JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts dismissing his suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession of the lands described in 'A' schedule of the plaint and for a decree for partition and other ancillary reliefs. 2. The Plaintiff's case was hat the disputed properties originally belonged to one Bouribandhu Shadangi who obtained them by a registered partition deed dated 9-10-1911 executed between himself and his brothers. Bouribandhu was alleged to have mortgaged the suit properties on 3-3-1914 to one Satyabadi Hota who brought a mortgage suit and obtained sale of the same on 1-10-1929 (Ext. 3) in Execution Case No. 924 of 1928. He was alleged to have taken possession on 15-10-1930 (Ext. 6). Satyabadi was said to have remained in possession, as the undivided co-sharer of the disputed properties along with the brother and brother's son of the said Bourihandhu until his sale to the Plaintiff on 13-3-1951. The Plaintiff, therefore, urged that be had obtained title and possession as an undivided co-sharer of the property and as such he was entitled to partition. 3. The main contest was by the descendants of the brothers of Bouribandhu. They alleged that the Plaintiff was never in possession of the properties even as an undivided co-sharer. They further urged that Bouribandhu died on 26-11-1928 during the pendency of the execution proceeding (Execution Case No. 924 of 1928) arising out of the mortgage decree and as admittedly his legal representatives were not brought on record the sale in favour of Satyabadi was void and consequently Satyabadi could not have had any valid title to convey to the Plaintiff by his deed of 1951. 4. The finding of both the lower Courts which is not challenged is that by the partition deed of 9-10-1911, Bouribandhu merely effected severance of joint family status with his other coparcener and that there was no actual partition by metes and bounds. The most important question for consideration, therefore, is whether the Plaintiff's vendor Satyabadi obtained valid title to Bouribandhu's interest by virtue of the mortgage decree and sale and delivery of possession. The sale certificate is dated 1-10-1929 in which Bouribandhu is shown as the judgment-debtor but the Defendant's case is that Bouribandhu had died on 26-11-1928 and his legal representatives were not substituted in the execution petition. The sale certificate is dated 1-10-1929 in which Bouribandhu is shown as the judgment-debtor but the Defendant's case is that Bouribandhu had died on 26-11-1928 and his legal representatives were not substituted in the execution petition. The question therefore is whether in such circumstances the sale is a nullity. The point is covered by ample authorities. 5. As early as 1914, in the when known case of Raghunath Das v. Sundardas AIR 1914 P.C. 129 it was held that the failure to serve notice under old Section 248 (corresponding to Order 21, Rule 22) of the CPC will render the execution proceeding void. But where, apart from the failure to serve such notice there is also an omission to bring on record the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor, as required by Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure, the authorities are unanimous that further execution proceeding will be void. Thus in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Kanchamalai Pathar Vs. Ry. Shahaji Rajah Sahib (deceased) and Others, it was held that Section 50 CPC notwithstanding the permissive nature of the language, is mandatory. In Ajab Lal Dubey and Another Vs. Hari Charan Tewari @ Hari Tewari and Others, the aforesaid Full Bench decision was followed and it was held by a Full Bench (by a majority) that a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree after the death of the judgment-debtor, but without notice to the legal representatives, is void as against the legal representatives. The Calcutta High Court also in a Full Bench decision, reported in AIR 961 Cal 336 adopted the same view and observed that the invalidity of such a sale is irrespective of the stage of execution proceeding in which the judgment-debtor might have died. 6. Mr. Mohapatra relied on Ramsaran Sah and Others Vs. Deonandan Singh and Others. But in that case the judgment-debtor had not died and hence the question of substitution of legal representatives or compliance with Section 50, CPC did not arise. 7. 6. Mr. Mohapatra relied on Ramsaran Sah and Others Vs. Deonandan Singh and Others. But in that case the judgment-debtor had not died and hence the question of substitution of legal representatives or compliance with Section 50, CPC did not arise. 