he has mentioned in paragraph 4 of the plaint that defendant No. 1 had in reply to his notice stated that on 7-5-58 out of the sum of Rs. 294-7-9 he paid Rs. 100/-. This acknowledgment the defendant has made as per Ex P/5. It is a reply to the plaintiff's notice Ex P/4. The plaintiff claims that at least a decree for Rs. 194-7-9 may be passed for the balance. 14. Unfortunately a decree cannot be passed on this acknowledgment. If it is taken as an acknowledgment at all it has been written more than 3 years after the accrual of cause of action and a mere acknowledgment in order to save limitation can only be useful if it is made before the expiry of limitation S. 19 of the limitation Act therefore will be of no help to the plaintiff. 15. The counsel relied on a decision of the Oudh High Court reported in Ram Awatar Vs. Benisingh AIR 1922 Oudh 435. In that case it has been only observed: – "When no reference to an acknowledgment is made in the plaint ..................but there are admittedly certain acknowledgments which save limitation, plaintiff is entitled to show in reply to the defence set up, that his claim is within time in any case from the acknowledgments and such a plea is not inadmissible." This decision cannot help as the acknowledgment must be an acknowledgment within three years of the expiry of limitation in order that limitation must be saved. 16. I therefore do not think that the court was justified in granting a decree. The claim is clearly barred by time. The revision petition is therefore allowed, the judgment and decree under revision are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed throughout with costs. Counsel fee according to scale, if certified.