Judgment :- 1. In this Second Appeal by the judgment-debtor, the only question for determination is whether the execution petition dated the 15th January 1959, is barred by limitation or not. The previous execution petition was dismissed on the 8th December, 1955. This was more than three years before the present execution petition was filed. Under S. 3(1) of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958, "no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made against any agriculturist in any court before the expiry of six months from the commencement of this Act" and S.20 has provided, that "in computing the period of limitation for an application for the execution of a decree in respect of a debt, the time during which the making of the application was barred under S.3 shall be excluded". If this period were excluded the present execution petition was within time. The fact that the appellant is an agriculturist was not disputed, but it was contended that the respondent-decree-holder is a Banking Company, that the debt due to it exceeded Rs. 1500/-, was incurred under a single transaction and was due before the commencement of this Act, and that therefore it is not a debt within the purview of the definition of that term in S.2 of the Act. This definition excludes a liability of the above category due to a Banking Company. It was further contended, that the word 'debt' in S.3 must be understood in the sense of the definition. The argument is no doubt plausible, but in my opinion cannot be sustained. The exclusion of a debt of the above category due to a Banking Company is enacted in clause (xi) of S.2(c) of the Act, but there is a proviso to it which reads: . "Provided that in the case of any debt exceeding one thousand five hundred rupees borrowed under a single transaction and due before the commencement of this Act to any banking company as defined in the Banking Companies Act, 1949, any agriculturist debtor shall be entitled to repay such debt in eight equal half yearly instalments as provided by sub-s. (3) of S.4 ...." The two courts below have based their decision in favour of the respondent on this proviso, holding that the respondent's debt, notwithstanding the exclusion in clause (xi), is within the meaning of the term. As contended for the appellant, clause (xi) is not so restricted and the proviso may be viewed as an enabling provision intended for the discharge of such a liability in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of S. 4, even though it is not a debt stricto sensu. 2. Mr. M.K. Narayana Menon who kindly acted as amicus curiae has placed before me another consideration, which I think must prevail. Under S.4 sub-section (3) the first instalment of the debt is payable at any time before the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Act. It is apparent, that the object underlying S.3 is that no agriculturist shall be harassed by any execution proceeding during this interval. In this manner, S.3 may be said to be related to S.4. If by reason of the proviso to clause (xi), S.4(3) is applicable also to the debt now in question, it is quite clear that the legislative intent was to extend the benefit of S.3 to such a debt as well. This legislative intent does clash with the strict definition of the term "debt" in S.2(c). But S.2 opens with the words "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires". So, if in the light of the legislative intent the ' context requires that the word "debt" in S.3 should be interpreted differently as applicable to a liability of this nature, then the opening words afford ample scope for such an interpretation being accepted. The following observations of the Full Bench in Kurien v. Saramma Chacko 1964 KLT.1 may be quoted: "In interpreting statutes the legislative intent has to be gathered by reading all the provisions of the statute including the interpretation or the definition clause. By so reading the entire statute if the legislative intent is not clear, courts have merely to interpret the words used strictly grammatically, without reference to the consequence of the interpretation. But, if it is possible to gather the intent of the legislature and if it is then found that such legislative intent cannot be given effect because of the legislative definition, the legislative intent must prevail over the legislative definition and the latter should not be allowed to control the former. But, if it is possible to gather the intent of the legislature and if it is then found that such legislative intent cannot be given effect because of the legislative definition, the legislative intent must prevail over the legislative definition and the latter should not be allowed to control the former. This must all the more be so in cases where the definition clause opens with the words "subject to the context to the contrary", or "unless the context otherwise requires", or expression similar in effect." To me, it appears that the intent of the legislature underlying S.3 of the Act is fairly clear, that the bar against execution, must apply to all those cases in which the benefit of S.4 sub-section (3) can be claimed, and if so, the period of the bar has to be excluded. This being the legislative intent must prevail over the legislative definition especially in the face of the opening words quoted above. For this reason, though not for the reasons stated by the two courts below, I come to the conclusion that the execution petition was within time. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. I thank Mr. M.K. Narayana Menon for his able assistance. Leave to appeal granted. Dismissed.