7. It is true that Order 21, Rule 22, CPC was amended by the Patna High Court on 14-5-1947 by the insertion of Sub-rule (3) to that rule and the addition of a new Rule (22-A) in consequence of which the omission to issue notice under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC or even to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor at a later stage in the execution proceedings becomes only an irregularity which, in the absence of prejudice, will not invalidate the sale. But the question for consideration is whether this amendment should be given wide restrospective effect so as to apply to all transactions which were completely closed long before the amendment came into operation. It is true that as the amendment deals with a procedural matter and as no litigant has vested right to a particular form of procedure the amendment will have limited retrospective effect so as to affect pending proceedings. But to extend such retrospective effect so as to apply to closed transactions there must be clear language in the amendment itself. Mr. Mohapatra relied on Mobarak Ali Vs. Dinabandhu Sahu and Others, but in that case the execution case was actually pending when the amendment came into force. The sale had taken place on 5-5-1947, and ordinarily at least one month should elapse before a sale is confirmed In the meantime the amendment came into force on 14-5-1947 and the learned Judges rightly held that the amendment would have retrospective effect so far as the sale in question was concerned. On the other hand in Balaram v. Rasananda 21 C.L.T. 226 ; ILR 1954 Cutt 629 the aforesaid Orissa decision was distinguished and it was held that a vested right cannot be taken away by a procedural amendment and that the invalidity of the sale could not be affected by any subsequent amendment made to Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure. 8. This principle will apply directly here. There was actually no proceeding pending in respect of the execution when the amendment came into force in 1947. 8. This principle will apply directly here. There was actually no proceeding pending in respect of the execution when the amendment came into force in 1947. The sale and delivery of possession had all been completed before 1930. It will not be proper, therefore, on any principle of statutory construction to give such wide retrospective effect by construction to a procedural amendment in the absence of express language in the amendment itself. 9. Mr. Mohapatra then contended that there is no legal evidence to show that Bouribandhu died on 26-11-1928. It is true that the oral evidence about the actual date of death of Bouribandhu consisted of the unsatisfactory evidence of the Plaintiff and also that of the present Choukidar of the village, namely Uchhab Malik (d.w. 1) and one Raghunath Misra (d.w. 2). The trial Court was not prepared to accept the oral testimony of these witnesses, but held that the entry in the Choukidar's Hath Chitta (Ext. G-1)(Death Register), showing the date of death of Bouribandhu as 6-11-1928 was sufficient to show that the said Bouribandhu died on that date. The Village Choukidar in whose custody the Hath Chitta is kept and who produced the same is Uchhab Malik (d.w. 1). This witness admitted that his father was the previous Choukidar before he succeeded him on 13-6-1933 as stated by d.w. 2. 10. The question of law which arises for consideration therefore is whether an entry in the Choukidari Hath Chitta produced from proper custody is admissible in evidence when the Choukidar on whose statement it was made is dead and the writer of the entry namely Biswanath Misra is also dead. It is true that mere proof of the entry will not suffice to show that the judgment-debtor Bouribandhu died on a particular date. Here, however, the entry not only shows the name of Bouribandhu but also that of his father. Though, in a village there may be two persons bearing the same name it is highly improbable that the names of their fathers also would be identical. The Plaintiff has led no evidence to show that there were two Bouribandhu Sarangis in the village and that the names of their fathers were also similar. Hence the identity of the person reported as dead in Ext. G-1 with the Judgment-debtor Bouribandhu is established satisfactorily. The Plaintiff has led no evidence to show that there were two Bouribandhu Sarangis in the village and that the names of their fathers were also similar. Hence the identity of the person reported as dead in Ext. G-1 with the Judgment-debtor Bouribandhu is established satisfactorily. There is no doubt that the Choukidari Hath Chitta is a public document and the Choukidar also is a public servant who is bound, by law, to ascertain and report about the death of persons within his jurisdiction. This duty is cast on him by Clause 7 of Section 39 of the Village Choukidari Act, 1870 and as Choukidars are generally illiterate, Clause (b) of Rule 126 of the Police Manual authorises them to get the entries in the Hath Chitta made by some educated person. I may quote that clause in full. In such police stations it shall be the duty of the Village Choukidar to report all deaths and births (the latter where registration is enforced) occurring within their beats, at the time of their periodical reports. They shall be supplied with Hath Chitta Palaparthi Ramamurthi Vs. Palaparthi Subba Rao and Others, and shall get them filled in by some educated person. It is true that there is no direct evidence to show that the father of Uchhab Malik was an illiterate person. But Uchhab Malik admitted that he is illiterate and the aforesaid provision in the Police Manual itself implies that the Choukidars are generally illiterate. Hence arose the necessity for making a provision authorising Choukidars to get the entries made by an educated pen on. It may therefore, be reasonably inferred that Uchhab Malik's father was also an illiterate person and must have sought the help of some educated person (Biswanath Misra,) to make the entries in the Hath Chitta from time to time. 2. But the illegal question still remains as to whether the entry (ext G-l) made by a deceased person (here Biswanath Misra) is admissible in evidence. The relevant provision in the Evidence Act bearing on this point is Sub-section (2) of Section 32 which may quote below written or verbal, made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts in the following cases. The relevant provision in the Evidence Act bearing on this point is Sub-section (2) of Section 32 which may quote below written or verbal, made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts in the following cases. (1)...(2) When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business. The latter portion of this clause namely, when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business would directly apply in the present case Ext. G-l is admittedly a written report of a dead person. It is also not challenged that a Hath Chitta is maintained in the ordinary course of business by a Village Choukidar with the assistance of some educated person. It was accordingly urged by counsel for the other side that an entry made by a dead person in a book maintained in the ordinary course of business would be admissible u/s 32(2) of the Evidence Act. Mr. Mohapatra however contended with considerable ingenuity that the person 'it' in the aforesaid clause refer not only to the statement mentioned in the earlier portion of that clause but that it includes only the statement made by such person in the ordinary course of business. According to him, therefore, the written statement of the dead person would be admissible only if the following conditions are fulfilled (1) the statement itself must have been made by him in the ordinary course of business and (ii) the entry must have been made in the books kept in the ordinary course of business. 13. In my opinion this argument is too far-fetched. If a book is maintained in the ordinary course of business every entry made therein-whether by one individual or by several persons-must also be held to have been made in the ordinary course of business, so long as those entries deal with matters which are required to be entered in that book. Here when Biswanath Misra made the entry Ext. If a book is maintained in the ordinary course of business every entry made therein-whether by one individual or by several persons-must also be held to have been made in the ordinary course of business, so long as those entries deal with matters which are required to be entered in that book. Here when Biswanath Misra made the entry Ext. G-l in the Hath Chitta, in pursuance of the authority given to him by the aforesaid rule in the Police Manual, it-must be held that the entry was made by him in the ordinary course of business though there is no evidence to show whether he made other entries in the Hath Chitta at the request of the Choukidar. It was pointed out by the Madras High Court in Palaparthi Ramamurthi Vs. Palaparthi Subba Rao and Others, . In the course of business as I understand it means in the way that a business (which may be of a trivial and private nature) is conducted. It has no connection with a course of business which suggests a series of acts of business. It was on this principle that the learned Judge, in that case, admitted in evidence one letter written by a husband to his wife, even though there was no evidence that he wrote similar letters to her in the past. The aforesaid decision is therefore authority for the view that it is not necessary to prove that the entry made by Biswanath Misra was one of a series of entries made by him in the Hath Chitta. The English law regarding the admissibility of evidence in such cases may be slightly different but as pointed out by Sarkar in his Evidence Act, Tenth Edition at page 330 the various restrictions imposed in the English law of evidence have not been retained in Section 32(2) of the Indian Evidence Act. One cannot, therefore, obtain guidance from English decisions and must confine ones if to the actual language used in that clause. 14. It may, in this connection, refer to an American decision Palaparthi Ramamurthi Vs. Palaparthi Subba Rao and Others, cited at page 374, Article 1525, of Wigmore on Evidence Third Edition Vol. V. There the question for consideration was whether a written report made by one Dr. Stilling (since dead) the surgeon of the Defendant company was admissible in evidence. 14. It may, in this connection, refer to an American decision Palaparthi Ramamurthi Vs. Palaparthi Subba Rao and Others, cited at page 374, Article 1525, of Wigmore on Evidence Third Edition Vol. V. There the question for consideration was whether a written report made by one Dr. Stilling (since dead) the surgeon of the Defendant company was admissible in evidence. Though there was evidence to show that there was an established practice of the Defendant's surgeon examining the injuries suffered brits employees there was no evidence to disclose the number and frequency of such entries made by the Defendant's Surgeon in general or by Dr. Stilling in particular. The learned Judge) observed. The degree of regularity goes only to its weight as evidence in support of the trustworthiness of the recorded statement. This principle may well apply here because here also there is no evidence about the number of entries made by the deceased Biswanath Misra in the Hath Chitta at the instance of the deceased Choukidar. 