JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against the appellate judgment of the Sessions Judge of Mayurbhanj-Keonjhar, maintaining the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 6(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act 37 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- passed on him by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Keonjhar. 2. The Petitioner owns a grocery shop at Dhenkanal Hat. The Food Inspector of Soso Range (p.w. 1) inspected his shop on 6-6-1962 and took samples of mustard oil there from. One of the samples was sealed and handed over to the Petitioner and another was sent to the Public Analyst at Cuttack and a third sample was kept in the office of the Food Inspector. The report of the Public Analyst (ext. 2) shows that the results of the analysis were as follows: Table missing File No. OR640149 The Public Analyst therefore certified that the sample was adulterated. On the basis of his opinion, and the evidence of the Food Inspector and other prosecution witnesses the Petitioner was convicted and sentenced as stated above. The prosecution was sanctioned by the District Health Officer. Keonjhar. 3. Mr. Asok Das raised the following two contentions in support of this revision petition: (i) The sanction given by the District Health Officer is not a valid sanction in law. (ii) The Public Analyst's report (ext. 2) is not in strict conformity with the statutory requirements and hence it cannot be held conclusively that the mustard oil was adulterated. 4. Clause (viii) of Section 2 of the Act defines a 'local authority' as follows: 'Local authority' means in the case of: (1) a local area which is a (a) municipality, the municipal board or municipal corporation; (b) a cantonment, the cantonment authority; (c) a notified area, the notified area committee; (2) any other local area, such authority as may be prescribed by the State Government under this Act; "Sub-clause (1) of this clause has obviously no application here because the 'Hat' was not a local area as defined in that sub-clause. Sub-clause (2) alone is applicable. That sub-clause confers power on the State Government, by Rules, to specify who shall be deemed to be the local authority for the purpose of the Act in any mofussil area. Sub-clause (2) alone is applicable. That sub-clause confers power on the State Government, by Rules, to specify who shall be deemed to be the local authority for the purpose of the Act in any mofussil area. In exercise of this power the Government of Orissa in the Health Department by their notification No. 14170 H dated 30th November, 1959, made Rules known as the Orissa Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1959. Rule 12 of the said Rules is as follows: "Local authority" means in the case of a local area in a particular Revenue district which is not a municipality or notified area The District Health Officer of that district. It will thus be seen that by virtue of Rule 12 of the said Orissa Rules the District Health Officer must be deemed to be the local authority for the purposes of the Act also, in a mofussil area, and hence as the sanction was given by the local authority the requirements of the mandatory provisions of Section 20(i) of the Act have been complied with. Mr. Das however made a distinction between "local authority" on the one hand and a "person" on the other and urged that the two expressions must have different meanings in view of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act which says that no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the State Government or local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government, or the local authority. According to him, if Sub-section (i) of Section 20 of the Act is construed along with the definition of 'local authority' given in Section 2(viii) of the Act, the reasonable interpretation would be that the expression 'local authority' cannot include a human being but must refer to some non-human being such as a municipality or notified area or any other body (incorporated or not). According to Mr. Das therefore a District Health Officer being a human being will not be a 'local authority' for the purposes of the Act though he may be a 'person' who may be authorised by a local authority. 5. In my opinion this contention cannot prevail. According to Mr. Das therefore a District Health Officer being a human being will not be a 'local authority' for the purposes of the Act though he may be a 'person' who may be authorised by a local authority. 5. In my opinion this contention cannot prevail. In the definition of the expression 'local authority' given in Clause (viii) of Section 2 there are no limiting words to the effect that that expression cannot include a human being also. On the other hand, Sub-clause (2) of that clause authorised the state Government by rules to define who shall be the local authority in a mofussil area. This rule making power is made very wide and in exercise of that power the State Government by rule have stated that all District Health Officers shall be deemed to be 'local authorities' within their respective jurisdictions. The "person" referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act is one who is different from the "local authority" as defined in the Act and in the Rules made by the State Government. That local authority is given power to authorise a particular person to sanction the prosecution for offences under the Act. In other words, it will be open to the District Health Officer as 'local authority' to authorise any person to sanction prosecution. But so far as he is concerned his power is derived from the rules made by the State Government defining him as the local authority for the purposes of the Act in a mofussil area. In my opinion, therefore, there was no invalidity in the taking of cognizance of the offence against the Petitioner as prosecution W8.S sanctioned by a local authority as defined in the Act. I now take up the second contention of Mr. Das. Rule 5 of the Prevention of Adulteration Rules, 1955, made by the Union Government, says that the standards of quality of the various articles of food have been specified in appendix B of theme Rules. A. 17.06 of that appendix says that mustard oil shall conform to the following standards: (a) Bu But refractometer reading at 40?0-58.0 to 60.5. (b) Saponification value-168 to 176 (c) Iodine value--96 to 108 (d) Unsaponific matter not more than 1.2 per cent (e) Bellier's (Turbity) test by Ever's method (acetic acid)-not more than 26.5?C) The test for argemone oil should be negative. (b) Saponification value-168 to 176 (c) Iodine value--96 to 108 (d) Unsaponific matter not more than 1.2 per cent (e) Bellier's (Turbity) test by Ever's method (acetic acid)-not more than 26.5?C) The test for argemone oil should be negative. I have already quoted earlier the relevant extract from the certificate of the Public Analyst. 'It will be noticed that though the butyro refractometer reading and the iodine value of the sample are within the standard prescribed in the aforesaid appendix the saponific value is slightly in excess. Similarly, Bellier's test showed 31?C whereas according to the statutory standard it ought to be 25.5?C. Mr. Das contended however that the statutory standard required for the Bellier's test should be made by Ever's method (acetic acid) but as the certificate (ext. 2) does not expressly state that the said Bellier's test was made by Ever's method the certificate should be held to be defective. It would certainly have been much better if the public analyst had incorporated in the certificate (ext. 2) an the particulars required to be given in A. 17.06 hut the expression Bellier's test when used by the Public Analyst who is presumed to know A. 17.06 would ordinarily mean Bellier's test by Ever's method as required by the statutory provisions. If there is any doubt on that point it was open to the Petitioner to ask the Court to summon the Public Analyst with a view to cross-examine him, but it appears from the records of the lower Court that the certificate of the Public Analyst was not challenged before him. 7. Mr. Das further contended that the statutory provision requires that there should be a test for argemone oil which should be found to be negative. The certificate however does not show that this test, "as applied to the sample analysed. In my opinion, even if this test was not applied once it is found that saponific value and the Bellier's test show that the sample was not in conformity with statutory requirements, the opinion of the analyst that the oil was adulterated must be accepted. Non-conformity with the requirements in respect of any of the tests laid down in A. 17.06 is itself sufficient to show that the oil is not of the standard purity required by the statute. I see therefore no illegality in the certificate given by the Public Analyst (ext. 2). 8. Non-conformity with the requirements in respect of any of the tests laid down in A. 17.06 is itself sufficient to show that the oil is not of the standard purity required by the statute. I see therefore no illegality in the certificate given by the Public Analyst (ext. 2). 8. It was then contended that there was undue delay in getting the sample analysed. The sample was seized on 6th June, 1962 whereas it was analysed by the Public Analyst only on 3rd April, 1963-more than ten months Later. Mr. Das urged that during this long interval the mustard oil in the sample might have deteriorated due to physical and chemical changes. This argument also does not convince me. If the oil is likely to deteriorate due to the long interval it was open to the Petitioner to put the necessary question to the Food Inspector during his cross-examination. But no such question was put to him. It may therefore be reasonably inferred that the mustard oil in the sample was not likely to deteriorate due to lapse of time. As regards the sentence also I see no reason for reducing it is view of the wide prevalence of adulteration-especially in respect of an edible oil like mustard oil which is in very common use here. The conviction and sentence are therefore maintained and the revision petition is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed