Judgment :- 1. The respondent held a prior hypothecation and obtained a decree thereon, without impleading the appellant who held a subsequent hypothecation and in execution of the decree, purchased the hypotheca and went into possession. The appellant also put her hypothecation in suit, impleading the respondent as the 2nd defendant and obtained the decree in execution of which this second appeal has arisen. In the suit by the appellant, the decree of the court of first instance was for the realisation of the amount from the property, but it was modified in several respects by the decree of the High Court dated the 15th February, 1956, passed in second appeal. This was the background in which the High Court passed the decree. The purchase by the respondent in execution did not bind the appellant, who was free to enforce her hypothecation, but as the purchaser of the equity of redemption, the respondent had the right to pay off the amount of the appellant's hypothecation, failing which he had to submit to redemption by her. Clause.6 of the decree of the High Court declared the right of the appellant to redeem the property on payment of the prior charge, and Clause.7 declared the right of the respondent to retain the property for himself on payment to the appellant of the amount of her charge including interest. Clause.11 with which this appeal is directly concerned, is as follows:- "that the second defendant will have to elect either to pay the plaintiff the sum of four hundred and eighty-two rupees (Rs. 482 0 0) and interest thereon at the rate of four per cent per annum from the fifteenth Meenom 1117 M. E. not exceeding a moiety of the principal or to surrender possession of the plaint schedule property on receipt of seven hundred and fifty rupees (Rs. 750 0 0) and the value of improvements, if any, effected by him on the plaint schedule property." When the appellant took steps for executing the decree, the respondent filed a petition on the 13th January, 1959, thereby electing in terms of Clause.11 to pay the appellant, but requesting that he may be allowed to do so in instalments under the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (Act 31 of 1958). The appellant then contended, that under the decree of the High Court, the liability of the respondent to pay the amount was contingent upon the respondent's electing to pay the appellant, or to surrender the property, that the liability became a debt only when he made his election and that till then there was no debt as defined in S.2 (c) of Act 31 of 1958. The relevant part of that definition is as follows: "'debt' means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from or incurred by an agriculturist on or before the commencement of this Art, whether payable under a contract or under a decree or order of any Court, or otherwise...." On the terms of the decree of the High Court, until the respondent made his election, whatever liability there was on his part remained contingent. The respondent might choose to surrender possession of the property and receive payment from the appellant, in which case, the liability would be that of the appellant and not his. According to Black's Law Dictionary,'a contingent liability' means "one which is not now fixed and absolute, but which will become so in case of the occurrence of some future and uncertain event". This is an apt description of the nature of the liability of the respondent under the decree of the High Court. According to the same Dictionary, "a sum of money which is certainly and in all events payable is a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency, however, is not a debt, or does not become a debt until the contingency has happened. People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. 524." The following passage in 26 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 4, is worth reproducing: "Every debt must be either solvendum in praesenti, or solvendum in futuro must be certainly, and in all events, payable; whenever it is uncertain whether anything will ever be demand able by virtue of the contract, it cannot be called 'a debt', since debt is a liquidated demand the payment of which is not dependent on the happening of any contingency or the performance of any condition. While the sum of money may be payable upon a contingency, yet in such case it becomes a debt only when the contingency has happened, the term debt being opposed to 'liability' when used in the sense of an inchoate or contingent debt." On such authority, I find little difficulty in coming to the conclusion, that the respondent's liability under the decree was contingent until election and was not a debt amenable to the provisions of Act 31 of 1958, for discharge by payment in instalments. 2. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent was two-fold, first, that the decree of the High Court only restored or affirmed with modifications the decree of the first court, which was for the realisation by the appellant of the amount due to her from the hypotheca and second, that the respondent's liability arose and was related to the hypothecation in favour of the appellant and though payable now under decree of court, it had been incurred before the date of the Act. It seems to me, that both these arguments have to fail. Though the decree of the first court was restored by the High Court subject to modifications, these were so extensive as to supersede the unconditional liability under the decree of the first court, that it is now incumbent on the court, to determine the character of the liability solely by the terms of the High Court decree. 3. The second is no doubt an ingenious argument. It may be taken, that to constitute a debt as defined, the liability need not necessarily be personal and may arise out of a nexus with property and relate to it. Even so, as a prior hypothecate, no liability of the respondent can be traced to the appellant's hypothecation. After the purchase by the respondent in execution of his decree, he stepped into the shoes of the owner of the equity of redemption and it is only in that capacity, that his interests would be affected by any proceeding taken by the appellant. Even then, the respondent had the right to stand by his rights as a prior hypothecate without paying the appellant, leaving it to her to redeem him. Such in the nature of his liability. Subsequently, the rights and obligations of the parties became crystallised by the decree of the High Court. Even then, the respondent had the right to stand by his rights as a prior hypothecate without paying the appellant, leaving it to her to redeem him. Such in the nature of his liability. Subsequently, the rights and obligations of the parties became crystallised by the decree of the High Court. Assuming that there was an original liability of some form or character in the respondent, as to which I am by no means sure, that liability became superseded by the decree of the High Court. For the application of Act 31 of 1958, the crucial thing to consider, is the liability, if any, on the date of the Act under the decree which was passed earlier. I am therefore of the opinion, that after the passing of the decree by the High Court, the liability of the respondent remained contingent until he elected by his petition to make payment to the appellant. This liability was not a debt, as defined. The respondent is not therefore entitled to the benefit of Act 31 of 1958. 4. In the result, the prayer of the respondent to allow the benefit of Act 31 of 1958 is dismissed and this Second Appeal is allowed with costs here and in the court below. Allowed.