15. It is also not necessary that the writer who made the entry should have personal knowledge of the contents of the entry. This position is well settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sitaji and Others Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary and Others, where it was held that the entries in a Panji maintained by Panjikars of Naithal Brahmins about the ancestors of various families are admissible in evidence when the writers are all dead even though their knowledge of the ancestry was based on statements made to them by other unknown persons. Hence, even though there is, no direct evidence that Biswanath Misra had personal knowledge of the date of death of Bouribandhu Sarangi, neverthless the entry Ext. (G-1) would be admissible u/s 32(2) of the Evidence Act. 16. There is also no reason to doubt the correctness of the entry. There is no material to show that in 1928 there was any controversy about the date of death of Bouribandhu or else that anyone was interested in giving a false date about his death. Hence Ext. G-l should be given great importance as proving the date of death of Bouribandhu. 17. I may now refer to certain decisions regarding the admissibility of the entries in the Hath Chitta, referred to by Mr. Mohapatra. Hence Ext. G-l should be given great importance as proving the date of death of Bouribandhu. 17. I may now refer to certain decisions regarding the admissibility of the entries in the Hath Chitta, referred to by Mr. Mohapatra. In Sampat v. Gourishankar 10 I.C. 713 the question of the applicability of Section 32(2) of the Evidence Act did not arise and the whole dispute was with regard to the applicability of Section 35 of that Act. In Jiwan Bakhsh v. Khan Bahadur Khan 19 I.C. 528 the entry in a Municipal register regarding the date of death of a person was held to be inadmissible because there was no evidence as to who, made those entries or as to who was responsible for keeping the register or on whose information the entries were made. Here, however, in respect of all these matters, not only is there clear evidence, but there is a statutory rule in support of the same. In 2 Patna Law Journal 42 the entry in the Hath Chitta was held not admissible u/s 32(2) obviously because the writer of the entry was alive and gave evidence. The learned Judges therefore held that the entry being there the previous statement in writing would be admissible u/s 157 or 159 of the Evidence Act. This principle has been followed in Chandramma v. Ramgayan AIR 1922 Pat 3. The report is not clear as to whether the writer of the entry was alive and whether he gave evidence in Court. The learned Judges moreover did not decide this question finally. In 11 C.L.T. 40, there was no evidence to show who made the entry and under what circumstances. The Choukidar at whose instance the entries must have been made gave evidence in Court but he was unable to give the date of death of the person in question. In Nanda Kishore v. Gouromoni C.L.R. 1962 Cutt. 409 there was no evidence as to who made the entry in the Hath Chitta and also there was no evidence regarding the identity of the person referred to in that entry. In AIR 1944 58 (Lahore) it was held that the account books showing the entries made by a deceased person may be admissible u/s 32(2) of the Evidence Act have also seen the recent judgment of the Supreme Court Brij Mohan Singh v. Priyabrat Narain Sinha and Ors. In AIR 1944 58 (Lahore) it was held that the account books showing the entries made by a deceased person may be admissible u/s 32(2) of the Evidence Act have also seen the recent judgment of the Supreme Court Brij Mohan Singh v. Priyabrat Narain Sinha and Ors. C.A. No. 9 of 1964 where an entry of a birth in the Hath Chitta of a Choukidar who was illiterate and made by a person since dead, was held to be inadmissible u/s 35 of the Evidence Act. The Choukidar was, however, alive and gave evidence before the Tribunal. Hence their Lordships had no occasion to consider the applicability of Sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. 18. The distinguishing features in the present case are that in Ext. G-l: (1) the identity of the dead person has been established clearly from the full description of his name, his father's name and the name of the village in the entry itself and the absence of any evidence to show that there is any other person bearing the same and parentage in the village (ii) the writer of the entry and the Choukidar on whose information the entry was made are both dead. (iii) the Hath Chitta is required to be maintained in the ordinary course of business and also as a part of the statutory duty and (iv) the Village Choukidar being generally an illiterate person is authorised to take the help of an educated person in making the entries from time to time. Hence when such an educated person helps the Choukidar in that manner he is also making the entry in the ordinary course of business. 19. For these reasons I would hold that Ext. G-1 is admissible in evidence and the two lower Courts did not commit any error of law in relying on that entry and in holding that Bouribandhu died on the 26th November, 1928. The appeal falls and is dismissed with costs. Das, J. 20. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed