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1964 DIGILAW 145 (PAT)

Mt. Rampyari Kuer v. Dulhin Bachuraj Kuer

1964-10-03

A.B.N.SINHA, H.MAHAPATRA

body1964
Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. The appellant brought a suit for recovery of possession on partition of her half share in the properties described in the plaint, after setting aside the deeds of transfer executed by her mother and sister in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 24 for want of legal necessity and consideration. She also claimed mesne profits in respect of her share in the properties till she gets possession. 2. Udit Narain Singh had two daughters and one son. Plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are the two daughters. The son is dead and his widow is Mt. Dhanraj Kuer. Udit Narains widow was Jamuna Kuer, mother of plaintiff and defendant No. 1. On the 2nd of June, 1903 a deed of gift was executed by Udit Narain Singh in favour of his wife Jamuna Kuer in respect of all the properties held by him. That was proved as Ex. C in the case in the trial. Jamuna Kuer made several transfers of portions of that property both during the lifetime and after the death of her husband Udit Narain Singh. One of those transfers was on the 14th of May, 1947, a deed of gift in favour of her daughter, defendant No. 1, in regard to all the properties that she held at that time. This document was marked as Ex. C-2, Jamuna Kuer died on the 21st of September 1947. 3. All the transferees including defendant No. 1 were impleaded as defendants to the suit. Three written statements were filed on their behalf. One was of defendants No. 1 to 5, 7 and 9 to 11 which was adopted by defendants No. 12 to 14 and 16 to 18. Two other written statements were by defendant No. 2-a and defendant No. 8. The common defence was that the plaintiff was not the daughter of Udit Narain Singh but she was the daughter of the sister of the deceased Jamuna Kuer; as such she had no loous standi to bring the present suit as she was not an heir to Mt. Jamuna Kuer or Udit Narain Singh. It was also pleaded that Ex. C, the deed of gift, executed in favour of Mt. Jamuna Kuer by her husband gave an absolute estate to her and she was competent to dispose of the property acquired under that deed in any way she liked. 4. Jamuna Kuer or Udit Narain Singh. It was also pleaded that Ex. C, the deed of gift, executed in favour of Mt. Jamuna Kuer by her husband gave an absolute estate to her and she was competent to dispose of the property acquired under that deed in any way she liked. 4. On these pleadings parties went to trial. The suit has been dismissed though the Court has found that the plaintiff is the daughter of Udit Narain Singh and there was no bar of limitation against the suit. The other finding that Ex. C, the deed of gift, conferred absolute ownership on Mt. Jamuna Kuer in respect of all the properties covered by that document non-suited the plaintiff. Against that, is the present appeal by her. 5. There can be little doubt that a female Hindu could acquire absolute ownership over the property that may have been given to her by an absolute owner. There is no presumption that a woman would take only a limited interest in all kinds of properties see Ram Gopal V/s. Nand Lal, AIR 1951 SC 139 ; Nathoo Lal V/s. Durga Prasad, AIR 1954 SC 355 . Before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force, ordinarily what a female Hindu acquired by inheritance, maintenance or the like, she held a Hindu womans estate, that is, an ownership devoid of the right of alienation but for legal necessity. After the 17th June, 1956, even in such properties the female Hindu acquired absolute ownership if she has possessed of such properties at the commencement of the Act. The present case has nothing to do with that Act. The deed of gift (Ex. C) was on the 2nd of June, 1903. If on a proper interpretation of that document, it is found that the intention of the donor, her husband, was to confer upon the donee Mt. Jamuna Kuer an absolute ownership of all the properties conveyed by gift, there would have been no fetters on her powers to dispose of those properties in anyway she liked. That would be binding not only during her lifetime but also after her death on all persons concerned. Unless those transfers were vitiated by fraud, undue influence, coercion or things like that her heir cannot challenge any of those, alienations. That would be binding not only during her lifetime but also after her death on all persons concerned. Unless those transfers were vitiated by fraud, undue influence, coercion or things like that her heir cannot challenge any of those, alienations. Absence of legal necessity or want of consideration would not be causes for any valid challenge by an heir of a full owner in respect of the alienations made by the full owner. In that view, the present plaintiff is bound to fail if the deed of gift is found to have conferred an absolute estate on the donee. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant pressed that the document (Ex. C) taken as a whole can mean only that the donee took the properties as a limited owner like that of a Hindu womans estate. He referred to the passage In the document where the donor said that the donee shall maintain the daughter-in-law and preserve the prestige of the family and not ruin the property and contended that the injunction against ruining the property is not consistent with conferment of the absolute ownership. If the donee was to be the absolute owner, it was certainly open to her to ruin the property if she liked. The words which have been translated as an injunction upon the donee not to ruin the property, read in the context of what preceded before that in the deed, can only mean that the donor wished that the donee should not squander away the property. A transfer by gift or for consideration is not either waste or ruin of the property. If the property was allowed to be sold away for paltry sums at Court auction for default of payment of rent or revenue on account of negligence on the part of the owner that may be an instance of ruin. When the owner converts a property into cash by sale of the same, that cannot be either ruining the property or squandering it. Similarly, if out of love and affection an owner bestows certain properties upon her daughter or a close relation, that again will not amount to ruining the property. Such acts on the part of owner are the usual forms of dealing with ones property and satisfy the sense of ownership. Similarly, if out of love and affection an owner bestows certain properties upon her daughter or a close relation, that again will not amount to ruining the property. Such acts on the part of owner are the usual forms of dealing with ones property and satisfy the sense of ownership. The donor after describing the nature of the property that he was in possession said that from that day the donee will be the absolute owner thereof (Malik). It is true that the mere use of the word "malik" should not be taken in an isolated sense but must be read in the context of other things. The language and tenor of the document, the context and surrounding circumstances in which that document came to be executed are to be taken into account for making out the real intention of the donor. After saying that the donee will become malik or absolute owner, if other restrictions on her enjoyment or power of disposal would have been clamped on her in that document, the intention could have been taken reasonably to be a confirment of a limited ownership; but the position is entirely different as it appears from Ex. C. Lerned counsel referred to the cases of Mahomed Shumstool V/s. Shewukram, 2 Ind. App. 7 (PC), Mangamma V/s. Dorayya, AIR 1937 Mad 100 and Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh V/s. Bakhtraj Kuer, AIR 1953 SC 7 . In those cases the Court interprted particular documents to mean that under them the alienee got only a limited interest in the properties. The terms of those documents and the entailments involved in them in regard to the properties after the death of the donee were the dominating reasons for taking such view of those deeds. The text, tenor and circumstances of a particular document have to decide the nature of the transaction. To me, it appears that Udit Narain Singh wanted to keep the property out of the reaches of his agnates and reversioners. The evidence in the case also indicates such intention to some extent. Mt. Jamuna Kuer was his third wife. It would have been natural for him to see that she was secured in her lifetime in the properties. In the document he said that he was satisfied with the way in which she was looking after the affairs of the family and maintaining its prestige. Mt. Jamuna Kuer was his third wife. It would have been natural for him to see that she was secured in her lifetime in the properties. In the document he said that he was satisfied with the way in which she was looking after the affairs of the family and maintaining its prestige. It is clear that the donor trusted her for future and had the confidence that she would continue her ways and habits in the way she did before the document. In that view it was not unnatural for him to confer an absolute estate on her so that not only she will have an undisputed ownership during her life but also after her, the two daughters of the donor and the donee would inherit the properties to the exclusion of the agnates of the donor. It is significant that though the maintenance of the daughter-in-law was provided for in the deed of gift, no mention was made about the maintenance or marriage of the two daughters. That could only be for the reason that the donee was trusted to look after them in the best way possible. For all these reasons and more particularly on the text of the document as a whole, I am clear in my view that Mt. Jamuna Kuer obtained absolute ownership over the properties conveyed to her under Ex. C by her husband. 7. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs in this Court. A.B.N.Sinha, J. 8 I agree.